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A … model for improving security may be the Y2K bug. Facing the threat of widespread 
computer meltdowns at the millennium, industry mobilized to change business practices 
and governments passed laws requiring Y2K certification for tech gear. Companies 
underwent massive campaigns to make certain they complied because they didn't want to 
be held liable for damages. The Securities & Exchange Commission required 
corporations to provide details of their Y2K efforts in quarterly earnings reports.  
 —Sager, I., & Greene, J., Business Week 
If we could do it this time, why not do it next time and every time? In many companies, 
success with Y2K could become the role model for success in all future IT [information 
technology] projects. 
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TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
 
In order to stabilize various uses of terms throughout the Delta documentation, 
this list serves to define and / or clarify terminology for purposes of this research. Official 
definitions are excerpted from a number of sources.1 
A&P license Airframe and Powerplant License 
 The A&P license, issued by the FAA, certifies aircraft mechanics for 
performing maintenance operations. The airframe is the aircraft body; the 
powerplant is the engine. 
 
AAAC Airlines Airport Affairs Committee 
 AAAC refers to a group that facilitates cooperative arrangements between 
airlines and airports. (AAAC is a generic term.) 
 
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
 ACARS is a datalink system that enables ground stations (airports, aircraft 
maintenance bases, etc.) and commercial aircraft to communicate data, such as 
fuel quantity, weight on wheels, FMS, etc. 
 
ACAS  Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems 
 ACAS is an electronic means for detecting other aircraft, designed to help 
avoid midair collisions. The ACAS provides a backup to visual search and the 
ATC system. However, threat aircraft must be equipped with an ICAO-
compliant altitude reporting transponder, not universally required as of 2007. 
 
ACC Airport Coordination Center 
 The ACC is the main tactical command center for daily operation in Delta’s 
hubs and strategic stations, providing support for local station operation, and 
coordination with the OCC/ATL. ACC employees are responsible for 
coordination, communication, service delivery, and recovery to Delta’s 
passengers when unexpected irregularities arise.  
 
ACI-NA  Airports Council International - North America 
 ACI-NA is the largest of the six worldwide regions of Airports Council 
International (ACI), an organization of airports worldwide. ACI-NA airport 
members enplane 95% of all domestic and virtually all international airline 
passenger and cargo traffic in North America. ACI-NA promotes cooperation 
with the commercial civil aviation industry in order to exchange ideas, 
information, and experiences on common airport issues. (http://www.aci-
na.org/). 
 
                                                 
1 Airline industry-specific terms from Jones (1998), Delta Air Lines (2006), and websites of airline 
industry and government organizations. Information security terms from “Glossary of Key Information 
Security Terms,” (2006). 
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ACM Asset Compliance Management 
 ACM was the process for tracking, controlling, and monitoring of assets 
through the four phases of Delta’s Year 2000 program. It was the process that 
determined if an asset was Y2K ready, and for those items found not ready, the 
process for getting them ready (Delta archive, 1998, p. 2). 
 
ACP  Airline Control Program 
 ACP was renamed “Transaction Processing Facility” (TPF). See TPF. 
 
ACS Airport Customer Service 
 ACS is the Delta business area that included the following activities: airport 
ticketing, skycap services, gate and boarding processes, loading and unloading 
of aircraft, baggage service, cabin cleaning, cargo handling and shipping, pre-
board security screening, and the ACC at hubs (ramp tower). 
 
ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone 
 The U.S. and Canada jointly administer the ADIZ, which is almost entirely 
over water. The area serves as a national defense boundary for air traffic over 
North America. Any aircraft flying in or through the boundary must have filed 
either a Defense Visual Flight Rules (DVFR) flight plan or an Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR) flight plan before crossing the ADIZ. 
 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
 An ADS-B signal broadcasts directly from aircraft, enabling the location of 
aircraft by a 1090 MHz receiver. 
 
AFA-CWA Association of Flight Attendants, CWA (AFL-CIO) 
 The AFA-CWA (affiliated with the Communications Workers of America) is 
the world's largest labor union (over 55,000 flight attendants at 20 airlines), and 
organized by flight attendants for flight attendants. AFA represents flight 
attendants at their workplace, in the industry, in the media and on Capitol Hill. 
The goal of AFA-CWA is to negotiate better pay, benefits, working conditions, 
and work rules for flight attendants at their respective airlines, and to improve 
safety on the job (http://www.afanet.org/). 
 
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
 The AFL-CIO is a voluntary federation of American unions. The membership 
of the AFL-CIO organization comprises fifty-two unions, and represents more 
than 9 million workers nationwide. 
 
ADA Airline Deregulation Act: signed into law by President Carter in 1978.  
 The ADA amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and was designed to 
encourage the development of an air transportation system that relies on a 
competitive market to determine quality, variety, and price of services. 
 
The infrastructure systems that control basic operations of an airport. Airport 
systems Computer-based airport systems included bag/mail sort, elevators, loading 
bridges, HVAC, and fuel management. 
 
ALAR Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction 
 Airlines, air traffic services, and aviation authorities cooperate to improve 
safety and increase ALAR. 
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ALPA Air Line Pilots Association, International 
 ALPA is the largest airline pilot union in the world (62,000 pilots who flew for 
39 U.S. and Canadian airlines). Founded in 1931, ALPA was chartered by the 
AFL-CIO and the Canadian Labour Congress. Known internationally as US-
ALPA, it is a member of the International Federation of Air Line Pilot 
Associations (IFALPA) (http://www.alpa.org). 
 
AMP Aviation Millennium Project 
 AMP was the Y2K program for the ATA in Washington. AMP compiled 
information for the use of 102 North American airlines, as well as 500 airports, 
pertaining to 9,000 computer dependent systems ranging from baggage systems 
to airport runway lights. The project had a two-year budget of $16 million. 
 
AMT Aircraft Maintenance Technician 
 In 2006, Delta employed over 10,000 AMTs in Technical Operations, Delta’s 
maintenance and repair division. (http://www.topix.net).  
 
AOC Airport Operating Committee 
 See AAAC. 
 
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association  
 AOPA is a U.S. non-profit organization, membership consisting mainly of 
general aviators. AOPA’s purpose is “to serve the interests of its members as 
aircraft owners and pilots, and to promote the economy, safety, [and] utility … 
of flight in general aviation aircraft” (http://www.wikipedia.org).  
 
APHIS Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service 
 APHIS is an operating unit of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Its 
mission is to protect the health and value of American agriculture and natural 
resources (http://www.aphis.usda.gov).  
 
Software for a computer-based system (not an operating system). Application 
system At Delta Technology, an application system is a collection of software that 
together serves to support the specific needs of a functional activity in the Delta 
Air Lines organization. 
 
A proprietary GDS Apollo 
/Galileo A GDS is computer-based airline reservation system (CRS) with global reach, 
designed for travel agents, travel suppliers, and corporations. See CRS.  
 
ARC Airlines Reporting Corporation 
 ARC is an airline-owned financial transaction processing company. 
 
ARINC ARINC, originally Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated 
 ARINC serves as the airline industry’s sole licensee and coordinator of radio 
communications outside of the government. 
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ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 
 ARTCCs are government facilities employing controllers that help to monitor 
air space and prevent collisions. In 1997, 20 ARTCCs were located around the 
country, each employing 300 to 700 controllers, with more than 150 on duty 
during peak hours at the busiest facilities 
(http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos108.htm). 
 
ASA Aviation Security Alliance 
 The ASA is an alliance within the airline industry and National Safety 
Council’s (NSC) International Air Transport Section. 
 
ASA Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc. 
 ASA is a regional carrier. Delta held a 24% stake in the company before selling 
to SkyWest in 2005. 
 
ASD Aircraft Situational Display 
 ASD emits an electronic signal that enables location of aircraft operating under 
Instrument Flight Rules. FAA receives the data and reports it slightly delayed. 
 
ASM Available Seat Mile 
 ASM is a method of tracking fares according to what a passenger paid (in 
cents) per mile. ASM includes several factors including purchase date, class, 
destination, flight date and time, fuel costs, competitors’ fares, and special 
factors. Another factor that affects ticket pricing is the hub system itself. If a 
large airline controls many of the gates at an airport, passengers flying on that 
airline could experience higher ticket prices (http://govinfo.library.unt.edu). 
 
ASN Aviation Safety Network 
 The Aviation Safety Network is a private, independent initiative that provides 
information on accidents and safety issues with respect to airliners, military 
transport planes, and corporate jets. Founded in 1996 and online since Jan 
1996, the ASN Safety Database contains detailed descriptions of over 10,700 
incidents, hijackings, and accidents. 
 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
 ASRS is a collection of 27 data sets vital to aviation safety. NASA maintains 
ASRS for the FAA. 
 
ASSE American Society of Safety Engineers 
 ASSE is the oldest and largest professional safety organization in the U.S. 
Founded in 1911; its more than 30,000 members manage and consult on safety, 
health, and environmental issues in industry, insurance, government, and 
education (http://www.asse.org/). 
 
ASTA The American Society of Travel Agents 
 ASTA is the world's largest association of travel professionals. Its mission is 
“to enhance the professionalism and profitability of members worldwide 
through effective representation in industry and government affairs, education 
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ATA Air Transport Association of America, Inc. 
 The ATA is the U.S. airline industry’s chief lobbying group and represented the 
airline industry on major aviation issues before Congress, federal agencies, 
state legislatures and other governmental bodies. The organization promotes 
safety by coordinating industry and government safety programs, and serves as 
a focal point for industry efforts to standardize practices and enhance the 
efficiency of the air transport system (http://www.airlines.org).  
 
ATAC Air Transport Association of Canada 
 See ATA. 
 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
 ATC is a vast network of people and equipment that coordinates the movement 
of air traffic to make certain that planes stay a safe distance apart. Their 
immediate concern is safety, but controllers also direct planes efficiently to 
minimize delays. Some regulate airport traffic through designated airspaces; 
others regulate airport arrivals and departures. Controllers are certified by the 
FAA. 
 
ATCA Air Traffic Control Association 
 ATCA is a professional organization that promotes the advancement of aviation 
and air traffic control. ATCA is unique in representing the spectrum of civil-
military cooperation typical of global flying activities. 
 
ATI Antitrust immunity 
 The U.S. Department of Transportation regulates alliances among air carriers, 
with a focus on how ATI affects competition and what the airlines could 
accomplish without it. 
 
A global alliance formed in 1996 among Delta, Austrian, Sabena, and Swissair Atlantic 
Excellence Atlantic Excellence was created via an antitrust exemption by the US DOT in 
June 1996 (Delta Air Lines, 1997).  
 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
 A global ATM system was formed with the assistance of ICAO, and the 
cooperation of States, providers of air navigation services, and airspace users.  
 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
 ATM is a network technology for both local and wide area networks that 
supports real-time data, voice, and video communications. ATM is widely used 
as a backbone technology in carrier networks and large enterprises.  
 
ATPCO Airline Tariff Publishing Company 
 ATPCO collects airline fare and fare related data from more than 500 airlines 
and distributes it to global distribution systems (GDS) (such as 
Amadeus/System One, Galileo, Sabre, and Worldspan) and computer 
reservation systems (CRS). ATPCO creates efficiencies in the process by 
permitting each airline to submit its information via ATPCO, thereby giving 
each CRS/GDS the opportunity for a single source of fare-related data. 
 
ATP Air Transport Pilot 
 An ATP is a license that permits commercial aircraft operation by airline pilots. 
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ATS Air Traffic Systems 
 ATSs are systems that manage and control air traffic.  
 
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA): signed into law by President 
Bush in 2001. 
 ATSA called for the creation of TSA within the DHS, transferring 
responsibility for airport security screening that had been under the FAA. 
 
Baseline A formal review point in the lifecycle of a computer system. 
 Following an initial evaluation, a baseline serves as the basis for further 
development; and changes to a system require formal approval. During Delta’s 
Year 2000 Program, baseline tests reflected the existing code in its existing 
environment, and established data to be used after renovation for the Y2K bug 
(Delta archive, dt147). 
 
BCP Business Continuity Planning 
 BCP is the activity related to strategies for making certain that an organization 
can continue to operate in the case of failures of infrastructure services or other 
contingencies. 
 
BDM BDM, International 
 Delta hired consultants from BDM, Inc, a multinational information technology 
company, to assist with Y2K conversion issues. 
 
The Black-McKellar Act: signed into law by President F. D. R. in 1934. Black-
McKellar The Black-McKellar law authorized annual airmail contracts to private airlines 
and created a Federal Aviation Commission to recommend aviation policy. 
Airmail contracts were authorized at lower rates and with clauses to force 
separation of airlines and airplane manufacturers and to give smaller airlines a 
chance. In practice, the “Big Four” airlines reorganized and retained most of the 
airmail contracts. 
 
BPM Business Process Management 
 BPM tools are software applications that help managers organize resources in 
terms of processes (http://www.bptrends.com). 
 
BPM Business Portfolio Manager 
 The BPM was a position within the Year 2000 Program charged with 
administering and coordinating one of the four business areas from the 
“business” side as opposed to the “technology” side of Delta. The four Delta 
functional business areas were Airport Customer Service, Operations, Business 
Support, and Revenue. 
 
BPO Business Portfolio Owner 
 Within the Delta Technology organization, software systems were grouped into 
four “portfolios,” which corresponded to Delta functional business areas: 
Airport Customer Service, Operations, Business Support, and Revenue. The 
BPO was the individual, usually a senior management-level officer, who was 
responsible for the final decisions concerning Year 2000 Program solutions in a 
Delta functional business area.  
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BTS Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
 The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 created 
BTS, a division of DOT, to administer data collection, analysis, and reporting 
and to ensure the most cost-effective use of transportation-monitoring 
resources. 
 
Business area A functional division of Delta 
 A business area is a group of related functional sub-organizations of Delta. 
 
CAA Cargo Airline Association 
 The CAA is an association for the all-cargo air carrier industry, and others in 
the air cargo marketplace that depend on these services. Located in 
Washington, D.C., the association represents the industry before regulatory 
bodies, the U.S. Congress and in the courts. (http://www.cargoair.com) 
 
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board 
 The CAB was established by the Civil Aeronautics Act, which was signed into 
law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938. This law established the CAB 
as the U.S. federal agency charged with the power to regulate the economic 
aspect of air transportation. The CAB was charged with the general supervision 
and regulation of air carriers and their rates and routes. 
 
Call Center Delta Call Center 
 As a cost cutting measure, Delta outsourced its telephone reservations 
operations to call centers, which were designed for receiving and sending a 
large volume of requests by telephone. 
 
CAPPS II Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening program 
 CAPPS II is a program developed by the U.S. government in 2001 that 
compares passengers’ names, addresses, dates of birth, and other details against 
a database to determine the risk travelers posed to the aircraft.  
 
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
 The CBP priority mission is keeping terrorists and their weapons from entering 
the United States. 
 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
 CDTI is used by pilots to aid navigation, esp. on approach to landing. 
 
CIS Computer Information Systems 
 CIS was the Delta division that handled all information processing 
requirements of the company prior to the establishment of Worldspan and Delta 
Technology. 
 
CISWG Corporate Information Security Working Group 
 The CISWG is a U.S. organization with members from the corporate, trade 
association, and academic arenas. CISWG works to develop a private-sector 
approach to securing U.S. information and infrastructure. 
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CM Crisis Management 
 Year 2000 CM was a coordinated effort among Delta sub-organizations for 
management in case of Y2K failure. For each sub-organization, a detailed Year 
2000 CM Support Plan was developed that included requirements, procedures, 
and staffing (Delta archive, Y2K CM Delta Divisions.doc). 
 
CM Configuration Management 
 CM is a system for managing large software development projects. A CM 
system automatically documents all components used to build executable 
programs. The system can recreate each build as well as recreate earlier 
environments in order to maintain previous versions of a product. It can also be 
used to prevent unauthorized access to files or to alert appropriate users when a 
file has been altered.  
 
CMS Conversational Monitor System 
 CMS is software that provides interactive communication for IBM’s Virtual 
Machine (VM) operating system. It allows a user or programmer to launch an 
application from a terminal and interactively work with it. The CMS 
counterpart in Multiple Virtual Storage (MVS) was Time Sharing Option 
(TSO). MVS, no longer supported by IBM, was the most commonly used 
operating system on the System/370 and System/390 IBM mainframe 
computers. 
 
Code-sharing Sharing airline codes—an arrangement whereby seats on one aircraft can be 
sold by two airlines. 
 Under code-share agreements, Delta purchases seats on a foreign air carrier that 
are resold as Delta seats. These agreements are referred to as “Code-sharing” 
since seats on one aircraft were being sold by two airlines, with each carrier 
placing its own two-letter airline “code” (e.g., “DL”) on the flight in the airline 




Airline companies with whom Delta connects in order to provide passengers 
with service beyond a hub to a desired final destination. 
 See Delta connection carriers. 
 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
 COTS refers to hardware or software acquired from sources external to Delta. 
Client/server and mainframe hardware platforms, operating systems, third party 
products, development tools, middleware products, database systems, 
applications software, and network components and protocols all fit into this 
category. 
 
CP Central Processor 
 See CPU – Central Processing Unit. 
 
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Datalink Communications 
 A CPDLC is an avionics system planned by FAA that links ground control to 
aircraft at enroute control centers (http://www.flttechonline.com). 
 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
 The CPU (aka processor or microprocessor) is the brain of a computer—the 
central unit that performs the instructions of a computer's programs. 
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CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
 The CRAF program is a cooperative arrangement between U.S. military and 
commercial airlines, whereby commercial airlines supplement military 
resources to benefit national security. 
 
Criticality The value of an asset relative to operations 
 During the Year 2000 Program, systems were assessed as to their “criticality,” 
or importance to Delta and its operations. 
 
CRM Customer Relationship Management 
 A collection of marketing and customer service processes meant to discover, 
retain, and grow customer value to the airline. 
 
CRS Computer Reservations System 
 A CRS is a remote processing system for reserving aircraft seats electronically, 
and is used primarily by travel agents to book airline, hotel and car rental 
reservations and to issue airline tickets. Several airlines own and market such 
systems. The Global Distribution System (GDS) at Delta is an example. Other 
examples of CRS systems are Sabre, Apollo, Amadeus, and Worldspan. 
 
CTL Core Team Lead 
 A CTL was a position within the Delta Year 2000 Program. The position had 
membership on the core team along with representing the team on a particular 
sub-project within the Year 2000 Program. 
 
CTO City Ticket Office 
 Delta maintains a number of CTOs for facilitating customer transactions in 
other locations besides airports. 
 
CTS Common Test System 
 A common set of data types in the Common Language Runtime environment of 
Microsoft’s .NET platform. 
 
Customs An authority in a country that is responsible for enforcing the regulations 
related to import and export of animals and goods, and collecting tariffs. 
 See U.S. Customs. 
 
CWA Communications Workers of America 
 CWA is the largest communications and media union in the U.S., representing 
over 700,000 men and women in both private and public sectors. CWA 
members are employed in telecommunications, broadcasting, cable TV, 
journalism, publishing, electronics and general manufacturing, as well as airline 
customer service, government service, health care, education, and other fields 
(http://www.cwa-union.org/). 
 
Data Information based on fact 
 Data is a collection of information that is used for analysis or for reasoning or 
making a decision. 
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Data mining Data mining is a process of extracting and refining valuable information from a 
body of electronic data. 
 Data mining in the analysis of the Year 2000 Program archive was challenging 
for this dissertation because of the inconsistency of formats and information 
design among the archive documents. 
 
DBA Database Administrator 
 DBAs are responsible for the operation and administration of Database 
Management Systems (DBMS), and the creation of physical database designs 
and performance tuning (Delta archive, 1998, Mar 13, Y2K Engineering 
SOW.doc). 
. 
DCI Delta Connection, Inc 
 DCI is a partnership arrangement established in 1984 that linked local “feeder” 





Connection carriers are airline companies with whom Delta connects in order to 
provide passengers with service beyond a hub to a desired final destination.  
 Chautauqua, Comair, Freedom Airlines, Shuttle America, SkyWest, and ASA 
were Delta connection carriers, and were described as “high criticality suppliers 
/ partners” because of their impact on Delta’s passenger service and revenue. 
 
DHS U. S. Department of Homeland Security 
 The DHS, a cabinet-level agency of the U.S. government, was established in 
2002 to protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation, 
especially from terrorist attacks. 
 
DLX Delta Express 
 DLX, a low fare carrier, was a business unit of Delta that operated short- to 
medium-haul flights into and out of Florida. 
 
DMSS Data Management Support System 
 DMSS software supports functional capabilities of a project, providing 
monitoring, maintenance and control of information. 
 
DNS Delta Nervous System 
 DNS is the IT infrastructure system implemented as a part of Delta’s IT 
transformation between 1997 and 2003. This integrated network links all of 
Delta’s communication and information functions, and allows all business areas 
of Delta to share real-time information with customers and / or employees.  
 
DOT U. S. Department of Transportation 
 An act of Congress on October 15, 1966 established the U.S. DOT as a cabinet-
level agency of the U.S. government. The mission of the Department is to 
“serve the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and 
convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and 
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DSO Data Source Object 
 A DSO is a Microsoft ActiveX object embedded within a Web page. It employs 
a process called data binding, whereby the ActiveX control communicates 
directly with another Web page, or with an external XML data source. A DSO 
exploit is a form of spyware that takes advantage of data binding to gain access 
to the hard drive of a computer that is connected to the Internet. 
 
DT Delta Technology 
 DT is the subsidiary business unit of Delta that provides information 
technology development and support exclusively for the airline. 
 
EAS Essential Air Service 
 When the federal government deregulated the airlines in 1978, the EAS 
program eased concerns that smaller communities would be stranded without 
air service. The program guaranteed that towns that had air service as of 
October 1978—provided they were farther than 70 miles from a larger 
airport—would be eligible for subsidy in order to keep that service in place. 
 
EC Executive Council 
 The EC is the top tier of Delta decision makers.  
 
ECD Estimated Completion Date 
 Assignment of an ECD was important for the management, esp. the planning 
and status reporting, of projects in the Delta Year 2000 Program. 
 
EPIC Electronic Privacy Information Center 
 EPIC, a nonprofit public interest research center in Washington, D.C., was 
established in 1994 to focus public attention on civil liberties issues especially 
the protection of privacy (http://www.epic.org/). 
 
ERISA Employee Retirement Income Security Act: signed into law by President Ford 
in 1974. 
 Delta sponsors qualified and defined benefit pension plans for eligible 
employees and retirees. The company’s funding obligations under these plans 
are governed by ERISA.  
 
E-SIGN Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: signed into law 
by President Clinton in 2000. 
 E-SIGN facilitates the use of electronic records and signatures in interstate and 
foreign commerce by ensuring the validity and legal effect of contracts entered 
into electronically (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/06/esign7.htm). 
 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
 The FAA, created in 1958 as an agency of the U.S. government, is responsible 
for the safety of civil aviation. The agency became a part of the DOT in 1967. 
 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
 FARs are rules prescribed by the FAA to promote safe aviation, designed to 
protect pilots, passengers and the general public from unnecessary risk. The 
FARs—part of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations—address “every 
conceivable aspect of aviation safety” (Hamilton, 2001, p. 4). 
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A title and a role in air traffic control. Flight 
superintendent A Flight Superintendent is an employee assigned to dispatch, clear, and control 
flights operated by Delta and its subsidiary organizations. See PAF-CA. 
 
FPS Flight Planning System 
 The FPS is a program that automatically transfers flight plans & databases to 
the aircraft’s data transfer module (DTM). 
 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
 FSF is an international non-profit organization where air carriers, 
manufacturers, suppliers, maintenance organizations, aviation regulatory 
agencies, and flight crewmembers share information, ideas and best practices 
for safety (http://www.flightsafety.org/home.html). 
 
GA General Aviation 
 General aviation is defined as all aviation other than military and commercial 
airlines.  
 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
 In the U.S, GAAP are accounting rules used to prepare, present, and report 
financial statements for publicly-traded companies and many privately-held 
companies. The government does not directly set accounting standards, in the 
belief that the private sector has better knowledge and resources. US GAAP is 
not written in law, although the SEC requires that it be followed in financial 
reporting by publicly-traded companies. 
 
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
 Since its inception in 1970, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
(GAMA) has strived to be a reliable source of information among the aviation 
trade press and the national media regarding general aviation (GA). See GA. 
(http://www.gama.aero). 
 
GARA General Aviation Revitalization Act: signed into law by President Clinton in 
1994. 
 GARA was designed to protect manufacturers of smaller, private aircraft (less 
than 20 seats) from liability for accidents involving older airplanes and/or parts. 
GARA bars lawsuits against the manufacturer of an aircraft or component part 
in service more than 18 years. GARA does not apply if the aircraft was engaged 
in scheduled passenger-carrying or air medical services operations at the time 
of an accident (http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/). 
 
GDS Global Distribution System 
 See CRS. 
 
GEMA Georgia Emergency Management Agency 
 The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) operates under the 
authority of the Emergency Management Act of 1981. Virtually all GEMA 
employees are on 24-hour call to assist local authorities in responding to 
emergencies. In addition, they staff the State Operations Center (SOC) when a 
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GID Gate Information Display 
 GIDs are plasma screens that Delta installed at airports across the U.S. in 2002. 
The screens are updated continuously with real time flight status, weather, 
seating configuration, standby and upgrade lists, boarding status, onboard 
service, cancellations, and gate changes. 
 
GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: signed into law by President Clinton in 1999. 
 GLBA, also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
allows banks to engage in a wide range of financial services, and provides 
privacy protections against the sale of private financial information. 
Additionally, the GLBA codifies protections against pretexting, the practice of 
obtaining personal information through false pretenses 
(http://www.epic.org/privacy/glba/). 
 
GO facilities Ground Operations 
 A GO crew tags, loads and unloads baggage, operates GSE, coordinates the 
service and surface movement of arriving and departing aircraft at an airport.  
 
GSE Ground Service Equipment 
 GSE refers to airport equipment such as baggage tugs and jetways. 
 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: signed into law by 
President Clinton in 1996. 
 The HIPAA Act amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve 
portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and 
individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and 
health care delivery, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for 
other purposes. The law requires the adoption of security and privacy standards 
in order to protect personal health information. HIPAA had been called “Y2K 
on steroids” (http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/hipaa.html). 
 
A network design adopted by major air carriers. Hub and 
spoke In a hub and spoke routing design, planes bring passengers to a “hub” airport 
where they connect to other flights enroute to other destinations. The spokes are 
the routes that planes take out of the hub airport. Delta was an early pioneer in 
the use of the hub and spoke concept in 1955. 
 
IAPA International Airline Passenger Association 
 The IAPA was established in 1960 to represent the interests of frequent air 
travelers by providing group discounts on items such as hotel accommodation, 
car rental and insurance, in addition to protecting and promoting their rights as 
airline passengers. The organization has over 400,000 members in over 200 
countries (http://www.iapa.com). 
 
IATA International Air Transport Association 
 IATA is the global trade organization for air transportation, and plays an 
important role in harmonizing technical standards for civil aviation worldwide. 
Its members comprise 265 airlines—the world’s leading passenger and cargo 
airlines—representing 94% of international scheduled air traffic. IATA 
members, as scheduled and non-scheduled airlines, operate commercial air 
services from more than 140 nations (http://www.iata.org).  
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ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
 ICAO, a specialized agency of the U.N., works toward safe, secure, and 
sustainable development of civil aviation through cooperation among its 
member nation-states. ICAO establishes international standards and 
recommended practices and procedures in the technical fields of aviation, 
which includes promoting security and the safe transport of dangerous goods 
(http://www.icao.int/). 
 
ICS Integrated Customer Service 
 ICS was an internal Delta initiative—a cross-divisional project focused on 
improving customer service. 
 
IFALPA International Federation of Air line Pilot Associations 
 IFALPA is made up of around 100 national member pilot associations—
approximately 120,000 airline pilot members out of the estimated 150,000 
active pilots (http://www.ifalpa.org). 
 
IFATCA International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations 
 IFATCA is a professional organization representing around 40,000 air traffic 
controllers in over 100 countries (http://www.ifatca.org). 
 
IFBP In-flight Broadcast Procedure 
 A form of air traffic control whereby pilots move their aircraft to new altitudes 
based on the locations of other planes nearby. 
 
IFEO International Flight Engineers Organization 
 The International Flight Engineers Organization (IFEO) has merged with the 
International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) 
(http://www.ifalpa.org).  
 
IFS In-Flight Service 
 IFS is the Delta division that includes flight attendants and onboard services. 
 
IG Implementation Group 
 An IG was a logical group of COTS products formed [in order] to plan, 
schedule, renovate, test, and implement Y2K compliant versions. Each IG had 
an IG Owner (See Roles & Responsibilities description in presentation 
handout) … (Delta archive, Workshop Presentation.ppt). 
 
INS U.S Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS) 
 On March 1, 2003, the service and benefit functions of the U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) transitioned into the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to become the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS). See USCIS. 
 
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
 ISACs are organizations that represent a cooperative effort between the federal 
government and private organizations to share information by industry sector in 
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Common IT services shared by multiple systems IT 
infrastructure IT infrastructure includes computer-based hardware, software, network 
components, etc. 
 
ITO / BPO IT Outsourcing / Business Process Outsourcing 
 Outsourced information technology [IT] services, as well as other business 
processing functions that are IT-enabled, are increasingly going offshore 
(Westby, 2007). 
 
JAA European Joint Aviation Authorities 
 The JAA is an organization of the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of European 
States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common 
safety regulatory standards and procedures for aviation. 
 
LCC Lower Cost Carriers 
 LCCs are airline organizations, e.g., jetBlue, Southwest, Frontier, and AirTran, 
that began after deregulation in 1978 as competitors to the network carriers. 
 
LOC Lines of Code 
 The progress of eliminating the Y2K bug from Delta systems was tracked by 
Delta Technology portfolio groups based on the number of LOCs that had been 
examined. 
 
McKinsey McKinsey & Company 
 McKinsey is a privately owned management consulting firm that focuses on 
solving issues of concern to senior management in large corporations and 
organizations. 
 
Middleware Software that provides interoperability with mainframe transaction systems.  
 The use of middleware is a way to access data on legacy mainframe systems for 
a client/server environment, allowing most of the existing applications and 
infrastructure to remain in place (e.g., IBM's MQSeries middleware).  
 
MVS Multiple Virtual Storage 
 MVS is an IBM proprietary operating system, designed for large scale systems. 
During the Year 2000 Program, Delta set up a test environment for applications 
that depended on MVS. 
 
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
 NACA was established in 1915 by the U.S. Congress as an organization 
dedicated to the science of flight. NACA was operational until 1958, when the 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 created NASA from NACA 
(http://history.nasa.gov/naca/index.html). 
 
NACO National Aeronautical Charting Office 
 NACO, a department of the FAA, publishes and distributes aeronautical charts 
and flight information publications (http://www.naco.faa.gov). 
 
NAS National Airspace System 
 NAS refers to the organization of entities and technologies relating to 
maintenance of flight safety in U.S. air space. 
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NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
 See NACA. 
 
NMB National Mediation Board 
 The NMB was established by the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926. It is an independent agency that attempts to facilitate harmonious 
labor-management relations within two of the nation's key transportation 
modes—railroads and airlines. 
 
Network airlines are major airlines, the hub-and-spoke operators. Network 
airlines 
(carriers) 
Network airlines included American, TWA, Delta, United, Northwest, 
Continental, US Airways, America West, and Alaska. 
 
Non-IT Equipment [containing embedded computer chips] used by Delta in 
distribution, production, services, or general office environments. Some 
examples include, but are not limited to planes, parts, tools, tugs, forklifts, cars, 
TVs, LCDs, copiers, postage meters, etc. (Delta archive, Definiti.doc). 
 
  
NSCIATS National Safety Council’s International Air Transport Section 
 The National Safety Council (NSC) is a nonprofit NGO international public 
service organization. The IATS membership is comprised of airlines, airport 
operators, and related organizations; the scope is operations such as ramp 
operations, fuel and cabin servicing, GO, and facilities maintenance 
(http://www.nsc.org/mem/indus/sect/intlair/intlair.htm). 
 
NWS National Weather Service 
 Formerly the Weather Bureau, renamed NWS in 1967. NWS is a division of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (http://www.nws.noaa.gov). 
 
OAEP Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 
 The OAEP is a division of the DOT, under the office of the General Council. 
The office provides investigative support, public counsel, legal prosecution for 
various cases regarding compliance with DOT aviation regulations. 
 
OC Operating Council 
 A committee of the Delta Year 2000 Program comprised of Portfolio Leads and 
Portfolio Directors. This group met periodically to deal with technical issues 
related to IT systems. 
 
OCC Operations Control Center 
 The OCC is a division in Delta’s Operations business area that monitors flight 
progress. Displays show all of the Delta flights wherever they are, all the way 
to the ground. 
 
OES Open Enterprise Server 
 OES is an open-source server by Novell, designed for delivering business-area 
applications in networked environments. It includes NetWare, the long-standing 
leader in networking services, and SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, an open 
source product (http://www.novell.com/products/openenterpriseserver/). 
 
 
   xxxvi
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
 Congress created OSHA under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, signed 
by President Nixon in 1970. OSHA's mission is to prevent work-related 
injuries, illnesses, and deaths. 
 
PAF-CA Professional Airline Flight-Control Association 
 PAF-CA is a collective bargaining unit representing aircraft dispatchers and 
operational control employees at Delta, ASA, and United. 
 
PD Point Director 
 The Point Directors were Year 2000 team leaders in Delta Technology that 
reported to the Portfolio VPs (Airport Customer Service, Operations, Business 
Support, and Revenue). 
 
PD Portfolio Director 
 A PD in a Delta Technology group spent some percentage less than 100% of 
their work effort—maybe 30%—on Y2K. 
 
PDN Personnel Department Number 
 A PDN is a number assigned to a Delta department for accounting purposes. 
 
PL Portfolio Lead 
 A PL was the Y2K point person in a Delta Technology group who was 
dedicated 100% to Y2K. 
 
PMO Program Management Office 
 The PMO was a department in the Delta organization that was created in order 
to coordinate the activities of the enterprise-wide Year 2000 Program. 
 
PMSR Program Management Status Review 
 The PMSR was a weekly status update designed to inform the Program 
Manager and other key people, internal and external to the program, of Delta 
Year2000 Program status. 
 
Portfolio A division of labor in the Delta Technology organization 
 Activities within the four application portfolios included development and 
maintenance of systems that supported the activities of the four corresponding 
business areas in Delta. 
 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
 PPP is a system in which a government service or private business venture is 
funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more 
private sector companies (http://en.wikipedia.org/). 
 
PVP Portfolio Vice President 
 The PVP was a top-level administrator in the Delta Technology organization 
who was responsible for the IT systems in one of the business areas in the Delta 
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RLA Railway Labor Act: signed into law by President Roosevelt in 1926 and 
amended in 1936 to apply to the airline industry. 
 The RLA governs labor relations in the railway and airline industries in the 
U.S. The Act sought to substitute bargaining, arbitration and mediation for 
strikes as a means of resolving labor disputes. Delta is a common carrier by air 
as defined in 45 U.S.C. § 181, of the Railway Labor Act. 
 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
 A private, non-profit, global corporation that develops consensus-based 
recommendations regarding communications, navigation, surveillance, and air 
traffic management (CNS / ATM). Organized in 1935 as the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics, RCTA includes 335 government, industry, and 
academic organizations. Domestic membership includes, among others, FAA, 
ALPA, ATA, AOPA, ARINC, Avwrite, Boeing, DOD, GARMIN, Rockwell, 
Stanford Univ, Lockheed Martin, MIT Lincoln Lab, MITRE / CAASD, Harris 
Corp, NASA, NBAA, and Raytheon (http://www.rtca.org). 
 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
 The mission of the U.S. SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. 
 
SIMS Simulator Systems - flight training equipment 
 Delta incorporates SIMS into the routines involved with pilot certification on 
particular aircraft. 
 
SkyTeam A global airline alliance 
 SkyTeam members are airlines that maintain international code-share 
agreements with Delta. These arrangements provide customers access to 
worldwide destinations, flights, and services. 
 
SME Subject Matter Experts 
 SMEs are Delta employees who have working knowledge of particular subject 
matter applicable to Delta operations and IT systems. 
 
SPA SkyTeam Pilots Association 
 The SPA comprises pilots from nine global SkyTeam member carriers. The 
carriers are Delta, Northwest, AeroMexico, Alitalia, CSA Czech, KLM, Air 
France, Korean Air, and Continental. 
 
SOA Service-oriented architectures 
 SOAs “treat applications as reusable services,” thereby reducing redundancy in 
related applications. This concept considers mission-critical legacy software 
applications as too valuable to “convert” to a new platform, therefore enables 
greater efficiency and flexibility by identifying common services to which they 
can link (Knorr, 2004).  
 
SOA Sarbanes-Oxley Act: signed into law by President Bush in 2002 
 SOA, commonly called “SOX” or “SarbOx,” covers establishing a public 
company accounting oversight board, auditor independence, corporate 
responsibility, and enhanced financial disclosure. Considered one of the most 
significant changes to the U.S. securities laws since the New Deal in the 1930s, 
it was designed to review the dated legislative audit requirements. The Act gave 
additional powers and responsibilities to the SEC. 
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STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route 
 STAR charts are used by pilots in aircraft cockpits to assist in navigation. 
 
TCAS Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System 
 TCAS is an instrument integrated into other systems in an aircraft cockpit. It 
consists of hardware and software that together provide a set of electronic eyes 
so the pilot can “see” the traffic situation near the aircraft 
(http://www.mitrecaasd.org/work/project_details.cfm?item_id=153).  
 
Threat A threat to the reliable operation of a computer-based system 
 A threat exists when there is an agent that places a system vulnerability at risk 
of exploitation. This dissertation limits focus to the human agent, apart from 
natural causes (e.g., weather related damage). 
 
TIA Travel Industry Association of America 
 TIA is a non-profit trade association that represents the common interests and 
concerns of the U.S. travel industry (TIA website). 
 
Tier I, II, III A description assigned to an airport  
 The tier description of an airport is based on its features for accommodating 
types of aircraft, and air traffic services. 
 
TCC Technology Control Center 
 TCC is a facility at Delta’s headquarters campus for viewing and interacting 
with its IT network. Employees at the TCC view and monitor real-time activity 
and deal with issues in Delta IT systems world-wide. 
 
TOC Technical Operations Center 
 The TOC is Delta’s maintenance operations facility in Atlanta, located at 
Hartsfield airport. TOC is also called the Jetbase. 
 
TPF Transaction Processing Facility 
 TPF is the software engine behind airline, hotel, and rental car reservations 
systems. It is a real-time mainframe operating system released by IBM around 
1976, and retooled in 2004 for Linux. TPF is particularly well suited for 
organizations dealing in very high I/O message switching and large global 
networks. Users include British Airways (reservations), VISA International 
(authorizations), Holiday Inn, and Delta. TPF was traditionally an 
IBM370/Assembler environment although release 4.1 contained C. It was 
common for TPF sites to use IBM's MVS and VM operating systems for off-
line processing (Lohr, 2004). 
 
TQ TransQuest 
 Delta Technology was formerly called TransQuest. Delta Technology, a wholly 
owned subsidiary organization of Delta is charged with developing and 
maintaining IT systems for the airline. 
 
TRW / BDM TRW, Inc. / BDM International, Inc. 
 In 1997, TRW purchased BDM, an IT consulting company, especially for its 
integrated supply chain management and enterprise management businesses. 
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TSE Test System Engineer 
 A TSE was a role during Delta’s Year 2000 Program. These employees 
provided assistance to the business area teams by evaluating the remediated 
software in a test environment before it was placed in production. 
 
TWU Transport Workers Union of America 
 TWU, a trade union representing workers in mass transportation, airline, 
railroad, utility, university, municipalities, service and allied industries, is 
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the worldwide International Transport Workers 
Federation (ITF). The organization was founded in 1934 as an industrial union 
dedicated to the idea of trust and equality for all workers. 
 
USAIG United States Aircraft Insurance Group 
 USAIG is a group of insurers that collectively functions as a global aviation 
insurance market. The group participates in insurance programs for 80 % of 
U.S. airlines and is the lead insurer for Delta. 
 
UEB Universal Enterprise Build 
 The UEB was a “design stack” for the standardization of desktop units across 
the Delta enterprise. 
 
The USA Patriot Act: signed into law by President Bush in 2001. USA Patriot 
Act The Patriot Act requires appropriate tools to intercept and obstruct terrorism, 
and has far-reaching consequences for computer privacy and information 
security. Enacted a month after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Patriot 
Act became a target of criticism for giving police broad powers and allegedly 
curbing civil liberties in the process. 
 
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 Formerly known as the INS, USCIS is responsible for the administration of 
immigration and naturalization adjudication functions and establishing 
immigration services policies and priorities. 
 
U.S. Customs United States Customs Service (Now CBP) 
 On March 1, 2003, the service and benefit functions of the U.S. Customs 
Service transitioned into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
become the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). See CBP. 
 
VM Virtual Machine (also known as CMS) 
 VM is a mainframe-based system operated by Worldspan and used by Delta, 
Delta Technology, and Worldspan. Delta established a Year 2000 VM testing 
environment, and coordinated construction and implementation of platforms 
with Worldspan.  
 
VPP The Voluntary Protection Programs  
 Cooperative programs of OSHA “promote effective worksite-based safety and 
health.” In the VPP, an organization’s management, labor, and OSHA establish 
cooperative relationships at qualified workplaces that have implemented a 
comprehensive safety and health management system. Approval into VPP 
recognizes workplaces with exemplary safety and health programs and exempts 
them from routine OSHA inspections (http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/). 
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Vulnerability A weakness in a computer-based  system 
 A vulnerability creates a risk that a system will malfunction, caused by misuse 
or other system condition.  
 
WBS Work-Breakdown-Structure 
 WBS was a part of the Year 2000 Program methodology whereby a project was 
implemented via a delegated structure of responsibilities. 
 
WGE Workgroup Engineering 
 WGE is the division of Delta Technology that is responsible for configuration 
and maintenance of end-user computing products. 
 
Workgroup A designation related to local area networks 
 In Delta Technology, a workgroup refers to an end-user: a workgroup product 
is a computer—desktop or laptop, or NT server for files and printing. 
 
WSP Worldspan 
 Developed as an outsourced reservations function of Delta, a consortium of 
airline companies owns and operates Worldspan (WSP). WSP provides 
comprehensive electronic data services linking approximately 800 travel 
suppliers around the world to a global customer base. Delta sold its 38% 
interest in 2003 (http://www.worldspan.com/). 
 
Y2K Year 2000 
 The acronym Y2K is associated with the computer programming practice that 
created a worldwide crisis. When world clocks moved from 1999 to 2000, 
computer-based systems that had not been replaced or their programming code 
adequately repaired produced erroneous calculations and either malfunctioned 
or ceased to function. 
 
Y2K solution Changes to IT systems that eliminated the Y2K code 
 Y2K solution is the dependent variable in the research model of this 
dissertation. A Y2K solution is defined as changes to software systems in a 
functional business area of Delta over the period 1997-2003.  
 
Year 2000 Act The Year 2000 Information Readiness Disclosure Act: signed into law by 
President Clinton in 1998. 
 Designed to encourage disclosure, the Year 2000 Act provided makers of Year 
2000 Statements with immunity from liability in civil actions based on 
allegedly false, inaccurate, or misleading Year 2000 Statements. Statements 
were defined as communications concerning the Year 2000 readiness of 
products or services made by one party to another party from July 14, 1998 
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TIMELINE 
 
This section presents an overview of Delta’s history in order to introduce the 
reader to the case study context. The essential foundation for this dissertation is based on 
the concept of institutionalized environment, and therefore, strongly relates to the history 
of Delta, its culture and its sectoral institutions. Entries in this timeline represent 
significant events or milestones that indicate Delta’s continuous growth, increasing 
complexity, military and union connections, and its background in computer technology. 
Also notable is Delta’s consistency of achievements in flight safety. Milestones in Delta’s 
history that relate to information technologies are in boldface type. 
 
1929 Delta operates its first passenger flights. 
 
 
1942 Delta contributes to the war effort, modifying 1,000+ aircraft, over-hauling 
engines/instruments, and training Army pilots and mechanics. 
 
1945 Official corporate name becomes Delta Air Lines, Inc.  
Delta receives the National Safety Council Award for over 300 million passenger 
miles and 10 years of flight without a passenger or crew fatality.  
C. E. Woolman is President and General Manager.  
 
1946 Delta starts regularly scheduled cargo service.  
The one-millionth passenger boards. 
 
1947 Delta receives the National Safety Award for more than one-half billion passenger-
miles without a fatality. 
 
1948 As the first U.S. interchange service, TWA crews fly Delta planes from Cincinnati 
to Detroit; Delta crews fly TWA planes south to Atlanta, Miami, and Dallas. 
 
 
1953 Delta acquires its first international routes—to the Caribbean and Caracas—via 
merger with Chicago and Southern Air Lines. 
Delta-C&S is the name of the merged airline for the next two years. 
 
1955 Delta pioneers the use of the hub and spoke system in the U.S.  
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1956 Radar is installed in the noses of all Delta aircraft. 
 
1957 Delta stock begins trading on the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
1959 Delta is the first airline to launch jet service.  
The red, white, and blue triangle “widget” becomes Delta's logo. 
 
 
1961 Delta receives the National Safety Award for flying over 11 billion passenger miles 
without a fatality.  
Charles Gravitt joins Delta as a communications specialist (Gravitt later plays a 
major role in Delta’s Year 2000 Program.). 
 
1962 Delta activates the SABRE system for electronic reservations. 
 
1964 IBM develops and installs the Deltamatic reservation system on Delta’s IBM 
7074 computers. 
 
1966 Delta begins computer training in-house. 
Delta founder and CEO C.E. Woolman dies.  
The crop-dusting division ceases operations. 
Charles H. Dolson becomes Delta's second CEO.  
 
 
1970 Delta has an all-jet passenger airplane fleet.  
Apollo 13 moon landing mission is aborted, but returns its crew safely to Earth. 
 
1971 W.T. Beebe becomes Chairman and CEO.  
Delta Dash (cargo service for small packages) begins operations. 
 
1972 Northeast Airlines merges with Delta.  
 
1974 Gravitt becomes General Manager, Computer Information Systems (CIS). 
 
1975 Delta Air Express begins operations, making Delta the first airline to offer its own 
“express delivery guaranteed” cargo service. 
 
1978 The Airline Deregulation Act passes.  
Delta begins flying transatlantic service: Atlanta to London.  
David C. Garrett becomes CEO.  
 
1979 Delta boards one million passengers in one city in one month—first airline in the 
world to experience this level of customer activity (Atlanta, in August). 
 
 
1980 In the early 1980s, Delta IT personnel develop DATAS II computer 
reservations system (CRS). 
 
1981 Delta launches Frequent Flyer Program (changed to SkyMiles in 1995). 
Delta forms Epsilon Trading Corp., a computerized marketing subsidiary, to 
coordinate and sell more passenger seats on all Delta flights. 
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1982 After Delta reports financial losses, its employees raise $30 million in payroll 
deductions to purchase the first Boeing 767, named “The Spirit of Delta.” 
 
1984 Delta begins its Delta Connections program, designed to strengthen relationships 
with regional airline partners.  
Delta offers the U.S. first public air-to-ground telephone system with Airfone, on 
the Lockheed L-1011. 
 
1985 Delta’s data communications network comprises over 400 privately leased lines 
that serve over 3,000 locations. 
 
1987 Via merger with Western Airlines, Delta becomes the fourth largest U.S. carrier and 
fifth largest world carrier.  
Delta offers its DeltaStar® PC-based CRS to independent travel agencies 
(DATAS II). 
Ronald W. Allen becomes Chairman and CEO. 
 
 
1990 Delta and 23 civilian airlines participate in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 
during Desert Storm/Desert Shield from 1990-1991, carrying passengers and 
military cargo. 
Delta, Northwest Airlines and TWA combine computer-based reservations 
systems (CRS) to form Worldspan Travel Information Services. 
 
1991 Delta purchases Pan Am's transatlantic routes and the Pan Am Shuttle—the largest 
acquisition of flights in airline history.  
Delta becomes a global carrier. 
Delta signs with DEC to develop its Technical Operations Publishing System 
(TOPS) for aircraft maintenance schedules and documentation—the first 
online maintenance information system in the airline industry. 
 
1993 Computerworld (de Jaeger, 1993) publishes Peter de Jager's article, entitled 
“Doomsday 2000.” The article describes the “catastrophe” that would ensue if 
mainframes could not process “2000” by the year 2000. 
Worldspan enters the airline technology services business. 
 
1994 Because of massive economic losses, Delta CEO Allen announces an aggressive 
cost-cutting program—Leadership 7.5. 
Ray Valeika, formerly with Continental, joins Delta as VP-Technical Ops. 
Worldspan introduces the first full Microsoft® Windows®-compatible 
workstation environment for travel agencies. 
 
1995 In partnership with AT&T, Delta outsources the balance of its IT services to a 
new subsidiary organization called TransQuest Information Solutions. William 
Belew, CIO at W.R. Grace & Co., becomes President and CEO of the new 
company. Delta’s IT personnel become TransQuest employees. 
Delta names James McCullough Director of IT, providing oversight for a new 
internal IT department—about 100 IT staff who remained at Delta to serve as 
technology liaison among Delta, TransQuest, and Worldspan. 
Year 2000 activities begin at Worldspan in July 1995. 
The 1996 Centennial Olympic Games names Delta as official airline; J.D. Power & 
Associates honors Delta as the best in long and short haul flights among major 
carriers. 
Delta returns to profitability in the fourth quarter, fiscal year 1995. 
Year 2000 activities begin at TransQuest in December 1995. 
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1996 Delta starts a low-fare airline, Delta Express. 
Delta powers up its Operation Control Center (OCC), a new computerized 
flight management facility. 
Delta's website, SkyLinks, enables customers to make reservations and 
purchase tickets online.  
TransQuest partnership is dissolved; TransQuest becomes a wholly owned Delta 
subsidiary supporting Delta’s functional business areas exclusively.  
Delta begins formally addressing the Y2K problem in June of 1996, and 
launches a structured program for eliminating the Y2K vulnerability in its 
systems and equipment in October. 
TransQuest begins inventory of IT systems in Dec 1996. 
 
1997 Delta is the first airline to board over 100 million passengers in a year. 
Belew resigns from TransQuest; Paul Matson, Sr. VP-Corporate Strategy and 
Planning is interim replacement. 
Mac Armstrong joins Delta as Exec VP-Operations in June. 
Delta announces the Year 2000 Program via internal publications: July 30 issue 
of Heads Up, and Aug 1 issue of Delta NewsDigest. 
Leo F. Mullin comes on board as President and CEO on August 14.  
Charlie Feld is named interim Delta CIO, and TransQuest CEO.  
Tom Roerk, CFO since 1987, resigns in November.  
TransQuest is renamed Delta Technology, Inc. 
 
1998 Delta and SwissCargo create the first international cargo alliance.  
ATA Y2K industry initiative begins in January. 
Delta Year 2000 Program reorganizes in March. Matson leads the IT Board. Feld 
becomes executive sponsor “responsible for the successful completion of all aspects 
of the Year 2000 program”; Walter Taylor, Delta Technology VP-Airline 
Operations Systems, is named Year 2000 Program director in April. Gravitt is Year 
2000 managing director. 
Benjamin R. DeCosta is named aviation general manager for Hartsfield 
International Airport in June. 
Year 2000 Desktop Strategy Project kicks off at Delta in September. 
 
1999 Air Transport World magazine names Delta “Global Airline of the Year” for 1998. 
Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine names Delta 1999's “Best 
Managed Major Airline.” 
 
 
2000 Delta announces Y2K success. 
Flight attendant scheduling system malfunctions, along with around 40 non-
critical systems. 
Bob DeRodes becomes Delta CIO. 
Delta carries 120 million passengers. 
Partnering with AeroMexico, Air France and Korean Air, Delta launches the 
SkyTeam global alliance.  
Delta acquires Atlantic Southeast Airlines and Comair, two regional Delta 
Connection carriers, as wholly owned subsidiaries.  
Delta.com web site goes live.  
Delta Technology receives the Computerworld Smithsonian Award for the 
Delta Technology Customer Care System. 
50,000 personal computers are distributed to employees, to increase familiarity 
with IT. 
Delta signs in September to run its pricing and reservations operations on a 
farm of Hewlett-Packard Unix servers with software from ITA Software.  
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2001 U.S. airspace is closed for two days after terrorist attacks on Sept. 11th.  
Delta posts its first financial loss in six years.  
Delta.com surpassed the $1 billion mark for 2001 ticket revenue on Nov 13. 
 
2002 Curtis Robb becomes Delta Technology CEO, Delta CIO. 
New IT systems are installed—kiosks at check-in, expanded gate information 
systems, and virtual check-in on delta.com.  
Flight attendants reject AFA representation; … “to remain union-free by 
overwhelming majority” (Cason, 2002, p. 12). 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) ranked Hartsfield number one in 
overall passenger satisfaction for large hub airports in 2002. 
Profit Improvement Initiative begins (savings goal of $5 billion). 
 
2003 Delta launches Song®, a low-cost subsidiary airline, replacing Delta Express.  
Delta implements the largest domestic code-share alliance with Continental and 
Northwest.  
SkyTeam is the world's largest leading airline alliance.  
Massive cutback of flights in March because of the war in Iraq. Delta eliminates 
roughly 16,000 jobs (21 percent of its workforce compared to pre-Sept. 11 levels) 
by mid-2003. 
Delta sells its interest in Worldspan.  
Delta introduces a new model for passenger check-in: lobby redesign, expanded 
kiosk function, agents to assist in the ticket lobby, Delta Direct phone banks.  
Delta is the first U.S. airline to offer prerecorded audio flight information at the 
gate. New ramp technology is installed, which is designed to improve fuel 
savings, load and unload times, and baggage transfer. 
Delta establishes an Information Security department, headed by Spark Nowak 
as Chief Information Security Officer. 
Mullin steps down as CEO at year-end. Board member and industry veteran Gerald 
Grinstein replaces Mullin as CEO. 
100-year anniversary of the Wright Brothers’ flight at Kitty Hawk, N.C. 
 
2004 Mullin resigns as Chairman of the Board in April. 
A “systems glitch” forced Delta to cancel about 40 flights and delay an 
unspecified number of departures on May 1 (“Delta stays mum on cause of IT 
glitch,” 2004). 
Comair IT systems crash on Christmas Day. 
 
2005 Delta and its subsidiaries filed to reorganize under Chapter 11 in the U.S. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Computer-based information and communication technologies have become 
indispensable components of modern organizations. However, historical evidence shows 
that both a growing reliance on computer-based systems and their pervasive use have 
created new threats to organizational assets and infrastructure systems. Caused by the 
growing complexity and proliferation of these systems, their vulnerabilities have 
outpaced technical and non-technical means for making them reliable and adequately 
secure.2  As an example, in the late 1990s organizations tackled an information security 
problem of unprecedented scale. A small detail written into the code of computer-based 
systems before the year 2000, often called the “Y2K bug,” emerged to create a worldwide 
crisis. Different from most crises or other failures, the Y2K bug affected not just a few 
isolated organizations; a vast number of organizations required changes to systems during 
the same period, and their networked environments complicated the process. At best, the 
Y2K problem represented a potential interruption to the normal workflow of an 
organization. At worst, the problem jeopardized the reliability and the ultimate safety of 
critical infrastructure operations worldwide. 
Because of the networks over which electronic information travels, a great deal of 
current discourse has identified environments as a source of information security 
problems. Further, among environmental sources, many of the security problems are non-
technical—resulting from the lack of harmony in legal systems, and the cultural 
differences that complicate operations of global organizations, among other issues. 
 
                                                 
2 “Non-technical means” include laws, policies, education, i.e., methods apart from hardware and 
software coding. 
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Historically, however, efforts to improve the security of computer-based systems have 
focused on technical system components, i.e., hardware and software. Researchers and 
practitioners now understand that non-technical issues are significant—equal to if not 
more important than technical issues, and that those at the environmental level are 
especially difficult to manage.  
Very little empirical research exists in the non-technical-environmental area of 
information security. Therefore, helping to fill this gap, the purpose of this theoretically 
based dissertation was to understand ways in which institutionalized environments 
influence information security in large, complex organizations. The successful 
elimination of the Y2K vulnerability provided a model to study how organizations 
contend with problems affecting the security of electronically stored and transmitted 
information, and how context influences their solutions.3 The investigation applied rival 
theories of organization from the sociological literature to analyze organization actions. 
This dissertation presents a case study set around the Year 2000 Program at Delta 
Air Lines (Delta), a complex U.S.-based transportation organization. Employing a 
comparative-case method, the dissertation explained the variation in 1997-2003 
compliance solutions among four business areas, as embedded cases.4 Data for the 
investigation were the Delta Year 2000 Program archive, personal interviews with 
individuals related to the Delta Year 2000 Program, and secondary sources. Evidence 
 
                                                 
3 A vulnerability is a weakness in a computer-based information system. A vulnerability creates a 
risk that a system will malfunction, caused by misuse or other system failure. 
4 For management purposes, Delta organized its IT systems as “portfolios” of systems. The 
portfolios of interest to this study were the software systems that corresponded to the four core business 
areas. 
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revealed characteristics of both the institutional and the rational-contingency models of 
organization.  
The case highlights how analyzing institutionalized environments can broaden 
perceptions and increase understanding of information security, thus enhancing the 
possibility to engage new mechanisms for technological and organizational management. 
Case results showed that: 
• A positive relationship among entities in the sectoral environment benefited the air 
transportation field in addressing the Y2K problem. In this cooperative setting, 
addressing common issues in one place helped a vast network of related 
organizations. Recognizing that all were stakeholders made it work. 
• Business area decisions were influenced by the institutionalized environments of 
their respective fields. 
• In the process of eliminating the Y2K bug from the Delta systems, new 
vulnerabilities were introduced. While tradeoffs are always required among 
security, functionality, and efficiency within the structures and IT systems of the 
present time, this negative effect might have been anticipated; but it was not.  
• The Year 2000 Program team lacked awareness and consideration that the Y2K bug 
was an information security issue.  
• The success of this complex, short-term project at Delta underscored the 
importance of leadership, understanding of IT, vision, motivation, IT skills, 
understanding of assets, and appropriate strategy.  
The Delta case study contributes to the field of organization studies. Results also 






CHAPTER 1      
HOUSTON, WE’VE HAD A PROBLEM 
 
Halfway to the moon, an explosion in the service module destroyed Apollo 13's oxygen 
and power equipment. … Jack Swigert’s first report of a problem is buried under another 
exchange on Flight’s loop, but you can faintly hear Lovell's famous “Houston, we've had 
a problem” a few seconds later (Murray & Cox, 2004b).  
During the 1970 flight of the Apollo 13 spacecraft (at 200,000 miles from Earth 
and moving away at 2100 miles an hour), the crew transmitted a report of a major 
technical problem—a life threatening fault—back to the Mission Control Center in 
Houston, Texas. The Mission Control organization then 
began the emergency procedures that grew into an effort by hundreds of ground 
controllers and thousands of technicians and scientists in NASA contractor plants and on 
university campuses to solve the most complex and urgent problem yet encountered in 
space flight (Woodfill, 2004).  
The problem was a power reduction in one of the two main electrical circuits [“We've 
had a main B bus undervolt” (Lovell, 1970, quoted in Murray & Cox).] that created a 
threat to the computer-controlled Command/Service Module—an information security 
problem.5 The computer that controlled the critical infrastructure systems on the 
spacecraft was losing electrical power, and the time was limited for finding a solution 
before all systems would fail. While this was not a malicious attack such as a date / time 
logic bomb planted by a disgruntled worker, the result was the same. An unexpected 
malfunction placed the computer systems at risk of failure if a solution could not be 
developed in time. The dramatic and ingenious remedies applied by the crew in concert 
with ground-based experts saved the lives of all three members of the crew. Even though 
 
                                                 
5 A threat exists when there is an agent that places a system vulnerability at risk of exploitation. 
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Apollo 13 failed in its mission to land on the moon, it was acclaimed as successful 
because the manual engineering of the spacecraft brought the astronauts safely home.  
The existence of the Y2K bug in the computer systems of critical infrastructure 
organizations prior to the year 2000 created a similar time-limited emergency. The 
emergency was managed and resolved successfully through the work of a large number 
of individuals and organizations. One of the organizations that achieved notable success 
in this effort was Delta Air Lines (Delta). The successful elimination of the vulnerability 
at Delta provided a model to investigate how organizations contend with problems 
affecting the security of electronically stored and transmitted information, and how 
context influences their solutions. Like the threat to the Apollo 13 computer system, the 
risk posed by the Y2K bug to aircraft and crew in Delta’s flight environments was a 
central concern. However, commercial airlines are not flying in the emptiness of outer 
space, but within an airspace that is overcrowded and continuously changing. In addition, 
the institutional entities that work to insure the safety of all passengers and aircraft had 
Y2K problems of their own. In Delta’s case, like Apollo 13, the swift and well-ordered 
processes of a complex collection of entities averted the catastrophic consequences of the 
information security vulnerability. Similarly, Delta’s interventions were hailed by many 
as bold and innovative and set the mark for other organizations by their achievements. 
Furthermore, in contrast, the potential consequences of Y2K-related failures in terms of 
loss of life and property made the Apollo 13 issue seem like a walk in the park. 
Research objective 
The objective of this theoretically-based case study was to understand how 
institutionalized environments influenced information security issues in a large, complex 
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organization. When this dissertation began, there was an expectation that information 
security had been compromised at Delta, possibly unwittingly, by the solutions developed 
during the organization’s Year 2000 Program. The notion went further to implicate 
external interconnections of various sorts in Delta’s institutionalized environment. These 
ideas were reasonable given the history of failures, or at least major difficulties, in large 
IT projects where external agents were involved, and given the history of implication of 
outsiders in security breaches of IT systems in large organizations.  
Even as this dissertation was winding down, an article in the news described of 
this kind of vulnerability, albeit regarding an organization unrelated to the air 
transportation industry (Vijayan, 2006).  The article described a security issue allegedly 
caused by an outside contractor working for the state of Vermont. In the process of 
performing activities related to the systems work, the contractor accidentally posted the 
Social Security numbers of hundreds of health care workers online. Similar incidents had 
been in the news for years; therefore probing a bit at Delta would certainly find such 
evidence there.  
There were two major reasons that the original notions about external influence 
came into focus from an academic perspective. First, prior studies—about normal 
accidents, unanticipated results from planned activities, garbage can models, and ideas 
pointing to a “dark side” of organizations—led to a theoretical forecast whereby in the 
predictable chaos of a large, critical, multi-faceted, time-delimited project, not everything 
would come to pass as an organization would desire it, no matter how well it was 
planned. The expectation was that in the institutionalized environment in which Delta 
lived, outside complexities would compromise information security in unexpected ways.  
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Second, it is usually the case when working on code in an organizational setting 
that myriad issues come to bear on its efficiency and effectiveness at any point in time. 
Just imagining what could happen in an attempt to reconcile technical issues with 
hundreds of application systems, undergoing modification by a number of programmers 
(maybe from outside contractors), in a large, complex organization within a short time 
frame was cause for trepidation. 
However, along with envisioning success for these propositions came the 
recognition that organizations are disinclined to discuss issues related to information 
security for the obvious reason of fear of inviting compromise—to systems, or reputation, 
or both. Therefore, the subject had to be approached with caution and with concern for 
the organization’s perspective. Reasoning that by investigating a successful information 
security event that was fading into history, and by declaring the intent to illuminate the 
involvement of external “culprits,” the confidence that Delta would not be reluctant to 
participate was established. 
Experience has born out some but not all of these preconceived notions. It is true 
that the organization was a receptive target. Delta’s executive management was very 
supportive of the investigation; however, many other Delta employees were cautious 
about contributing to the research, and not all (if any) of their reluctance related to 
concern for security vulnerabilities. Given the state of Delta’s financial condition in 2004 
when the study began, most concerns related to job security or the possible negative 
impact on future employment.6 
 
                                                 
6 The company had cut 13,000 employees, or 16 percent of its work force, in 2001. 
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It is also true that Delta’s Year 2000 Program was complex. Complexities related 
to their financial condition had been evident in the Delta organization for over a decade; 
and especially notable were the complexities in the organization’s struggles for 
leadership; and in its IT systems. Indeed, it was also true that Delta’s external 
environment was the source for compromise to information security, but not in the way 
that was envisioned. The role of Delta’s industry environment was surprisingly one of 
cooperation and support among the regulative entities in air transportation rather than the 
adversarial and inflexible positions that were expected. It was the technologies 
themselves and the institutional arrangements that surrounded them that ultimately set 
Delta up for information security issues.  
Information security vulnerabilities and threats 
By the late 1990s, threats to information security had become a critical issue for 
the U.S., and for the global community of computer users, with no clear understanding of 
how to combat them. Historical evidence had shown that both a growing reliance on 
computer-based systems and their pervasive use had created new vulnerabilities as well 
as multiplied the threats to organizational assets and infrastructure systems. The number 
of malicious attacks was increasing along with the growing number of vulnerabilities. In 
year 2000, the CERT® Coordination Center (CERT/CC) received 1,090 reports of 
security vulnerabilities.7 Figure 1 shows the dramatic rise of reports in the following 
years. 
 
                                                 
7 The CERT®/CC, based at the Carnegie Mellon University, is federally funded and functions as a 
central information exchange repository.  
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Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (2006). 
Figure 1: Security vulnerabilities, 1995-2005 
In the instance of Y2K, an information security vulnerability of unprecedented 
scale, a vast number of organizations had tackled and resolved the problem, even as their 
networked environments complicated the process. A small detail written into the code of 
computer-based systems before the year 2000, often called the “Y2K bug,” had emerged 
to create a worldwide crisis. At best, the Y2K problem represented a potential interruption 
to the normal workflow of an organization. At worst, the problem jeopardized the 
reliability and the ultimate safety of critical infrastructure operations worldwide.8  
Global resolution of this problem by its year 2000 deadline was extremely 
expensive; yet in comparison, the problem was a microcosm of the security problems that 
 
                                                 
8 According to PDD 63, “Critical infrastructures … include, but are not limited to, 
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, 
both governmental and private” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998). 
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remained. The importance of the experiences illuminated by this case is Delta’s success 
in organizing and executing to repair critical flaws in IT systems under very complex 
circumstances. The case is exemplary because of the efficiency of the cooperation and 
coordination within the air transportation environment. 
Perspectives on information security management 
A great deal of dialogue lately has concerned the varied and conflicting 
perspectives regarding information security management; and organizations have been 
the focus of much of the discussion. The problem is one of risk management, and may be 
called a wicked problem because it cannot be solved (Rittel & Webber, 1973). It is a 
process involving trade-offs—a process of understanding vulnerabilities and threats, and 
applying adequate controls (See Figure 1). As vulnerabilities change, and / or as new 
threats are discovered, the controls must adapt in order to maintain adequate security. In 
the volatile setting of a networked system, there is continuous monitoring and evaluation 
of threats, discovery of vulnerabilities, and re-evaluation of controls. The more a user can 
understand the vulnerabilities of the system, the better s/he can control for known threats. 
Increasing the complexity of the systems and the changing nature of threats add to the 
difficulties of the challenge.  
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Source: M. Nelson-Palmer, Georgia Institute of Technology 
Figure 2: Information security is a risk management process 
To improve the management of information security, many practitioners and 
academicians have advocated a holistic approach, where security strategies include 
deliberation and input from the entire organization, as opposed to the more traditional and 
limited view from within the IT department. A holistic approach promotes activities such 
as increasing the awareness and the understanding of security vulnerabilities in 
organizations and the improvements such awareness can bring. However, information 
security is a subject that not many organizations want to highlight. In fact, many 
organizations believe that increasing general understanding of security vulnerabilities can 
not only result in adverse publicity but also bring evildoers to their doors.  
Such topics of discourse revolve around the existence of non-technical factors that 
affect security in organizations in ways not studied in the past. Non-technical factors 
include cultural beliefs and attitudes, norms of behavior, and other social constructions 
that influence security actions, such as ways of organizing or regulatory policies. 
Historically, efforts to improve the security of computer-based systems have focused on 
technical system components, i.e., hardware and software. Researchers and practitioners 
 Threat Vulnerability  
Risk
• a weakness in an information 
system 
• Y2K was a logic bomb 
• an agent that places a 
system vulnerability at 
risk 
• time was the threat 
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now recognize the strong interaction between technical and non-technical aspects of the 
problem, and understand that the non-technical aspects are significant. The non-technical 
aspects are viewed now as equal to if not more important than the technical problems; in 
fact, the non-technical problems are impossible to eliminate. Further, those non-technical 
aspects that exist at the external environment level (i.e., outside organizational 
boundaries), are especially difficult to manage. However, this does not mean that efforts 
to deal with non-technical factors should be abandoned. To the contrary, it means that 
new and more insightful ways to view the problem must be developed in order to 
improve methods of protection. Information security can and must be improved. 
During the crisis of Y2K, both technical and non-technical factors, inside and 
outside organization boundaries, influenced organizations to renovate information 
systems in particular ways. The technical environment (i.e., the technologies) could be 
implicated as the determining cause of certain conditions and behaviors in the workplace. 
However, social scientists have always been skeptical of such arguments, their point 
being that technologies by themselves cannot be the independent cause of anything. It is 
not the technologies alone but the manner in which the technologies are applied, 
reflecting the motives and actions of individuals and groups that control the technologies. 
Examples of known non-technical influences on information security decisions within an 
organization are the knowledge and skills of its members, management involvement, risk 
communication, types of work organization, policies, setting, etc. Less understood are the 
influences that originate outside organizational boundaries, especially those that can be 
characterized as institutional. As consequences of these non-technical types of influences, 
both similarities and differences likely existed among the security solutions of the great 
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variety of complex organizations that staged a Y2K project—even though the Y2K bug 
had immutable technical characteristics. This dissertation has investigated the activities 
inside one of these complex organizations. By investigating the impacts of 
institutionalized environments on the Year 2000 Program at Delta, an opportunity existed 
to learn more about these non-technical aspects of security problems. 
Research question 
The question was, how did Delta go about addressing and solving an IT problem 
that affected the security of its electronically stored and transmitted information, and 
how did contextual conditions influence its solution? This dissertation examined the 
process by which Delta, a complex critical sector organization and one of the nation's 
oldest commercial air transportation organizations, dealt with the crisis of Y2K.  
The crisis of Y2K was created by vulnerability in computer code. Many computer-
based systems containing date calculations had been developed using a two-digit code, 
rather than four, to specify the year. Because of the uncertainty regarding date 
calculations beyond 1999, no one knew whether systems would create erroneous results 
or fail completely without remediation or replacement of the lines of code that contained 
the Y2K bug. 
The crisis of Y2K was a massive information security confrontation that required 
“the largest concentrated effort ever undertaken [by Delta]” (Delta archive, “Mission 
Year 2000 Master Plan, Section 1.0 Executive Summary,” 1998, p. 4). In order to manage 
the remediation/renewal program, in 1996 Delta set up a Program Management Office 
(PMO) that included, among others, a representative from every business area of the 
organization. Its strategic plan for eliminating the security vulnerabilities associated with 
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Y2K included specific activities to be performed in each business area. However, this 
plan lacked momentum; and toward the end of 1997, Delta was under pressure to deal 
with the Y2K bug.  
In that same year, in addition to the focus on the Y2K bug, Delta “launched a 
companywide Information Technology (IT) Transformation process,” with a stated goal 
“to simplify the technological infrastructure, improve efficiency and deliver state-of-the-
art solutions for Delta’s business needs” (Delta Air Lines, 1997, p. 15). Between 1997 
and 2003, Delta’s IT organization (i.e., Delta Technology) inventoried and assessed its IT 
systems, designed a new “transformed” systems architecture, and implemented changes 
both to its organization structures and activities and to its IT systems—all activities that 
were intertwined with solving the organization’s Y2K problem. However, as one might 
expect in a complex organization, these changes were not uniform across the 
organization; instead, they represented a variety of solutions across the business areas. 
Across business areas, some solutions were similar, but also some were different. 
Drawing from Delta’s archival records, interviews, secondary sources, and a review of 
the literature, this dissertation employed an organizational system model an attempt to 
explain what happened and why. 
Structure of the investigation 
The following questions established the structure of the investigation: which of 
two models of an organizational system offers a better explanation for the variation 
among the Y2K solutions of Delta’s business areas? Based on the evidence, does an 
institutional system model or a rational-contingency system model provide a better fit? 
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Further, in developing the model, can environmental conditions be identified as specific 
factors that contributed to the diversity of solutions in the Year 2000 Program?  
If an institutional system model fit the evidence, then this dissertation could verify 
and replicate in the context of the Delta setting the generalization that an organization 
performs based on other than rational preference (cost/benefit) criteria. It could also 
demonstrate that institutionalized environments are important to information security 
management. Institutional theory has been a useful rubric for explaining decisions in 
organizations that cannot be explained by rational choice models. By connecting 
environmental factors to decisions, institutional theory has explained why organizational 
output deviates from what is rationally designed. Even though technical procedures may 
be rationally planned, evidence has shown that cultural and historical forces, and other 
regulative structures, may control ultimate outcomes. (Theorists argue also that the 
behavior of individuals who work within large established organizations can become 
institutionalized.9 The supportive structure and routines can lead to a narrowing or 
reduction in critical judgment and reasoning. This mental outlook can lead to oversights 
and slowed reaction to changes outside the organization thus hindering adaptation to new 
circumstances.) An institutional system model conceptualizes an organization’s technical 
processes as constructed from within a social framework (e.g., organizational structures), 
which in turn is shaped by cultural and historical pressures and institutional 
environments. 
Institutionalization, particularly evidenced by field-wide adoption of 
organizational structures and practices, occurs in all types of organizations and affects 
 
                                                 
9 Using a broad definition, institutionalization refers to an acculturation process, the social 
integration of an organization with its surrounding culture that develops over time. 
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organizational output.10 Institutionalization is a result of routines and of shared 
environments, environments that present cognitive, cooperative, competitive, and 
coercive means to influence thinking and performing.11 Given the importance of 
computer-based information and communication technologies to the functioning of 
modern organizations, many, in fact, propose that coercion is required to improve 
security and recommend laws and regulations that can apply within the organizational 
setting. Paradoxically, computer-based communication and operation are constrained and 
channeled in ways that derive from laws, rules, and practices designed for organizations, 
but that may actually impede organizational effectiveness as well as adequate security 
management.  
Overall results of Y2K for Delta included not only the elimination of the Y2K bug, 
but also updated software systems and equipment that produced gains in processing 
accuracy, productivity, and efficiency. However, among its four core business areas, 
outcomes varied in scale. The Airport Customer Service area replaced almost everything, 
as CIO Charlie Feld said, “Plow the field, and replace.” The other three areas—
Operations (aircraft and crew), Business Support (accounting, finance, HR), and Revenue 
(sales and marketing)—remediated code prior to the rollover, but later replaced a number 
of systems with commercial off the shelf (COTS) applications. In the Operations area in 
particular, Technical Operations (Tech Ops) made a huge investment in COTS ERP 
(enterprise resource management) systems after the Y2K crisis had passed. This 
dissertation examined these Y2K compliance solutions by analyzing the four business 
 
                                                 
10 An organizational field consists of communities of related organizations: organizations that 
produce similar services or products together with their suppliers, resource and product consumers, and 
regulatory agencies. 
11 Cognitive refers to mental processes of knowing, thinking, and learning. 
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areas as embedded cases in order to understand: What caused the differences in approach 
to Y2K solution? If all business areas had the same technical problem, and the Year 2000 
Program was managed as an organization-wide effort with the same mission, how did the 
different results come about? Further, upon reflective analysis, were the various 
remedies the best choices with respect to information security management? 
This dissertation sought to answer these questions by investigating non-technical 
factors in the specific business area environments that may have contributed to the 
diverse technical solutions. One might speculate that the Y2K team in each business area 
chose the most rational and efficient route to dispose of the problem, and that efficiency 
meant different solutions within different business areas. One might speculate also that 
solutions could be described as incremental changes, representing modest alterations to 
existing information systems, which were dissimilar among business areas. However, 
investigation of this dissertation was focused especially on institutional aspects, including 
how institutional manifestations may have varied with respect to differences in the 
institutionalized environments of business areas, i.e., sector histories with respect to 
culture, regulation, and computer processing, and associated best practices. 
The attempt to locate determining sources of variation involved sorting through a 
number of complexities. The investigation began with the central assumption of a 
tendency toward isomorphism within the respective fields represented by Delta business 
areas.12 Initial questions included, what were the specific solutions in response to the Y2K 
problem in each setting? How was each business area setting organized? What 
 
                                                 
12 Isomorphism is a process whereby organizational characteristics diffuse within a field to create 
more similarity among organizations over time (Scott, 1992, p. 209). 
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organizational cultures existed? Did business areas deal with dissimilar regulatory 
requirements, or other specialized institutional rules or practices, or something else?13  
Importance of the dissertation 
Answers to these questions were important for several reasons. First, by revealing 
the influence of institutional context on Y2K compliance approaches, this research had 
the potential to demonstrate the value of an environmental-level approach to information 
security management, i.e., consideration for ways of improving security management 
through environment-based mechanisms. Next, it could reveal ways in which institutional 
environments shape organizational structures and processes. Thus, this empirical 
investigation allowed examination of hypotheses with respect to information security that 
theorists had generated about institutional influences in general and therefore might be of 
interest to social scientists.  
The dissertation sought also to contribute to the field of public policy. It examined 
information security in organizations as an important societal issue that was timely and 
critical to organization survival. In addition, because of the global nature of networks and 
the e-commerce environment, the issue transcended national boundaries. Therefore, the 
dissertation’s focus on environmental influences could contribute to understanding on the 
part of public policy-makers who face decisions that impinge on the entire global policy 
space. Further, the structural similarities of public and private organizations, and their 
common utilization of networked information systems, make this research of potential 
interest to managers in all types of organizations, in addition to information security 
 
                                                 
13 Institutional theory claims that patterns of organizational interaction and adaptation develop in 
response to social and cultural environments. Such patterns, even if supportive of an organization’s primary 
mission, may not contribute favorably to maintaining adequate security. 
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researchers. Indeed, all users of information technology—as individuals and as 
organizations—have a stake in providing for the security of the network commons. 
Therefore, increased understanding of the process of improving information security 
management in organizations is important and useful to consumers and to the public-at-
large.  
Finally, as is true with any initial effort, likely there were both mistakes and 
improvements made via the Year 2000 process. Analyzing the effort and debriefing 
participants offers decision-makers the opportunity to understand factors that affect the 
safety of critical infrastructures. If, on the one hand, this research effort could show that 
laws, regulations, industry guidelines, or other institutionalized patterns were at odds with 
the Y2K problem solution, the analysis could provide direction to correct these issues. On 
the other hand, if structural systems were harmonious, this knowledge could be used to 
add confidence and strengthen efforts to improve information security management. 
Organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as ten chapters. This chapter provides overview 
information on the current information security problem, and the structure of this 
investigation. The overview presents background information paying particular attention 
to organizations’ dependence on vulnerable information networks, the social conflicts in 
information security management, and the difficulties that abound in the current security 
terrain. The chapter also describes a bounding framework for organizing the information 
security literature. Chapter 2 is a literature review, which reflects both the information 
security literature and the organization theory literature that supported the arguments of 
this dissertation. Chapter 3 presents hypotheses about how institutionalized environments 
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influence information security solutions and the design for the investigation. The chapter 
outlines the approach to addressing the research question, and explains how this approach 
addresses both the empirical problem and the gap in the information security literature. 
Chapter 4 describes the sources of evidence and the research method, which is a cross-
case comparison of organizational and environmental characteristics and Y2K solutions 
among four Delta business areas. Chapters 5 and 6 provide background on the Delta 
organization and the Year 2000 Program, respectively, which represented the common 
context for the case studies. Chapter 7 describes and analyzes the environments and 
solutions at the individual sub-case level and presents metrics from Y2K assessments in 
each case. In Chapter 8, these solutions and contexts are compared across business areas. 
In Chapter 9, events and outcomes related to information security following the rollover 
of Year 2000 are discussed. Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, presents a summary of 
findings, a discussion of the limitations and theoretical implications of this dissertation, 
and practical ideas for information security management. The next section begins the 
overview discussion of the information security problem. 
Overview of the information security problem 
We are now using our most novel, fragile, and vulnerable infrastructure to operate and 
coordinate all of the others. There is no part of our social and economic infrastructure that 
is not operated by our telecommunications infrastructure (Murray, cited in Parker, 1998, 
p. xii). 
Critical infrastructure systems: a growing concern 
Our economic and social well-being depends on the reliability of computer-
controlled infrastructure operations and the global networks to which many are 
connected. In the past, infrastructure organizations were relatively distinct, autonomous, 
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and had few interconnections. Now, thanks to computer-based systems, all of these 
organizations represent a proliferation of complex interconnections and 
interdependencies. While the extensive reach of such networked environments adds 
enormous productivity and operations control benefits, it also adds complexity and 
increased vulnerability. The global nature of the Internet and its common use by millions 
of individuals and organizations worldwide raises the risk of interruption or damage to 
information systems.  
Failures in critical infrastructure systems—such as the August 2003 blackout in 
the Northeast and Midwest; and network breaches that disabled Bank of America's 
automatic teller machine network, interrupted a nuclear power plant network in Ohio, and 
the operations of CSX Corporation trains and Continental Airlines flights (Berlind, 
2003)—not only confirm their importance, but also reveal their vulnerability. The Y2K 
bug—the systems code that had become a standard programming practice—had the 
potential to generate events with similar grievous outcomes in vitally important systems. 
These happenings foreshadow what could happen in an intentional security breach 
designed to cause harm.  
Among the public, a common concern about information security is a system 
breach that could result in theft of valuable personal or corporate information.14 Yet, 
security breaches also may include the corruption of information, a condition with less 
evidence of public consideration. Destroying the integrity of processed, stored, and/or 
transmitted information can impair its accuracy and thus interrupt business activities, and 
 
                                                 
14 “Identity theft topped the list of consumer fraud complaints to the Federal Trade Commission 
[FTC] in 2003… the commission estimated that identity theft hit 9.9 million victims in 2002 … as many as 
27.3 million in the last five years” (McGuire, 2004).  
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critical control functions. The availability of accurate information helps an organization 
to control and coordinate its internal and external activities and relationships, and 
influences its effectiveness. The potential for corruption of information, and its 
implications for critical infrastructure systems, was the chief security issue of Y2K. 
Corruption can originate from various acts: accidents and mistakes; and criminal 
misconduct, such as corporate espionage, propagation of viruses, denial-of-service 
attacks; and even cyber-terrorism. While some have discounted the idea that a network 
attack can actually damage physical objects (Lewis, 2002), others have written about the 
real possibility (Byers, Rubin, & Kormann, 2003), and have pointed to events 
characterized as cyber-terrorism that have already occurred.15 Goodman, Hassebroek, 
King, and Ozment (2002) suggests if we cannot find answers within a few years, 
criminals will use computers as instruments to bring about enormous physical damage. 
Taking into account the continuation of computer crime and other threats to critical 
systems, it is essential to better protect and defend against computer-based attacks—and 
to provide safety features to guard against other failures.16 
Non-technical factors in information security management 
Even though maintaining technical systems is a very important part of managing 
security in networked systems, non-technical aspects are important as well. Managing 
security with respect to non-technical aspects involves managing unresolved social 
 
                                                 
15 In 2001, a Queensland man was found guilty of using his car as a command center to sabotage the 
computer that controlled a sewage treatment plant (Osborn, 2003). In 2003, a teenager is alleged to have 
brought computer systems to a halt at the Port of Houston, in Texas, from his bedroom in Shaftesbury, 
Dorset, in what police believe to be the first electronic attack to disable a critical part of a country's 
infrastructure (Allison, 2003). 
16 A threat exists when there is an agent that places a system vulnerability at risk of exploitation. 
This work limits focus to the human agent, apart from natural causes (e.g., weather related damage). 
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conflicts and other obstacles, both within organizations and in the larger social 
environment. While organizations want to protect information in their systems from 
technological accidents and criminal misuse, they also want to permit reasonable access 
to information for those who are authorized to use it, and to maintain adequate privacy of 
information that belongs to individuals and organizations. Obstacles to achieving these 
goals exist both in dealing with complex, changing technology, and in the political 
environment. Thus, social or non-technical factors complicate the technical challenges. 
In the U.S., especially, information security is affected by unresolved social 
conflicts. All organizations face decisions about the best ways to use and to protect their 
systems, and about the amount of staffing and funding needed to enable adequate 
security. However, complicating this decision process is a tension between individuals 
and organizations. Individuals want the advantages that using computer-based networks 
provide; and they want their personal information protected. Yet, information privacy 
cannot happen without effective security. Furthermore, any advantage of network use, 
such as customized information and online transactions, jeopardizes the security of their 
information. Organizations also want to use computer processing and network 
transactions to their advantage—to make their operations more efficient and to acquire 
competitive position. A secure environment that supports integrated, enterprise-wide 
information systems is important to processing accuracy.17 In addition, increasing 
competitive position through management of supply chains and e-commerce requires 
essential focus on security. Especially in online environments, concern for public image 
motivates attention to security. Organizations want to be viewed as responsible, reliable, 
 
                                                 
17 It is difficult to achieve and confirm data accuracy with disparate internal systems, possibly 
incompatible for network connection. 
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and trustworthy; therefore, they value systems security and other attributes that promote 
this image. In contrast, organizations operating in the competitive environment of 
cyberspace also want to use the personal information of network users and customers in 
ways that can increase their revenues and their competitiveness. Many customers view 
this as irresponsible, unreliable, and untrustworthy—as exhibiting behavior that is 
unethical and unconstitutional. 
The role of government is another source of conflict in the process of providing 
information security.18 Neither individual citizens nor organizations are eager for 
unauthorized use of private information, or for government surveillance of private 
electronic transactions that would assist in tracking criminals. However, the 
government’s national defense community, as well as standard law enforcement, has 
need for surveillance capability (Denning, 1997). While there is consensus that networks’ 
vulnerability to fraud, theft, and other disturbances should be reduced, the methods that 
public agencies recommend for tackling the problem are fraught with problems.19  
These conflicts reveal the challenge for information security policymakers in 
determining an acceptable balance between freedom and order. Just as we need to 
increase the security of information systems—improving the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information—by providing controls to mitigate malicious acts, normal 
accidents, and mistakes, we seek to improve the usability of systems while maintaining 
the privacy of individual and organization information.  
 
                                                 
18 Incidentally, public organizations face many of the same concerns as private sector organizations 
about the aforementioned and other security issues.  
19 For example, many involved with intelligence and law enforcement argue that identifying 
terrorists requires enhanced access and use of information. However, the use of corporate databases 
containing personal information on individuals in an effort to identify terrorists has been met with criticism 
from those who see such measures as a threat to privacy. 
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Proper prescription for information security ailments can only happen after first 
reconciling the discrepancies between the goals of individuals and organizations. An 
institutional infrastructure must be coordinated among social, organizational, and 
political rule systems. As part of this process, structures at a societal level—cultural, 
economic, and political—must all adapt and integrate new information into an established 
institutional system of values and functions. Then organizations can improve information 
security management with a clearer understanding of how environments influence the 
behavior of individuals and organizations, and how those influences ultimately affect IT 
systems and the security of their information. 
Obstacles in the security terrain: complexity, change, and politics 
Researchers and practitioners have developed and implemented numerous 
approaches for improving systems security, but reports of both malicious exploitation of 
information networks and other system malfunctions confirm that networks remain 
vulnerable and that the intrusions are taxing human ability to respond. The financial 
losses to organizations have taken a heavy toll (Richardson, 2004). These reports have 
shown either that we have not discovered the optimal combination that works to protect 
systems adequately, or that perhaps approaches have been prescribed without first 
properly determining an organization’s essential requirements. Major obstacles in the 
security terrain are systems complexity, rapidly changing technologies, and 
complications in the political arena.20 First, consider the issue of systems complexity. As 
 
                                                 
20 A report by the NAS Computer Science and Technology Board (National Research Council, 1991) 
attributes the “computer security problem” to the rapid pace of technological change, the slow pace of 
government interventions (through procurement and evaluation programs), export controls, a lack of 
consumer understanding of the risks, and the limited recourse that U.S. users have against vendors of 
flawed software. 
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computers have become more powerful and organizations have become more diverse, 
people have designed systems that are more complex.21  Failures in large technical 
systems—so-called “normal accidents”—have been attributed to complexity (Perrow, 
1984; Petroski, 1994; Sagan, 1993). A quick analysis of large system failures usually 
results in blaming the operators. Often, however, while operator error is the most direct 
source, the real culprit is the unexpected or unforeseen consequences of complexity.  
A second obstacle in the security terrain is rapidly changing technologies. The 
past few decades have seen a tremendous increase in both the breadth and complexity of 
computer-based systems. As the fast pace of technology development continues, vendors 
hurl complex application software and advanced hardware on the market without 
standards or adequate testing. It is difficult for users, including systems administrators, to 
keep up with changes in the products that have been released and employed.22 Security 
patching, program configuration, and other security-related activities require relentless 
effort. One may speculate in the case of Y2K that the technologies were so difficult to 
maintain and the changes were emerging so rapidly that it became difficult to stay abreast 
of changes. Did the snarl of change management eclipse the date problem? 
Finally, failures in large technological systems are associated with not only 
human practices and mental processes, but with broader social structures such as culture, 
communication, and politics (Cohen & Noll, 1991; Klein, 2000; Vaughan, 1990).23 Klein 
suggested that conflict between coalition politics and program administration can explain 
 
                                                 
21 Evidence of systems complexity is the enormous amount of effort and expense required in the Y2K 
compliance process, eliminating a small piece of technical code from IT systems. 
22 Ironically, increasing homogeneity in hardware and software also makes information technology 
(IT) more vulnerable. Consider the widespread use of Microsoft Outlook and the TCP/IP protocol. These 
products have enabled the propagation of viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, often called malicious 
software. [Note: Referring to malicious software, Schneier (2000) calls this “malware” (p. 151).] 
23 The Y2K process involved all of these societal structures. 
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failures in large, complex systems development programs. Political forces common to 
most programs create three general offenders, any of which can contribute to system 
failures: geography, multifunctionality, and budgetary uncertainty.  
These technical, political, and fiscal obstacles are formidable. However, even if 
we were able to exclude them, we cannot make such systems completely reliable and 
secure because of the restrictive user environment this would create. Using information 
systems requires human interaction, which means accessibility. The human contribution 
to the problem, the “user access,” is a large part of its intractability. Information security 
requires a careful balance between user access and information safeguard (McFadden, 
1997), in addition to balancing risk and expenditure (Schneier, 2003). Social norms, 
regulatory structures, organization culture, cognitive processes, and the presence of other 
organizations influence user behavior within organizations. We need to understand those 
parts of the problem better so that we can minimize security incidents and avoid 
catastrophic failures.  
Uncertainty and complexity are evident both in the problem space of information 
security, and in the way that stakeholders want the problem addressed. Such conditions 
create problems for action; both organizations and individuals lack the conviction that 
enables decisive direction. According to Turner (1976), “Action is made possible in 
organizations by the collective adoption of simplifying assumptions about the 
environment, producing what Simon (1976) called a framework of ‘bounded rationality’” 
(p. 378). It is imperative therefore, that empirical effort be guided by a bounding 
framework that promotes clearer understanding.  
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A conceptual framework for literature in the information security field 
A conceptual framework incorporating four dimensions organizes the information 
security literature, and exposes gaps where further research is needed. The four 
dimensions are organization, environment, technical, and non-technical. While these 
dimensions are not the dichotomous variables represented in the framework, they are 
presented in this form as an aid to broad classification. Positioning these dimensions as a 
matrix (See Table 1), the technical-organization quadrant contains the bulk of the 
academic literature on information security. The remaining three quadrants hold the 
relatively fewer and more recent works. 
Table 1: Framework for information security literature 























On the horizontal axis, the framework segments the information security research 
into two areas of focus, predominantly technical or non-technical. On the vertical axis, 
the framework further divides the research depending on its level of application, either 
organization or environment. That is, does the research relate to information security 
from the perspective of an organization and its internal activities or from that of an 
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organization as it spans outward to its environment, such as to the marketplace, sectoral 
environment, or socio-political system?24  
Summary 
This chapter introduced the research problem, the research question, and the 
context of the broader information security landscape. The information security 
landscape was presented in three sections, paying particular attention to organizations’ 
dependence on vulnerable information networks, the social conflicts in information 
security management, and the difficulties that abound in the current security terrain. A 
fourth section described a bounding framework for organizing the information security 
literature, designed to expose gaps where further research is needed. 
 
 
                                                 
24 One aspect of organizational environment is its “technical,” or “task,” environment, which refers 
to sources of “material [resources], technologies, and information essential to the transformation of inputs 
into outputs” (Dill; Thompson, cited in Scott, 2000, p. 1). Environment also refers to social, political, and 
cultural influences on behavior. As a third aspect, direct association to the natural environment was 
excluded in this study. 
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CHAPTER 2      
WHAT EARLIER WORKS HAVE CONTRIBUTED 
 
The essence of good security engineering is understanding the potential threats to a 
system, then applying an appropriate mix of protective measures—both technological and 
organizational—to control them (Anderson, 2001b, p. xx). 
This chapter reviews the information security literature using the four-quadrant 
framework that was developed in Chapter 1. Applying this framework, the organization-
environment quadrant reveals a gap in understanding of the information security problem. 
Following the review of the research domain of information security, the literature of 
organization studies is presented in this chapter as a way to build knowledge in this area.  
Information security literature 
Table 2 positions topics within the literature-organizing scheme described in 
Chapter 1. The leftmost two quadrants contain a non-exhaustive list of topic areas in the 
literature focused on technical information security, that which concerns strictly hardware 
and/or software-related issues.25 A review of this research revealed that problems 
continue to shadow technical strategies, such as access control (including defense against 
malware) and software development methods. Software developers have difficult 
problems, not the least of which is that both distributed systems and security principles 
are relatively recent additions to their work (Anderson, 2001a). The continual discovery 
of software bugs (only revealed through attacks that exploit them), has substantiated the 
need for improvement in this area. In addition, many technical strategies have been detail 
 
                                                 
25 This review does not identify specific work in the technical area. Because of the focus of the 
study, discussion is limited to literature related to non-technical topics. 
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intensive and have required tailoring to a specific system and continuous vigilance to 
insure that systems are properly fortified. Such methods have invited problems because 
of the attention required (Goodman, Hassebroek, King, & Ozment, 2003). Turner (1976) 
has described these methods as a way of circumnavigating an ill-structured problem. 
System administrators must stay highly motivated for these methods to be effective.  
Until recently, the literature defined information security only by the technical 
aspects of the problem. The literature has proposed technical changes for managing 
systems, but neglected the human aspects. Different from a technical perspective with its 
focus on hardware and software, a non-technical perspective relates to the reciprocal 
nature of the relationship between people and systems. A non-technical perspective views 
people as the designers and users of the systems, and therefore, as the instrument for 
security management. A non-technical perspective includes consideration for 
organization context, including both its institutional and its task environments, which is 
related to human motivation, responsibility, and ethical decision-making. An illustration 
of the technical and non-technical nature of information security management is the pilot 
program announced in 2004 by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The 
TSA plan described employing technical systems to improve the security inspection of 
airline passengers (Verton, 2004). Biometric systems, such as fingerprint and iris 
scanners, were the foundation for the authentication system, together with an IT network 
component to integrate this information with a TSA database. However, providing 
adequate security using this system entailed not only designing the technical features, but 
also required a non-technical component: the project required structures and procedures 
for people to administer the systems and to analyze and evaluate results. 
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Non-technical topics in the information security literature are shown in the 
rightmost two quadrants of Table 2.26 This literature is largely conceptual in nature with 
little evidence to support the ideas. In addition, those empirical studies that do exist 
exclusively relate to activities internal to an organization, the topics shown in the upper 
right quadrant. This review briefly discusses those studies. Following this discussion is an 
overview of published ideas in the non-technical-environment category, the lower right 
quadrant that contains this dissertation. 
Table 2: Classification of information security literature 
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Studies focused on non-technical factors in organizations 
Computer-based information and communication technologies are essential for 
work performance within modern organizations. However, their reliable functioning 
cannot be guaranteed because of threats inherent in human-computer interaction. Threats 
 
                                                 
26 This matrix classifies research relevant to IT security management. Knowledge—as well as social 
and economic values and belief systems—dictates approach choices at each grid location. The matrix might 
also be titled “Strategies to reduce information security risk.” 
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to the security of information in organizational systems exist in both intentional (whether 
premeditated or opportunistic) and unintentional forms. Intentional system breaches can 
be brought about by “social engineering” (Mitnick, 2002) and other forms of insider 
misconduct. Studies concerned with the threat of insider access (CNSS, 1999; 
Harrington, 1995; Hsu & Kuo, 2003; Leonard & Cronan, 2001; Loch & Conger, 1996; 
Peace, Galletta, & Thong, 2003) have determined significant indicators for insider-
induced systems problems. The collective knowledge from these studies have implicated 
factors such as individual attitudes, subjective norms, gender, and perceived behavioral 
controls—maybe an employee with certain situational or personality characteristics who 
corrupts system operation whether by mistake or by purposely gaining unauthorized 
system access. In an investigation of the information systems that facilitated ATM fraud 
in British banks, Anderson (1994) found that “[t]he conventional threat model, of a 
capable motivated attacker, was wrong; attacks were essentially opportunistic.” The study 
revealed a pattern of losses variously attributed to processing errors, to thefts by staff, or 
to individuals tampering with the postal service, with system design and operation 
problems accounting for most of the rest.  
Assessing such threats to organizational systems is the first step in the information 
security process. The next step is to determine the risk in each kind of possible misuse, 
and to decide how much to spend on control. One obstacle that continues to limit 
improvement in information security management is the assessment of information 
security as strictly a cost, instead of as part of the portfolio of risk management issues. 
The threat and risk evaluation process is vital, and goes hand in hand with an 
understanding of available control strategies. However, even if organizations use risk 
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assessment practices in evaluating security investments, when inconsistent values are 
placed on risk, different organizations will respond differently in their attempts to 
improve the condition. Ezell (1998) developed a risk management framework that uses 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to quantify the risks of intentional 
threats to special purpose control systems. A survey documented information on cyber 
malfunction, and determined the security concerns of administrators of supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in water utilities, in order to find ways of 
improving robustness, and resistance to intentional breaches.27 
Understanding the perception of such risk to an organization directly relates to 
protection strategy. Research surveys separated by over 10 years (Loch, Carr, & 
Warkentin, 1992; Whitman, 2004) revealed that the perception of threats held by 
information system (IS) managers over 10 years ago was still prevalent in 2004. 
Respondents, all senior IS managers, professed awareness of the risk, and believed they 
were doing well to mitigate it. They believed their organization to be at low risk from 
viruses, while they believed other organizations to be at higher risk. They were not 
familiar with state and federal laws concerning computer crimes and believed that their 
employees and competitors operate in good faith. These findings are significant in that if 
an organization’s threat assessment is inconsistent with reality, the organization will fail 
to apply appropriate mitigating mechanisms. According to Anderson (1994), 
“[e]xplicitness is fundamental to robust security. One must be explicit not just about 
threats, but about how these are tied to mechanisms and how the system will be operated; 
it is the failure to do this which causes the typical loophole” (p. 37). 
 
                                                 
27 As a critical infrastructure control mechanism, SCADA systems allow utility operators to monitor 
and control processes distributed among various remote sites. 
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Most researchers in the non-technical-organization area have generally supported 
a holistic approach to security (e.g., Dhillon, 2001; Hitchings, 1995; and James, 1996) 
and have advocated risk models and security processes that include people and practices 
enterprise-wide (i.e., not limiting focus to a particular aspect of a component system). 
This view thus considers traditional ideas of technical information security—assuring 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability—as only part of the plan. A fundamental 
element to a holistic approach is alignment of policy for information security with the 
activities of the organization, making it a part of overall organizational policies. Policy 
alignment can provide a culture of security that can improve security practices, including 
increasing awareness. 
Designing organization policies that promote reliable, error-free systems is 
difficult (Anderson, 2001a), but user policies can provide education and structure that 
affects the security practices of organization members. Harrington (1996) found that 
providing a code of ethics helped to deter unethical behavior. Peace et al. (2003), a study 
of software piracy in the workplace, concluded that punishment certainty, severity, and 
software cost had direct effects on intention toward unethical behavior. 
A range of controls can be effective in limiting misuse, including the use of 
security software and an active security staff that informs users about unacceptable 
system use and penalties for noncompliance (Straub, 1990; Straub & Nance, 1990). The 
use of security software has required high-quality systems administration, as improper 
configuration and monitoring leads to opportunities for insiders to misuse the system 
easily (Anderson, 1994).28 Schultz (2002) presented an algorithm that predicted insider 
 
                                                 
28  In conjunction with willful misuse, human error is a lingering problem (Wood & Banks, 1993; 
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threat based on activity logging, but if improper systems management were the problem, 
administrators would be unlikely to employ such an algorithm.  
These strategy issues have underscored the value of senior management to 
security (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002). While it has long been the practice for management 
to compartmentalize the IT function, considered a specialized niche operation, 
management must now view the IT function among the other functional areas that must 
adapt to environmental pressures (Cannon & Woszczynski, 2002). According to Long 
(1999), even though many have believed that top management is key to information 
security within an organization, management generally failed to possess an adequate 
understanding of security issues and control mechanisms. Straub and Welke (1998) 
reported similar results from studies in two IT Fortune 500 companies: managers 
typically were not aware of available security measures.  
The theme that came through in the analysis of this body of work was that 
understanding threats and matching them with effective controls is key to improving 
information security. However, studies were limited to the internal organization system. 
If the influences of external environment were not considered, knowledge of either what 
constitutes a threat or what might be a full range of effective controls would not be 
possible. A number of initiatives have been developed that focused on organizational 
environment, but no studies have been performed that would indicate that these initiatives 
were helping to improve information security management.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chestnut, 2000). 
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Topics focused on non-technical factors in environments 
Topics in the non-technical-environment category of Table 2 included the 
cultural, interorganizational, national, and international sphere of information security. 
Collaboration and cooperation were current themes in this area. Organization self-
regulation—the potential for organizations to manage the security of their own 
information systems, rather than through state intervention—was a focus in this 
category.29 Attempting to stave off intervention—and because security management is 
difficult—industries and professional groups have collaborated in the interest of better 
tools and practices. While risky to an organization because of the possibility of exposing 
vulnerabilities in their own systems, sharing information with outsiders has been 
important for learning how to manage security more effectively. In 2003, the Global 
Council of CSOs (chief security officers) was formed in order to “share information on 
Internet security … and to attempt to work with vendors to reduce risks” (Wrolstad, 
2003).30 In civil aviation, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) is an 
organization of long-standing, with international reach and active information sharing 
among its member organizations, which includes 270 airlines from 130 countries. 
Information security initiatives of interest to this global alliance have included using the 
travel reservation infrastructure as a system for surveillance of travelers, Computer 
 
                                                 
29 Private organizations wish to avoid dependency and regulation, which has the potential to limit 
their autonomy. Limited government intervention has been the subject of a number of publications that 
observe the advantage of free market development and its effect on innovation, and production (e.g., 
Werbach, 1997; Neuman et al., 1998; Odlyzko, 1998; Lessig, 1999). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
adopts such a position.  
30 Founding members included Howard A Schmidt of eBay (former White House cyber-security 
adviser), Bill Boni of Motorola, Vint Cerf of MCI, Scott Charney of Microsoft, Dave Cullinane of 
Washington Mutual, Mary Ann Davidson of Oracle, Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Steve Katz 
formerly of Citigroup, Rhonda MacLean of Bank of America, and Will Pelgrin of the New York State 
Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure. See http://www.csocouncil.org/. 
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Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II (CAPPS-II), US- VISIT, Advance Passenger 
Information System (APIS), and biometric, radio frequency identification (RFID) on 
passports and other travel documents.31  
In addition to private initiatives, a number of organizations have enabled the 
sharing of information between government and private organizations. The CERT® 
Coordination Center (the CERT®/CC) and the World Wide Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (World Wide ISAC)32 have served as reporting centers for security 
incidents. Other ISACs have assembled around critical infrastructure industries and 
served as community forums.33 InfraGard is a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
program that promotes protection of critical information systems through information 
sharing. Its members are required to be U.S. citizens, and must undergo a background 
check performed by the FBI.34 
While organizations have attempted to provide confidential settings for discussing 
security issues, national laws and other regulations make issues public. U.S. federal level 
policymakers have proposed legislation to provide stronger incentives for organizations 
to improve their security practices, much as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) provided to publicly-traded companies during the Y2K period (Gross, 2003). 
However, given present understanding of the complex problems that organizations face in 
 
                                                 
31 After Sept. 11, 2001, Congress passed laws requiring countries in the Visa Waiver Program to 
issue biometric, machine-readable passports by Oct. 26, 2004. See 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,62876,00.html. 
32 Information in the World Wide ISAC database comes from its members, U.S. Government 
agencies, hardware and software vendors, and other sources. 
33 Internet Security Systems (ISS), a private sector company that provides managed security services 
(bought by IBM in 2006), hosts the Information Technology ISAC. Airports Council International - North 
America (ACI-NA) has the role of sector coordinator for the Aviation ISAC. 
34 The Georgia Tech Information Security Center (GTISC) is an underwriter of Atlanta’s InfraGard 
program, the second largest chapter in the country. 
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addressing security, designing effective federal level legislation acceptable to all 
stakeholders might be very difficult to achieve.  
Legislative efforts were present in the U.S. at both state and federal levels that 
focused on improvement of security in organizational networked systems. Depending on 
the jurisdictions within which an organization operated, any successful legislative action 
required multiple compliance obligations and a legal staff to oversee its compliance. For 
instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, commonly 
known as HIPAA (pronounced “hip’ ah”), included provisions that encouraged electronic 
transactions, but also required new safeguards to protect the security of health 
information. Other legislative acts requiring compliance, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOA), mandated various activities to certify business processes that affect security 
policies for an organization (Bigelow, 1995).35 
The international character of global networks has prevented total reliance on 
legal means to influence system use.  
Laws and tax regimes are based on geography, not network topology; online merchants, 
for example, may be allowed to sell some products in some countries but not others 
(“Geography and the net: Putting it in its place,” 2001).  
A consequence of global networks has been the inevitable interaction between U.S. law 
and that of other countries. Laws to promote security and the protection of intellectual 
property have differed widely across countries (American Bar Association, 2003), these 
laws based on cultural differences among other issues. Any nation that has laws 
inadequate to define and enforce information security has created a safe haven for 
 
                                                 
35 The Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002 mandates that CEOs and CFOs of publicly-traded companies 
personally attest to the validity of financial statements and other information, and that their companies have 
proper “internal controls.” 
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network users who would use the network for criminal activities (Goodman, Hassebroek, 
King, & Ozment, 2003). This situation is likely to remain despite efforts to harmonize 
laws.  
International agreements have involved collaborative and cooperative efforts 
similar to information sharing, and legal initiatives. International agreements offer the 
possibility of globally coordinating efforts to share information, track criminals, effect 
standards, and harmonize the disparate laws of sovereign nations. The Stanford Draft 
Convention (Sofaer, Grove & Wilson, 2001) proposed a legal globalism for cyberspace. 
Universal support and ratification of a treaty of this kind helps to eliminate safe havens 
for attackers. An international initiative of note is the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime.  
The Convention broke new ground by being the first multilateral agreement drafted 
specifically to address the problems posed by the international nature of computer crime 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2003).  
Although harmonization of laws was just one focus for this treaty, much of the rest of the 
work depended on this foundation. On August 3, 2006, the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime, the first and only international treaty designed exclusively to 
combat computer crime, won approval from the U.S. Senate, but continued to garner 
criticism from groups concerned with privacy (McCullagh & Broache, 2006). However, 
other groups, including the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Cyber Security 
Industry Alliance (CSIA), supported the treaty.  
Klein (2002) and “Milton Mueller Delivers Gerbner Lecture 2000” (2000) 
expressed the notion that Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) could be effective as an international regime. Mueller stated, “… [T]he creation 
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of ICANN can be seen as a process by which resource assignment and allocation are 
linked to [international] regulation and control.” 
Beyond cooperative arrangements, strategies at the environment-level have 
included incentives and constraints in the marketplace or political system, often using 
regulations and policies that required legislative and justice system investments and 
interventions. Anderson (2001a), Varian (2000), and Schneier (2000) discussed these 
avenues for improving security management, and advocated empirical investigation. 
Anderson described the practice of liability dumping by European banks and software 
companies. In the U.S., banks were responsible for risks in the use of their technologies, 
while in Britain and other countries, banks defended the “truth” of the information 
system. In Anderson’s view, if the bank carried the risk, then security would become a 
“straightforward engineering problem.” Similarly, software companies were dumping 
liability on the users. These same works have argued that law should hold organizations 
responsible for distributing information systems products without proper testing, and that 
risk insurance should include incentives for adequate organizational security.36 Varian 
wrote that insurers want clients with adequate security, which gives insurers incentive to 
instruct their clients in how to achieve it.37 “This … illustrates one of the fundamental 
principles of the economic analysis of liability: it should be assigned to the party that can 
do the best job of managing risk.” 
 
                                                 
36 The U.S. Senate shelved legislative bills designed to protect corporations from product liability 
lawsuits stemming from Y2K computer glitches (Barlas, 1999). The Business Roundtable CEOs 
recommended that software vendors incur liability for distribution of insecure products (“Meeting of the 
Business Roundtable Information Security Coordinating Committee,” 2003). 
37 J.S. Wurzler Underwriting Managers requires that an organization demonstrate a certain level of 
security before providing systems failure coverage (Brush, 2001). 
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The ideas put forth in the non-technical-environment category were promising; 
however, they were limited, and largely unexplored and untested. The expansion of focus 
in information security literature to include such environmental-level social concerns 
reflected not only the explosion in computer-based communication in recent years, but 
also the addition of a new global community of users. Thus, not only was a larger, more 
volatile setting for investigation developing, but also a new perspective on information 
security. 
In summary, this review of information security literature has focused on non-
technical aspects, and has provided an overview of research in both the non-technical-
organizational and non-technical-environmental quadrants of Table 2. Research in the 
non-technical-organizational quadrant was focused on activities internal to organizations 
that affect security; more specifically, the research examined the effects of various 
internal deterrents to both intended and unintended disruption of information systems 
within organizations. Conversely, topics in the non-technical-environment quadrant 
focused on activities external to organizations. In reviewing literature identified with the 
non-technical-environment quadrant, the shortage of scientific investigation related to 
this domain was noted. This dissertation helps to fill this gap by applying sociological 
theories of organization to investigate the effects of institutionalized environments (the 
social contexts in which organizations are embedded) on information security. Such a 
guiding framework represents a departure from traditional research disciplines of 
information security (e.g., computer science).  
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Theories of organization 
At this point one might ask, “Why would we look to theories of organization to 
understand the relationship between environment and information security?” The answer 
reflects central concepts of organization theories: while the primary focus of this 
literature is indeed organizational systems, contemporary theories consider environment 
as a significant component in its influence on organizational behavior.38  
In order to prepare the reader for a discussion of specific theories, a description of 
major concepts is provided. The concepts include “organization,” “organization 
boundary,” “environment,” and, “organization field.” The term “theory.” is also briefly 
discussed. Following these discussions, organization theories of interest to this 
dissertation are introduced.  
Acknowledging that many works have proposed differing definitions for the term 
“organization,” this dissertation offers the one that follows as a conceptual grounding for 
the investigation. 
According to Lawrence and Lorsch, 
An organization is defined as a system of interrelated behaviors of people who are 
performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each 
subsystem performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to 
achieve effective performance of the system (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, p. 3). 
In order to analyze an organizational system, it is necessary to define the term 
“organization boundary.” Conceptually, an organization boundary separates the entities 
and activities within an organization from those related to an organization that take place 
 
                                                 
38 A “system” is conceived as bounded activity with inputs and outputs. A model described as a 
“closed system” is separated from its environment, operates within defined limits, and is strictly focused on 
internal organization activities. An “open system” considers environment as both supporting and 
influencing an organization. It is reasoned that the more one understands a system, the easier it is to 
“predict” its behavior. For elaboration of these concepts, see Scott (1992). 
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in the organization’s environment. A definition of the limits or boundary of the 
organization dictates what is considered the organization’s environment. However, 
complete empirical determination of an organization’s boundary is difficult if not 
impossible. The following is Pfeffer and Salancik’s definition for an organization and the 
limit of its internal activities:  
The organization is the total set of interstructured activities in which it is engaged at any 
one time and over which it has discretion to initiate, maintain, or end behaviors … The 
organization ends where its discretion ends and another’s begins (1978, p. 32). 
Like organization boundary, the term “environment” is equally difficult to pin 
down. Organization theory literature presents a number of conceptions of the term; 
however, of these conceptions, four are discussed here. First, as mentioned above, in 
contemporary theories environment is conceived to be a component of an organizational 
system. The principal distinction between the concepts of “closed” and “open” systems 
relates to whether or not environment is considered a component of the system. 
Specifically, the concept of a closed system eliminates the influence of environment, 
whereas the notion of an open system incorporates environmental support and influences. 
Different from early models of organizations as closed systems, contemporary theories 
encompass various perspectives of organizations as open systems (e.g., Williamson’s 
(1995) transaction-cost economics, Hannan and Freeman's (1977 / 1993) population 
ecology, Pfeffer and Salancik's ([1978] 2003) resource dependence) in an effort to 
understand complex organizational structures wherein external environment plays an 
important role.  
A second conception of environment is that it is heterogeneous—composed of 
various elements that influence organizations in various ways. For example, studies have 
shown that organizational structure is related to environmental heterogeneity (e.g., 
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Lawrence & Lorsch). In order to understand this and various other relationships in an 
open system model, Scott and Meyer (1983) proposed that the elements of heterogeneous 
environments be classified as either technical or institutional components. As such, the 
distinctions between technical and institutional components are not alternatives, but 
rather represent dimensions that vary in their influence depending on the activities of the 
organization. 
Technical environments are those in which organizations produce a product or service 
that is exchanged in a market such that they are rewarded for effective and efficient 
performance (Scott, 1992, p. 132). 
Technical environments include production and control technologies, patterns of 
interorganizational exchange … and other factors that lead to relatively more or less 
efficient or effective forms of organization (Orru, Biggart, & Hamilton, 1991, p. 361). 
Institutional environments are characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements 
to which individual organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and 
support (Scott, 1992, p. 132). 
Institutional environments are composed of organizations that are judged more by the 
appropriateness of their form than by their outputs. In institutional environments, 
organizations compete for social fitness rather than economic efficiency (Powell, 1991, p. 
184). 
In this open system model, both technical and institutional environments channel 
and constrain organizational performance. For example, the marketplace arena provides a 
competitive technical environment for resources, therefore potentially constrains efforts 
to maximize efficient or effective organizational performance. An institutional 
environment, set within a cultural or political system, establishes social norms and 
expectations of legitimate behavior, therefore, channels performance depending on 
restrictions imposed by laws and other social structures.39 The notion of institutional 
 
                                                 
39 A regulation may be assessed in terms of its ability to support an efficient outcome, e.g., tax 
incentives. However, from an institutional perspective a regulation is a product of a social system, values-
oriented and may actually inhibit efficient business operation.  
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environments is not as well developed as that of technical environments.40 However, we 
know that “a clear difference exists between organizational responses to technical and 
institutional aspects of their environments. … Whereas organizations exchange elements 
with their technical environments, [organizations] are constituted by elements drawn 
from their institutional environments” (Scott, 1992, p. 208). Scott and Meyer (1983) 
acknowledged that these two environments are difficult to distinguish empirically, but 
argued that either a technical or an institutional environment must exist for strong and 
stable organizational forms to develop. For example, airline companies are subject to 
both “highly developed technical and institutional pressures,” whereas manufacturing 
companies are more strongly technical, and schools and churches are more strongly 
institutional (Ibid., p. 123). Airline companies must deal with demands for efficiency as 
well as with procedures related to public values such as personal privacy, safety of 
individuals, concern for the environment, etc. Moreover, over time, technical processes 
can become institutionalized as well (Selznick, 1957).  
A third conception of environment is that it is dynamic. It is constantly changing, 
thus re-shaping organization boundaries, and affecting organizational change. Miles, 
Snow, and Pfeffer (1974) discussed the concept of environmental change as having two 
aspects: predictable and unpredictable.41 These aspects influence organizational change or 
adaptation, but in different ways. Predictable change in environments can be anticipated 
and responded to in ways that allow organizations to maintain efficient operations. 
Uncertainty is the aspect of environmental change that creates the most concern. 
 
                                                 
40 The “institutional” concept is multifaceted and difficult to describe in brief fashion. However, an 
understanding of what is implied by this term is critically important to this study. The definition is 
discussed in the section on institutional theory with respect to contributions from a number of works. 
41 Unpredictable environmental change is described as environmental uncertainty. 
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A fourth conception of environment is that its dimension varies depending on the 
level of analysis. For example, the environment of a single organization is different from 
the wider environment of a group of related organizations (Scott, 1992, p. 132). 
Therefore, either a change in activities or a change in organizational domain would 
introduce a change in environment for an organization. 
As the final major concept, the term “organization field” is used to describe a 
group of related organizations in a wider organizational environment. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) defined a field as 
those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: 
key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products (p. 143).  
According to Scott and Meyer (1994),  
[f]ields identify communities of organizations that participate in the same meaning 
systems, are defined by similar symbolic processes, and are subject to common 
regulatory processes. The rationalizing frameworks giving rise to and shaping 
organizational fields are, in the modern world, constructed primarily by the professions 
and agents of the state (p. 71). 
Over the centuries, the fields of manufacturing, finance, sales, marketing, and 
engineering have [each] evolved into a set of commonly understood practices, with 
established vocabularies and operating principles… (Feld & Stoddard, 2004, p. 72). 
This initial grounding is completed by defining the term “theory,” and by briefly 
discussing how organization theory can benefit information security. This is Kerlinger’s 
definition:  
A theory is “a set of interrelated constructs (variables), definitions, and propositions that 
presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with 
the purpose of explaining natural phenomena (Kerlinger, cited in Creswell, 2003, p. 120). 
Theories of organization (specifying relations among variables under specialized 
conditions and assumptions) explain organizational phenomena; and thus, aid in 
predicting future organizational performance. It has been said that a perfectly organized 
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system is completely predictable (Miller, cited in Scott, 1992, p. 84). All uncertainty is 
eliminated; therefore, there is nothing to learn by observing the performance of this 
perfect system. In contrast, the performance of a complex organizational system is very 
difficult to predict. However, “[t]he more disorganized and unpredictable a system is, the 
more information you get by watching it” (Ibid.). Thus, observing the performance of a 
complex organizational system during Y2K offered the opportunity to discover factors 
that affected the management of information systems. Organization theories can explain 
relationships between forces in organization environments and observed actions of 
organizations, actions that can place the security of organizational systems at risk. 
This dissertation employs organization theories in order to explain the diversity of 
solutions among Delta business areas during the Year 2000 Program. Application of 
theory offers the opportunity to learn more about the justification for business area 
solutions in order to predict future outcomes. If this investigation can explain 
organizational solutions during Year 2000, there is potential for better management of 
information security in the future, and for providing knowledge that has policy 
implications.  
Two influential organization theories are of interest to this dissertation: rational 
system theory and institutional system theory. Research efforts within both the rational 
and institutional schools of thought have sought to explain how and why organizations do 
what they do. However, the two perspectives present what might be considered 
competing, even contradictory, views of organizations. Classical rational models of 
organization operate as controllable machines, attempting to deliver efficient 
performance and improved effectiveness in such areas as administrative functions, 
 
   46
production processes, workplace structuring, etc. In contrast, institutional models of 
organization operate as natural systems, social and evolving, a more human metaphor 
than the mechanistic rational models.42 Further, institutional models consider 
manifestations of culture and its shaping of organizational practices.  
With reference to rational-institutional differences, Scott (1987) referred to 
Selznick’s model.  
Selznick distinguished between organizations as technically devised instruments, as 
mechanical and disposable tools, and organizations that have become institutionalized, 
becoming valued, natural communities concerned with their own self-maintenance as 
ends in themselves (p. 494).43 
North (1992) highlights central elements that distinguish earlier theoretical models from 
more recent work, i.e., comparing rational (instrumental rationality) and an institutional 
model. According to the theory of instrumental rationality, given objective reality, 
complete knowledge, and unlimited mental processing capability, “institutions are 
unnecessary because markets are perfectly efficient” (Ibid., p. 3). In the contrasting 
institutional model, institutions are described as “rules of the game,” and organizations, 
the players (Ibid.). In this conceptual economic system, it is the presence of institutions, 
not their absence, that enables greater market efficiency. However, while these broader 
economic concepts will present themselves in again in Chapter 10, works from the 
economics discipline were not the principal source for theoretical grounding of this 
dissertation.44 Other distinguishing characteristics are discussed in the following sections, 
 
                                                 
42 The term “natural system” refers to an organization as attending to its own maintenance and 
survival.  
43 Selznick (1996) stated that his work Leadership in Administration (1957) is “often cited as a 
source of the ‘old’ institutionalism in organization theory” (p. 270). 
44 Political scientists, economists, and sociologists have been writing about institutional attributes 
since the turn of the 20th century, and connecting their ideas to the structure and behavior of organizations 
since the 1940s. The interdisciplinary nature of the organization studies field has led to diversity in 
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where alternate perspectives on organizations are described: the rational system 
perspective in its classical and contingency forms, and the institutional system 
perspective.  
A rational system perspective 
… [W]hat must be explained is an action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose or intention. 
… [T]he action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem. … [The] 
explanation consists of showing what goal the [entity] was pursuing when it acted and 
how the action was a reasonable choice, given the … objective (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, p. 15). 
The rational system perspective in organization theory has come to be associated 
with works by Weber ([1906-1924] 1946 / 1958), Taylor (1916), and various writers on 
“Fordism” principles (e.g., Sabel, 1982). Broadly, from a rationalist perspective, 
organizations are technical systems, referring to a way of organizing structures and 
activities “to lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency” (Scott, 1992, p.30).45 
The foundation of the model is the rational actor paradigm and its means-end process.  
The rational actor paradigm is the process of ordering sets of preferences by a 
self-interested actor with complete knowledge and devoid of context or bias, with the 
goal of maximizing benefit. A rational model of organizing thus describes an 
identification, consideration, and ordering process of determining the best means toward 
a desired objective, and the organizing of work systems as a rational design process—the 
ordering of processes to facilitate efficiency in production, communication, performance 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceptions. This study is focused on those conceptions represented in the sociological literature. The term 
“institutional system perspective” encompasses ideas of both “old” and “new” institutionalism. 
45 In the review of information security literature, the term “technical” is used in connection with 
computer hardware and software. This term has an extended meaning in its use in organization theory. 
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monitoring, and decision-making. Employing a rational system perspective, an 
organization is a rationalized system linking means to ends.  
Classical theory 
Works early in the twentieth century from engineering, academia, and 
management (Taylor, 1916; Gulick & Urwick, 1937; Weber, [1906-1924] 1946 / 1958) 
employed rationalist concepts to organize the components of work systems in the best 
way for efficient production. Classical rationalists viewed an organization as a technical 
system, explicitly goal oriented and optimized for task performance within a closed 
system. 
Works by sociologist Max Weber have had a profound influence on the concept 
of a rationalized system. Weber (1970) drew attention to bureaucratic forms of 
organization and their support for rational decision-making and administrative efficiency. 
This work portrayed an “ideal” bureaucracy as an elaborated work system that divides 
tasks into specialized segments for efficiently performing the activities of the 
organization.46 The bureaucratic system defines work requirements for each position 
within a segment, and organizes the positions in a hierarchy of authority that provides 
both control and channels of communication. In this system, formally trained employees, 
using standard technical procedures and behavioral rules for their work, are rewarded 
based on competence. The bureaucratic model, with its simple rational design, is 
particularly evident in public organizations, and has become the dominant form of 
organization generally. 
 
                                                 
46 Adam Smith ([1776] 1996) described this in his writing on the “division of labor.” 
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Works by engineer Frederick W. Taylor, who represents the extreme in a 
rationalist perspective and well known for his development of methods for “scientific 
management,” defined the organization of work systems using a bottom up approach. A 
work system included the objective of the job, the sequence of operations required to 
perform the job in terms of time and motion, and the standards for performance of the 
job. Taylor believed that by analyzing the job, managers could determine the optimal 
method for performing the job and therefore “standardize” the requirements, making 
production rationalized and predictable. His pioneering efforts contributed the concepts 
of objective and of standards (i.e., the ideal performance requirements for accomplishing 
an objective), and left a legacy in better understanding of how to produce efficiently and 
eliminate uncertainty. Taylor’s ideas can be seen in the concept of a “best practice”—the 
idea of an industry standard for the best way to perform a particular business activity.47 
This idea is in keeping with Taylor’s concept of a work system that included a human 
contribution only in the sense of finding the most skilled person to do the job, and 
providing adequate wages for its performance. He considered human behavior as simply 
a replaceable mechanism, a component of the work system, and organizations, if well 
structured, as efficient technical instruments for attaining a desired goal. Taylor’s model 
provided a causal relationship between organizational actions (X) and organizational 
consequences or outputs (Y).48 
 
                                                 
47 However, in contrast to Taylor’s ideas of quantitative measurement and rational choice, the 
concept of an industry best practice, as discussed later, is an ephemeral description diffused within 
institutionalized environments. 
48 “Organizations are to be explained by scientific laws in which the shape taken by organizations is 
determined by material factors” (Donaldson, 1996). 
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As another example of rationalist ideas, Henry Ford is known for conceiving and 
implementing the production line, a way of organizing a manufacturing process that 
divides activities into very small elements. By using a highly specialized division of 
labor, his process (now called Fordism principles) introduced greater efficiency into the 
manufacturing of automobiles.  
Management scholars’ (e.g., Lyndall Urwick, and Luther Gulick) work carried the 
similar instrumental, rationalist objective of improving productivity, but as a top down 
approach across the entire organization, as opposed to the work of Taylor and Ford. The 
work of these scholars viewed the overall organization with the intent of enhancing 
effectiveness (“administrative management”), and emphasized the importance of 
structure as an influence on organizational performance.49 Together with the efficient use 
of organizational resources, the implementation of management principles—clear 
definition of worker specialization, superior-subordinate relationships, roles within 
organizational hierarchies—predicted efficient organizations (Meier & Bohte, 2000).  
Contingency theory 
The contingency model is associated with works such as Donaldson (2001), 
Galbraith (1973), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Thompson (1967), and Woodward 
(1970). Like the classical theory, contingency theory has focused on technical 
organizational structure, but has offered a more complex model than the earlier view. 
Rather than closed systems this model describes organizations as open systems, which 
means, “affected by and affecting the environments in which they exist” (Scott, 1995, p. 
 
                                                 
49 Structure as it is used here refers to the internal mechanisms supporting organizational activities—
the division of labor and the coordination mechanisms for achieving the total objectives of the organization 
(Lorsch, 1970). 
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xiii). In addition, the model expands the classical view by recognizing that differences 
exist among organizations. Rather than a search for the one best way to structure and 
manage, contingency theory suggests not simple, but conditional, relationships between 
the characteristics of an organization and the performance of its specialized tasks in a 
dynamic and distinctive environment.  
… [T]he rational-contingency model views organizational actions as the result of choices 
made among a set of goals in an environmental context of constraints and opportunities 
(Drazin & Van de Ven, cited in Hall, 1996, p. 295). 
Besides structural arrangements, a number of other variables, e.g., “individual, social, and 
organizational inputs,” influence organizational outputs (Pennings, 1975, p. 1).  
Contingency theorists claim that organizations adapt their internal functional 
structures in response to environmental changes. An organization focuses on its technical 
activities, shaping its work processes while protecting them from disturbances in the 
environment (Gupta, Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1994). 
… [I]ndividual organizations adapt to contingencies and being in a state of adaptation 
means that the organization’s structure ‘fits’ the contingency or contingencies that the 
organization is confronted with at a given point in time (McKinley & Mone, 2003, 
p.347). 
Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) described one of the foundational studies of contingency 
theory. This study examined the structural design of organizations in various work 
environments: comparing manufacturing organizations that produced plastics with two 
groups of two others that produced containers and foods respectively. Evidence 
demonstrated that organizations create specialized sub-units to deal with various 
environments and that they adapt their internal structures to specific environmental 
conditions.  
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Characteristics of the type of work being performed—the technology—and of the 
technical and institutional environment pose opportunities and challenges to which 
organizations respond (Scott, 1992, p. 124).  
Consider an organization singularly focused on commercial air transportation. 
Passengers pay to be safely transported from a point of origin to a final destination. 
Within this organizational system, distinct subsystems perform tasks that must be 
integrated in order to accomplish this mission. Scheduling flights, interpreting air traffic 
and environmental conditions, ticketing passengers, screening and storing baggage, 
managing pilots, flight attendants, and other human resources are some of the myriad 
duties of functional subsystems.  
A number of studies have examined work characteristics at the sub-unit level. The 
Lawrence and Lorsch study focused on a characteristic they called “task uncertainty” and 
found that sub-units performing predictable tasks (e.g., the production department) were 
more effective when they were formally structured, whereas sub-units performing tasks 
in an uncertain environment (e.g., the research and development department) needed a 
different structure. The sub-systems (sales, research, and production) in each organization 
were differentiated from each other in sub-system formal structures, as well as other 
attributes. The study concluded that differentiation was related to requirements of the 
sub-unit’s particular sub-environment. 
The Lawrence and Lorsch study provides a set of research findings and concepts 
that enable us to understand what characteristics an organization must have to be 
effective in a particular set of environmental circumstances. This study directs our 
attention to the environmental demands placed on the organization in terms of the degree 
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of differentiation, the pattern and degree of integration, integrative mechanisms, and 
conflict management behaviors (Dalton, Lawrence, & Lorsch, 1970, p. 12). 
The Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974) study determined that “task difficulty” and 
“task variability” affected sub-unit structures. Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal (2001) 
examined “task domain” and “task variability” to determine the knowledge management 
processes required for performing sub-unit tasks.  
Organizations in Action (Thompson, 1967) also directed attention to the 
importance of organization-environment adaptation. Different from Lawrence and Lorsch 
and others, the work focused on tying different organization perspectives to different 
functional levels—technical, managerial, and institutional (Parsons, cited in Thompson, 
p. 10)—that are more or less open to environmental pressures. Thompson proposed that a 
classical model would be suitable for describing the technical level, a natural system 
model for the managerial level, and an open system model for the institutional level. For 
Thompson, an organization can function as a rational, technical system by selectively 
compartmentalizing critical parts of organizational structure (Scott, 1992). The concept of 
uncertainty was viewed as central to organization theories: “Uncertainty appears as the 
fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping with uncertainty, as the 
essence of the administrative process” (p. 159). 
In later work, Gresov (1989) included the idea that organizational structures are 
socially constructed and may become institutionalized, and that certain practices may be 
symbolic as opposed to instrumental—ideas represented by the institutional model. 
Contingency theory contains both similarities and differences when compared to 
the classical model. The most obvious similarity is that each contains the concept of a 
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goal. Further, each views an organization as a neutral technical instrument. Each seeks 
optimal performance under specific conditions. However, contingency theory provides a 
more complex description of organization that accommodates varying contexts of work 
systems. This theory seeks no one best way for designing an organization, because each 
organization has a different set of characteristics and environmental circumstances in 
which different sets of activities must take place. “The best way to organize depends on 
the nature of the environment to which the organization relates” (Scott, 1992, p. 89). The 
“model is complicated as soon as we move to a complex, multi-unit organization in 
which each unit strives to cope with a different part of the environment” (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967, p. 209).  
Limitations of the rational system perspective 
Many works have described limitations in conceptualizing organizations as purely 
rational: the rational actor model with its goal paradigm, its bureaucratic structuring, and 
lack of consideration for institutional context. The rational actor, preference-ordering 
concept is limited caused by both cognitive and contextual constraints on the actor. 
March and Simon (1958) recognized these limitations in explaining organizational 
decision-making, one of the key components in efficient production activity. The work 
stated that because organizations operate in environments with endemic uncertainty and 
complexity, and human rationality is limited, decision-making is less than optimal. Simon 
(1976) argued that managers do not attempt to optimize organizational performance—the 
clear goal in the rational actor model—because of limited time and limited knowledge. 
Managers tend to “satisfice,” or choose the first alternative that meets their minimum 
criteria. Simon argued that if managers really attempted to be completely rational and 
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comprehensive in their approach to organizational design, they would not have the capital 
and information resources to deal with more than a few problems at a time.50 Problems 
that are handled are resolved with limited or uncertain information.  
Taylor (2001) asserted that the rational model is incomplete as a theory of 
organization, especially in its description of the cognitive process. The model assumes a 
single decision maker, rather than the multiple actors involved in organizational decision-
making. 
[I]nteractively produced intelligence is distributed, rather than located in a single brain. 
Because it is distributed, rather than linear, it is a form of reasoning that is at variance 
with the logical algorithms of traditional rationality. … [I]f rationality is distributed, 
reasoning must be the accomplishment of several individuals working in concert. Teams 
develop knowledge that is not simply the sum of the members’ cognitive processes (p. 
142). 
Further, the idea of conflicts of interest is contrary to the foundational premise of 
a self-interested actor. Resolution of conflicts must occur in markets since other 
mechanisms—”power and influence processes, kinship and shared group membership, or 
even moral or ideological principles,” are argued to be less efficient for resolving 
conflicting claims made by self-interested actors (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005, p. 11). 
Goals are also problematic. If there are multiple and conflicting goals, a condition 
clearly identifiable in a complex organization representing multiple interest groups, how 
does a rational model of organization work? Empirical analyses have found that 
organizational goals are often “vague, contradictory, or multiple, with no clear indication 
of their respective priorities …” (Georgiou, 1973, p. 293). As evidence of this confusion, 
a considerable gap often exists between organization goals and the results of organization 
 
                                                 
50 Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) wrote about the many limitations on utility maximizing behavior 
within a given context, describing a “garbage can model” that incorporates complexities that inhibit 
rationality. 
 
   56
actions (Merton [1940] 1957/1968). The actual activities of organizations often center 
around the proper functioning of procedures, rather than on achievement of goals. Merton 
“emphasized the ‘unintended consequences of purposive action,’ and his junior 
colleagues [Selznick, Blau, Gouldner], who carried out early definitive studies of public 
and private organizations, each gave his own twist to the dual nature of organization” 
(Scott, 2004, p.3). “This phenomenon of goal displacement [i.e., where organizational 
outcomes are different from stated objectives] is perhaps the most frequently noted 
pathological aspect of large-scale organizations” (Sills, 1970). Hall (1996) suggested that 
official goals tell us little about the organization. More important are the “operative 
goals,” those focused around the allocation of resources toward organizational functions, 
given the constraints on the decision making. Internal and external forces can influence 
operative goals and can deflect the organization significantly from its original purposes. 
Georgiou (1973) suggested, “Commitment to a goal paradigm has retarded analysis by 
requiring the disassociation of conceptual scheme from incompatible empirical findings 
on organizations” (p. 291).51 
What about the design of bureaucratic structures? The elements of classical theory 
have serious shortcomings when applied to a complex organization, such as the 
challenges in coordination of work among multiple levels (Lorsch, 1970, p. 2.). 
Both the [classical] … and contingency approaches presume that [organizational] designs 
are planned, that criteria exist by which good designs can be distinguished from bad 
designs in terms of how the structures operate, and that designs meeting these criteria 
contribute to organizational performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977, p. 17). 
 
                                                 
51 Georgiou described the generalized understanding of organizations as “goal attaining instruments” 
as “an overwhelmingly accepted conceptualization” (p. 291). This conception thus may be called a 
paradigm as opposed to a theory or model. 
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Studies confirm the idea that “organizations are essentially rational, structurally 
speaking, but in dealing with an uncertain, unpredictable world, organizations necessarily 
fall short of the ideal” (Taylor, 2001, p. 141).  
Classical works established a causal relation between organizational actions (X) 
and organizational consequences or outputs (Y), but did not go far enough to consider 
factors that complicate actions or other factors that ultimately shape organizational 
outputs. Work that is more recent leads us to understand the causal relationship as a 
contingent relationship. However, Schoonhoven (1981) and others (e.g., Drazin & Van de 
Ven, 1985; McKinley & Mone, 2003) have criticized contingency theory and studies that 
employ it citing unclear theoretical statements, and poor description of functional 
relationships.  
[T]raditional versions of contingency theory … underrepresent the complexity of 
relations between technological uncertainty, structure, and organizational effectiveness” 
(p. 369). Contingency theory also falls short as an organizational model by “ignor[ing] … 
political considerations … (Hall, 1996, p 294). A rational model, representing a 
reductionist perspective, “dispenses with the need to engage with history, context, values, 
and conflict” (Reed, 2003, p. 294). 
In many works that noted the limitations of a purely rational system model—a 
model that assigns dominance to the material forces that shape organizations and to the 
concept of eliminating uncertainty—the institutional system perspective became the 
focus. The next section presents a brief review of literature concerned with this complex 
and often confusing view of organizations, the second major perspective of interest to this 
dissertation. 
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An institutional system perspective 
An institutional system perspective is associated with works such as DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), Merton ([1940] 1968), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Scott (2001), Scott 
and Meyer (1983), Selznick ([1949] 1984), and Zucker (1987). These works describe an 
institutional system perspective as a natural, “open system” view of organizations that 
“highlights the importance of the wider social and cultural environment as the ground in 
which organizations are rooted” (Scott, 1995, p. xii). Research has shown that 
“organizational environments are not only technical, providing resources and information 
in support of the production of goods and services and rewarding efficient performance, 
but increasingly institutional” (Greening & Gray, 1994, p. 470), reflecting socially-
constructed contexts with their associated constraints and incentives, and, reflecting 
practices that may defy rational logic. Thus, organizational behavior is bounded both by 
resource dependencies and by expectations of “acceptable,” “reasonable,” or “legitimate” 
behavior.  
Organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and 
institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991, p. 66).  
From an institutionalist perspective, organizations’ “output goals … are often 
undermined or distorted by energies devoted to the pursuit of system goals, chief among 
which is the concern to survive” (Scott, 1992, p. 73). 
In the case of complex, large-scale organizing and rapidly changing technologies, 
it is difficult to conceptualize an organization as the idealized, predictable system defined 
by the rational model. So much of the environment is uncertain and thus by definition 
unpredictable that it has been more appealing for some researchers to investigate why 
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organizational purposes were not achieved—in contrast to pursuing the expectations of a 
rational model. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and others (e.g. Cohen, March 
& Olsen, 1972; Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 1993; Vaughan, 1999), organizations are sources of 
both order and disorder. 
Thus, although we stress that rules and routines bring order and minimize uncertainty, we 
must add that the creation and implementation of institutional arrangements are rife with 
conflict, contradiction, and ambiguity (p. 28). 
From an institutional system perspective, the behavior of an organization is 
neither simply an internally directed nor an externally determined rational system. In fact, 
components of institutional theory may well be described as the “residue” of rational 
theory, all of the possible non-rational explanations for organization performance. Thus, 
one of the daunting issues of the institutional system perspective is its multifaceted 
character. “… [I]t is often easier to gain agreement about what [institutional theory] is not 
than about what it is” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 1). Further, that the terms 
“institution” and “institutional” encompass divergent perspectives has made it difficult to 
pin down a good description of the theory. 
However, at this point it is useful to provide definitions of terms as a starting 
point. The following are definitions of “institutions”: 
Institutions are symbolic and behavioral systems containing representational, constitutive, 
and normative rules together with regulatory mechanisms that define a common meaning 
system and give rise to distinctive actors and action routines (Scott & Meyer, 1994, p. 
68).  
Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various 
carriers—cultures, structures, and routines—and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction (Scott, 1995, p. xiii). 
Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience (Scott, 
2001, p. 48). 
 
   60
Restating the above in brief form, institutions are products of social interaction. 
Institutions regulate social interaction. In addition to rules and regulations, institutions 
include behavioral norms and established habits of thought. 52 Institutions transmit and 
support societal structures. Institutions affect organizations. Organizations can be 
institutions. 
Now, if that isn’t confusing enough, to provide meaning for the term 
“institutional,” Zucker (1987) presented two defining elements,  
1. a rule-like, social fact quality of an organized pattern of action (exterior), and  
2. an embedding in formal structures, such as formal aspects of organizations that are 
not tied to particular actors or situations (nonpersonal/objective) (p. 444) 
and three defining processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150), 
(a) imitative or mimetic, adopting successful elements of other organizations when 
uncertain about alternatives,  
(b) normative, transmission of social facts generally from external sources such as the 
professions. 
(c) coercive, pressure by other organizations—by cultural expectations and/or the state. 
The coercive process “is central to state legitimation in the environment-as-
institution approach…” (Zucker, 1987, p. 444).53 
These definitions offer evidence that this theoretical space is fundamentally 
difficult to navigate. To aid the reader, in the next section provides insight into the 
meanings of some of the above concepts.  
 
                                                 
52 Behavioral norms are customary principles and values used to make decisions—to assess or justify 
actions. These principles vary depending on the social system that maintains them. 
53 Zucker identifies two approaches in institutional theory: organization-as-institution, and 
environment-as-institution. 
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Concepts in institutional theory 
The introduction to the section on theories of organization stated that employing a 
theory can help to relate causal mechanisms to Y2K solutions. Theories of organization 
can explain the Y2K solutions of Delta’s functional business areas; and, explanation can 
have an impact on how information security is managed in the future. Fundamental to the 
use of theory is the understanding the meaning of concepts that comprise the theory. The 
above definitions for the terms institution and institutional employ concepts of 
institutional theory that have been developed over a long time and through a number of 
works. The purpose of this section is to highlight those concepts that relate to the present 
investigation in order to begin to understand the institutionalized contexts—therefore, the 
actions—of Delta’s functional business area organizations. Toward this end, two 
important concepts are emphasized:  
1. Institutions are socially-constructed symbolic structures. 
2. In order to understand actions, the symbolic structure in which the action 
occurred must be taken into account.  
The first concept is the idea that institutions are symbolic structures. The work of 
sociologist Emile Durkheim ([1901] 1950) described symbolic structures—shared 
structures of knowledge, belief, and moral authority, which, for Durkheim, were “social 
institutions” (Scott, 2004, p. 13). Ideas included that of “social facts,” symbolic structures 
that are products of human interaction but are experienced as objective. Durkheim wrote 
that we “institute” external structures and behaviors that were initially in the subjective 
sphere of individual interaction (Alexander cited in Scott, 2004, p. 13). Behaviors then 
are normative institutional behaviors if they are 
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… guided not primarily by self-interest and expedience, but by an awareness of one’s 
role in a social situation and a concern to behave appropriately, in accordance with 
others’ expectations and internalized standards of conduct (Scott, 1995, p. xv). 
Such behaviors are “instituted” by culture—ritual behaviors, values, and belief 
systems, which affects strategic choice, technical performance mechanisms, and 
organizational outputs.  
The second concept is that in order to understand action, the symbolic system in 
which it occurred must be taken into account. Weber ([1924] 1968) understood action as 
a response shaped by interpretation within a particular context, not based on mechanical 
stimuli. “Environmental stimuli must be cognitively processed by actors—interpreted by 
individuals employing socially constructed symbol systems—before they can respond by 
taking action” (Scott, 1995, p. xiii). Therefore, according to institutional theory, one must 
investigate social context and associated common meaning systems in order to 
understand an action. 
… [I]nstitutional logics constitute the cosmology within which means are meaningful, 
where means-ends couplets are thought appropriate and become the naturalized, 
unthought conditions of social action … (Friedland, cited in Lounsbury & Ventresca, 
2003, p. 465). 
In the above quotation, “means” is a technical concept that refers to the 
instrument, method, or mechanism for accomplishing an objective. “Meaningfulness” is 
an institutional concept, a shared understanding among members of a culture or society. 
As an example, according to a reporter, upon arrival in the Sentinel Islands to deliver aid 
following the December 2004 tsunami, an Indian coastguard helicopter was “attacked by 
tribesmen using bows and arrows” (Charles, 2005).54 What did the islanders think was 
happening? How are we to understand their actions? One interpretation—the one the 
 
                                                 
54 These islands in SE Asia are home to extremely isolated tribes.  
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reporter employed—is that they were threatened by the helicopters, and therefore, they 
were trying to defend themselves against what they perceived as an attack. According to 
this interpretation, the tribesmen employed the bows and arrows as means of protection. 
In contrast to the primitive weapons of tribesmen, industrialized nations understand 
means of protection as highly rationalized and computer-based weaponry. In these 
dissimilar cultural settings, the different defense mechanisms are their respective 
“naturalized, unthought conditions of social action,” a common understanding of what 
means are best to enable a desired “end”—protection from enemies. However, another 
interpretation of the islanders’ actions is that they were confused by the arrival of the 
helicopters. A volley of arrows signified a need for a helicopter to identify itself and state 
its mission. The islanders employed the bows and arrows as a means of communication. 
The point is, “[t]o understand or explain any action, the analyst must take into account 
not only the objective conditions but also the actor’s subjective interpretation of them” 
(Scott, 2001, p. 57). In fact, regardless of the true explanation in this situation, if the 
particular action were simply “the way things are usually done,” this suggests that 
cognitive processes operating for the most part beneath the level of consciousness 
dictated the action.  
The rest of this section concerns the concept of institutionalization, and the idea 
that institutionalization distorts a rationalist view of decision making. Institutionalization 
attaches both the cognitive aspect described above and a temporal quality to social action. 
“… [I]nstitutionalization is both a condition and a process: Regulations, norms, and 
cognitive systems do not appear instantaneously but develop over time …” (Scott, 1995, 
p. xx). Over time, organizations tend to perform according to established routines, and for 
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their own preservation instead of according to a model of goal-orientation. According to 
Meyer, Boli, and Thomas (1994), 
Institutionalization … is the process by which a given set of units and a pattern of 
activities come to be normatively and cognitively held in place, and practically taken for 
granted as lawful (whether as a matter of formal law, custom, or knowledge) (p. 10). 
Selznick (1996) described institutionalization as “infusion with value beyond the 
technical requirements of the task at hand” (p. 271).  
Zucker (1987) stated that institutions, once established in a society, endure “even 
though they are collectively suboptimal” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 4). Thus, Zucker 
noted that institutionalization places limitations on the process of rational choice. 
Institutions become embedded as “social facts,” and therefore, organizations often cannot 
access the full extent of their options. These confusing concepts are implicit in an 
understanding of organizations as “embedded” in social contexts. Even though many 
aspects of organizing are the result of rational decisions, these decisions are embedded in 
an institutional environment, i.e., within symbolic and behavioral structures that define 
common ways of thinking and doing—sometimes channeling decisions and actions out of 
the reach of maximizing performance. An institutional model attempts to characterize the 
context within which a rationalized, technical system of organization must function.  
In an institutionalized environment, decision alternatives not only become limited 
and obscured, but also decisions are not the result of a purely rational evaluation of 
alternatives and their consequences. “This logic of consequences can be contrasted with a 
logic of appropriateness by which actions are matched to situations by means of rules 
organized into identities” (March, 1994, p. 57). Organizations have identities; e.g., Delta 
is a transportation organization and therefore, has rules associated with that identity. For 
Delta to be a “legitimate” transportation organization, it must organize and perform in a 
 
   65
particular way. March and Simon described “organizational behavior as … rule following 
more than the calculation of consequences” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 19).  
Administrative Behavior (Simon, [1945] 1976) described how organizations work 
to simplify and support decision making in organizations (Scott, 2001, p. 27). Behavior is 
rational because choices are constrained and organizations are guided by rules. Value 
assumptions, cognitive frames, rules, and routines predetermine the preferences of 
individuals and enable “rational” choice. “Institutions do not just constrain options; they 
establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences” (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991, p. 11). A Primer on Decision Making (March, 1994) described both the 
logic of rationality—in its ideal and its bounded versions—as well as the logic of 
appropriateness as “reasoned” behavior. Kingsley has summarized the two logics: 
The difference between the two is often summarized in the following phrase: under 
rational models, preferences drive decisions which drive actions, but under institutional 
models actions drive preferences which drive decisions (G. Kingsley, “Re: 10 page 
research project overview attached,” E-mail to the author, 2005). 
Framing the concepts 
As discussed in the prior sections, institutionalists have introduced a number of 
concepts in the attempt to make sense of organizational actions that did not seem to fit a 
rational model. Since the concepts themselves are often complex abstractions and the 
theoretical contributions sometimes conflicting, organizing frameworks have been 
constructed in order to relate these concepts and themes (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1987). Two frameworks have 
highlighted contrasting themes. In the first framework, “organization as institution” is 
contrasted with “environment as institution.” In the second framework, “old 
institutionalism” is contrasted with “new institutionalism.”  
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In the first framework, Zucker (1987) described two distinct theoretical 
approaches to the study of institutions and institutional effects:  
… Environment as institution assumes that the basic process is reproduction or copying 
of system-wide (or sector-wide…) social facts on the organizational level, while 
organization as institution assumes that the central process is generation (meaning 
creation of new cultural elements) at the organization level (p. 444).  
Put into Zucker’s framework, this dissertation adopts the first theoretical approach—
environment as institution, and its process of reproducing sector-wide social facts onto 
the organization.  
Next, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) framed institutional theory by pointing to 
limitations of the classical model, and advocating a “new institutionalism.” Classical 
(“old institutionalism”) works were for the most part in the camp of Zucker’s second 
theoretical approach, organization as institution. Under this classical model, institutions 
are designed for legitimate and explicit social cooperation, coordination, and control. 
Institutions are socially-constructed agents (e.g., regulatory agencies). “Institutions are 
staffed and are created to do the job of regulating organizations” (Stinchcombe, 1997, p. 
1). People create institutions in legislative bodies and international conventions. 
Institutions influence individual organizations, which may choose or decide whether to 
respond to institutions and how to respond, sometimes in the face of conflicts or, 
differing attitudes. Under this view, organizations must negotiate with their environments 
for resources and legitimacy, which emphasizes the capacity of organizations to construct 
and enact their environments. Acknowledging the influence of norms and values, 
theorists focused on dynamics, change, social construction, and intentionality, 
notwithstanding sometimes unanticipated consequences (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997, p. 
407). 
 
   67
DiMaggio and Powell’s “new institutionalism” portrayed institutions as structural 
constraints, and for the most part in the camp of Zucker’s first theoretical approach, 
environment as institution. In this view, institutions determine organizational structures 
and practices. They “are implemented by diffusion, are exterior and constraining without 
exterior people doing the creation or the constraining” (Stinchcombe, 1997, p. 2). In 
addition to rules and regulations, which are explicit, institutions can be subtle—like 
social habits or performance patterns. Institutional theorists in this second camp thus have 
rejected intentionality, and have stressed instead the routine nature of most human 
behavior. The preferences of rational actors are seen as constituted by institutions. 
Theorists have focused on “statics, outcomes, cognition, and the dominance and 
continuity of the environment” (Hirsch & Lounsbury, p. 407) to which organizations 
conform to achieve legitimacy. This dissertation adopts the new institutionalism 
approach, positing that organizational decisions are primarily influenced by 
institutionalized environments, which provide the best possibility for survival as opposed 
to that of efficient operations.  
Considering the contrasting views of institutions, institutional conformance may 
be envisioned as spanning a spectrum of two extremes: At one end, conformance is 
among conscious alternatives in the act of ordering preferences in an organization. At the 
other extreme, conformance action takes place completely without reflection. Some have 
advocated integration of sociological theories into a single model, “the analysis of the 
experience of social agents and the analysis of the objective structures that make this 
experience possible” (Bourdieu, quoted in Camic & Gross, 1998, p. 456). 
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In Scott’s opinion, “the most consequential dispute [existing among variations of 
institutional theory] centers on which institutional elements [normative, regulative, and 
cognitive] are accorded priority” (p. 50). Normative and regulative elements are 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Normative consensus creates an understanding 
of what constitutes acceptable or legitimate activity. Even social theories can create 
norms. Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2005) described  
how the dominant assumptions, language, and ideas of economics can exercise a subtle 
but powerful influence on behavior, including behavior in organizations, through the 
formation of beliefs and norms about behavior that affect what people do and how they 
design institutions and management practices (p. 20). 
Regulative elements constrain, channel or direct organizational activities by establishing 
rules, and associated monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. “A stable system of rules, 
either formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning power, is one 
prevailing view of institutions” (Ibid., p. 54). Although regulative elements can benefit 
prejudiced arrangements, e.g., vested interests, they also support the prevailing norms of 
a society. Cognitive aspects come into play in the concept of embeddedness. Such aspects 
as routines, rule following rather than rational decision making, etc lie in this category. A 
focus on legitimacy is paramount.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) stated that, within all of these attempts at 
characterization, the whole point of institutional analysis is “to develop robust 
explanations of the ways in which institutions incorporate historical experiences into their 
rule and organizing logics” (p. 33). 
Institutional effects in organizational fields 
The discussion now turns to the application of institutional concepts at the level of 
organizational fields, which relates to the analysis of this dissertation. The paragraphs 
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that follow provide definitions for institution, institutional, and institutionalization; and, 
frame some of the concepts that have been incorporated into the institutional system 
perspective. Recall that institutional theory relates institutionalized aspects of 
environments to organization actions. Institutionalized aspects of Delta’s business area 
environments contributed to its Y2K solutions. The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate how the institutional system model has incorporated another environmental-
level concept wherein groups of organizations, called organizational fields, exhibit 
similar characteristics.  
This concept of organizational fields links organizational activities horizontally 
and vertically to “organizational structures and processes that are industrywide, national 
or international scope” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 9). 
The visible structures and routines that make up organizations are direct reflections and 
effects of rules and structures built into (or institutionalized within) wider environments 
(Scott & Meyer, 1994, p. 2).  
Scott and Meyer (1983) pointed out the great variety of wider environments 
identified as societal sectors, representing increasing numbers of significant vertical 
connections. Sectors vary in important respects, such as in their domination by either 
institutional or technical processes; and, the various sectoral characteristics are expected 
to influence strongly the number and types as well as the structure and performance of 
organizations within each sector. Thus, e.g., “regulatory processes may be expected to 
assume quite different guises and to have different effects in the medical care sector than 
in the civil aeronautics sector, reflecting not only differences in political processes [see 
Wilson, 1991] and economic mechanisms [see Knoll, 1971] but organizational 
arrangements” (p. 137). 
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While sectors or fields are different from each other, the similarity (i.e., 
homogeneity) among organizations within a field relates to the organizations’ shared 
environment. Delta’s business areas are elements of wider environments, and studies 
have demonstrated that wider environments have a homogenizing effect on internal 
organization activities among groups of organizations in the same field.  
The concept that best captures the process of homogenization is ‘isomorphism.’... 
[I]somorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, p. 149). 
Related groups of organizations often display isomorphism in their homogeny of 
structures and processes when viewed from a broader perspective. Among organizations 
exhibiting isomorphism, similar internal functional structures have diffused and 
replicated over time as they responded to issues of competition and other external 
changes, and a focus on the appearance of legitimacy.  
Legitimacy signifies looking like and performing like an organization that claims 
a stated purpose. Institutionalists have shown that organizations adopt organizational 
models that are accepted as appropriate for organizations populating the particular field to 
which they belong. The idea is that organizations depend on external support for survival; 
therefore, they comply with social expectations, laws, and regulations in order to 
maintain legitimacy and desired public image, but otherwise separate their internal 
technical activities from public scrutiny.  
A consensus credits ideas concerning legitimacy to two articles as foundational 
works: (1) Meyer and Rowan (1977), “Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony”; and (2) DiMaggio and Powell (1983), “The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” Meyer 
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and Rowan’s article is associated with the concept of symbolic vs. instrumental behavior. 
That is, organizations outwardly demonstrate institutional conformity, i.e., maintain a 
status of legitimacy using symbolic means in order to pursue appropriately their own 
technical purposes.  
DiMaggio and Powell’s article described the idea of isomorphism among 
organizations in a field, which is associated with actions that support legitimacy. Within 
common cultural frames such as exist in an organizational field, industry sector, or 
society, institutional influence actually comes more through “the diffusion of standard 
rules and structures … than the adaptive custom-fitting of particular organizations to 
specific settings” (Ibid., p. 27). The article discussed how the powerful organizations in a 
field exert pressure for conformity on others. The influence of power structures and 
vested interests has an important role in developing and maintaining norms and 
regulations.  
Some institutional sectors or fields contain environmental agents that are 
sufficiently powerful to impose [or authorize] structural forms and/or practices on 
subordinate organizational units (Scott, 1987, p. 501).  
Receiving a stamp of legitimacy by such agencies may be tantamount to survival 
for an organization. According to Astley and Van de Ven (1983), institutions 
embody a response to vested interests residing in their environments … Political 
domination, rather than technical efficiency, is held to underlie the design of 
organizational structure … The political domination argument thus requires that we shift 
our analytical focus away from the organization, toward broad social dynamics that 
unfold at a collective level of analysis (p. 264). 
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At this “collective level of analysis,” a set of agents—e.g., industries, the state, 
professions—disseminate organizational models, which are adopted by organizations 
through the following three mechanisms: 55 
1. coercive isomorphism …, [which] stems from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy; 
2. mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 
3. normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, p.150). 
Coercive isomorphism may come through legal and regulatory environments, 
where organizations in a particular field are subject to the same constraints and require 
organizing around those requirements. Mimetic behaviors derive from the historic look 
and feel of organizations that operate in a particular sector, and often arise in response to 
uncertainty. Mimetic isomorphism is also achieved by organizations sharing knowledge 
and strategies via consulting firms and professional alliances—environmental sources of 
influence that may encourage practices outside a purely instrumental model of behavior. 
Normative isomorphism occurs in order to demonstrate conformity with social and/or 
professional requirements in a competitive environment.  
A number of works have examined these homogenizing mechanisms in field-level 
analyses. The paragraphs that follow provide brief summaries of the findings in five of 
these studies, in which institutional features that are particularly relevant to the approach 
in this dissertation are incorporated.  
In the first study, Fligstein (1991) provided empirical evidence of the DiMaggio 
& Powell thesis regarding the mimetic process of isomorphism and its mechanism of 
diffusion in organizational fields in a study of the spread of diversification strategies 
 
                                                 
55 Zucker (1987) identified these mechanisms as “defining institutional processes.” 
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among U.S. corporations. The study showed that key actors in organizations who were in 
favor of diversification provided the momentum to adopt new strategies. Once influential 
organizations began to diversify, others began to imitate the new model. Fligstein showed 
that diversification “was a historically specific process that was shaped by the existence 
of organizational fields and the shocks provided to those fields over time” (p. 335).  
Next, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) explored DiMaggio and Powell’s 
thesis that under conditions of uncertainty organizational decision makers will mimic the 
behavior of other organizations in their environment, an idea related to the problem of 
decision making under conditions of incomplete information. Investments in boundary-
spanning roles and strategic board members are examples of approaches to providing 
information that is more complete. The findings of this study show that networks are 
critical to mimetic processes.  
In the third study of interest, Lounsbury (2001) sought to understand why 
responses to institutional pressures differ among organizations. While studies have 
focused on how organizational pressures for conformity weigh against technical demands 
of organizational activities, i.e., opposing forces that lead to practice diversity, “[t]here 
has been virtually no empirical research … directed toward understanding how variation 
in the content of organizational practice is systematically shaped by institutional forces” 
(p. 30). Findings showed that variation in staffing of recycling programs among 
educational institutions was shaped by a national social movement organization that 
provided resources and support to particular schools. These results suggest that “[a] focus 
on organizational heterogeneity can help to bridge the gap between institutional analysis 
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and more traditional perspectives of organizational adaptation that portray organizational 
variation as antithetical to institutional analysis” (p. 50). 
In the fourth study, Mezias (1990) compared applied economic models and an 
institutional model in an empirical study of financial reporting practice at the Fortune 200 
between 1962 and 1984, in order to understand the effect of changes in institutional 
frameworks on organizations at the field level. The study demonstrated how both changes 
in the field of federal agencies and the professional bodies responsible for setting 
accounting policy resulted in changes in the financial reporting practices of corporate 
organizations under their jurisdiction. The findings indicate that the institutional model 
adds significant explanatory power over and above rational models.  
In the fifth study, Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna (2000) examined the variety 
of changes in organization of medical services in a single geographical area within a 
single industrial sector over a three year period. The study involved the examination of 
populations in three organizations, as well as the effects of changes in these populations 
on each other. Over the three year period, fundamental changes were experienced in the 
common understanding of how medical care should be delivered and financed, and who 
has the legitimate right to make such decisions.  
These studies revealed homogenizing mechanisms in institutionalized 
environments in various sectors and settings. The studies also provided evidence that 
institutional analysis is important for understanding how changes at the field-level affect 
organizations, and for understanding organizational variation, all of which helped to 
guide the analysis of Delta’s Y2K solutions.  
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Limitations of an institutional system perspective 
Critics of institutional analysis have pointed out difficulties in defining the 
concepts and understanding how to resolve the issues of institutional theory. 
Disagreement exists on the basic assumptions and claims of the institutional system 
perspective. DiMaggio and Powell’s advocacy of a new institutional system model was 
based on their idea that old institutionalism limits itself in its concern with internal and 
local organizational environments, while neglecting important wider environmental 
influences. Others (e.g., Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) 
suggested that the models should be integrated to include both the old model’s stronger 
agency perspective, and the new model’s stronger structural perspective, and empirical 
evidence of this has been demonstrated (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000). 
However, a major problem with the institutional system model is its potential 
requirement for tautological understanding. Such understanding is flawed in that 
variables have reciprocal definitions, i.e., chicken and egg priority problems. Critics 
suggest that identifying culture as the source of thinking and acting makes for a fuzzy 
causal model. To what in the multiple aspects and levels of culture can one attribute 
causation? Moreover, if the cause is embedded in culture, then what? Can culture be 
altered to achieve strategic objectives? Similarly, the term institutionalization is used in 
two conflicting ways:  
Institutionalization as an outcome places organizational structures and practices beyond 
the reach of interest and politics. By contrast, institutionalization as a process is 
profoundly political and reflects the relative power of organized interests and the actors 
who mobilize around them (DiMaggio, 1988, p. 13).  
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This suggests that a large number of organization situations and problems can be 
described as institutionally-based, and therefore de-emphasize the importance of a focus 
on efficiency. 
Comparing the rational and institutional system perspectives 
Rational and institutional system perspectives offer different and contrasting 
perspectives for understanding organizations.  The rational perspective focuses on 
individual, autonomous organizations and strategies for efficient management, and 
emphasizes reducing uncertainty in order to achieve predictable organization 
performance. The classical form conceptualized organizations as closed technical systems 
that seek the one best way to organize in order to maximize productivity and reduce 
uncertainty. Early works focused on designing and standardizing work tasks, labor 
organization, and coordination mechanisms in order to achieve optimum performance 
toward a well-defined organizational goal.  
Contingency theory is an elaboration of the rational, goal-based perspective, 
where the organization is conceived as an open system. Contingency theory claims that to 
understand the behavior of an organization requires more than examination of tasks as in 
the classical view; also required is consideration for the organization’s environment. 
Important are logistics and task coordination structures that adapt to demands of changing 
environments. In a rational model, output reports can show results of process 
implementation and progress toward goals, whereas an institutional model must rely on 
interpretive examination to assess organizational functioning. 
Institutional theory conceptualizes an organization as an open system where 
elements of its institutional environment affect the organization’s technical performance 
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mechanisms and outputs. These elements include the concept of performance according 
to socially-constructed cultural influences and established routines. Theory represents 
organizations as focused on the maintenance of legitimacy instead of the rational model 
of goal-oriented efficiency. In a particular sector or society, organizations exhibit 
isomorphism created by the pressures of institutional environments, resource 
dependencies, and their competition.56  
The institutional system perspective is focused on environmental influence at 
multiple levels of analysis. The concern is with social institutions rather than technical 
performance. Institutions include collective norms of acceptable behavior, settled habits 
of thought, organizations that display characteristics of institutionalization and political 
domination. Studies have sought understanding of institutional decision-making and have 
assumed unpredictability with respect to organizational outputs.  
Integration of the two perspectives has been proposed (Scott, 1992, p. 96; Abell, 
1995, p. 14) in order to provide a more complete picture of an organization’s influences. 
One way of resolving conceptual inconsistencies is by the consideration that conforming 
to institutional expectations may be viewed as a rational act.57  
Summary 
An overview of literature in the information security field was presented in this 
chapter. Using the four-quadrant matrix developed in Chapter 1, the non-technical 
dimension was targeted for review, stating the discovery that most of the contributions to 
 
                                                 
56 Recall that isomorphism refers to a process whereby organizational characteristics diffuse within a 
field to create more similar organizations over time (Scott, 1992, p. 209). 
57 Gupta, Dirsmith, and Fogerty (1994) claimed to be the first to integrate these two perspectives in 
analyzing an organization.  
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knowledge were confined to the activities within organizational boundaries, thus 
providing a rationale for research that employs sociological theories of organization. Next 
in order was a review of the literature on rational and institutional theories of 
organization, wherein the two perspectives were compared.  
The empirical investigation proposed in this dissertation—an investigation of the 
influence of institutionalized environments on technical and procedural security 
approaches of organizations—fits within the non-technical-environment quadrant of 
information security studies, an area unexplored in information security research. This 
dissertation can help to fill a gap in our knowledge and can have broad implications. The 
new understanding can add insight that may help to answer the big question that will 
remain: How can we design and implement security strategies that are both politically 
acceptable and technically effective?  
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CHAPTER 3      
SETTING UP THE INVESTIGATION 
 
Experience shows … that the social and political aspects of organizations appear to have 
a significant impact on the manner in which information technology systems are 
conceived, designed and implemented (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001, p.133.) 
This chapter presents a statement of the specific problem for investigation, and 
the structuring elements of the dissertation: the setting, hypotheses, and research design. 
The research problem 
 Information security management is complex. In an organization, it involves 
dealing with complex environments both inside and outside organization 
boundaries, and involves a combination of non-technical and technical issues.  
 To manage the security of information and information systems effectively, an 
institutional infrastructure must be coordinated among organizational, social, 
and political systems.  
 Research on technical components, i.e., hardware and software, has dominated 
the literature. Ways of envisioning and understanding the problem need 
creative expansion in the attempt to lessen the serious consequences of 
information security failures. 
This dissertation fills a gap in the information security literature by focusing on 
institutionalized environments of organizations. The research examined the process of 
eliminating an information security problem in a complex organization. The focus of the 
investigation was the Y2K compliance solutions at Delta.58 Guided by organization 
theory, the dissertation analyzed contextual conditions that affected the compliance 
process in Delta’s sub-unit business areas. The focus of the investigation was on the ways 
in which institutionalized environments “complicate and constitute the paths by which 
 
                                                 
58  Legislative action required Delta, like many organizations in the U.S., to pursue Y2K compliance 
and to provide evidence of their progress toward achieving success. 
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solutions are sought” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 11). Neither the cause of the Y2K 
problem, nor the immense public interest in it was part of this work. Rather, the 
investigation concerned the effects of contexts within which Delta sub-unit business areas 
pursued solutions to their Y2K problems once this information security vulnerability was 
identified.59 This dissertation demonstrated how knowledge about the institutionalized 
environment of an organization can reveal not only issues that compound and frustrate 
information security management, but also ways to enlist support. 
Why study Y2K? 
Airline and transportation industry have the most dependency on automation and 
therefore have the biggest challenge for BCP [business continuity planning] (Gartner 
Group, 1999, cited in Delta archve, “Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book,” 1999, 
p.5). 
The Y2K transition will occur worldwide (and even in space). … [W]e have little past 
experience with Y2K-like transitions (Neumann & McCullagh, 1999, p. 144). 
A simple explanation for the Y2K problem: The Y2K problem comes from the fact that 
people trust idiot savant computers with their lives (Cohen, 1998, p.9). 
The technical description of Y2K was simple. A long-standing and widespread 
software coding practice, established to gain efficiency when computer memory was 
scarce, was to abbreviate the calendar year in the date code of computer programs. Such 
program code represented the year in a form that included only the last two digits: for 
example, the year 1968 was coded as 68. Although over the years, programmers 
acknowledged the computer date-coding scheme as a potential problem, this code 
endured for whatever reasons to cause an unforeseen global crisis, and the resulting 
lengthy and expensive process of repair and compliance.  
 
                                                 
59 A distinction is made here between Delta sub-units and Delta subsidiaries, which are business 
areas that operate outside organizational boundaries. 
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The Y2K compliance process represented a coordinated effort both nationally and 
internationally to eliminate this small and specific detail from program code. In Y2K-
flawed systems, which in the 1990s included many of the world’s computer systems, the 
change to the year 2000 had unknown consequences. The functions of far-reaching 
networks were at risk; experts feared that airplanes would crash, financial systems would 
collapse, or other horrifying disasters would occur. The federal government’s attempts to 
mitigate panic came with “no uniform definition of Y2K compliance, no uniform 
definition of testing, and little independent validation and verification” (Neumann & 
McCullagh, 1999, p. 144). Within a context of the ultimate danger to the nation, crisis 
decision making would ideally fall into a model of rational choice. In fact, the model 
Delta set out to follow in developing its Mission Possible: Year 2000 action plan was 
devised according to rational logic. However, this dissertation shows how Delta’s 
institutionalized environment, coupled with the Y2K crisis, promoted institutional 
decisions and solutions that ultimately created information security risks.  
Like all IT system vulnerabilities, the complexity of systems environments 
rendered the Y2K bug difficult to eliminate. Preserving the integrity of information was 
the essential concern. However, the digital date coding scheme ultimately affected all of 
the features of secure systems—the confidentiality of information, its availability, and its 
integrity; and all system functions—its authentication scheme, its content, its 
accessibility, and its operations. Therefore, the integrity of the data affected the control 
and safety of critical infrastructure systems. The Y2K problem thus provided an 
opportunity to examine a security vulnerability with all of the features and concerns of 
security problems that still exist in 2007.  
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However, different from examining a security problem of 2007, studying Y2K as a 
past issue offered logistical advantages. The event provided clear boundaries, both in 
time and in topic. It provided a clean beginning and ending point in time in terms of the 
Y2K event itself. In topic, the event provided a security problem for investigation that was 
in a stable environment, rather than the volatile environment in which information 
systems must function. The event also had a closed form, in the sense of project 
management. The problem solving process involved a beginning, middle, and end. Delta 
assembled a task force, developed strategies for addressing problems, prepared 
documents that recorded its progress, and implemented a variety of action plans to 
achieve success in solving its Y2K-related problems.  
The setting: Delta Air Lines 
Delta is a civil aviation enterprise that provides scheduled air transportation 
services for both cargo and the traveling public over national and international routes. A 
number of characteristics of the Delta organization made the setting well-suited for the 
focus and design of this dissertation.  
First, it was a large organization with dispersed operations. By 1997, Delta had 
become the “most traveled airline in the world, carrying 101 million passengers.”60 For 
the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1997, passenger revenues accounted for 92% of Delta's 
operating revenues. Cargo revenue, which included freight and mail, accounted for 4% of 
Delta's operating revenues, and other sources accounted for the remaining 4%. Delta was 
the largest U.S. airline in terms of passengers carried, and the U.S. market leader in the 
world’s two largest aviation markets, North America and the North Atlantic. With its 
 
                                                 
60  Source for the statistics in this paragraph is Delta Air Lines (1997). 
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worldwide partners, Delta operated over 4,800 daily flights. Some 8,400 Delta pilots and 
18,000 flight attendants formed flight crews serving on approximately 550 aircraft, and 
its total employees numbered over 63,000. Atlanta, Delta’s headquarters since 1941, was 
the world's largest airline hub. 
Second, Delta was a complex organization. The organization had also developed a 
complex environment, which may be characterized as simultaneously technical and 
institutional. See Table 3. As part of its technical environment, Delta had established a 
flight network that extended to 149 domestic cities in 42 states, as well as 41 cities in 25 
foreign countries.61 Because of its extensive reach and its long-standing political 
involvements, Delta’s institutional environment included domestic and international 
regulatory agencies, unions, and other organizations in the air transportation industry in 
both U.S. and international spheres. 
 
                                                 
61 These figures represent Delta’s routes as of August 15, 1997. The complex route network included 
the Delta Shuttle, Delta Express, the Delta Connection program and the firm's alliances with foreign 
airlines. 
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Table 3: Delta’s organization-environment complexity 
ENTERPRISES 
Passenger services 
 Domestic & international 
 Delta Shuttle 
 Delta Express 
Freight operations 
 Delta DASH 
Information Technology services 
 Worldspan 
 TransQuest/Delta Technology 
Delta SkyMiles Program 
 Delta Loyalty Management Services, Inc 
Organization staffing services 
 Delta Staffing Services 
Communications services 
 DeltaTel 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 
Airports 
Delta Connection carriers 
Other airline relationships 
 Alliances  
 Code-share services 
CONTINGENCIES 
Competitive market activities 
Competitors ACE Aviation 
AirTran Holdings Alaska Air Group 
Amadeus AMR Corp 
British Airways Cathay Pacific 
Continental Airlines Galileo Intl 
Hawesko Holdings JetBlue Airways 
Japan Airlines KLM 
Lufthansa Mesa Air 
Northwest Airlines Qantas 
SAS Sabre 
Singapore Airlines Southwest Airlines 
TACA UAL 
US Airways Virgin Atlantic Air 
Fuel availability and cost 
Scheduling 
 Airports Maintenance 








 Computer-based systems (IT) 62 
  Bag & mail sort systems 
  Finance functions 
  Flight training devices 
  TOC tools 
Customers 
Funding, financial operation 
Human resources 
 Skills 
 Certifications  
 Pay scale 
 Security clearances 
Personnel 
 Airport flight controllers 
 Pilots, flight attendants 
 Mechanics 





 Aircraft parts & tools 
 Food service 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 
Government 
APHIS, plants & 
health inspections 
U.S. Customs 
DOT, antitrust, int’l EPA 
FAA, safety ICAO 
INS, immigration IRS, domestic & 
foreign taxation 
NWS, weather NavCanada  
NOAA, ocean & 
atmosphere 
OSHA, workplace 
safety & health 
DOJ, security  
Industry-owned organizations 
Unions 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE RESPONSIBILITIES63 
Antitrust, embargoes and trade sanctions 
Copyright and other intellectual property 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
Environmental 
Falsifying company records, drug trafficking or use 
Federal contract procurement policies 
Finance Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other anti-
bribery and anti-kickback laws 
Immigration (including employment of aliens) 
Political activity 
Securities reporting and corporate governance 
 
 
                                                 
62 IT systems perform information processing within all of the functional areas of the airline. 
63 This list is not intended to be all-inclusive (“Corporate compliance is everyone's responsibility,” 
1997, p.10).  
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Third, as a leading U.S. airline, Delta was also a critical organization. Civil 
aviation is the heart of the travel and tourism industry, which during this study period was 
the second largest U.S. economic sector.64 Aviation and related industries were 
contributing $800 billion to the U.S. economy, or about 8% of the total GDP (Mullin, 
2003). Thus, airlines could be considered critical sector organizations, not only because 
of the function they serve as facilitators of commerce and of civil and defense industries, 
but because they provided a significant portion of the economy.65 
Fourth, to complicate its critical sector status, Delta was highly dependent on 
computer-based information systems to run the business. Inasmuch as the many business 
areas of this organization were required to work together to produce Delta’s finished 
product, that of safe and reliable transportation, reliable and timely information was vital 
to their business operation. Indeed, flights were at risk if an IT malfunction impaired 
systems related to airline operations.  
Some of the most … widely used systems include those for air traffic control, navigation, 
reservations, and aircraft flight control. Others are used … for airport and airline 
management. … Neumann … believes many of these systems are poorly designed with 
respect to security and are at risk to GPS jamming, electromagnetic interference, denial 
of service, Trojan horses, disgruntled employees, and other threats (Goodman, 2001, 
p.70). 
Goodman suggested that the transportation sector might serve as a useful example 
and precedent for other major sectors in dealing with the problems of information 
 
                                                 
64 “The economic impact of aviation is so big it’s almost beyond measure. Revenues generated by 
airports like Chicago O’Hare, Dallas/Fort Worth, and Hartsfield Atlanta run in the billions. … And as we 
were reminded so painfully after September 11, travel and tourism, which depends on the airlines, accounts 
for one out of seven jobs in America, and is among the top three employers in 29 states” (Garvey, 2002). 
65 “Hartsfield pumped $9.3 billion into metro Atlanta's economy in 1997 … according to an 
economic impact study released by the airport. The … business revenues, along with the creation of 9,771 
new jobs … at the airport, make it vital to Atlanta's economy” (Hartsfield City Limits: A $9.3 billion a year 
impact, 1998, Nov 2).  
 
   86
security, especially with respect to cyber crime and terrorism. The reasons he cited 
related to civil aviation as not only “one of the most widespread and extensively 
interconnected international infrastructures” (Ibid.), but also that the enterprise has a long 
history of successful collaboration to resolve problems. Thus, it seemed valuable to 
understand how Delta dealt with the Y2K bug. 
Finally, an important characteristic of the Delta organization with respect to this 
dissertation was the generosity with which its senior management accommodated the 
dissertation’s development. Early in the dissertation design stage, Leo Mullin, who had 
served as Chairman and CEO of Delta during the years of the Year 2000 Program, 
arranged access to the Delta organization for purposes of this dissertation.66 Through this 
connection, the extensive documentation of the Year 2000 Program in the form of CDs 
and printed documents was made available. In 2006, access was facilitated through the 
office of Gerald Grinstein, CEO and long-term Delta Board member.  
In summary, Delta was appropriate as a target for this investigation because: 
 Delta was as a large, complex organization, and characterized the differentiated 
environment within which security mechanisms must often be implemented. Further, 
the environment of the organization was simultaneously technical and institutional. 
 Delta operated within a critical infrastructure sector.  
 The organization’s operations depended on the reliable functioning and 
trustworthiness of networked information systems. Scheduling (time, place, date) of 
operations was critical; therefore, Delta’s ability to comply with the directives of Y2K 
policy was related to its ability to continue to deliver service and to the ultimate 
survival of the organization. 
 The organization had detailed written documentation of the Y2K compliance process. 
 Delta provided access to the organization and its archives for purposes of this work. 
 The administration of the Year 2000 Program had been carried out in Atlanta; 
therefore, sources of information were convenient to the investigation. 
 
                                                 
66 The author’s first visit to Delta took place in January 2004. Mullin had resigned as CEO, which 
was effective in December 2003; but he had stayed on as Chairman through April 2004. 
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The Year 2000 Program 
The goal of Delta’s Year 2000 Program was twofold. First and foremost, the goal 
was to eliminate the Y2K vulnerability in all of Delta’s computer-based information 
systems, and to verify the Y2K compliance of IT systems outside Delta’s boundaries that 
affected its operations. Since these goals involved the entire organization, a process was 
devised that engaged all of Delta’s business areas. 
When TransQuest was started, Delta’s IT staff had first sorted the IT systems into 
groups (i.e., Portfolios of systems) that supported the four core business areas. These 
technologies similarly formed the basis for the organizational divisions when TransQuest 
became Delta Technology.67 The Year 2000 Program structures incorporated multiple 
parallel activities within these Portfolio divisions.  
As described earlier, the Delta organization was a good target for investigation in 
a number of ways; but convenient aspects existed within the Year 2000 Program also—in 
addition to particularly interesting aspects, and some puzzling situations that motivated 
further inquiry. From a convenience standpoint, not only did the Delta Year 2000 
Program serve to operationalize the concept of information security, but also it was well 
structured for analysis. In each business area, project activities pursued the same goal in 
an identical manner; but in each business area, these activities unfolded in a different 
context and resulted in different solutions. The evidence of different solutions among the 
parallel business areas allowed investigation of the influence of organizational and 
environmental contextual features.  
 
                                                 
67 Delta Technology is Delta Air Lines’ wholly owned subsidiary organization whose activities are 
dedicated to the development and support of Delta’s information technologies. The Delta Technology 
portfolio divisions align with the Delta Air Lines functional business areas and are considered 
interchangeable units for purposes of this work. 
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Interesting and puzzling initially was the way the plan was carried out. In the 
process of trying to get the project underway, a secondary goal emerged. Along with the 
primary goal of eradicating the Y2K bug, this secondary goal, was to overhaul 
everything—to modernize and streamline the IT systems for better service to the needs of 
the organization. At first glance, the decision was puzzling. The goal seemed to run 
counter to the notion of eliminating security vulnerabilities; it appeared to be adding 
unnecessary complexity to an already risky situation. It seemed that the decision-makers 
must have been either painfully ignorant or incredibly courageous. Adding to the puzzle 
was the question: did all of this “tinkering” with a complex system that worked 
adequately before the project started invite problems as a result? Was it luck that Delta 
was overwhelmingly successful in achieving its goals? Prior theories would suggest that 
something had gone awry with this plan in such a large, complex organization. As it 
turned out, as this secondary goal was met it would both strengthen and weaken 
information security. Strength would come by standardizing hardware, replacing outdated 
systems, and by gaining a better general understanding of how the systems worked 
together. The weakness would come by standardizing systems and employing a common 
network protocol to connect them all, thereby opening the door to security problems.  
Research hypotheses 
As the characteristics of Delta’s Year 2000 Program came into focus, the question 
emerged that served as the basis for the design of the investigation, i.e., why the disparity 
among Y2K solutions of Delta business areas? What caused the difference in compliance 
response? The investigation would resolve other questions while answering this central 
inquiry. 
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From a rational perspective, the answer to the question relates to the variation in 
task environments of the business areas. Business area structures and processes depend 
on the nature of the tasks that a business area performs (and the conditions in its IT 
systems); therefore, while pursuing the goal of the organization (i.e., removing the Y2K 
vulnerability, etc.), the task environment of each business area shaped its internal rational 
responses.68  
From an institutional perspective, structures and processes in business areas 
depend on not only the nature of tasks and the associated IT systems, but also on 
conditions in their respective institutional environments. Therefore, the answer from an 
institutional perspective is that Y2K goals became secondary to institutional forces—
regulative, cultural, and mimetic processes, and produced institutional responses that 
varied depending on the business area environment. The answer would suggest that 
legitimacy rather than efficiency was the ultimate driver for a Delta business area 
solution. 
To test these propositions, this investigation considered competing hypotheses 
that reflected the institutional system and rational-contingency system perspectives, 
respectively: 
Hypothesis 1: the institutional system model: The Y2K solution in a Delta 
business area can be explained as an institutional response to 
contextual conditions, which is related to sector-based institutional 
mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 1a: A business area solution was an institutional response 
influenced by industry regulation. 
 
                                                 
68 This means viewing each business area at the aggregate level based on the predominant nature of 
its tasks, while recognizing that each business area performs numerous tasks that are not all similar 
(Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal, 2001, p. 27). 
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Hypothesis 1b: A business area solution was an institutional response 
influenced by inter-organizational relationships. 
Hypothesis 1c: A business area solution was an institutional response that 
imitated the solution of other organizations. 
Hypothesis 2: the rational-contingency system model: The Y2K solution in a 
Delta business area can be explained as a rational response to 
contextual conditions. 
Hypothesis 2a: A business area solution was a rational response to 
technical system conditions. 
Hypothesis 2b: A business area solution was a rational response based on 
cost/benefit evaluations and availability of resources. 
Consistent with the findings of Fligstein (1991), Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 
(1989), and other studies reviewed here, business area solutions associated with the Year 
2000 process were predicted to conform to the first hypothesis: institutional responses 
demonstrating influences that stemmed from the institutionalized environments of their 
respective organizational fields.  
Research design 
A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected … to the initial questions 
of a study (Yin, 1994, p.18). 
The research was designed as a case study. The case study included analysis of 
four Delta business areas as embedded sub-cases: Business Support, Airport Customer 
Service, Operations, and Revenue, and their respective sub-environments; therefore, the 
unit of analysis was the business area-environment system. Their respective activities, 
resources, and sets of actors had differentiated these business areas from each other and 
had led to distinct IT systems that assisted their performance. The characteristics of these 
business areas also included somewhat distinct technologies and relationships in the 
organization-environment sub-systems within which each operated. The investigative 
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methodology included comparison of the four business areas with respect to three 
variable constructs: Y2K solution, environmental context, and response assessment (See 
Table 3). The study attempted to learn what conditions were influential in leading to 
individual business area solutions, and to assess the solutions as rational or institutional 
responses, based on institutional or rational-contingency theory concepts. Employing a 
comparative method, the investigation attempted to isolate any contextual conditions that 
the business areas shared in the attempt to reveal causal factors for their differences; and, 
attempted to determine which of the rival models better fit the organization actions. 
The term “contextual conditions” or “environmental context” refers to conditions 
that existed within a business area-environment system—conditions relating to its task 
environment (which included its IT systems), and to its institutional (cultural and 
regulative) context. Assessment of a Y2K solution as rational or institutional (response 
assessment), with respect to the environmental context that influenced the Y2K solution, 
related to the performance expectations for a rational-contingency system model or an 
institutional system model, respectively. 
Model variables 
The dependent variable, Y2K solution, was defined as changes to software 
systems in a functional business area of Delta over the period 1997-2003.  
An independent variable, environmental context, was defined as a set of 
conditions that existed in a business area-environment system that impinged on the 
decision processes. Environmental context had two components: task environment and 
institutionalized environment, the latter representing the cultural and regulative context of 
the business area. Task environment was operationally defined as functional activities and 
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supporting technologies; institutionalized environment comprised cultural context and 
“federations, associations, customer-supplier relationships, competitive relationships, and 
a social-legal apparatus defining and controlling the nature and limits of relationships” 
(Pfeffer et al., 1978)—structural systems that had become established over time.  
A third variable, response assessment, related to the Y2K solution. Response 
assessment was a binary variable whose value was either “rational” or “institutional,” 
relating to a Y2K solution as either predominately rational or predominately institutional 
in response to the Y2K mandate. 
“Predominantly rational” was operationalized as the relative prominence of 
features or mechanisms that lead to a relatively more or less efficient or effective 
solution. These mechanisms, which are associated with a rational-contingency model of 
performance, are related to organization of labor, goal orientation, attention to efficiency 
of operation (reducing complexity/increasing predictability), including attention to 
productivity, coordination, cost and revenue. 
“Predominantly institutional” was operationalized as the relative prominence of 
features or mechanisms that are associated with an institutional model of performance, 
i.e. regulative, cultural, and/or mimetic mechanisms. This construct relates to the ideas of 
new institutionalism, wherein the “environment as institution” constitutes the source of 
homogenizing mechanisms on organizations in the same field (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Zucker, 1987).  
Institutional mechanisms described as regulative: 
1. pressure from external sources, e.g., professions, established business 
relationships, and government regulatory agencies 
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Institutional mechanisms described as cultural: 
2. diffusion of social facts through the historical processes of a Delta business 
area, e.g., trust arrangements with resource suppliers 
3. influence within a Delta business area from existing practices and routines 
relating to IT systems 
Institutional mechanisms described as mimetic: 
4. imitation of solutions via diffusion from external sources, e.g., vendors, 
consultants, or other organizations.69  
The model variables, and their descriptions, are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Model variables 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 













Existing practices and routines 
Imitating the solutions of others 
Rational responses relate to: 
Organization (division of labor, coordination mechanisms)  
Goal orientation 
Planning (certainty of means) 




                                                 
69 Mimetic mechanisms are especially evident under conditions of uncertainty, such as existed 
during the Y2K crisis. 
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Models of organization 
According to an institutional model, organizations exhibit evidence of rational 
behavior; but, different from a model designed for efficient performance, organizations 
make decisions that can be attributed to both overt and subtle social pressures in 
organizational environments. Expectations of legitimate behavior prevent rational choice 
based on purely economic cost and benefit (preference) evaluation. Over time, a focus on 
legitimacy leads organizations as members of a field to demonstrate isomorphism. 
Processes that lead to isomorphism, especially evident in a crisis mode, include imitation 
of the actions of other organizations in the field, and pressures that emanate from other 
sectoral aspects, e.g., the State and professions. Institutional behavior may be rational or 
institutional upon analysis, depending on an assessment of the value of efficiency vs. 
legitimacy to organization survival. The institutional model favors legitimacy over 
efficiency. In each of the target sub-cases in this investigation, solutions were interpreted 
according to both an institutional system model and a rational system model. 
Summary 
This dissertation was designed to fill a gap in understanding by investigating the 
ways in which institutionalized environments influence actions to secure information 
systems in complex organizations. The chapter presented a statement of the research 
problem and justification for the setting at Delta, the study of Y2K, and a focus on Delta’s 
Year 2000 Program.  
The investigation was described as a case study, which included a multiple 
embedded-case design—its purpose being to compare the actions and contextual 
conditions of four Delta sub-unit business areas, and to evaluate the actions as rational or 
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institutional responses. Actions of the parallel business areas of Delta were 
conceptualized as Y2K solutions—the results of decisions that were made with respect to 
software systems over the period 1997-2003.  
The evidence of different Y2K solutions among parallel business areas allowed 
investigation of the influence of contextual conditions. A value for the response 
assessment as either “rational” or “institutional” was designed to contribute to 
understanding the business area’s concern for efficiency vs. legitimacy with respect to 
organization survival. 
The research hypothesis was stated: the Y2K solution in a Delta business area can 
be explained as an institutional response to contextual conditions, which is related to 
sector-based institutional mechanisms. 
A competing hypothesis was stated: the Y2K solution in a Delta business area can 
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CHAPTER 4      
DATA COMPLEXITIES AND ANALYSIS CHALLENGES 
 
The investigation of each of the cases entailed three stages. First, relevant 
information was collected from both primary and secondary sources to serve as data. In 
the second stage, the data were processed to facilitate its analysis. The evidence was 
organized by business area according to the three constructs: Y2K solution, environmental 
context, and response assessment, the variables that represented the “common rules for 
distinguishing phenomena from context” (Yin, 1982). This data organization provided the 
framework for comparison. Qualitative analysis software was used to assist in the 
process, especially in locating evidence of influential environmental factors. Finally, a 
comparative method identified the similarities and differences among the sub-cases with 
respect to the framework. The following sections provide details for each of these stages. 
Data: sources and analysis 
Primary sources of data included both the unpublished records from the Year 
2000 Program obtained directly from Delta and information assembled through 
interviewing individuals associated with the organization. The unpublished records had 
been produced as written communication during the process of implementing Delta’s 
Year 2000 Program. These records, which numbered over 7000 documents, were stored 
as digital files on CDs—as letters, emails, project reports, compliance reports, internal 
publications, presentations, interorganizational communications, government documents, 
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etc. 70 A list of the documents from this archive that were cited in this dissertation is 
provided as Appendix J. These records had been stored previously on Delta’s in-house 
computers, and copied onto CDs for backup purposes. The discovery that the number of 
files was large, that their organization schemes were inconsistent, and that the files 
themselves possessed different characteristics, led to a number of different attempts to 
standardize them and thus manipulate them more easily for analysis.  
The files were organized in two different ways on the CDs: (1) as various 
document types via Microsoft (MS) Windows OS directory/folder system, and (2) as 
records in Oracle database format. The file characteristics were different both in format 
types, e.g., text, PowerPoint, Word, PDF, etc, and in design of the document information. 
Documents lacked specific and uniform business area identifications. Therefore, data 
mining using easy search methods was difficult. The documents were first “reverse 
engineered” in order to put them into forms and categories that enabled more efficient 
searching. This involved creating algorithms in programming code to locate date fields, 
and keywords and then categorize the documents accordingly. However, many of the 
documents were document image files, esp. pdfs, and therefore, did not lend themselves 
easily to this kind of manipulation. 
The MS folder structures gave the initial appearance of being well-organized and 
of containing excellent information. However, upon inspection, the knowledge 
management system (kms) that Delta used to organize the project documents had not 
been populated uniformly by business area. Neither had the structure been used in its 
entirety as it was designed. Upon reflection, this might have been expected because of the 
 
                                                 
70 Originals of many of these records existed as paper documents that were stored in a commercial 
off-site storage facility. These paper originals were to be retained until some time in 2007.  
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origin of the database system. The kms was a commercial package, not specifically 
designed by or for Delta; thus it provided the opportunity for fine-grained project 
documentation, but in a very “one-size-fits-all” way. In the end, many of the folder 
structures that had appeared useful for this research were empty of content. 
The language used in document content created a challenge as well. The Delta-
specific jargon and acronyms in these documents rendered them extremely difficult to 
comprehend as an outsider. As the IFALPA “Jargon Buster” states, 
Aviation jargon is sometimes a confusing and frustrating language. … just one acronym 
alone (IFE) has several meanings depending on the area of aviation it relates to, for 
example, IFE can mean ‘In-Flight Emergency’, ‘In-Flight Entertainment’ or 
‘International Flight Engineers’ (International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations 
(IFALPA), 2005). 
Two methods helped to resolve this issue. First, it was necessary to create what became 
an extensive glossary in order to read the documents with understanding. A Delta 
employee generously agreed to a visit by phone periodically to provide definitions and 
interpretations of acronyms. However, this activity was even difficult for the employee 
from time to time, as the Year 2000 Program was becoming dim in his memory. Second, 
making lists of keywords and names of people, along with their associated roles and 
titles, also helped to locate and understand relevant information in the archives. The 
discovery and utilization of qualitative analysis software was an invaluable aid to reading 
and keeping track of the documents, and to analyzing them with respect to environmental 
factors.  
As noted above, informants were also a key source of primary evidence. Over two 
dozen individuals participated in this study and served as informants. Project discussion 
and interviews took place beginning in January 2004 through the close of the 
investigation in 2007. Informants were individuals who had been associated with Delta, 
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either as participants in the Year 2000 Program or as persons possessing relevant 
information.  
The first contact with Delta was in the fall of 2003, when the dissertation design 
was being considered. This contact resulted in a meeting in January 2004 at the office of 
Leo Mullin, Chairman of the Board of Directors at Delta. Information from the 
conversation with Mullin led to an understanding that Delta was a viable target 
organization for the investigation. Subsequent visits to Delta included meetings with 
Delta Technology CEO Curtis Robb, a “field trip” to the Technology Control Center and 
to other facilities that served as support for the massive complex devoted to computer 
processing for Delta Technology. Robb also arranged for visits with Walter Taylor, 
former director of the Year 2000 Program and with Spark Nowak, Delta’s Chief 
Information Security and Privacy Officer. Many other interviews followed. 
Over the course of this investigation, the organization became a very difficult 
research site because of its bottom line—Delta reported a $2.6 billion net loss on $12 
billion in revenue for the first nine months of 2005, and had declared Chapter 11 
bankruptcy that September.71 Many Delta employees had resigned and moved on or 
retired. Of those who had new jobs in other places, some were extremely difficult to track 
down. In contrast, although a very difficult time at Delta, weathering the problems with 
cost cutting in the attempt to emerge from bankruptcy, many of the people who remained 
at Delta were motivated to support this dissertation. Layoffs and employee attrition had 
 
                                                 
71  Between 1997 and 2003, Delta’s net income of $302 million had turned to a net loss of $773 
million, and the specter of being included among the reductions in the workforce was a very real presence 
after that. 
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led to a workforce that had to shoulder more than its normal share of duties, therefore, 
had less discretionary time to aid this dissertation.  
Participation in the study typically consisted of one or two short interviews.72 A 
signed consent form was exchanged prior to formal interview, which was a requirement 
of the Georgia Institute of Technology and its Institutional Review Board when 
performing research involving human subjects. The interview consent form, which 
guaranteed confidentiality of information to the informant, is provided as Appendix B. 
Individuals interviewed included executives from both Delta and Delta Technology, 
members of the Year 2000 Program team, and consultants—persons external to the 
organization who had information regarding the Delta organization, but were not strictly 
involved with the Year 2000 Program. These three classes of individuals included key 
employees from each of the business areas, and others who participated either directly or 
indirectly in the Program. Employee participants included individuals who provided Year 
2000 Program coordination and leadership, employees who dealt with the technical issues 
first-hand, and administrators who had to juggle the normal business processes with the 
need to give priority to the Year 2000 mandate. In the process of uncovering information 
about Y2K, efforts were made to include employees who had worked at Delta for a long 
time, and those who represented other special interests, e.g., pilots. Informants are listed 
in Table 4, which includes brief details about the relationship of informants to the project 
and the dates of interviews. Note that most of the employees on the Year 2000 Program 
team held dual roles. It also should be noted that while not reflecting the makeup of the 
 
                                                 
72 Exceptions were the interviews with two individuals: a Delta Technology employee who agreed to 
multiple brief chats via cellphone as he commuted home in the evening, and a former employee who 
provided multiple opportunities for information gathering—in person, by phone and by writing. 
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Year 2000 Program team, with only a couple of exceptions, all of the employees who 
were formally interviewed for this dissertation were male. 
Table 4: Information about interviews and informants 






Chairman Delta Air Lines, Former CEO, Delta (1997-2004). 
Mullin provided overview information and set up contacts for 
obtaining Year 2000 documentation and further information. 
Jan 27, 2004 
Aug 15, 2004 
Gerald Grinstein 
CEO, Delta (2004-2007) 
Non-Executive Chairman of the Board, Delta (1997-1999). 
Grinstein enabled contact with Shirley Bridges, who in turn 
provided contact with other Delta employees. 
Late 2005 
Curtis Robb* 
Sr. VP & CIO, Delta; and CEO, Delta Technology (2002-2005). 
Former CTO, Delta Technology. Robb introduced Delta 
Technology, its facilities and chief participants in the Year 2000 
Program. 
Apr 07, 13, 21, 
2004 
Walter Taylor* 
Managing Director of Process and Technology, and Pilot, Delta; 
Former Director - Year 2000 Program, and VP-Airline Operations 
Portfolio, Delta Technology (1997-2004) 
Taylor performed the leadership and administrative duties for 
the Year 2000 Program. 
Apr 07, 13, 21, 
2004 
Spark Nowak* 
Chief Information Security & Privacy Officer, Delta Technology 
(2000-2006) 
Nowak provided overview of information security activities. 
Apr 07, 2004 
Harry Richardson* 
VP, Systems Operations, Delta Technology (2000-2007) 
Met Richardson briefly on tour of Technical Operations Center. 
Apr 13, 2004 
Charlie Feld 
Exec VP, EDS; Former acting CIO, Delta, and CEO, Delta 
Technology (1997-2001).  
Feld spoke about overall strategy and leadership for the Year 
2000 Program. He provided a video of the company-wide 
meeting that kicked off the Year 2000 Program at Delta. 
Mar 31, 2006 
Shirley Bridges 
Sr. VP & CIO, Delta, and CEO, Delta Technology (2005-2007), 
Former Sr. VP - Operations, VP - Air Operations Portfolio, Delta 
Technology (1990-2005).  
Bridges provided contact with Delta Technology employees, but 
declined interview herself, stating she possessed no relevant 
information. 
Feb 13, 2007 
YEAR 2000 PROGRAM TEAM 
Tim Mitchell 
Manager, BCP, Delta Technology, Former Production and Field 
Services, Technology Portfolio Lead, Manager – Year 2000 
Program Desktop Strategy Project, led rollover crisis 
management team. 
Mitchell had a broad view of the Year 2000 Project because of 
his involvement with enterprise-wide aspects. He was 
responsible for release of Year 2000 Program records from 
storage in 2007. 
Dec 08, 2005 
Jan-Jun, 2006 
Barry Webb 
Delta Technology. Former Technology Portfolio, Y2K Workgroup 
Engineering team. 
Webb was one of the first Delta employees interviewed; and he 
was directed by HR not to participate in this dissertation. 
Jan 20, 2006 
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Table 4: continued 





Municipal court judge, Jonesboro, GA. Former Year 2000 PMO 
Managing Director, Hartsfield airport Y2K Director, member - IT 
Board, Delta. 
Gravitt provided important early history of Delta. 
Oct 11, 2006 
John Jacobi 
EDS. Former VP – Customer Systems, Customer Portfolio lead, 
Delta Technology. 
Feld arranged contact with Jacobi.  
Mar 15, 2007 
Neal Morgan* 
Retired. Former Customer Portfolio Lead (1997-1998), Y2K 
Remediation Director, Delta Technology, (1998-1999), member 
- Hartsfield airport Y2K team (1999-2000). 
Morgan led important Y2K initiatives for Delta. 
Oct 28, 2006 
Feb 03, 2007 
John Mock 
Former Y2K Technology External Agent Process team, Delta 
Technology. 
Neal Morgan arranged contact with Mock. 
Feb 03, 2007 
Eugene Shtern* 
Consultant, Miratech (2006-2007) Former PMO Operations 
Portfolio rep (1997); liaison - Y2K code remediation project in 
Kiev, Ukraine, Delta Technology (1998-1999) 
Shtern was instrumental in saving Delta $12 million because of 
liaison with Ukraine consulting group. 
Neal Morgan arranged contact with Shtern. 
Feb 03, 2007 
Mar 25, 2007 
Oscar Gallindo IT security for ISN, consultant to Hartsfield Y2K project Feb 03, 2007 
Otis Former Manager, City of Atlanta Aviation Department Feb 03, 2007 
Russ Morgan 
EDS, Former Customer Portfolio, Delta Technology (1998-2006) 
Jacobi arranged contact with Morgan. 
Mar 15, 2007 
CONSULTANTS 
Jack McMillan 
CEO, TechBridge, Former project leader on the Finance 
Reengineering project performed at Delta from 1990-1996. 
Following interview, McMillan introduced former Delta 
employees. 
Sep 29, 2006 
John Day 
Retired. Former Partner in Charge of the Delta audit team, first 
with Arthur Andersen & Co, and then Deloitte Touche.  
Oct 09, 2006 
OTHERS 
Peter Wan 
Sr. Information Security Engineer, Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
Wan provided broad context for history of IT, exp. related to 
information security. 
Feb 05, 2007 
Luke Ott* Pilot, Asst deputy information security officer, Delta Oct 30, 2003 
Kelly Wills 
Retired. Former Network Systems - Human Factors Team Mgr, 
Delta Technology. 
Wills made a presentation to the CHI-Atlanta organization where 
she described the development of Delta IT transformation with 
respect to HCI. Even though Wills had leadership responsibility 
within the Future Vision technology transformation, she declined 
interview stating she possessed no relevant information. 
Jan 29, 2004 
Jay Libove 
Sr. Information Security Engineer, Information Security & 
Privacy Office, Delta 
Oct 21, 2005 
Tim King 
Information architect, MacQuarium, Former Network Systems - 
Human Factors Team, Delta Technology 
King worked on the Customer Care system. 
Feb 22, 2006 
Judy Bean 
Manager, Delta Air Transport Heritage Museum, Delta.  
Provided Delta in-house publications. 
Jan 11, 2007 
 
   103
Table 4: continued 





Curator, Delta Air Transport Heritage Museum, Delta. 
Introduction and brief interview while touring the museum. Her 
father being a 30 year Delta veteran, she grew up in the Delta 
“family.” 
Jan 11, 2007 
Marie Force 
Archives Manager, Delta Air Transport Heritage Museum, Delta. 
Brief interview while touring the museum.  
Jan 11, 2007 
Mary Raines 
Retired. Lawyer in the Legal Department, Corporate Secretary, 
Delta.  
Raines declined interview, stating lack of involvement with Y2K, 




In charge of information security for the Delta website, Delta 
Technology. Gomez-Sanchez agreed to a date and time for 
interview by phone, and then did not answer his phone at the 
predetermined time, nor did he return subsequent calls. 
 
 
Interviews probed themes related to the investigation in a semi-structured way.73 
Themes associated with the institutional system model pertained to regulatory, cultural, 
and mimetic mechanisms. Themes that related to the rational-contingency model 
pertained to rational mechanisms. Attention was paid in the interviews to gathering 
information regarding the problems each of the Delta business areas encountered related 
to the Year 2000 Program (esp. any issues that could be characterized as externally 
induced), and the approach each business area utilized to address these challenges.  
Secondary sources of data were previously published materials in the form of 
articles both from scholarly and trade publications, and books about Delta. These 
materials were publicly available in libraries, bookstores, websites, and electronic 
databases. Also included in this category of evidence were the Delta annual reports.  
The process of analysis proceeded somewhat iteratively with data collection. 
Documents from the Year 2000 archive were investigated using content analysis, which 
 
                                                 
73 An interview protocol guided the interrogation of informants. The protocol is attached as 
Appendix A. 
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began early-on by applying concepts and factors that were expected to emerge in the 
data, factors with strong association to the concepts of institutional and rational-
contingency theory.  
Then, analysis proceeded via an inductive process. Through a systematic process 
of reading, interpreting, and coding the documents using qualitative analysis software, a 
number of additional concepts were included. Table 5 summarizes the analysis process. A 
list of factors is shown in Appendix I. 
 
Table 5: Data analysis process 
TARGETS FOR ANALYSIS 
 Business area characteristics 
 
 Organization of process, materials 
 
DATA  Participant roles, relationships PRODUCTS 
Archival document contents  Changing roles, responsibilities Results of decisions, action 
items 
- reports by business area  Discussion topics, features Goals 
- Year 2000 team 
communications 
 Sequences of events Participants 
- presentations to Delta 
executive management 
 Mission statements Participant perspectives 
- communications within the 
air transportation industry 
 Statements of objectives Organizing themes, 
concepts 
- public communications  Repeated activities Evaluative rules, criteria 
Interview notes  Cultural features Organization facilitators 
Journal articles  Evidence relating to beliefs Organization constraints 
Trade publications  Evidence of conflicts Power and status systems 
Video of company meeting  Patterns in communications Regulative organizations 
Books  Use of language, word choice Financial consequences 
  Evidence of rule following  
  Decision processes  
 
In the attempt to discover causal factors for actions, the investigation compared 
the context and content of Y2K response actions among the four Delta business areas as 
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embedded sub-cases. The structure of the Year 2000 Program paralleled the 
organizational structure in Delta’s business areas, which in turn facilitated the sub-case 
comparison. This Program structure served to define the project elements in each sub-
case according to business area Portfolio assignments. The project elements included 
resources, roles and responsibilities, as well as project methods and metrics. The 
challenge was to locate information in the archives and, to discover and locate associated 
employees. Each sub-case entailed fieldwork and follow-on analysis of data. The 
subsequent discovery of environmental factors was the result of a process that was both 
deductive and inductive. 
Comparative case study method 
The comparison of the four sub-cases was designed to address whether or not the 
same relative causes could explain the differences in solutions that four business areas 
adopted in dealing with the same problem. The method of analytic comparison (Mill’s 
method of difference) formed the basis for cross-case comparison.74 The analytic 
comparison process systematically compared sub-cases to determine those that were 
similar with regard to solutions and causal factors with others that differed on solutions 
and causal factors. The method provided the ability to find sub-cases that had the same 
causal factors and solutions but lacked a few key features, then through a process of 
elimination, to locate factors common to them all.  
Using this method, variables representing the two competing models were 
examined, the institutional system model and the rational-contingency system model. 
According to an institutional system model, the influence of environmental context leads 
 
                                                 
74 Neuman (2000) describes Mill’s logic. For further discussion, see also Ragin (1987). 
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to sub-optimal organization decision-making (institutional responses) with respect to 
efficiency and predictability. Conversely, according to a rational-contingency system 
model, optimally structuring the organization and its processes (rational responses) 
maximizes the efficiency of operations and its coordinating mechanisms. 
Summary 
This chapter described the data and its sources, and the method of analysis. 
Primary data sources were the archived records of Delta’s Year 2000 Program, and 
interviews with various people associated with Delta. Secondary sources were previously 
published materials. The chapter described the approaches used to organize the data and 
to analyze the data for environmental influences, and the challenges encountered in 
attempting to understand and organize Delta’s written records. Qualitative analysis 
software was used to facilitate analysis, which involved the coding of concepts that were 
identified in the documents and the interview reports. Following organization of the 
evidence, a comparative method was applied in order to compare the solutions and 
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CHAPTER 5      
THE CASE OF DELTA AIR LINES: ITS CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Three weeks after Leo Mullin joined Delta as chief executive in 1997 he learned that the 
airline had the worst technology in the business. No one was sure that Delta would 
survive the year-2000 calendar change (Corcoran, 2000). 
[Delta] would never have achieved what we did without Y2K. … and, 9/11 still has great 
impact. Delta was very involved at the time and it still strongly affects us. We instantly 
changed from a $16B to $13B company. If it happens again, we can’t survive (L. Mullin, 
1998, Jan 27, interview by author, Atlanta, GA). 
This chapter presents background information on the Delta corporate organization 
in broad historical, cultural, and environmental overview, and more specifically with 
respect to the Year 1997, the year when the Delta Year 2000 Program was announced 
formally.75 Attention is given to issues related to Delta’s growing dependence on 
information technology and to issues related to the management of its IT systems. This 
overview establishes the context within which the Year 2000 Program took place.  
Historical overview 
1924-1997 
This section provides a brief chronological accounting of the history of Delta and 
its industry environment from 1924 through 1997, these years representing the beginning 
of the company and the beginning of the study period, respectively. A more complete 
chronology of Delta’s history is available in the Timeline (p. xxxvii), which presents 
milestones in Delta’s operations during this period and after. It is interesting to reflect on 
 
                                                 
75 Information and statistics in this section are taken from the following: Delta annual reports, from 
Jones, G. (2003), and from Bitran, Gurumurthiο, & Sam (2006). 
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how far Delta and air transportation technologies have advanced, considering that the 
year 2003 marked one hundred years since the Wright brothers’ flight. The early 
activities at Delta came around 20 years later.76  
Delta began as a crop dusting firm in Macon, Georgia in 1924. Two young men 
with different skills, but innovative ideas, started the business with very limited capital—
sounds like the experience of Jobs and Wozniak. However, in contrast to the beginnings 
of Apple Computer, the innovation of the Delta founders, Dr. B. R. Coad and C.E. 
Woolman, came through the new technology of aviation, and required no expertise on the 
part of the customer.77 However, expertise on the part of the managers of this business 
must have been strong, as this air transportation company has weathered many storms 
over the years, yet stayed the course.  
The founders expanded the crop dusting business into transporting passengers in 
1929, five months before the stock market crash that set off the Depression.  
The five-passenger, 90-mile-per-hour Travel Air launched Delta's passenger service on 
June 17, 1929. (“A History of Service,” 2003). 
Then nine years later, legislation was passed that would prove to be a pivotal event for 
Delta’s future. Beginning in 1938, Delta (along with the rest of the airline industry) was 
required to operate under the control of the federal government regarding its fares and 
routes.78 For the subsequent forty-year period under the new regulation, the air 
transportation industry settled in and developed into a valued element of U.S. 
infrastructure. This was a period of both stability and growth for Delta, which included 
 
                                                 
76 As another reference point, the activities that are the subject of this research took place around 20 
years after the introduction of the personal computer. 
77 The crop dusting business would remain intact until Woolman’s death in 1966. 
78 Prior to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, airlines had been free to operate with no 
regulation other than regulations that promoted safety. 
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developing its first computer systems in-house. However, federal regulation of the 
airlines reduced the need to focus on efficiency in operation and ultimately permitted the 
industry’s payrolls to expand; these realities added to the mayhem when the regulation 
was reversed.  
In 1978, President Carter reversed the government control by signing the Airline 
Deregulation Act, which eliminated most domestic economic regulation of passenger and 
freight services and returned airlines to free competition on ticket prices and routes. The 
act resulted in such a shakeup in the industry that bankruptcies became common, adding 
to the chaos and uncertainty in the marketplace.  
The fuel crisis of 1979, the air traffic controllers’ strike of 1981, the severe recession in 
the early 1980s and the intense price competition combined to produce the worst losses in 
the history of domestic aviation. During the first decade of deregulation, more than 150 
carriers collapsed into bankruptcy. ... In part due to the Persian Gulf War in late 1990 and 
the end of leveraged buyouts in 1989, the industry again experienced a serious downturn 
(Bitran, Gurumurthiο, & Sam, 2006, p. 2). 
Even though Delta had suffered economic losses during this time, the 
organization survived by making organizational changes, which reflected its capacity to 
adapt in the new competitive environment. This adaptation became a pattern that has 
been observed in its more recent management strategies. 
After thoroughly analyzing the harsh financial pressures and the competitive reality of 
low-cost carriers’ continued expansion, Delta embarked upon an ambitious and 
accelerated journey to reinvent and redirect itself. Our goal is to meet the competition 
head-on by becoming a more efficient and simplified airline uniquely designed to 
improve the customer travel experience while simultaneously cutting costs (Grinstein, 
quoted in Delta Air Lines, 2004).  
Over the next 20 years that preceded the Mission Possible: Year 2000 Program,79 
the Delta internal organization, as well as Delta’s sectoral environment, experienced a 
 
                                                 
79 “Mission Possible: Year 2000 Program” was the name that was given to Delta’s Y2K project. In 
this study, the name of the project is simplified to “Year 2000 Program.” 
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number of changes  in response to the changes brought about by deregulation. During this 
time Delta gradually began to uncouple in-house functions—in keeping with popular 
ideas about focusing on core activities and outsourcing the rest, the rest including those 
associated with IT investments.80 Delta IT investments had become significant fixed 
costs; therefore, were examined with respect to streamlining the business and increasing 
operating efficiency. Further, Delta’s strategy turned to plans for employing functional 
assets for generating revenue, rather than limiting them to the support of Delta’s own 
business activities. As part of this strategy, for a brief time Delta attempted to market its 
software assets as a source of revenue.  
In-house management of IT systems 
Through the mid-'90s, much of Delta's operations ran on spreadsheets and checklists. 
Pneumatic tubes were used to shuttle information throughout airports. What systems were 
in use were scattered and disconnected (Overby, 2003). 
By the mid-90s, the Delta organization was heavily dependent on technology, its 
greatest dependence being its aircraft. In order to operate the aircraft, Delta’s pilots and 
mechanics had to stay current with the increasingly complex aircraft technologies, which 
involved training and certification. However, managing aircraft technologies was just one 
of the highly complex technologies that the organization had to stay on top of 
continuously in order to stay in business. Among its daily challenges was managing its IT 
systems.  
Delta’s dependence on IT goes back to the 1964, when IBM developed and 
installed the Deltamatic flight reservation system for Delta (Smithsonian National 
 
                                                 
80 Catering operations is an example. Many airlines sold these operations years ago as part of a plan 
to focus on core activities (Moorman, 2004). 
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Museum of American History). However, beyond this earliest effort to engage IT to 
support the business, it was rare for Delta’s management to call on the expertise of 
outside vendors for help with systems’ maintenance. The CIS department generally 
resisted using consultants. As one retired employee said, “We wouldn’t touch them with 
a ten foot pole!” 
Over the years that followed, hundreds of other business software systems and 
technologies were developed and installed in piecemeal fashion, of which—like most 
organizations of Delta’s age and size—a large percentage had taken place in-house. In-
house development was common, simply because few or no commercial applications 
were available until sometime in the early to mid 1990s. Over these earlier years, Delta 
business areas had developed their computer systems internally rather than to contract 
with outsiders. Delta and many other organizations felt their systems were so specialized 
and critical to their operations that they chose to develop them in-house. However, more 
realistically, the special issues in the air transportation industry, coupled with the limited 
number of airline companies, necessitated custom applications in many areas. Further, the 
philosophy of custom in-house development would extend into areas where there were 
better commercial off the shelf (COTS) solutions on the market, such as business support 
and customer service software. Moreover, by 1997 the systems were no longer working 
together effectively to coordinate and facilitate the increasingly complex functional 
activities. This situation compounded the complexity of the organization and reduced its 
operating efficiency. 
Delta’s core business areas— Airport Customer Service, Operations, Business 
Support, and Revenue—all had unique needs for processing information. In addition, 
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Delta’s systems were isolated in functional areas of the organization, many incapable of 
interaction. Therefore, the systems had become limited in their ability to provide 
accurate, timely information about flights and to coordinate information between users 
who needed it. Historically, business area priorities for whatever reasons had put the CIS 
department way down the list resulting in less than state-of-the-art systems. For example, 
Delta’s own reservations systems were long in coming, and, some would say, inferior 
upon arrival (Petzinger, 1996). These different technology circumstances would influence 
business areas in how their problem was defined for Y2K solution. In addition, Delta’s 
financial difficulties since deregulation had created a focus on reducing expenditures, 
which had created distrust among employees in different Delta business areas.  
During the 1990s, the vulnerabilities in Delta’s information systems—made more 
pressing by the Y2K bug—eluded resolution by the Computer and Information Services 
(CIS) department. Typical of many complex, institutionalized organizations, computer-
based systems at Delta developed according to an incremental process and over time had 
not kept pace with changing technologies. In the midst of this high technology 
environment, Delta had trouble dealing with the vulnerabilities in its information 
systems. The expertise of IT staff matched the state of the systems. This was to be 
expected. The employees who managed the systems possessed the knowledge that was 
required to perform their duties. However, the world of software production had 
advanced since the code in many of the systems was written. Delta’s training personnel 
had also become deficient in staying abreast of the latest technologies; therefore, the 
situation could not mend itself internally.  
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Having been in the air transportation business for over 70 years, change at Delta 
had become difficult (especially to its information systems) and, competition was intense. 
As a result and contrary to the notion of controlling cost, parts of the organization 
operated according to decades-old patterns, and were incapable of improving profits with 
their current production systems. Within this organizational environment, attempts to 
improve the IT function enterprise-wide had come in fits and starts and amid 
uncertainties; so that, mired in its own history, Delta had been unable to pull itself 
forward. 
Outsourcing systems management 
While all GDS81 computing platforms are essentially the same—big IBM mainframes 
running on the 40-year-old Transaction Processing Facility (TPF) operating system and 
doing everything from holding airline ticket inventories to handling transactions—
Worldspan has aggressively moved some application software to faster, less-expensive 
servers. In January 2002, it shifted its fare and pricing applications to servers running 
Microsoft Windows NT (McCormick, 2003). 
Beginning in 1990, Delta began to outsource portions of its IT services. Executive 
management had spent time with organization guru Mike Hammer, who encouraged the 
notion that an organization should focus on its core business, and should let an outside 
entity that specialized in the non-core functions do the other part. In addition, Delta’s 
executive management believed that outsourcing was a way to fix some of the issues they 
had with their IT shop.  
First, Delta entered into partnership with Northwest Airlines, TWA, and 
ABACUS Distribution Systems to operate and market Delta’s computer reservation 
 
                                                 
81 Computer reservations services (CRS) are also called GDS (global distribution services), which 
reflects the expansion of these kinds of services internationally. 
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system (CRS) under the name of Worldspan.82 Following the outsourcing agreement, 
Worldspan provided CRS services to Delta; and Delta in turn provided communications, 
information processing, and administrative services to Worldspan. 
The second project that outsourced IT activities came during the December 
quarter of 1994. Delta announced a joint venture and outsourcing contract that formed 
TransQuest, a new company operating in partnership with AT&T Global Information 
Solutions that would provide for Delta’s IT service needs.  
Part of the charter is to move Delta away from legacy systems to a client/server 
architecture, according to company officials, who estimate that the venture will yield 
productivity gains that will save Delta $400 million over the 10-year period (Stackpole, 
1994). 
The IT organization began with the hiring of 1,800 personnel from within Delta's 
computer services group and a $300 million annual budget.  
In forming TransQuest, Delta envisioned that the new company would not only 
provide IT services for Delta, but would also sell its services to others in the travel and 
transportation industries. At the outset, the company’s focus was on three areas:  
1. improving the quality and productivity of Delta's system development process,  
2. installing a new IT infrastructure and,  
3. cutting costs.  
In its first year of operation, TransQuest had made major contributions toward meeting 
these goals. Toward addressing the first goal, TransQuest had improved its ability to 
satisfy end-user needs and shorten application development time by using object-oriented 
 
                                                 
82  Travel agents are the primary users of CRS services, which enable electronic booking for airline, 
hotel, car rental and other travel reservations and issuing airline tickets. CRS services are provided by 
several companies in the U. S. and worldwide. In the U.S., other CRS competitors are SABRE (owned by 
American Airlines, Inc.), the Galileo International Partnership (owned by United Air Lines, Inc., USAir, 
Inc. and certain foreign carriers) and System One AMADEUS (owned by Continental Airlines, Inc., 
AMADEUS and EDS).  
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programming technology. Toward addressing the second goal, TransQuest had nearly 
completed deployment of an enterprise-wide, three-tier client-server system to integrate 
and standardize Delta's systems, and to provide common data that supported the users in 
multiple business areas. 
The Atlanta-based company has turned to IBM's MQSeries to tie together applications on 
a rainbow of different platforms and drastically cut application development costs, said 
Mark Whitney, senior fellow for middleware at TransQuest, Delta's information systems 
arm. “Now we can gather all our disparate information and drop it into a queue and bring 
it into one database,” Whitney said. “You can begin to join information you never could 
join before.” TransQuest will also use MQSeries for several other projects that let Delta's 
widespread client/server applications converse with the Transaction Processing Facility 
(TPF), the central airline process system running off an IBM System/390 mainframe. 
These include electronic ticketing and reservations and information kiosks located in 
airport terminals, all which require secure, unbroken communications (Ouellette, 1996).  
By then TransQuest had made the decision to install Windows NT operating systems in 
desktops units, and it was important to assure that the middleware functioned properly in 
connecting with end users. Therefore, the organization was also considering testing 
middleware from Microsoft that could help its Windows NT desktops exchange data with 
a slew of legacy systems. Although TransQuest had purchased MQSeries for Windows 
NT, its client platform of choice, the firm also was interested in Falcon, Microsoft's 
middleware for Windows NT, which would not available until the following year. With 
continued cooperation between IBM and Microsoft on the project, TransQuest hoped to 
run both Falcon and the MQSeries middleware. Computerworld’s Ouellette (1996) 
interviewed Mark Whitney, who was then a senior fellow for middleware at TransQuest, 
about this. 
We are delighted with the cooperation between IBM and Microsoft on MQ-Series. … 
That is a positive, because we have such a heterogeneous environment and don't want to 
make a choice between one or another vendor. 
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That same year, TransQuest also had established the Operations Control Center 
(OCC) in the Operations business area, which improved flight monitoring and air traffic 
control, and offered the opportunity to trim the cost from flight delays (Caldwell, 1997). 
However, the cost-cutting goal was yet to be accomplished. Table 6 shows Delta's 
percentage ownership in the partnership companies at June 30, 1996, which reflects 
earnings (losses) for fiscal 1996, 1995, and 1994.  
Table 6: Delta percentage ownership in associated companies 
 EQUITY EARNINGS (LOSSES), $MILLIONS 
 Ownership, % 1996 1995 1994 
Worldspan 38 $(5) $(4) $1. 
TransQuest 50 (8) (3) - 
Source: Delta Air Lines. (1997). 
On July 1, 1996, the partnership was dissolved; and, TransQuest became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Delta. 
Delta Air Lines in 1997 
Long before 1997, it was clear that Delta’s information systems had begun to 
contradict the outward competence evidenced by the airline’s many years of successful 
operation. By 1997, Delta had demonstrated remarkable endurance as an enterprise 
despite the deregulation shakeup. As noted in the Timeline, Delta had weathered its 
economic trials by strategic action that represented both technical and institutional 
endeavors, and in the process had recorded a number of air transportation “firsts.” 
Continuing this forward momentum, a number of prominent events occurred in 
1997. Having come through some difficult years through the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Delta was in excellent financial shape in 1997. The 1997 Annual Report shows that fiscal 
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1997 was the best financial year in Delta's history. In that year, Delta had reached a 
milestone in aviation history in transporting 100 million customers in a single year. No 
commercial airline had ever achieved this. In 1997, Delta made major change to its 
insignia for the first time in 35 years. There also was a change in its auditing relationship. 
After 52 years of successful partnership with Arthur Andersen & Company (AA&Co), 
Delta named Deloitte & Touche as independent auditors.83  
The year 1997 witnessed the retirement of President and CEO Ronald Allen after 
serving for 14 years in that post, and for a total of 34 years with the Delta organization. 
Allen’s replacement, Leo Mullin, represented a change in philosophy of the 
administration, as evidenced by three major differences from prior CEOs. As the first 
major difference, Mullin was the first person to lead the company that had not been 
promoted from within the organization. Second, even though Mullin had worked in the 
transportation industry, he came with no experience with an airline company at all.84 
Third, different from previous CEOs, he came with extensive experience in IT that went 
back to the beginning of his career.85 
Mullin (2004) described the posture of the organization with respect to Y2K when 
he first arrived in the fall 1997: 
 
                                                 
83 As auditors of Enron, the entire global firm of AA&Co was forced to cease operation because of 
the collusion of a few of its principals in Enron’s fraudulent activities, a court ruling that would later be 
withdrawn but too late to save the firm. 
84 Mullin had served for five years as Sr. VP for Strategic Planning at Consolidated Rail Corporation 
(Conrail) in Philadelphia, a company offering freight rail service. 
85 Early in Mullin’s career, he spent 9 yrs. with McKinsey & Co. 
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The company was extremely serious about Y2K. In fact, I would call it a crisis mode. 
The situation was very threatening due to the condition of the existing information 
systems. The major questions for all concerned had to do with identifying the issues. By 
far the biggest problem was setting priorities on what absolutely had to be done by 
January 1, 2000. Pent up ideas and demands from various entities had to be sidelined in 
order to focus only on tasks that were essential for assuring compliance and continued 
operations. The company helped these entities to understand the rationale for priorities 
and why their needs had to wait. 
Table 7 shows the state of the Delta organization as of 1997 and 2003, 
representing organizational statistics at two milestone events: the employment of Leo 
Mullin as CEO, and Mullin’s retirement [after Delta had spent $1.6 billion on IT 
improvements (Robb, 2004, Apr 21)], respectively.86 See Appendix C for an organization 
chart of management in late 1997. 
Table 7: Delta organization statistics at the beginning and end of the study period 
 1997 (BEGINNING) 2003 (END) 
Employees 63,400+ 70,600+ 
Aircraft 553 (14 types) 833 (15 types) 
Operating revenue, $millions $13.6 billion $13,303 
Operating expenses, $millions $12.1 billion $14,089 
Passenger mile yield 12.79¢ 12.49¢ 
Avg. fuel cost/gal 66.28¢ 81.78¢ 
Independent auditors Arthur Andersen & Co 87 Deloitte & Touche LLP 
Delta + partners daily flights 4,800+ 7,100+ 
Destinations 
149 domestic cities in 42 
states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands 
41 cities in 25 countries 
206 domestic cities in 47 
states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands 
48 cities in 32 countries 
Revenue passengers, millions 101.148 104.452 
 
 
                                                 
86 Mullin accepted the role of Delta’s President and CEO, and a membership on the Board of 
Directors, immediately following the official launch of the Year 2000 Program in July 1997.  
87 Arthur Andersen & Company had served as independent auditor of Delta for 52 of its 70+ years. 
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Table 7 continued 
 1997 (BEGINNING) 2003 (END) 
Delta Connection carriers 





Atlantic Coast Airlines 
(ACA) 




















CSA Czech Airlines 












El Al Israel Airlines 
Royal Air Maroc 





El Al Israel Airlines 
Royal Air Maroc 
South African Airways 
Source: Delta Air Lines (1997), Delta Air Lines (2003). 
 
Cultural character 
In addition to Delta’s history, its culture was an important element of context for 
the Year 2000 Program. Three prominent institutional characteristics among Delta 
employees were identifiable in Delta’s culture:  
 view of themselves as “family,” and 
 experience in military organizations.  
The next sections discuss these features in turn. 
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Family 
For much of its history, Delta employees had considered themselves “family.” As 
an example of family loyalty, in the economic downturn of 1981 and 1982, when Delta 
was in financial trouble, employees raised $30 million to purchase a plane, enabling 
Delta to make good on an order that had been placed at an earlier time when all was well. 
The plane, a Boeing 767-232, entered service in 1983 and was named the “Spirit of 
Delta.”88  
Even though in this example Delta employees may have represented a cultural 
extreme, the family culture was the norm among large corporations for much of the 20th 
century, where employees expected to work their entire careers with the support and 
protection of their firm. Organizations tended to hire for life, and employees shared a 
similar sense of loyalty. Companies celebrated the tenure of long-term employees; they 
took care of their people by providing health benefits, pay raises, and retirement funding. 
Following de-regulation, Delta tried to hold on to this paternalistic view quite a bit longer 
than most companies of that era.  
Over the years, as in any family, there were sources of conflict, particularly 
during times of financial hardship. Under these circumstances especially, the pilots’ 
union had played a particularly adversarial role. It might have been the Delta family 
spirit—and the underlying incentive systems at Delta—that united the employee 
community and preempted the need for unionization of most of the workers. However, 
Delta pilots had come to expect the high pay and benefits they had enjoyed over the years 
as the privileged “kids” in the family; pilots seemed to behave as “spoiled brats” in 
 
                                                 
88 The Spirit of Delta was housed in the Air Transport Heritage Museum, located in Delta’s original 
Hangar One at Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport. 
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Delta’s continuing attempts to lower costs and compete with the newer airlines that 
became prosperous following deregulation.89 Some have described the Delta family as 
having two components, the pilots and everyone else. Nevertheless, Delta employees 
were accustomed to this situation with the pilots, and often blamed not the pilots, but the 
Delta administration (“Mom and Pop”) for the pilots’ favorable economic status. The 
story goes that at one point, the pilots’ union demanded that Delta provide pilots with 
limousine service to and from the airport, and that this benefit be written into their 
contracts. However, in this case, Delta administration prevailed, arguing for greater 
equality of privileges for all the groups that made up the Flight Operations division.  
In addition to issues with pilot conflicts, over time Delta had added enormous 
complexity to its operations and processes—through mergers and acquisitions, increasing 
numbers of affiliations, and various additions to aircraft and computing technologies—to 
which many employees had become accustomed and saw as normal. In 1997, a large 
percentage of the workforce had been in the organization for 20 years or more. Therefore, 
many were potentially able to assess this cultural persistence at Delta.  
Military 
The aviation industry has evolved out of a military base. Much of our management style, 
marketplace orientation and paraphernalia of culture still reflect an authoritarian, 
hierarchical and command-and-control worldview (Shackford & Shackford, 2003). 
This mentality, like other aspects of the air transportation industry, has strong ties 
to the military, another cultural environment where strict control is emphasized. Because 
of their common use of airspace, among other reasons, Delta’s wider environment 
 
                                                 
89 Lower cost airlines operate with a different culture and employ a point-to-point route system 
instead of the hub-and-spoke system. “A major hub-and-spoke airline such as Delta has costs that can be 
150% higher than those of a carrier that only flies from one city to the next” (Gage & McCormick, 2003).  
 
   122
included military organizations. Within its “family” environment, Delta had developed a 
tightly coupled cultural model over the years for very sensible reasons. Safety was 
strongly emphasized as a part of the air transportation mentality such that Delta had built 
into the culture strict controls incorporating attention to detail.  
The abundance of military pilots trained for service in WWI helped to establish 
the beginning of the air transport industry after the war ended. In 1942, Delta contributed 
to the effort in WWII by modifying over 1000 aircraft, performing maintenance 
operations, and training pilots and mechanics. As noted in the Timeline, Delta carried 
passengers and military cargo during the first war in Iraq in 1990-91. More recently, 
Delta was a participant in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program during the period 
beginning October 1, 1997 and ending September 30, 1998, whereby the company agreed 
to make available up to 21 of its international range aircraft for use by the U. S. military 
related to national emergencies (Delta Air Lines, 1997, p. 10). 
Many Delta employees, particularly in the Operations business area, received 
training in military organizations prior to joining Delta. “80% of Delta pilots are former 
military” (Shtern, 2007). Other employees in the Flight Operations division (e.g., 
communications technicians) and Technical Operations (e.g., mechanics) in many air 
transportation organizations often have military experience prior to joining a civilian 
activity. An example is the transition of Admiral James Loy directly from the military to 
Undersecretary of Transportation for Security, a post in the Department of Transportation 
(DOT). 
Loy, who retired as commandant of the Coast Guard the same day he was tapped for 
TSA. … TSA is focused for the moment on aviation security and airports because of the 
way the ATSA [Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which called for the creation 
of TSA] was written, but eventually we want the national transportation system writ large 
to be the benefactor of a higher security profile (Scalet, 2003). 
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Military environments are institutionalized, and their cultures are well known in 
terms of rule following and behavioral expectations. Military culture supports routine 
ways of performing and discourages innovation. An array of military organizations (e.g., 
U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, British Navy, and Army of the PRC) likely exhibits similarity 
in structures and processes, similarity that derives from conformity to what is understood 
to be legitimate in the industrialized military field rather than evidence of effectiveness. 
Can it be said that the British lost the war of American independence because of its strict 
reliance on structures and processes that were institutionalized in British military culture? 
An institutional system model may explain actions of military organizations.  
The enduring culture embedding those with military experience creates a sense of 
rule following and behavioral expectations in an organization that is likely different from 
the non-military experienced employee. Further, if the organization’s dominant coalition 
were embedded in military culture, which is characterized by its highly rationalized 
model of planning, management, communication, and adaptation, the rules and 
behavioral expectations for the organization would be influenced by this. (Note: If the 
organization in total is influenced by military culture, then there should be no variation 
among business areas, except that related to technical function.)  
Military organizations are mission driven. Each sub-unit has a clearly defined 
mission. There is a high degree of bureaucratization and delegation, from the highest 
level down to lowest sub-unit. Each person knows where he fits and what his job is. 
Military organizations employ a command and control management structure, with top 
down control and communication. Every sub-unit is expected to conform to the chain of 
command without independent strategizing. As a rule, military organizations are oriented 
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toward contingency planning—advancing thought to various alternative responses and 
plans. Even though tightly structured, there is the expectation of adaptation to immediate 
circumstances at each level of command structure. Therefore, constant communication is 
a requirement for execution of duties. Information and feedback continuously travels 
back and forth from top to bottom and bottom to top through the chain of command. 
Labor organizations 
Over the history of Delta, labor organizations were absent from the Delta ranks 
except among the pilots. In 2002 Delta could still be proud of the fact that besides the 
unionization of the flight superintendents (approx. 200 employees), the pilots’ union was 
the only union represented in the company.  
Delta's operating advantages include having only one union, the pilots'. Flight attendants 
in 2002 rejected unionization by a vote of 71 percent to 29 percent, and ramp workers 
rejected it for a second time in 2000, 83 percent to 17 percent. Mullin, who is from 
Boston, credits Delta's “Southern heritage,” meaning a sense of graciousness that has 
become, among employees, a kind of “covenant” (Will, 2003). 
The flight attendants and other Operations groups had successfully voted down attempts 
to unionize.  
All of these cultures—military, family, and labor organizations—have a high 
degree of loyalty. However, in military culture, different from that in a family or a labor 
union, mission trumps individual rights. Like military organizations, Delta historically 
had promoted from within. However, because of severe profit pressure in the later years 
of Allen’s leadership, morale and customer service had been negatively impacted and 
changes were needed. Like in a traditional family culture, when problems were at an 
impasse, outsiders were hired to try to fix them. Mullin was an outsider and a non-
military employee. However, the executive in charge of operations, Mac Armstrong, also 
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an outsider, was a retired U.S. Air Force (USAF) General.90 Walter Taylor, the director of 
Delta’s Year 2000 Program, was an outsider and a former USAF pilot.91 How many 
others in the executive ranks were new to Delta at the time of Y2K? … were military? Did 
outsider leadership significantly affect the Year 2000 Program? Answers to these 
questions, while not a part of this investigation, are indirectly relevant to Y2K solutions. 
However, toward illuminating the factors of direct interest to this dissertation, the next 
section addresses the situation with respect to the influences in Delta’s external 
environment. 
Sectoral environment 
This is an especially good time for you vacationers who plan to fly, because the Reagan 
administration, as part of the same policy under which it recently sold Yellowstone 
National Park to Wayne Newton, has “deregulated” the airline industry. What this means 
for you, the consumer, is that the airlines are no longer required to follow any rules 
whatsoever. They can show snuff movies. They can charge for oxygen. They can hire 
pilots right out of Vending Machine Refill Person School. They can conserve fuel by 
ejecting husky passengers over water. They can ram competing planes in mid-air. These 
innovations have resulted in tremendous cost savings which have been passed along to 
you, the consumer, in the form of flights with amazingly low fares, such as $29. Of 
course, certain restrictions do apply, the main one being that all these flights take you to 
Newark, and you must pay thousands of dollars if you want to fly back out (Barry, quoted 
in Lu, A. C.-J., 2003, p. 1). 
Business units fully understand that the Year 2000 problem, if left unresolved, would 
result in business failures, loss of opportunity, extreme customer dissatisfaction and 
litigation. … The business units recognize this is not just a technology problem. External 
dependencies, where there is little to no influence, pose an even greater risk to Delta’s 
operation (Delta archive, “Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book,” 1999, p. 4). 
The business of Delta Air Lines is conceptually simple: transporting passengers 
and freight from one place to another via aircraft. What makes it difficult is the vast 
numbers of aircraft—of many types, owned and operated by many others—who share 
 
                                                 
90  Armstrong came to Delta as a 31-year military aviation veteran. He had retired from the Air Force 
as a three-star general in 1995. 
91 Taylor had actually come and gone and come back, but had accrued little service time with Delta. 
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common spaces, both in the air and on the ground. Among the aircraft operators are 
numbers of both military and civilian organizations, all of which are responsible for 
critical public infrastructure services. Because of the critical nature of air services—
therefore the importance of safety and reliability—a number of government agencies and 
industry affiliations provide regulatory oversight for the aviation system.92  
To manage the common spaces, a conspicuous mass of regulations and standards 
have been developed, along with government and industry agencies that monitor air 
transport-related entities with respect to compliance. However, many of the agencies that 
were created principally in the interest of safety have become dependencies upon which 
airlines rely in order to perform their services. Further, by 1997, many of these agencies 
had become dependent on computer-based processors and were likewise dealing with the 
risks of Y2K. 
Government agencies 
The airlines now have the network infrastructure and planes, but airports and ATC [Air 
Traffic Control] systems [are] inadequate (Mullin, 2000, p. 7). 
[O]ur airports and ATC systems remain woefully inadequate, both in capacity and in 
many measures of operational performance. We are continuing to work closely with 
governmental representatives to find solutions that will fix the interrelated ATC problems 
of uncertain funding, inadequate equipment, an unresponsive organizational structure, 
and outmoded systems (Mullin, quoted in Delta Air Lines, 2000). 
Government regulations principally center on safety, but also focus on routes. 
Safety regulations were designed to protect the safety of the aircraft, the crew, the 
passengers, the mechanics, the ground handlers and equipment, the jet fuel, and other 
 
                                                 
92 The aviation system comprises airports, aircraft, air traffic control, airspace, and air travelers. 
Within these elements are pilots and passengers, control systems for approach and routes, control towers, 
and various categories of ownership of air transportation services: military, corporate, commercial, and 
general, along with various types of aircraft.  
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aircraft that share the same spaces, the spaces being the airspace, the buildings and 
runways of airports, the nation-states over which and in which the aircraft travel, …, the 
list goes on. Route regulations deal with two main issues: safety, and sharing in the 
commercial marketplace.  
First, in the interest of safety, a plane needs a place to land in case of emergency. 
In the U.S., more than 10,000 airports serve a variety of flight-related activities, ranging 
from large complexes with several runways and many types of aircraft operations, to 
small air strips that can only accommodate light aircraft. Routes were established in order 
to limit the chances for traffic congestion, but also to enable access to an airport under 
emergency conditions. In earlier times, long distance routes for commercial aircraft were 
designed around the capability of the aircraft. Safety requirements dictated the route 
based on traveling only so far away from an emergency landing spot. Therefore, to deal 
with these issues government agencies evolved from the municipal-level on up to the 
federal level in order to regulate and monitor the air traffic.  
Next, with regard to sharing in the marketplace, government oversight prevents 
airlines from flying at will to any destination they might desire. Delta’s acquisition of the 
NY-London route from United in 2006 serves as an example. The agreement was subject 
to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) approval. The origin of this situation dates 
back to a 1977 treaty between the U.S. and the U.K. In this bilateral air transport 
agreement, the U.K. restricted use of the U.S. – U.K. routes in order to prevent U.S. 
domination in the global industry. Therefore, a formal process exists wherein the rights to 
fly between certain airports are conferred to a limited number of entities. 
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In order to accommodate air traffic lanes, as well as to accommodate passenger 
and cargo services, the schedules of air transport (time, place, date) must be accurate and 
reliable. From 1997 to 2003, the period during which the Delta Y2K solutions were 
planned and implemented, a number of air transportation regulations, professional 
certifications, and guidelines existed that may have influenced the way business areas 
organized and developed their IT systems. The following paragraphs present a selection 
of government regulators: FAA, DOJ, DOT, the U.S. Postal Service, and others. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the chief regulator of public air 
space. The FAA regulates Delta’s general flight operations affecting air safety, including 
the control of air space, flight personnel, and aircraft certification and maintenance, and 
other air safety concerns. FAA also regulates “slot allocations” at four major U.S. and 
certain foreign airports served by Delta. Each slot represents the authorization to land at 
or take off from the particular airport during a specified time.  
In accomplishing its mission, especially regarding the control of air space, FAA 
employed computer-based systems that were questionable and worrisome during Delta’s 
Y2K management program. 
Modernization of the U.S. air traffic control system has been a disaster story of epic 
proportions. The General Accounting Office estimates the cost of the push to modernize 
its information systems that the FAA started in 1981 will top $45 billion by 2005 (Carr & 
Cone, 2002). 
Other regulatory bodies monitor and regulate certain competitive aspects of the 
airline industry. The U.S. Department of Justice has jurisdiction over issues of airline 
competition, which includes mergers and acquisitions. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) exercises regulatory authority over international routes, and 
international tariffs and pricing, although domestic air transportation is unrestricted. 
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Authority to operate international routes is regulated by the DOT and by the foreign 
governments involved. International routes are also subject to the approval of the 
President for conformance with national defense and foreign policy objectives.  
The DOT and certain foreign governments regulate the operations of CRS 
vendors. The DOT is also concerned with certain other consumer-related matters such as 
advertising, compensation for those who are denied boarding, baggage liability, and 
smoking aboard aircraft.  
Many other interrelationships exist in the airline industry. The U.S. Postal Service 
has authority over the transportation of mail. The Communications Act of 1934 governs 
Delta's use and operation of radio facilities. The Railway Labor Act governs labor 
relations in the airline industry. Environmental matters (including noise pollution) are 
regulated by various federal, state, and local governmental entities.  
In addition, other macro structures besides government regulation had been 
developed as a way to coordinate flying arrangements and collectively deal with other 
common issues for mutual benefit. How did these relationships affect Y2K solutions? 
Industry relationships 93 
[O]ur long standing relationships have been proven to work – not just on paper but in the 
real world of day-to-day, airport-to-airport travel (Mullin, quoted in Delta Air Lines, 
2000). 
Mullin had learned a lot about the air transportation sector in a short time because 
of dealing with the crisis of Y2K. Along the way, he was able also to take a leadership 
position to help with issues in the air transportation sector. 
 
                                                 
93 Much of the material in this section regarding industry structures from Delta Air Lines, (1997). 
See also Appendices D & E. 
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Code-sharing arrangements and airline alliances 
Code-sharing arrangements and airline alliances had enabled Delta to leverage its 
ability to provide air travel services to its customers. Many U.S. carriers had increased 
their ability to sell transatlantic services and destinations to and beyond European cities 
by code sharing. Similarly, code-sharing agreements with U.S. carriers had enabled 
foreign carriers to obtain access to interior U.S. passenger traffic.  
Under these dual designator code sharing arrangements, Delta and the foreign carrier 
publish their respective airline designator codes on a single flight operation, thereby 
allowing Delta and the foreign carrier to provide joint service with one aircraft rather than 
operating separate services with two aircraft (Delta Air Lines, 2000). 
Airline alliances worked differently. Alliances represented a deeper level of 
cooperation based in a well-established relationship history among carriers. In particular, 
relationships among full service airlines generally represented the same cultures, 
management beliefs, labor policies, and route structures. As an example, Delta joined 
Aeromexico, Air France, and Korean Air to launch SkyTeam, an international airline 
alliance. SkyTeam airlines had  
a time-tested history of code-shares and other working relationships prior to this 
partnership, so [the partners] know and understand each other. [Their] similar corporate 
cultures, matched networks, and common performance ethics mean a smoother flight 
for customers, right from the start (Delta Air Lines, 2000).  
In an interview with Curtis Robb (2004, Apr 7) former CEO at Delta Technology, 
he said this about the industry relationships: 
Military or code-share partners – neither really constrains Delta. Delta had to drop 
partners based on maintenance issues. Delta and eight other airlines have global alliances, 
which are terrific business opportunities to maximize passenger opportunities [i.e., Air 
France, Mexico, Italia, Czech, KLM, South African, Continental, and Northwest 
(Continental and Northwest mix frequent flyer miles)]. 
SkyTeam alliances must meet criteria of safety, technology, and customer service. (All 
metrics deal with safety). 
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Industry-owned organizations 
Delta, as a part of the air transportation industry, has an extensive network of 
sector-based organizations that are regulative. Organizations such as the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) establish global standards for flight safety among 
other things.  
Delta works closely with the Air Transport Association (ATA), Air Transport 
Association – Canada (ATAC), and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). 
The Air Transport Association (ATA) is the U.S. airline industry’s chief lobbying group, 
and represents the airline industry on major aviation issues before Congress, federal 
agencies, state legislatures and other governmental bodies. The organization promotes 
safety by coordinating industry and government safety programs, and serves as a focal 
point for industry efforts to standardize practices and enhance the efficiency of the air 
transport system.94 Delta chaired the ATA Y2K Airport Sub-Committee and led the ATA 
Y2K supplier programs. ATA was instrumental in coordinating activities of airports. 
Delta had a similar relationship with the Canadian Air Transport Association (ATAC), 
which had its own Y2K committee. 
Another relevant organization is the IATA, the global trade organization for air 
transportation, which plays an important role in harmonizing technical standards for civil 
aviation worldwide. Its members comprised 265 airlines—the world’s leading passenger 
and cargo airlines among them, which represent around 94% of international scheduled 
air traffic. IATA members, as scheduled and non-scheduled airlines, operate commercial 
 
                                                 
94 See http://www.airlines.org. 
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air services from more than 140 nations in every part of the globe.95 Delta held one of 
nine seats on the IATA Y2K Executive Steering Committee and Mullin served as 
Chairman of IATA from 1999-2002. IATA membership approved the membership-wide 
assessment for the expansion of the industry-wide Y2K program. 
ACI-NA was the largest of the six worldwide regions of Airports Council 
International (ACI), an organization of airports worldwide. Most all domestic and 
international airline passenger and cargo traffic in North America goes in and out of ACI-
NA airports. ACI-NA promotes cooperation within the commercial civil aviation industry 
for exchange of ideas, information, and experiences on common airport issues. The 
organization is the interpreter for key airport policy and business issues to the ACI-NA 
membership.96 
The following is an excerpt from an email message sent to Delta’s PMO by 
ATA’s Y2K director Paul Archambeault: 
ATA PO learned on Thursday that ACI-NA Board of Directors denied a request for 
funding up to $60,000 for common airport Year 2000 testing program on the grounds that 
it would duplicate efforts already underway (Delta archive, 061298.txt).  
Further information provided to the Delta managers described progress with other 
entities and their activities and concerns. 
ATA requested that WCO [World Customs Organization] begin gathering Y2K readiness 
information from its members. IATA is also in contact with WCO. ATA President Hallett 
of WCO met with Senator Bennett (R-UT), who chairs the Senate Select Committee on 
Year 2000. Sen. Bennett indicated concerns over FAA and airports. 
The ATA airport matrix was expanded by FAA to include additional items provided by 
ACI-NA and other items (such as locally owned navaids at smaller airports).  
 
                                                 
95 See http://www.iata.org.  
96 See http://www.aci-na.org. 
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The checklist will be expanded to include three columns: one indicating that an item is 
related to FAR Part 139 airport certification; one indicating that an item is related to the 
movement of aircraft on the airfield but not related to Part 139; and one to indicate that 
an item is related to FAR Part 107 or 108 security requirements. Tentative FAA target 
for release of the letters is the week of June 22 [1998]. On action items list are Airbus, 
Rolls Royce, Sunstrand Corp, and Pratt & Whitney, GE engine services FAA Flight 
Standards; APHIS; and NWS, FAA Y2K testing protocols generally, host computer 
testing results; and the end-to-end testing plans for FAA/airline and other system 
interfaces.  
It was with the backdrop of this Delta context that the scenario was envisioned for 
the Year 2000 Program, and for the different solutions among Delta’s business areas. 
Everything about the environment of the Delta organization pointed to the idea that 
coercion would come into play in a number of ways as a Y2K solution was designed. It 
seemed reasonable to conclude in advance of the investigation that institutional factors 
would be the overriding influence on the actions in business areas; and that these 
contextual conditions would force solutions that were not the same and not the best. It 
was surprising to come to different conclusions as the investigation developed. The story 
continues in the next chapter with the design of the component activities of the Year 2000 
Program. 
Summary 
Delta formed the background context within which each of the sub-unit business 
areas developed its Y2K solution. This chapter described this context, discussing the 
Delta organization in broad historical overview and more specifically with respect to the 
study period between 1997 and 2003. The overview also included a discussion of Delta’s 
cultural and sectoral environment. The next chapter continues the development of this 
context by elaborating the Year 2000 Program and its component structures. 
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CHAPTER 6      
THE YEAR 2000 PROGRAM SUPPORTED DELTA’S FUTURE 
VISION 
 
The Y2K issue impacts every facet of Delta Airlines. All Business Areas and Subsidiaries 
of the airlines [are] in some way affected by this technological problem. Every individual 
within the airlines will be in some way affected by the Y2K issue. Coping with the Y2K 
issue will require organization wide focus and resources in order to meet the finite 
deadline of the year 2000 (Delta archive, “Mission Year 2000 Master Plan, Section 1.0 
Executive Summary,” 1998, p. 4). 
Some of you have made mention of this being the first time business, support and 
operating units have come together to formally discuss the business processes and the 
impact decisions have throughout the company (Delta archive, McCullough letter, 
ITcosts.doc). 
Delta Technology had to inventory, inspect, repair or replace every computer system in 
the company. This was a golden opportunity to upgrade where necessary, eliminate old or 
redundant systems, and generally produce a slimmer, more robust computing 
environment (Delta archive, Taylor, quoted in Corporate Communications Y2K-
Normal.doc). 
The aim of this case study was to understand how a complex organization like 
Delta addressed and solved an IT problem that affected the security of its computer-based 
systems. The study focused on the crisis of Y2K, and on the effects of context on solution 
choices for eliminating the Y2K bug. Toward this end, Chapter 5 presented an overview 
description of Delta, which served as the context within which each sub-unit business 
area developed and implemented its Y2K solution. The study proceeds in this chapter to 
bring to light the context provided by the Year 2000 Program, i.e., the structured process 
that was used to assess Delta’s IT systems and to devise and implement its treatment 
plans. The “Future Vision” for Delta’s systems that had been devised in earlier years 
drove this activity in large part.  
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Back as far as the early 1990s, Delta had identified a “Future Vision” of the ideal 
IT systems that would best serve the complexity of the enterprise. The vision supported 
management of the organizational complexity with a high level of real-time functional 
interdependence among Delta's IT systems, including reservations, flight planning, 
passenger check-in, cargo loading, aircraft maintenance, crew scheduling, etc. The vision 
identified the architecture along with the kinds of systems that would be needed, and the 
technical expertise that would be required to develop and implement them.97 For Delta, 
bringing this vision to reality meant a complete transformation of its existing systems. 
One might therefore speculate that because of the scale and scope of such an effort, and 
for any number of other reasons, the Future Vision idea (along with addressing the issues 
with IT) had been low priority. The Y2K bug gave the company a reason to bring these 
projects to the forefront.  
However, making plans to change the condition of the systems did not come 
without trepidation on the part of executive management. Mullin (2004) described a 
conversation he had with Feld in September of 1997, shortly after Mullin arrived.  
Charlie said that IT at Delta was ‘abysmal.’ He said Delta could not be compliant by year 
2000. I called my wife, who was still in Chicago, and told her not to sell the house. I 
wasn’t sure I wanted to take over with this facing the company. 
Grinstein (Delta’s Non-executive Chairman) must have offered Mullin a deal he could 
not refuse, since he did stay on the job. Further, he not only took on the Y2K project, but 
he led the company to apply their IT systems to garner benefits for Delta that no CEO 
before Mullin had been able to imagine. 
 
                                                 
97 These ideas were based on ideas of the “Airport of the Future,” (See NASA: 
http://ffc.arc.nasa.gov/). 
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Fortunately, some in the organization were already squarely confronting the Y2K 
problem before Mullin arrived; the methodology with all of the details outlined to 
complete the project had been acquired and put in place. The methodology provided a 
template for the project, the structure of which consisted of multiple components that cut 
across the four functional areas of the organization. The methodology also defined the 
means for coordination across the components. However, Mullin first had to engage the 
leadership for carrying it out. This chapter presents a discussion of the IT transformation 
and brief descriptions of the methodological components of the Year 2000 Program. The 
chapter also describes Y2K-related activities of organizations in Delta’s external sectoral 
environment. 
Delta’s IT transformation 
A number of accounts have described the Year 2000 Program at Delta as an “IT 
Transformation.” The term “transformation” as it relates to the Year 2000 Program 
pertains to both the organizational restructuring within Delta Technology, and the 
changes to Delta’s IT systems—to the systems architecture and to the means for user 
interaction. These two processes, (1) changes to organization and (2) changes to 
information technology, worked in tandem as equally important aspects that contributed 
to the favorable results that the organizations of Delta and Delta Technology achieved 
together while solving the Y2K problem. 
Organization restructuring 
The organizational restructuring began with new leadership for Delta Technology. 
After prior missteps and false starts including the failed TransQuest partnership and 
unproductive engagement of consultants, Delta finally found the leadership both for the 
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enterprise and for the IT organization that would produce the needed results. One of 
Mullin’s first actions after taking the reins as CEO was to hire Feld to act as Delta's Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), and Delta Technology’s CEO.  
Immediately prior to the Delta assignment Feld had served as acting CIO at 
Burlington Northern Inc. (BNI), the railroad company where Grinstein had been 
Chairman and CEO. At BNI, Feld led the integration of IT systems after BNI acquired 
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. The 22-month effort involved more than 60 million lines of legacy 
code. The real-time integrated system went live in July 1997, and Delta hired him a 
month later. Of note, the Delta assignment would involve installing a real-time integrated 
system, about 50 million lines of legacy code and had a two-year deadline. 
When Mullin presented the challenge of solving Delta’s Y2K problem to Feld, he 
insisted that he would not take the job unless he had the freedom to transform the entire 
system. Feld convinced Delta’s executives that his transformation approach would enable 
the enterprise to weather the change of millennium without incident, but more 
importantly, that the approach would put Delta in a leadership position in networked 
information systems at a time when the competition seemed to be way ahead. However, 
Feld did not want to take the job as a Delta employee, but rather he wanted to do the 
work in a consulting role. Mullin, according to Feld, was accustomed to managing a more 
traditional leadership team where all members were employees; but in the interest of 
getting Delta’s IT issues put to rest, he met all of Feld’s terms. Thus, Mullin gave Feld 
responsibility, as a consultant, for the development and operations of Delta’s wholly 
owned subsidiary, Delta Technology. 
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When Feld first came on board, Delta’s IT company was still called TransQuest. 
Feld was instrumental in changing the name of TransQuest to Delta Technology, but 
other changes that followed were also dramatic. The early activity following Feld’s hiring 
involved re-mixing roles and responsibilities. One informant described it this way: 
Feld began a minor cultural revolution. He selectively moved employees to comparable 
responsibilities in new divisions. People became disconnected from others they were 
accustomed to working with. At an informal gathering after work with former co-
workers, a secretary confided that Feld had requested a confidential report of how people 
were getting along in their new places.  
During this time, Feld assessed skill levels of IT staff, began a process of firing and 
hiring, identifying leadership and processes, reorganizing for Y2K, and outsourcing code 
cleaning. Feld commented on the pace of work during the project initiation, “… coming 
off of failed outsourcing and a lot of junk, we worked in 90 day increments” (Feld, 2006). 
With all of the changes that happened inside the Delta Technology organization, 
one thing that did not change was the organizational structure. During the phase of cross-
populating within the organization, Feld had maintained the divisional structure of Delta 
Technology that had been established before his arrival. In the prior year, which was the 
inaugural year of TransQuest, the employees had been organized to work in teams 
(“portfolios”) that corresponded to the business areas in Delta. This structure was based 
on mapping Delta’s functional areas to the IT systems that supported their activities. This 
structure would serve to organize the Year 2000 Program. Figure 3 illustrates the Year 
2000 Program coordination between the portfolio divisions in Delta Technology and the 
business areas of Delta. 
 












impacts of systems and
subsystems
 
Source: Delta archive, “Figure 3-3. Mapping Technical and Business Risks,” 1997. 
Figure 3: Year 2000 Program maps a business area onto its technology portfolio 
 
Customer Portfolio’s work in Delta Technology related to software applications (systems) 
that supported customer-interfacing functions, such as airport gate and ticket agents, in 
the Airport Customer Service business area of Delta. Airline Operations Portfolio 
performed systems work related to the functional activities supporting Delta’s pilots, 
flight attendants, and mechanics in the Operations business area of Delta, Business 
Support Portfolio performed systems work for Delta’s finance function, legal, HR, etc. 
Revenue Portfolio performed work in support of the sales and marketing groups. In 
contrast to the aforementioned groups, a fifth portfolio, Technology, provided 
infrastructure support for the other four portfolios’ application software, and for the 
global enterprise-wide architecture systems. The Technology portfolio supported the 
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entire Delta enterprise, providing engineering and support services for desktop units, 
file/print/communication servers, networks, and system platforms. During the study 
period, the Technology Portfolio was divided into three groups: Common Services, 
Engineering, and System Operations. Common Services covered database, development 
tools, Intranet services, middleware services, and usability engineering. Engineering dealt 
with change and configuration management of IT infrastructure systems, including 
networks and workgroup systems. The third division, System Operations, managed 
platform operations, the help desk and field services. See Appendix D for a diagram of 
the Delta Technology organization structure.  
The Year 2000 Program combined employees from Delta and Delta Technology, 
assuring not only that the process was not limited to the IT staff, but also that the 
Program included input from business people who understood the business processes that 
were required to run the company. At first, the Program organization had problems with 
leadership. Even though the methodology had been defined for running the Program, it 
was not until late in the spring of 1998 that the people were put into positions that 
allowed strong forward progress. 
Organizing the Year 2000 Program 
It is imperative that Delta create an audit trail of all our Year 2000 efforts so that we can 
prove due diligence if we have the unfortunate experience of being involved in any Year 
2000 litigation (Delta archive, “Delta’s Enterprise Year 2000 Management Overview 
Inventory Phase,” 1997, p. 2). 
Methodology 
The methodology for the Year 2000 Program, called SMART/2000+™, was 
purchased from the BDM consulting company. This methodology defined all of the 
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coordinating organizational and activity structures. Roles and responsibilities were 
defined and the activities were structured in phases. A central Project Management Office 
(PMO) was established to coordinate all of the Y2K related activities. The PMO included 
Program Control, Quality Assurance (QA), Configuration Management (CM), Testing & 
Compliance Validation, Systems Architect (SA), Risk Management, and 
Communications. Some areas of the PMO were difficult to fill by only a Delta team 
member because of the lack of expertise. BDM contractors filled some of these roles. Ten 
people, including a representative from legal and media relations, met every week. They 
dealt with coordination mechanisms prescribed by the project methodology, such as 
keeping records on inventory, assessments, etc. This group also managed Y2K issues 
related to entities external to Delta: fuel, FAA, airports, weather, immigration, 
maintenance suppliers. The group was dissolved after the year 2000 rollover.  
An IT board provided oversight for strategy implementation and determined IT 
priorities, in addition to providing coordination among Delta IT personnel, Delta 
Technology, Worldspan, and Delta's business areas. The IT Board consisted of the CFO, 
the Executive Vice President for Airport Customer Service, the Controller, and the heads 
of Flight Operations, Customer Commitment, and Distribution Planning (Delta archive, 
Res Conference.ppt)  
Table 8: Delta Information Technology (IT) Board 
Paul Matsen 
Charlie Feld (executive sponsor) 
Charles Gravitt (managing director) 
Business Technology 
Portfolio Owners Portfolio VPs 
Portfolio Managers Portfolio Director 
Business Director Portfolio Teams, core & extended teams 
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Walter Taylor directed the work of the Delta systems assessments along with the 
changes that had to meet the year 2000 deadline. Taylor, a military veteran and Delta 
pilot had a definite “command and control” attitude about the project. 
Y2K represented a “burning platform,” and needed a battlefield military mentality 
(Taylor, 2004, Apr 13).  
There were 600 people involved in the Year 2000 Program. A person in each 
business area (a “strong contributor”) was assigned to Taylor. The idea was “don’t 
remove accountability for the work – take someone out of the regular work force who 
knew the system, and was responsible” (Ibid.).  
Table 9 shows the leadership by Portfolio. Note that Taylor was also the VP in 
charge of the Operations portfolio. 
Table 9: Year 2000 Portfolio owners & Portfolio VPs 
PORTFOLIO DELTA OWNERS DELTA TECHNOLOGY VPs 
Business Support Ed West David Pittman 
Customer Vicki Escarra Keith Halbert 
Operations Mac Armstrong Walter Taylor 
Revenue Vince Caminiti Mark Sohl 
 
The Program was assigned “high priority” status relative to other work activities, 
and given liberal funding. Delta’s executive management felt that due to the critical 
nature of the Y2K issue, the Program required a more flexible funding process than 
existed in other areas. Understanding the nature of this issue to the organization, Mullin’s 
attitude was to invest whatever was necessary to get the job done. 
[Delta] utilizes software and related computer technologies essential to its operations that 
will be affected by the Year 2000 issue. Delta is studying what actions will be necessary 
to make its computer systems Year 2000 compliant. The expense associated with these 
actions cannot presently be determined, but could be material (Delta Air Lines, 1997). 
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The SMART/2000+™ plan called for seven phases: Awareness, Inventory, 
Assessment, Migration Planning, Renovation, Testing/Validation, and 
Implementation/Integration. Table 10 shows some of the Delta events during the 
Inventory, Assessment, and Treatment phases. These phases were roughly defined; and 
the dates are somewhat different in various documents. 
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Table 10: Year 2000 team activities by Program phase 
INVENTORY PHASE  SEP 1997-FEB 1998 
Conduct a physical inventory of all business area/enterprise assets. 
Attend Atlanta Y2K Users Group 08-25-97 
BDM consultants helped to implement Delta 
Enterprise PMSR process for the Core Team and 
Extended Team meetings. 
09-11-97 
Core team complete 09-15-97 
BDM support for configuration mgmt (CM) 09-29-97 
Ensure TransQuest backup and recovery systems 
are sufficient for the Y2K data (PMSRs and 
database) 
10-20-97 
Decision not to use Clearcase or Documentum for 
CM 
01-28-98 
ASSESSMENT PHASE  FEB 1998-JUN 1998 
Assess Y2K readiness, risk in IT equipment and systems, non-IT equipment, and facilities. Assign 
criticality as high, medium, or low. If approved, Y2K assessment of low criticality items may be deferred 
to the Treatment Phase. However, low criticality items will be completely assessed no later than 
12/1/98. Determine estimated date for completion of external suppliers’ Y2K programs. 98 
E&Y leading coordination between Delta 
Technology and Suppliers. 
03-02-98 
Charles Gravitt of Delta Technology assumes the 
position of Managing Director with four full-time 
Directors in the areas of Remediation, Testing, 
Knowledge Management, and Business (non-IT).  
03-23-98 
TREATMENT PHASE  MAR 1998-JUN 1999 
Take corrective measures to assure equipment, systems, and facilities are capable of processing data 
with date sensitive fields before, during, and beyond the year 2000. This includes developing business 
continuity plans. For external suppliers, the phase evaluates supplier progress against stated Y2K plans.  
Meet with connection carriers to discuss Y2K 
status & readiness of regional airports. 
07-09-98 
Determine assessment and compliance validation 
procedure for aircraft certification. 
07-14-98 
Determine level of detailed information we can 
obtain from ATA/IATA that supports readiness of 
an airport, supplier, and regulatory agency. 
09-25-98 
Coordinate and engage int'l station managers with 
Y2K (IATA effort and efforts within their airports). 
10-30-98 
Identify contact and create process for 
remediation of bag and mail sortation systems. 
11-03-98 
Meeting with FAA, Delta’s Mac Armstrong attends. 01-20-99 
ARINC begins testing, sends list of all services 
ARINC provides to Delta.  
02-01-99 
 
The Inventory and Assessment phases provided the foundation for the remaining 
phases. The assessment phase provided more detail as to the nature of the systems for 
 
                                                 
98  These strategies are addressed in Delta archive, “Year 2000 correspondence E-GDTS-1606-
006.00.” 
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which the teams were responsible. Table 11 shows the breakdown of the Delta 
Technology portfolios according to numbers of systems and total lines of code (LOC) that 
required assessment and possibly “cleaning” to eradicate the Y2K bug.  
Table 11: Distribution of systems by Delta Technology portfolio 
PORTFOLIO DIVISIONS # SYSTEMS LOC (MILLIONS) 
Application portfolio   
Business Support 111 11.2 
Customer 35 2.8 
Revenue 14 10.2 
Airline Operations   
Flight Operations (Flight Ops) 35 8.5 
Technical Operations (Tech Ops) 36 15.9 
TOTAL 231 48.7 
   
Technology Portfolio   
Common Services   
Database 92  
Development Tools 267  
Intranet Services 15  
Middleware Services 48  
Usability Engineering 47  
Engineering   
Large Tier Engineering 230  
Mid Tier Engineering 233  
All Unix Servers 610  
Network Engineering 231  
Systems Management 70  
Workgroup Engineering 575  
System Operations   
Field Services 191  
Platform Operations 20  
ENTERPRISE TOTALS 2250  
Source: Delta archive, EC Update0399.ppt. 
The objectives for Year 2000 date compliance were defined, the source code from 
the Inventory phase was extracted and sent to the BDM renovation center, the code was 
scanned for Year 2000 date issues, and reports showing the results for each subsystem 
were generated. The idea was not only to determine the scope of the project, but also to 
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prioritize activities by how critical the systems were to the airline and how difficult each 
would be to remediate. 
Each computer-based system was assigned a criticality level based on the 
following guideline (Delta archive, Workshop Presentation.ppt): 
 High - Failure that could affect safety or result in costs that are potentially fatal to 
the organization … can’t provide service which is our business. 
 Medium - Failure that could result in substantial but not lethal costs to the 
organization … systems without which we lose our competitive edge. 
 Low - Failure that could result in trivial costs or only an inconvenience to the 
organization ... systems which make us efficient and more productive.  
The primary scanning tool used in the analyses varied with programming 
language. The Formal Systems and Insight 2000 scanning tools were used to scan Natural 
language code. The Cap-Gemini tools scanned source code for COBOL, Client Server, 
and other languages. Following the date analysis, if a subsystem met any of the criteria 
listed below a waiver from the assessment process was granted to that application.  
 The application was already Year 2000 compliant 
 The application did not contain any date issues. 
 The application was to be retired prior to its projected failure date. 
 The application was to be replaced with a Year 2000 compliant system prior to its 
projected failure date. 
The result of the scanning process would be classification of a system as waivered 
(Y2K compliant), or as candidate for some level of treatment regarding the Y2K bug. The 
code was also assigned a rating (HIGH, MED, or LOW) that indicated the difficulty of 
renovation based on scan information (Delta archive, ASR_123197 Lang-LOC stats 
12.97.doc). The details of this information played a key role in the Migration Planning 
phase (Y2K solution design process) where it was used to assist in determining the 
requirements for personnel and other resources, as well as cost estimates for achieving 
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Year 2000 readiness. The process for designing a detailed solution for Y2K (Delta 
archive, OPS Migration plan 04.98.ppt):  
 Direction for each application 
 Complexities 
 Enhancements 
 Grouping and sequencing 
 Cost Estimates 
By January 1998, Human Resources had augmented Delta’s key Leadership 
Performance Assessment (LPA) criteria to include integration of Year 2000 objectives 
(Delta archive, ACT_ITMS.xls, 1999).  
Year 2000 Program implementation 
The Year 2000 Program implementation encompassed several component 
activities operating concurrently. These components are referred to in this dissertation as 
“business area” activities and “infrastructure” activities.99 Business area activities relate 
to changes in specialized software systems for users in particular functional groupings of 
core business areas such as the finance function, aircraft maintenance, customer-related 
activities, etc. Business area activities are further described in Chapter 7 as individual 
sub-cases. Infrastructure activities relate to changes in the infrastructure framework of 
support and services for IT operation that was shared by all users across the organization, 
and are described in the next sections.100  
 
                                                 
99 The Delta Technology organization included five portfolio divisions: Customer, Air Operations, 
Business Support, Revenue, and Technology. For purposes of this research, in order to distinguish 
functional business area activities from infrastructure activities, the four Portfolio divisions are called 
“business areas,” and the Technology division, “infrastructure.”  
100 Infrastructure may also be related to services that extend to external entities. 
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Infrastructure activities: enterprise-wide changes to IT systems 
The infrastructure project began in 1998 and (including the other portfolio work), 
by year 2003 had cost $1.6 Billion, according to Robb.101 The objective of the Year 2000 
Program involved changes to computer-based systems; but the changes that Delta 
envisioned involved more than changes to date codes. During the first year of 
TransQuest’s operations, 1995, the future vision for computing had been defined 
whereby major restructuring of Delta’s computing architecture would enable real-time 
information processing. The emergency nature of the Y2K bug simply gave the company 
a reason to accomplish it more quickly.  
Delta’s essential IT processing was based in mainframe computers and servers 
that served as central sources for electronic data storage, computation, and information 
retrieval and delivery for all of Delta’s business area users.102 Desktop units comprised 
36,000 standalone computers and 12,000 “dumb terminals”103 that were located at various 
business area sites across the Delta organization. Each desktop unit interacted with the 
mainframes via operating system software and application software systems. However, 
many of these software components controlled functions that were unique and were 
available only to serve the needs of users in a particular business area. The output of 
these systems was confined to the business areas where they had been developed. 
 
                                                 
101  See also: “Staying the Course” (2003).  
102 Delta operated 4 IBM 2064s mainframe computers with 21 CPUs in the RCC, and 3 more IBM 
2064s with 17 CPUs in the ACC. In addition, Delta operated 1,441 Intel-based servers, and 750 Unix 
servers, 350 Sun and 400 HP. Worldspan operated 9 IBM 9672s in the RCC that were dedicated to Delta 
production, and 9 more in the ACC that were dedicated to Delta disaster recovery. 
103 A dumb terminal is a unit that has a monitor and a keyboard, but no generalized processing 
capability on its own. It is limited to input of data to (and display of output from) another computer as host 
(historically a mainframe). 
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Delta Nervous System 
Seeking to avert a Y2K crisis, Delta invested $1 billion in its IT infrastructure and 
developed a publish-and-subscribe environment to support a cross-functional customer-
orientation (Ross, 2001). 
During the Year 2000 Program, Delta Technology developed and implemented 
new system infrastructure. Operating within this new IT environment had resulted in 
increased productivity and efficiency across the company. A bottom-up approach was 
used to develop it, where all the business areas were evaluated separately. Each new 
application component was designed to serve the needs of each business area. Table 12 
shows the new system components. 
Table 12: Delta Nervous System (DNS) components 
APPLICATION PRODUCT SUPPLIER 
Delta Nervous System Active Enterprise suite, including Active Portal and 
Active Exchange 
Tibco 
Messaging software Rendezvous, MQSeries Tibco, IBM 
Data warehouse Teradata NCR Teradata 
Databases Oracle, DB2 Oracle, IBM 
Systems management OpenView, HP Tivoli, IBM 
Transaction processing Tuxedo, CICS, BPM/InConcert BEA, IBM, Tibco 
WEB SITE 
Application server WebLogic BEA Systems 
Content Management Enterprise Content Management Platform Documentum 
HARDWARE 
Delta runs many of its applications on Hewlett-Packard HP 9000 Series servers and HP Vectra PCs 
Source: Gage & McCormick (2003). 
Delta named its new infrastructure system the “Delta Nervous System” (DNS), a digital 
network designed to receive continuous data input, then store it, organize it, filter it, and / 
or report it to the organization. One of the attractive attributes of the infrastructure design 
benefiting the Year 2000 Program was that the DNS used middleware to defer or to 
bypass dealing with legacy systems. The design of the system was similar to the 
development of the original Internet, not overly complex, not disruptive of existing 
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responsibilities and power relationships, and therefore not contributing uncertainty (Ker, 
1994).104  
The DNS functioned as a series of layers, so that services were decoupled from 
the infrastructure; and new services could be added without necessitating changes that 
would disrupt the structures and integrity of the legacy systems. Figure 4 is a simplified 
diagram of the old and the new IT architecture. 
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Source: Feld & Stoddard (2004). 
Figure 4: Old vs. new (DNS) system architecture 
 
The DNS linked all of Delta’s IT functions into two databases: a real-time 
operational database and a data warehouse for performing analysis and producing reports. 
Data-management vendor Teradata then worked with Delta Technology to create the 
 
                                                 
104 In developing the Internet, a “black box” served as an interface, so that each organization’s 
computer system could connect to it for communication with other locations without changing its core 
functions. See Abbate (1999).  
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cross-enterprise data repository that was fed by a number of business area systems. The 
information required for the core processing was stored in nine centralized “datastores”: 
o Inventory Management 
o Revenue 
o Fares & Pricing 
o Schedules Reengineering 
o TOC Maintenance 
o Sales & Distribution 
o Operations Control Center 
o Airport Customer Service 
o Customer  
o Tower / ACC (Airport Coordination Center) 
o In-Flight 
A representative of the database vendor said, 
Delta has the most comprehensive data warehouse in the airline industry … most airlines 
get about 20% of their transactions into a data warehouse. At Delta … almost every 
transaction is in there (Elsworthy, quoted in Gage & McCormick, 2003). 
Middleware was built around the databases so that new applications could access and 
update the data. This architecture allowed deferring decisions to install new or later 
models of software. The entire Delta enterprise system is depicted in Figure 4.  
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Source: Ross (2001). 
Figure 5: Delta IT system enterprise-wide 
 
The system is not finished. In the works are more customer-facing applications, 
operations and revenue management functions and—a new need—security. But the result 
so far is stunning, creating efficiencies that have pushed Delta’s workload cost far below 
its competitors and not far above a theoretical minimum, according to a Gartner IT 
assessment. With DNS, Delta clearly established its technology leadership credentials 
(Technology Leadership: Delta Technology, 2004).  
Code remediation 
The productivity gains from the Ukraine Off-Shore Support Team, which are proving to 
be substantial, will not be factored into these estimates (Delta archive, ASR_123197 
Lang-LOC stats 12.97.doc). 
For those elements determined to be non-compliant (not Y2K ready) in the 
assessment phase, some form of remediation was required. Remediation meant bringing 
non-ready systems to a ready or compliant state. Targeted first toward critical systems, 
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options existed for standard remediation. For those items and systems found to be not 
ready, a business area could elect to remove them from use and replace or upgrade as 
necessary, or to renovate. Decisions on which option to choose were based on the 
following factors: 
o Criticality 
o Item Life Expectancy 
o Cost to Replace Versus Upgrade 
o Future Plans 
o Present Use 
o Operational Impacts 
If an upgrade of the equipment or product was available, this was usually the most 
expedient cost-effective approach and generally had less of an impact on operations than 
replacement. Renovation of the equipment or product was typically reserved for those 
situations where the non-compliant element was no longer supported by its vendor or had 
been developed in-house. A Technology Review Board was created to resolve any 
migration planning issues that could not be resolved by the individual Portfolio 
Coordinators (Delta archive, OPS Migration Plan 04.98.ppt). Figure 6 shows the cost 
approval and spending process to support these decisions. 
 



























































Figure 6: Cost approval and spending process for the Year 2000 Program 
Requirements for code remediation were established by the business area teams. 
Actual accomplishment of remediation for Delta involved outsourcing.  
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We did in-house remediation as well as off-shore. Off-shore (AG software & others) 
didn’t work well because they didn’t understand the systems. However, Delta used them 
to verify remediated code. They couldn’t verify it, but could red flag possibilities. Delta 
could then double-check (Taylor, 2004, Apr 13). 
About 90% of the code was sent to a consulting company in Kiev, Ukraine, while the 
other 10% was sent to Software AG, a German software company that had developed the 
Natural programming language. The cultural aspects of the code remediation project were 
interesting: Delta’s connections with the Ukraine consultants, its management by an 
employee relatively new to Delta, and the overt recognition of information security—rare 
in other aspects of the Year 2000 Program.  
Delta’s connection to The Institute, a consulting company in Ukraine, came via 
the U.S. State Department. Neal Morgan, who provided the leadership for code 
remediation had been recruited in 1996 from outside the company. As a retired military 
officer, he had extensive experience not only in IT, but also with the setting of IT in 
Eastern Europe. Delta Technology employee Eugene Shtern provided liaison with The 
Institute, as he was a Ukraine native. These two employees traveled to Kiev part of every 
week for over a year to facilitate the code remediation project. The project was reported 
to have saved Delta $12 million over what it would have cost if a U.S. consulting 
company had performed the work (Shtern, 2007). 
Concurrent with the Y2K design and development activities were the Desktop 
Strategy Project and the Renewal projects, which were groups who worked to design and 
to implement, respectively, the hardware and software solutions enterprise-wide. 
Desktop Strategy Project 
The Desktop Strategy Project represented aspects of both infrastructure and 
specialized software (business area) systems in the Delta organization. Desktop units 
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represented infrastructure components that were common to all users, but desktop units 
also comprised software systems that varied by business area. Therefore, because of the 
enormous variety in the components of the units enterprise-wide, Delta strategists 
decided that inventory of the units was most efficiently accomplished autonomously by 
business area end-users. Table 13 shows the roles and assignments for the Desktop 
Strategy Project. 
Table 13: Desktop Strategy Project personnel assignments by business area 





Delta VP Ed Bastian Vicki Escarra Jenny Poole Vince Caminiti 
Delta Mgmt 
Sponsor 
Sharon Moody Robin Stricklin Tim Rider Larry Beck 
Delta Technology 
Mgmt Sponsor 




Delta Coordinator Phil Stanley 















Rip Dickinson Kevin Hutcheson Theresa Ryan Steve Cooper 
Desktop Lead Joel Ellis (10/’98) Melanee Haywood Vernon Fulton Fran Rutledge 









FSVC Coordinator Susan Marchant Bill Jeffrey Susan Ross Susan Marchant 
Delta Desktop SME 
Assigned JIT by 
DAL Coordinator 
Assigned JIT by 
DAL Coordinator 
Assigned JIT by 
DAL Coordinator 




Assigned JIT by 
Delta Technology 
Coordinator. 
Assigned JIT by 
Delta Technology 
Coordinator. 
Assigned JIT by 
Delta Technology 
Coordinator. 
Assigned JIT by 
Delta Technology 
Coordinator. 
Renewal Desktop Coordinators 
Airport:                  Bryan Lamberth 
Campus:                   Majid Mohseni 
Reservations:                John Jacobi 
Tech Ops:                     Bryan Price 
 
“The Year 2000 Desktop Strategy Project was one of the multiple components of 
the IT overhaul. Prior to the renewal effort, almost every desktop was unique” (Mitchell, 
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2006, Feb 21). The Y2K solution was to replace vs. patch these systems in every place 
where it was possible to do so. 
Delta Technology Workgroup Engineering has recently determined that most desktop 
computers in use at Delta Air Lines are not Year 2000 compliant. This includes the 
hardware and most all desktop operating systems …. Considering that there are 
approximately 25,000+ desktop computers in use at over 300 locations the challenge is 
significant (Delta archive, “Y2K Desktop Charter,” 1998). 
The project approach included identification and evaluation of existing desktop 
computing models for each business area within a portfolio. A computing model 
described a set of desktop computers that shared the same hardware and software 
configurations. Following the identification and evaluation process, a solution model was 
developed for each computing model to ensure Year 2000 compliance of each 
component. Compliance was attained either through the recommended Future Vision 
model upgrade, or by a secondary recommendation that included software and/or 
hardware patches. The Desktop Strategy Project was responsible for Planning, Analysis, 
and Design as follows: 
o Define current state of desktops in each Portfolio 
o Determine Year 2000 issues 
o Develop appropriate Renovation Strategy 
The Renewal Projects were responsible for 
o Implementation Planning 
o Implementation  
The Future Vision desktop model was a set of hardware and software systems 
designed to standardize desktop units as much as possible across the Delta organization, 
but configured where necessary to accommodate specialized requirements of processing 
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in a business area, and in some cases for a specific user. Each model was designed around 
the following set of standard attributes: 
o Hardware 
o Operating System 
o Network Operation System 
o Delta Application 
o Delta Technology Applications 
o Estimated # of Clients 
o Estimated # of Locations 
The Future Vision model (Table 14) was a configuration model for desktop units. The 
benefit of this standardization was stated to be “reduction of technology footprint” (Delta 
archive, BA Review.doc). Vendors that were considered for supplying the replacement 
hardware included Dell, Gateway 2000, Hewlett Packard, IBM, NCR, Toshiba, and 
Westinghouse. The project team would recommend migration to the standard model 
where possible. 
To expedite the assessment of desktop units with respect to the Y2K vulnerability 
and their criticality to the business area, the project required the skills of infrastructure 
experts, business area systems specialists, as well as business area users. Decision-
making concerning the renewal or replacement of systems was accomplished at the 
business area level. Year 2000 decisions either to replace systems or patch, even though 
the preferred option of CIO Feld was to replace. Feld had noted that, “the Atlanta airport 
alone had over 6000 desktops in it” (Feld, 2006). 
The Desktop Strategy Project strategy was to inventory and assess existing 
desktop computing models for each sub-organization within a business area. The project 
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team would then develop an appropriate renovation and implementation strategy, which 
would include, where possible, recommending migration to the standard model.  
Table 14: Standard Future Vision model for desktop units 
5: ELECTIVES 
discretionary software 
4: BUSINESS AREA SUITES 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
FOUNDATION 








OCC, SAFETY, ETC. 
REVENUE 
PASSENGER SALES 
REVENUE ACCT., ETC. 
3: ENTERPRISE COMPONENTS 
Common Services 


















2: GROUND ZERO COMPONENTS 
Operating System 
MS Windows NT 4.0 (Desktop) 
Systems Management 
Tivoli 
HP Top Tools 
Information Security 
Norton Anti Virus 
MSGINA 
1: HARDWARE COMPONENTS 
Desktop 
HP VECTRA VL8, Pentium III, 450 MHz, 128MB RAM, 10.1 GB Hard Drive, 32X CD-ROM 
 
Source: Delta archive, “Y2K Desktop charter,” 1998. 
The Desktop Strategy Project was one of the Year 2000 Program groups that 
provided direction for the renewal groups. The scope of the project included providing 
the process, management, and oversight to ensure that all desktop units were renovated, 
but the actual implementation would be done by the renewal groups. 
Renewal groups 
Multiple renewal efforts across the Delta organization targeted upgrading the 
technology infrastructure to Future Vision standards (Ibid.):  
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o Airport Renewal 
o Tech Ops Renewal (Maintenance renewal) 
o Reservations Renewal (Airport Customer Service) 
o Headquarters Campus Renewal 
o Sales Force Renewal 
Table 15 provides “snapshots” of the goals and conditions of Delta’s IT systems as of 
1997 and 2003.  
Table 15: Snapshots of Delta IT, 1997 & 2003 
TRANSQUEST 1997 DELTA TECHNOLOGY 2003 
Business goals:  Business goals: 
 Improve IT response to Delta's business needs 
 Cut IT costs 
 Market industry-specific applications 
 Serve Delta’s business needs 
 Create efficiencies in enterprise-wide business 
processes 
Applications:  Applications: 
700 total 
382 in-house 
599 COTS/system software 
Workstations: Workstations: 
25,000 HP Vectra and Dell PCs 
11,000 dumb terminals 
 
36,000 HP Vectra PCs 
1,000 Unix terminals 




175 midrange and enterprise Unix, primarily 
NCR (some Sun and HP) 
1,411 Intel-based 
750 Unix (350 Sun, 400 HP) 
108 dedicated email servers 
Mainframes: Mainframes: 
2 Hitachi Skylines 
4 IBM 3090s 
7 IBM 2064s 
Operating systems: Operating systems: 
Migrating to Unix or Windows NT on servers 
and to Windows NT 4.0 or Windows 95 on 
workstations 
Unix or Windows NT on servers 
Windows NT 4.0 or Windows 95 on 
workstations 
Databases: Databases: 
Migrating to Oracle Oracle 
Network connectivity: Network connectivity: 
LANs: FDDI, Ethernet or token-ring 
LAN interconnect network: standards-based, 
high-speed 
LAN/WAN environment: routers, switches and 
hubs, ATM, ALC, voice and frame-relay 
circuits, TCP/IP protocol, wireless access 
points. 
Systems/network management: Systems/network management: 
Tivoli TME-10 and HP OpenView Tivoli TME-10 and HP OpenView 
Source: various, including Caldwell (1997), “Delta Technology Fun Facts” (2003). 
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Table 16 provides a brief chronology of events related to the Year 2000 Program. 
The next section describes some of the activities in the air transportation sector. 
Table 16: Chronology of events in the Year 2000 Program 
DATE EVENT 
Dec 1995 Work on Y2K begins at Worldspan 
Oct 1996 Year 2000 Program kick-off at TransQuest 
Jul 1997 Year 2000 Program announced to Delta employees 
Aug 1997 Leo Mullin hired as CEO 
 Mullin hires Charlie Feld and The Feld Group 
Dec 1997 ATA begins to coordinate Y2K activities in the air transportation industry 
Mid 1998 DNS infrastructure project begins 
Sep 1998 Desktop Strategy Project kickoff 
Sep 1998 Installed the CustomerCare prototype at Delta's facility in the Jacksonville, FL airport.  
Jun 1999 Deployed the CustomerCare application in four major U.S. airports. 
Jan 2000 Delta announced Y2K success 
after rollover Work begins on applications deferred before the rollover 
 
Y2K activities in the air transportation sector 105 
Since the fall of 1996, Delta pursued sound technology solutions and shared its 
knowledge with the airline industry in efforts to assist other airlines, airports, vendors, 
and suppliers in achieving Year 2000 readiness (Delta archive, Y2K-Normal.doc). 
With over 20 ATA member airlines solving the same problems with the same suppliers at 
the same airports, it is easy to predict a disaster is in the making. We firmly believe we 
[i.e., Delta] can achieve our goal of higher quality preparedness, lower Y2K costs and 
improved consumer confidence through working together (Delta archive, 
BODDec97.doc). 
$8.8 - 9.0 million. Elements: increase of ATA staff by 2.5 FTEs; 42 FTE airline 
representatives; outside consultant increased for airport evaluation. Delta share: 
Maximum of $1.6 million plus 7 FTEs for at least nine months (Delta archive, 
BODMar98.doc). 
Air transportation organizations determined that many external suppliers were 
common to all members of the industry group. Therefore assessing in one place the 
preparedness of these suppliers optimized resources used for Y2K activities. Organizing 
 
                                                 
105 Most of this section from Delta archive, “Y2K Program Overview Facts.” 
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and performing these processes on behalf of numbers of entities reduced redundant 
inquiries and costs. Since airports were one of the common denominators, the FAA and a 
number of aircraft parts suppliers formed a Y2K industry team through the ATA. This 
team consisted of ATA member airlines and cargo carriers, and their purchasing 
departments. Delta adopted “conformity requirements” for these processes from several 
sources including the British Standards Institution.  
Delta CEO Mullin was active as a member of the Board of the Air Transport 
Association of America and a member of the Board and Chairman-designate of the 
International Air Transport Association in 1999. He was also a member of The Business 
Council, The Business Roundtable, and the President's Export Council, all prestigious 
groups populated by leaders of the major infrastructure organizations in the U.S. and 
places where Y2K policy and procedures were discussed. Feld and Taylor represented 
Delta at Senate hearings regarding Y2K. 
Government 
FAA 
The FAA promotes aviation safety in the interest of the American public by regulating 
and overseeing the civil aviation industry to make sure that the United States is operating 
a safe aviation industry (http://www.faa.gov/). 
As an agency of the U.S. federal government, the FAA had authority to promote 
safety and to combat aviation hazards. The FAA had sole responsibility for developing 
and maintaining a common civil-military system of air navigation and air traffic control 
(ATC). The FAA was also responsible for pilot and aircraft certification, safety 
rulemaking and enforcement, and airway development. The FAA was one of several 
organizations within the DOT, a cabinet department created by Congress in 1966.  
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Since the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the FAA, the agency had assumed 
responsibilities over time beyond what the law originally designed. The FAA had become 
involved in the field of aviation security during the hijacking epidemic that occurred 
during the 1960s. Congress gave the FAA's Administrator the power to regulate aircraft 
noise standards in 1968. The Airport and Airway Development Act made the FAA 
responsible for safety certification of airports served by air carriers in 1970. Following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), which succeeded the FAA as the agency with primary 
responsibility for civil aviation security.  
During Y2K, not all of the FAA’s activities were regulatory in the sense of 
coercive rules and policing activities. Under normal circumstances, in the course of 
performing its mission, the FAA worked with all airline organizations, both military and 
civilian, to provide research and support for common issues. However, in the case of 
Y2K, the FAA was scrambling as much as the other organizations in the air transportation 
sector to get its computer-based systems certified to operate after year 2000.  
[T]he FAA alone had more than 600 systems — and millions of lines of code — that had 
to be reprogrammed before the clock struck midnight. The U.S. had the added 
responsibility of leading the rest of the world’s aviation systems through what had to be a 
seamless transition. And we did it. … Since 1997, we’ve completed more than 7,100 
projects, installing new facilities, systems, and equipment across the U.S. and integrating 
them into the National Airspace System. We’ve done more than 10,000 upgrades of ATC 
hardware and software. Today, you can visit every one of our centers in America and 
won’t find a single piece of hardware that’s been around longer than I’ve been in this job 
(Garvey, 2002). 
In October 1998, Delta initiated planning for a 'Home Stretch' meeting with the FAA to 
be held in January 1999, making sure that Mac Armstrong (Exec VP-Operations) would 
attend (Delta archive, ACT_ITMS.xls, 1999). 
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Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport 
At Hartsfield International Airport, one of the world's busiest, billing records are kept by 
hand (http://ajc.com, 1997). 
Delta had such a strong interest in the Hartsfield Atlanta airport, that when the 
need for help to make the airport ready for Y2K was revealed, Delta offered to send its 
experts on loan. Delta sent Morgan of the Airport Customer Service business area (and 
former director of the code remediation project in Kiev), and Gravitt, a long-time 
member of the Delta family who had been running the PMO. 
Industry 
ATA / IATA / ICAO / ACI-NA 
Obtaining international information on airports and air traffic services has been difficult 
but is being made albeit slowly. All avenues for gaining information are being pursued 
(IATA, ICAO, ATA, FAA, White House Y2K Council, and Delta business units). ACS 
Regional Directors and Int’l Business Unit Leaders are assisting (Delta archive, EC 
Update0399.ppt). 
The ATA served as the moderator and clearinghouse for Y2K activity, which at 
times included other critical groups such as Boeing and the FAA. (See the status report 
on air transportation organizations in Appendix E.) In December 1997, ATA member 
airlines met to begin formulating an approach for solving Y2K problems that were 
common to all members of the air transportation industry. Prior to this meeting, Price-
Waterhouse had been assisting the ATA, and the working group recommended that they 
be retained as partners in the effort. In Price-Waterhouse’s initial estimate, the airlines 
were expected to “reduce their total cost up to 75% by working together to solve common 
problems” (Delta archive, BODDec97.doc). 
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By January 1999, Delta encouraged ICAO to obtain the same level of critical 
system information from international airports that the FAA was obtaining domestically. 
Delta also requested status information on SITA and CUTE systems, and mail and bag 
sort systems. AIRINC (radio communications) was contacted with respect to testing 
opportunities. Delta Internal Audit division was engaged to audit ATA’s databases (Delta 
archive, ACT_ITMS.xls, 1999).  
As of May, reports indicated the following status of various organizations (Delta 
archive, “Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book,” 1999, p. 14): 
FAA - still on target to be 100% completion by 6/99; recently reported that of 636 critical 
and non mission critical systems 90% were compliant with 89% of the mission critical 
systems ready; successful testing at DEN airport, additional testing being conducted in 
host computer systems and air traffic en route centers; Delta and other airlines are 
participating in FAA Contingency Planning workshops; working on a public 
communications plan; FAA inspectors making site visits to airlines (met with Delta 
5/13/99); Jane Garvey and Ray Long have purchased tickets for 12/31/99 on AA; FAA’s 
international focus is on areas that affect 60% of the domestic originated travel: Canada, 
Mexico, Bahamas, Japan, United Kingdom, [and] Dominican Republic. 
National Weather Service - Testing complete with positive results; awaiting 
documentation. 
NAV CANADA - Reporting Y2K Ready. 
U.S. Customs – U.S. Customs is stating computer systems will process data correctly but 
due to security concerns will not release documentation; individual customs offices do 
have contingency plans. 
ATA - On target. 
Airlines Clearing House (ACH) - Internal databases compliant, awaiting documentation 
from Chase Manhattan. 
Air Cargo Inc. (ACI) - State 2 systems are Y2K affected and both have been tested. 
Airline Industrial Relations Conference (AIRCON) - Compliant; completing disaster 
recovery plans. 
Airline Tariff Publishing Company ATPCO) – Compliant. 
Airline Reporting Corporation (ARC) - Internal systems now being addressed. 
SITA (Atlanta & London) - on target for 6/30/99 completion. 
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Summary 
This chapter presented the context for Y2K solution that was provided by the 
Delta Year 2000 Program, and by external sector-based organizations. This context was 
common to all four business areas. The Year 2000 Program was highly structured, and 
provided a template for each business area to perform the same steps. All four business 
areas therefore had 
o  A common goal 
o Common activities and reporting structures 
o Common deliverables 
These contexts have set the stage for understanding the factors in business area 
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CHAPTER 7      
PROGRAM ROLLOUT TO DELTA’S SUB-UNIT BUSINESS AREAS 
 
Environmental stimuli must be cognitively processed by actors—interpreted by 
individuals employing socially constructed symbol systems—before they can respond by 
taking action (Scott, 1995, p. xiii). 
In 1998, Delta began a multiyear, billion-dollar-plus overhaul of its dated IT 
systems, which included implementing a new infrastructure design. At a time when other 
airlines were postponing expensive IT projects, Delta continued to invest beyond year 
2000; $200 million was spent on new development during 2002, and this amount was to 
be a continuing item in the annual budget.  
This chapter traces the history of the overhaul from within each of four sub-unit 
business areas. The changes were developed within the structure of the Year 2000 
Program over the period from 1997 to 2003. The inclusion of the period beyond the year 
2000 for this study, i.e., from 2000 to 2003, was essential in order to consider the results 
of the total IT transformation process. Because of timing and Delta’s financial priorities, 
some elements of the Y2K solution that were chosen prior to January 2000 were not 
implemented until afterwards. Delta’s financial condition, which became increasingly 
uncertain over the study period, affected IT expenditures. The World Trade Center 
attacks in 2001 affected the U.S. economy overall; and, the air transportation industry 
was especially wounded. The decline in numbers of airline passengers had a major 
impact and resulted in reduced revenues not only for Delta but also for all commercial air 
transport enterprises. Further, the cost of additional security scrutiny of passengers and 
the increasing cost of fuel produced increasingly enlarged expenditures.  
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Each of the four sub-cases presented in this chapter represents a setting for the 
parallel structured activities of the Year 2000 Program, which were not only embedded 
within the Delta organization, but also extended across to the external environment in 
each sub-unit system. Since Delta’s main business was to provide air transportation 
service, the Operations area was naturally the largest and most influential of the core 
business areas. However, the other three areas Airport Customer Service, Business 
Support, and Revenue, provided essential supporting functions for Operations. Each of 
the four business areas had the same Year 2000 team structures, and the same process 
formats for carrying out the same Year 2000 Program activities. However, differences in 
other business area conditions led to different Y2K solutions. The aim of this chapter is 
twofold: to locate factors in the context of each of the business areas that led to its Y2K 
solution and then to assess each solution relative to contrasting organization performance 
models in light of the contextual factors.  
Each sub-case presents one of the four core business areas in four sections.  
o Y2K solution 
o Functional and resource overview 
o Institutional context 
o Response assessment 
The first section, Y2K solution, describes the actions of the business area in 
response to the Y2K problem. These actions are presented first in each case, since the 
existence of different solutions among the four business areas provided the structure for 
the research design, and served as the basis for the comparative investigation.  
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The second section, Functional and resource overview, presents a description of 
the task environment—size, locations, various other indicators of organizational 
complexity, and resources. Resources include key personnel and IT systems. Key 
personnel in each business area are named; names of any other relevant personnel are 
omitted, but their associated roles may be mentioned if necessary to explain an action 
more clearly. Because of the somewhat dynamic nature of the Year 2000 Program, a few 
of the leaders and team members changed roles and/or worked in different business areas 
or process areas of the Program at different times. Depictions of IT systems in each 
business area provide background and a baseline for the Y2K changes. Depictions include 
numbers of systems and desktop units, and condition of the systems in the form of 
summary metrics that were gathered as a part of the Year 2000 Program. Technical 
details of the assessment process are simplified, but are adequate for revealing conditions 
that existed at the time of the Y2K event.  
The third section, Institutional context, presents the cultural character of the 
business area, which may include the presence of unions, ex-military employees, and / or 
other special circumstances; and the external regulative environment, which includes any 
external interconnections (industry and/or government) that were present.  
Following the description of these background conditions in each sub-case, the 
fourth section, Response assessment, discusses the nature of the compliance response. 
The section presents conditions existing in the context of a business area that likely 
influenced its Y2K solution, and assesses the response as rational or institutional. 
Assessing a Y2K solution as rational or institutional characterizes the response with 
respect to the rival hypotheses, which are contrasting expectations for the influence of 
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context on actions. Rational responses correspond to a rational-contingency model. 
Institutional responses correspond to an institutional model.  
A solution assessed as rational is a solution that is 
o the result of a rational choice process based on adequate information and,  
o the optimal choice for managing complexity, therefore decreasing uncertainty / 
increasing predictability, and / or increasing efficiency. 
Evidence of adequate information includes that a business area sought a variety of 
information sources, e.g., consultants and vendors with high reputations and 
understanding of best practices, along with high quality internal sources. Evidence of a 
rational process in the business area is increased predictability or increased efficiency 
(increased revenue, reduced cost, or other measure), cost management or staying in 
budget. 
A solution assessed as institutional is a solution that is 
o not the result of a rational choice process (because of complexity or time 
constraint or both), therefore the choice is based on 
 inadequate information (either limited or low quality) and / or  
 sectoral influences (cultural, competitive, or regulative conditions) and / or 
 copying the solution of others (models of experience) 
Evidence of the possibility for inadequate information and an institutional choice process 
is complexity and / or time constraint. Evidence of an institutional solution is decreased 
predictability or decreased efficiency (reduced revenue, increased cost, or other measure) 
in the business area, a solution required by regulations or other regulative circumstances 
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such as enhancing the image of the airline, or a solution representing a technology or 
COTS product that is a popular choice, but not necessarily a fit with the activity.  
The environmental factors relating the theoretical analysis of the Y2K solution in 
the sub-case are presented in tabular form, along with a brief discussion, at the end of 
each sub-case section. An elaborated discussion of factors is presented in Chapter 8. 
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Sub-case 1: Airport Customer Service 
… at Delta's gates, there are few, if any, queues in front of the agents' desks … Instead, 
many passengers stand, trancelike, before big-screen, flat plasma displays. The monitors 
flash every few seconds. All this information comes into the displays via the Delta 
Nervous System, which pulls information from Delta's various databases and pushes it 
onto the gate displays (Gage and McCormick, 2003).  
[T]he Airport Renewal project is the #1 project at Delta Technology, and a large part of 
the organization is focused on rolling out the new infrastructure worldwide over the next 
18 months. Roughly 250 people are allocated to the project, working in teams on support, 
deployment, development, procurement, and equipment. Phase One—renewal of Delta's 
top 20 airports and deployment of the CustomerCare application—is scheduled for 
completion by the end of this calendar year when Delta will have rolled out about 20,000 
pieces of hardware (Harding, 1999). 
Y2K solution 
In response to the mandate for Y2K compliance, the Airport Customer Service 
business area replaced the majority of their systems. The Year 2000 Program team in 
Airport Customer Service, in conjunction with the Airport Renewal project, designed and 
installed a completely new infrastructure for airports, where high bandwidth data 
networks connected to the DNS and new standardized desktop units replaced a 
hodgepodge of PCs and green screens.  
The Human Factors team at Delta Technology designed the integrated software 
system, called the “CustomerCare” system, which included the design of information on 
displays that accounted for various aspects of usability.106 A number of other specialists 
assisted in the development, from technical systems experts to gate agents. Fourteen gate 
agents contributed to the gate design, which included various programs for providing and 
presenting information to customers, and, to ticket and gate agents, and other Airport 
Customer Service employees. Informal polling of customers in the gate areas contributed 
 
                                                 
106 The Human Factors team comprised a group of specialists who were educated at Georgia Institute 
of Technology; most had degrees from the graduate programs in HCI and Digital Media. 
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to understanding what information elements and delivery media worked best—even to 
testing whether a male or female voice was better for communicating messages in the 
gate area. A prototype of the system was installed in the Jacksonville, Florida airport in 
September 1998. The Jacksonville station manager was so enthusiastic that he wanted to 
install it immediately in the other four Delta gates. However, according to Feld,  
as a prototype, it was held together by “bailing wire.” The system could not be 
reproduced without further modifications. The manager therefore stopped the flights and 
sent them all through the one demo gate!  
Airport rollout was 14 months from prototype to installation. Rollout continued to 
Atlanta, Salt Lake City and Cincinnati beginning in 1999 and to other airports after year 
2000.  
For customers entering the airport, kiosks were installed to allow passengers more 
efficient check-in and to reduce wait times. Customers could use these kiosks to access 
boarding passes, itineraries, and receipts. Large display screens were placed at each gate 
for departing customers. Program output displayed up-to-date information about flight 
schedules, seat assignments, upgrades, boarding times and boarding order, crown room 
and restroom locations, etc. For customers deplaning in hub airports, the screens also 
displayed the location of connecting flights. Apart from the improved customer service, 
and efficiency of operation, the CustomerCare system significantly enhanced the 
integrity, reliability, availability, and accessibility of the information that existed in the 
Airport Customer Service area prior to Y2K. The system received the Computerworld 
Smithsonian Award for Technology Innovation in year 2000. 
In addition to replacing hardware and introducing the DNS-powered software in 
airports, similar systems were installed at Delta’s 12 major call centers. Table 17 shows 
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the new systems developed for Airport Customer Service that had replaced airport 
systems that were at risk. 
Table 17: Y2K solution in Airport Customer Service 
AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE 
Function System Vendor 
Fiberoptic networks installed at 
airports and call centers 
  
Standardized PC systems replaced 
older PCs and green screens 
 HP 
Large screen display Gate Information Display System (GIDS) Delta Technology 
Flight-information Flight Info Display System (FIDS) Delta Technology 
Gate agent / boarding passengers Cornerstone Delta Technology 
Baggage handling   
Kiosks TouchPort Kinetics 
 
The condition of systems and the Future Vision goals for Airport Customer 
Service strongly influenced the design of its Y2K solution. The influence of its wider 
institutional environment was evident in the familiarity of the environment for the new 
technology, the presence and availability of networking products and technical expertise 
in the marketplace, and only minimally from government regulations. Government 
influence was through their activities in funding research that influenced solutions. 
Functional and resource overview 
The Airport Customer Service business area comprised the divisions of Delta that 
performed customer-facing functions. Airport Customer Service was concerned with 
customer activities from the time of entering the airport to boarding the plane. These 
functions were predictable, repetitive customer interactions—essentially tracking the 
customer and his/her baggage through airport facilities. Names of the Airport Customer 
Service divisions, which included 58 different personnel department numbers (PDNs), 
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revealed the nature and variety of activities in the business area and provided evidence of 
the complexity of the business area. The division names were also an indicator of 
specialized roles and occupations. Of the four core business areas, the activities of the 
Airport Customer Service divisions were among the most visible to the public, but among 
the least complex. However, the approximately 180 different locations for many of these 
activities, as shown in Table 18, added a dimension of complexity.107  
Table 18: No. of divisions and no. of locations in Airport Customer Service 
DIVISION NO. OF PDNs NO. OF LOCATIONS 
Airport Customer Service (ACS) 33 
180 airports plus 
Atlanta campus 
Cargo n/a  
Consumer Marketing 5 1 
CustomerCare 2 1 
Delta Shuttle 5 n/a 
Distribution Planning 1 1 
Reservations (RES) 12 15 
TOTAL 58 
180 airports plus 
Atlanta campus 
 
Table 19 shows the various functions that the division performed. 
Table 19: Functional activities in Airport Customer Service 
Customer service & operations 
Finance, business solutions 
Domestic & int’l line operations 
Domestic station mgmt, Ops & services 




Airport courtesy driver 
Domestic gates / FTO 
Crown Room club & G.O. 
Domestic fuel operations & cabin service 
 
                                                 
107 The columns headed by the titles “NO. OF PDNs” (personnel department numbers) and, “NO. OF 
LOCATIONS,” show the total number of divisions and geographic locations included within the business 
area. Some of the individual division metrics could not be obtained. 
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Table 19 continued 
Domestic skycap service 
Int'l lounges in domestic locations 
International station mgmt 
Int'l field operations (ramp) 
Int'l gates, security, cabin & skycap 
Reservations sales 
Res sales admin & training 







Shuttle & management 
 
In Delta Technology, the Customer Portfolio division managed all of the IT 
systems that supported the Airport Customer Service business area of Delta. In 1997, 119 
systems were their responsibility. Hartsfield airport in Atlanta, the location of the most 
activity for Delta, had 149 systems, mostly proprietary to the airport. The only interface 
with Delta Technology was the baggage sort system. Landing lights, elevators, escalators, 
landing security system, etc. were owned and maintained by the City of Atlanta.108  
The Customer Portfolio consisted of 5 sub-groups, including, Airport Customer 
Service (ACS), Reservations, Distribution Planning, Consumer Marketing, and 
CustomerCare (formerly called Consumer affairs, and included baggage service). The 
divisions shown in Table 18 reflected these groupings. 
The personnel shown in Table 20 served as leaders and decision-makers for the 
replacements and upgrades that were performed for the Year 2000 Program in this area.109 
 
                                                 
108 Note: the software for the landing light system was written by two Georgia Tech graduates—
brothers who did the work as independent contractors. 
109 A date beside a name in this table refers to the date of the Delta report that shows the assignment. 
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Table 20: Year 2000 Program team in Airport Customer Service 
DELTA DELTA TECHNOLOGY 
Delta Exec Sponsor: V. Escarra, Exec VP – Airport 
Customer Service 
 
Delta Portfolio Owner: V. Escarra Delta Technology VP: Keith Halbert 
Delta Portfolio Manager: June Fox (5/’98)  Delta Technology Portfolio Manager: Chuck Creech 
Delta Portfolio Director: Robin Stricklin  
IT systems not maintained by Delta Technology110 IT systems maintained by Delta Technology 
Worldspan Y2K Team Leader: Neal Morgan (9/’97) 
 Y2K PD: John Jacobi 
 Customer Portfolio Lead: Kevin Hutcheson 
 
Customer Team Coordinator: Richard Hardy 
(12/’97) 
 
Vicki Escarra, Executive Vice-President – Airport Customer Service, played an active 
and key role in the successful planning and implementation in this area. Escarra was a 
long-time member of the Delta “family.” Describing her enthusiastic involvement with 
the airport renovation, Feld said, “Vicki Escarra was phenomenal at rallying the troops” 
(Feld, 2006). On the Delta Technology side, however, Keith Halbert and Neal Morgan 
were outsiders. Halbert was a contractor who worked at Delta as a member of The Feld 
Group, the consulting group led by Feld. Morgan was hired at Delta in 1996 following a 
successful career in the U.S. military. Both Halbert and Morgan had extensive experience 
with networked IT systems. The following individuals participated in the identification, 
analysis, and solution development effort for the Customer Portfolio of Airport Customer 
Service (ACS).111 
 
                                                 
110 Note: The category “IT systems not maintained by Delta Technology” included systems in 
external facilities and operated by external vendors. (Delta archive, Metrics.xls). 
111 In this table, DT refers to a Delta Technology employee; DL refers to Delta. 
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Table 21: Employees on the Customer Portfolio (ACS) team 
NAME ROLE 
Liz Boothe DL - Reservations Desktop Coordinator 
Cheri Burbage DT - Desktop Support Analyst 
Don Burgoyne DT - Reservations Field Services Support 
Clyde Eaton DL - Customer Portfolio SME 
Mark Griffin DT - Field Services Support 
Jerry Hall DT - ACS TPC 
Glenn Harper DT - Customer Care SME 
Melanee Haywood DT - Desktop Lead Analyst 
Bill Jeffrey DT - Field Services Support 
Timothy Johnson DL - Distribution Planning Coordinator 
Jeani Jones DT - Call Center Renewal 
Fred Juch DT - Airport Renewal Deployment 
Sherri Kadel DT - Call Center Renewal 
Bryan Lamberth DT - Airport Renewal Liaison 
Rhonda Morris DT - Call Center Renewal 
Lisa Peters DT - Workgroup Engineering 
Dale Piper DT - Airport Renewal Liaison 
Paul Redemske DL  - ACS Desktop Coordinator 
Pat Roberts DL - Consumer Marketing Coordinator 
Cathy Spencer DT - Customer Care Field Services Support 
Chuck Tatum DL - ACS SME 
Randy Tiemann DL - Customer Care Coordinator 
Ken Ward DT - Workgroup Engineering 
 
The Customer Portfolio team took the following actions in phases according to 
the process design template: (1) inventory and assessment, (2) migration planning, (3) 
code remediation, and (4) desktop renewal. This process in Airport Customer Service was 
identical to that of the other business areas. However, the focus on system replacement 
and improving the customer experience ultimately overrode the focus on Y2K. 
The team’s first action was to inventory the systems to learn what they owned, 
and to assess this body of systems for planning purposes. The number of systems, their 
complexity, and other attributes were assessed during this initial phase. This was a very 
difficult stage of the process. Many of these systems and their hardware devices were 
among the oldest and most outdated of the Delta systems. The nature of the systems—the 
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fact that they were old and that no one had known before how they all interacted in total 
to produce their collective outputs—contributed to the difficulty. Results of the first 
phase, the inventory and assessment actions, are shown in Table 22 and Table 23, which 
indicates the level of complexity that existed in the systems in this division. The 
inventory identified the systems; the assessment phase classified them based on their 
criticality to the functioning of the business area. They were listed as high, medium, and 
low to reflect these assessments.112 
Table 22: Assessment metrics for systems in Airport Customer Service 
NO. OF SYSTEMS 













Table 23: Programming languages and date fields in Airport Customer Service 





Assembler 3,600   0.00% 
C 225,498   0.00% 
C++ 766,756   0.00% 
COBOL 18,517 634 232 1.25% 
Delphi 133,341   0.00% 
HTML 90,933   0.00% 
Natural 203,831 29,813  14.63% 
Oracle 1,500   0.00% 
ProC 16,514   0.00% 
SQL 1,877 317  16.89% 
ScriptWrite 224,744   0.00% 
VBA 108,180   0.00% 
Visual Basic 30,431   0.00% 
 
 
                                                 
112 The classification (HIGH, MED, or LOW) indicates the critical nature of the system to the 
functioning of Airport Customer Service. The classification was assigned during the assessment phase 
based on a variety of scan information. 
113 “There were over 6000 desktops in the Atlanta airport alone” (Feld, 2006). An accurate number 
for the total was not available. 
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Migration planning was the phase where the team confirmed action plans. In the 
code remediation phase, the code that had been previously identified as containing the 
Y2K bug was sent to one of two outside organizations to be cleaned. In the desktop 
renewal phase, desktop units were replaced with standard models identified by division. 
The other data shown in Table 22 are the number of programming languages represented, 
the lines of code (LOC) requiring remediation to eliminate the Y2K vulnerability, the 
number of waivered systems, and the number of desktop units assigned to the area.114 
In the Airport Customer Service area, there were 53 current state computing 
models (existing hardware and software configurations). Attempting to conform these 
models to the Future Vision standards, the number was reduced to 23 solution models 
(Delta archive, 1999, Customer Summary Document.doc). 
Table 24: Desktop models in Airport Customer Service 
DIVISION CURRENT STATE MODELS  TRANSLATED TO SOLUTION MODELS 
ACS 28 10 
RES 18 10 
Distribution Planning 1 1 
Consumer Marketing 5 1 
CustomerCare 1 1 




The concern for customer satisfaction at Delta was strongly related to the notion 
of southern hospitality. In Delta’s tradition, this approach was directly an outgrowth of 
how “company” would be treated when visiting in your home. In fact, most Delta 
 
                                                 
114 Language and waivered system metrics from (Delta archive, “Assessment Summary Report of 
Dec 31, 1997,” 1997). 
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veterans viewed the changes in the airport as an extension of this attitude and level of 
consideration. Employees had used technology in this business area from “way back.” 
However, the problem with the earlier Airport Customer Service systems was the cryptic 
interfaces, reminiscent of early PC experiences, and the incomplete and outdated, 
therefore inaccurate information that was provided. In many cases, the boxes that the 
Delta gate agents were so adept at using were only “green screens,” i.e., terminal 




The institutional environment of Airport Customer Service had fewer regulative 
aspects than the other business areas. The regulative structure most “present” was the 
airport authority. In the U.S., airports are operated by various government entities, 
usually a county or city authority.  
The structural protection that the government provided for Delta personnel and 
various contractors (legal contracts, pension protection) was no different in Airport 
Customer Service from that of other Delta business area environments. However, systems 
design and use of Delta’s reservations systems and its security screening did reflect its 
particular regulatory requirements. Reservation systems were the concern of the DOT. 
The Sabre system of American Airlines was the first computer reservations system 
(CRS). The first “yield management” program used information from Sabre to 
understand customer buying patterns to help determine the optimum pricing for seats and 
the first cheap but nonrefundable fares. Observing the competitive advantage that 
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American had with the CRS, the DOT imposed regulations that governed the use of such 
technology (Gage & McCormick, 2003). Delta’s reservations systems had been operated 
by Worldspan since 1990, where Delta was both a Worldspan owner and a customer. For 
the Year 2000 Program, Delta appointed a liaison for communicating between Delta and 
Worldspan regarding its Y2K status. The Worldspan systems were declared Y2K 
compliant by mid-1998. 
Rules for security screening affected the design decisions of airport systems and 
the security process in the airport facilities. One informant, who worked on the Airport 
Customer Service Human Factors team said, 
Delta improvements can only progress to a point. Delta is controlled by airport 
environments, the control tower, and other constraints. For example, TSA ruled that a 
customer must have a printed boarding pass to go to the gate area. DT worked with IBM 
and other vendors to address such concerns. 
The security screening process was historically the duty of Delta’s ticketing and gate 
agents. However, TSA requirements would change Delta agent responsibilities 
dramatically after 9/11. As Mullin said,  
Delta now has a “new partner” [the U.S. government] in that passengers are not totally 
under Delta’s control between the airport and the plane.  
One Delta informant described his encounter with a new Homeland Security Department 
TSA security agent when the screening processes were being changed.  
… communication with the TSA deputy resulted in impasse. The guy has a state police 
background … speaks a different language. 
Industry relationships 
Various relationships existed in the Airport Customer Service environment that 
required special processing to eliminate Y2K concerns. The Airport Customer Service 
(ACS) division contracted directly with suppliers for labor, and these contracts were 
processed and stored as electronic files. ACS issued labor contracts (Ground Handling 
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Agreements) for under wing services that include ramp, cabin cleaning, security 
screeners, skycaps, janitorial, transportation on airport grounds, waste removal, etc. 
Ticketing (code-sharing) agreements existed for entities using certain specialized 
computer systems, particularly Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and South African Airlines 
(SAA) computer systems. The Cargo division had approximately 25 agreements with 
General Sales Agents (GSAs) to sell cargo space on Delta's behalf from an international 
perspective. Informants believed that those GSAs were independent of any other business 
area's GSAs. The Airport Customer Service business area was also responsible for 
conducting the inventory, assessment, and treatment phases related to facilities’ leases 
entered into by Cargo (Delta archive, Defnote1.doc).  
Table 25: Year 2000 Program snapshots – Airport Customer Service 
DATE (MM/YY) Y2K ACTIVITY 
1998 
Remediation of the Deltamatic reservation system, hosted by Worldspan, 
is complete 
Sep 1998 Jacksonville prototype. New system installed “live” for user testing 
2000 CustomerCare systems installed in hub airports 
2002 Reservations call centers established and operational. 
2003 Airports with DNS connection totaled 81. 
 
Response assessment  
We started down this path prior to Y2K. As we looked at the technology that was in our 
airports we felt that there was lower risk to actually going in and replacing the technology 
that was there than trying to remediate it for Y2K (Robb, quoted in Murray, 2002, p.1). 
The condition of the Airport Customer Service IT systems drove the decision to 
“plow the field and replace,” which was assessed as rational, even though institutional 
aspects of the decision and its development constraints were apparent. This business area 
was a top priority for the new CEO at the outset because of Delta’s recent history of poor 
customer service, undoubtedly a result of prior financial problems and associated 
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cutbacks. The leaders charged with the mission to improve customer service via IT 
systems were deep in experience and understanding of how to make it happen. The IT 
staff was similarly well equipped—the “best and brightest.” Further, the decision was 
consistent with Future Vision concepts. The “Future Vision” refers to a new generation of 
technology capabilities that will enable management of the overcrowded national 
airspace system (NAS) into the future, a vision conceived by researchers under various 
government contracts (e.g., NASA, RTCA).115 The decision was also consistent with the 
experience of CIO Feld and his consultant group.  
It is notable that the evolutionary thinking regarding the ATC systems is related to 
the overcrowding of the air space. The models of air transportation management have 
changed very little in concept since the early days of passenger flight. The imprinting of 
this model has held even as the numbers of passengers and aircraft have been increasing, 
and while other aspects of the air transportation environment have been changing. The air 
traffic controllers are overworked and many airports are understaffed. The job is stressful 
and taxing on the processing power of the human brain. However, it is “the way these 
things are done” (Scott, p. 505). Since there is a saturation point in air traffic, given the 
capacity of the airports and the capabilities of the aircraft, the Future Vision concepts 
have been part of an initiative to develop technologies that are different from those that 
are no longer working to solve the problems, and that have implications for safety. It is 
also notable that Delta was influenced to pursue the Future Vision changes by regulatory 
sources, and by consultants. 
 
                                                 
115 These conceptions have included a number of features related to the use of IT to extend the 
capabilities of air traffic controllers. 
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The decision to replace equipment and to modernize resulted in increased 
predictability, especially considering the age of the systems and the possibility that 
unknown “features” in the code carried negative consequences for their operations. 
However, the decision process did not include consideration for all of the possible 
consequences of how the current hardware and software might coexist within the DNS 
architecture without changes. Nor did the decision process include consideration for the 
multitude of ways where costs could have been eliminated by keeping pieces of the 
existing systems. However, if such a detailed analysis were feasible, the time and cost of 
the process would likely have outweighed the cost of the solution they chose given the 
36,000 desktop units and thousands of interconnecting pieces of networking equipment 
and systems.  
Delta adapted the overhaul to fit their financial condition by putting off projects 
that would take more than a year to pay off (like new baggage-handling systems) and 
accelerating others that would cut costs immediately and possibly increase revenue (like 
increasing the number of self-service kiosks and replacing call center systems). Systems 
were rolled out gradually, to just one or two hub airports instead of to all 40 domestic 
airports, with the intent that once the financial situation turned around they would be 
ready to speed up implementations. Since Delta was among several carriers that had 
continued to receive low marks in prior years for many functions in customer service, lost 
baggage being one, it was an obvious way to improve customer relationships and 
improve turnaround efficiency in the process.  
Turnaround at the gate was important to the overall flight operation in a number 
of ways. Delays at the gate for any reason created problems, but most important to Delta 
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was their effect on the bottom line. One airline analyst estimated the cost of delaying a 
departure could run as high as $500 a minute (Gage and McCormick, 2003). In an 
interview with Delta’s Finance division reported in 1997  
that irregular operations cost Delta about $20 million per month to cover hotels and meals 
for interrupted passengers, tickets on other airlines, baggage delivery extra crew costs, 
ACS overtime, and monetary compensation to inconvenienced passengers (“On-time fix 
requires cross-divisional commitment,” 1997,  p. 11). 
Prior to Y2K and the Airport Renewal project, gate agents had a limited view of 
what was going on that affected the efficient boarding of the aircraft, and that ultimately 
affected the satisfaction of a customer. The Y2K solution changed that. The real-time 
information that was provided by the new systems enabled all Delta personnel to have the 
same view of all activities. Further, customers could interact with the systems 
themselves—via delta.com and other system interfaces—to make reservations, purchase 
tickets, and check in for flights. Customers could access the DNS through any data 
device, such as computers, PDA’s, pagers, cell phones, and gate displays and readers; 
therefore, the numbers of Delta personnel required to assist customers was dramatically 
reduced, and that reduction contributed to major ongoing cost reductions. The interaction 
capabilities using the interface devices also enhanced Delta’s image as a high tech player. 
These benefits extended to baggage handlers and ground equipment personnel, and to 
travel agents via CRS systems—other ways in which the integrated systems improved 
business area performance. This is an example where the state of the technology—within 
the institutional environment—drove solution possibilities. Even if money had been no 
object ten years earlier when the Y2K bug could have been eliminated, the possibility for 
solutions would have been different conceptions, and development and implementation 
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would have taken much longer. The rationality of the decision within this scenario, 
however, would likely have been similar. 
The rationality as evidenced by the financial benefit is clear. The following is the 
estimated cost reduction that resulted from replacing and modernizing the Airport 
Customer Service systems:116 
Personnel reduction: 
 Gate agents: Delta's main airports have an average of 50 gates. The new systems in 
81 airports reduced personnel from 3 to 5 agents per gate to one agent per gate, 
saving from $324 million to $486 million a year (based on $40K annual salary). 
 Ticket counter agents: Delta’s main airports had required 50 people for two shifts 
prior to installing kiosks. Using a kiosk, a single ticket agent could check in three 
people at once, which reduced personnel from 3 counter agents to 1. With 81 airports 
using the system, Delta could experience a total savings of between $107 million and 
$110 million a year (based on the total salaries for these positions—between 
$640,000 and $680,000 per airport). 
Improvement in baggage handling: 
 Delta’s cost for a lost bag was around $150 to locate it and return it to its owner. In 
2002, for every one thousand customers Delta baggage handlers lost 3.57 bags. In 
2001 the lost bag count was 4.11 bags per thousand. The improvement saved Delta 
$8.7 million.  
This cost reduction improved Delta’s financial condition and improved the customers’ 
experience, which could bring additional revenue in increased numbers of repeat 
customers. 
Sub-case 1 summary 
The Airport Customer Service business area of Delta served as Sub-case 1. The 
sub-case description included its Y2K compliance response (Y2K solution) and the 
context for this action provided both by the conditions in the Airport Customer Service 
 
                                                 
116 See Gage & McCormick (2003).  
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business area and by its sectoral environment. The functions of Airport Customer Service 
were routine. The customer interaction was dynamic. The Y2K solution included 
remediation of code in existing high critical systems in order to remove the Y2K 
vulnerability and replacement of systems across the board where possible. The context 
included airport restrictions, and various legal arrangements with contractors and 
employees, but otherwise a neutral area from a regulative standpoint with a couple of 
exceptions: reservations systems and security screening. The DOT and the DHS / TSA 
regulated and monitored those activities, respectively. However, the regulations did not 
affect Y2K solution decisions appreciably. Table 26, Table 27, and Table 28 summarize 
the information from this sub-case. 
Table 26: Y2K solution in Airport Customer Service 
AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE 
Function System Vendor 
Fiberoptic networks installed at 
airports and call centers 
  
Standardized PC systems replaced 
older PCs and green screens 
 HP 
Large screen display Gate Information Display System (GIDS) Delta Technology 
Flight-information Flight Info Display System (FIDS) Delta Technology 
Gate agent / boarding passengers Cornerstone Delta Technology 
Baggage handling   
Kiosks TouchPort Kinetics 
Table 27: Summary metrics in Airport Customer Service 
TOTAL NO. OF DIVISIONS 47 
NATURE OF WORK Routine / dynamic 
LOCATIONS 180 airports plus Atlanta 
TECHNOLOGY PROFILES 1997 2003 
Application systems 119 129 
# High/Med/Low critical systems 36/35/48 36/34/59 
# Languages 13  
# LOC (millions) 6  
# Delta Technology systems 119  
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Table 27 continued 
# Waivered systems 9  
# Desktop units  20,000 
117
 
# Desktop models, original 53 n/a 
# Desktop models, solution 23 n/a 
Intro computer processing date Deltamatic reservations system 1964 
DOMINANT INDUSTRIES (fields represented)  
 Customer relations 
ENVIRONMENT  
GOVERNMENT Airport authority, DOT, TSA, Customs, INS etc. 
CULTURAL Non-union  
INDUSTRY Employee contractors 
 
Table 28: Summary of environmental factors in Airport Customer Service 
FACTORS INSTANCE 
Public image Airport displays and kiosks 
Belief systems Family, “southern hospitality” 
Existing practices and routines 
New airport environments were simply 
reformulations of the familiar, propagating the 
imprinting of institutional arrangements. 
Industry relationships Ticket processing, travel agents 
Regulations Airport rules, security, privacy, competition 
Mimesis “Airport of the Future,” elements of BNI solution 
Goals 
Improve customer service while removing Y2K 
bug 
Cost management 
Deferring rollout to new airports depending on 
budget 
 
Given the Y2K solution in Airport Customer Service, its context was examined in 
order to assess the rationality or institutionality of the decision as an alternative for 
solving the Y2K problem. The solution was assessed as rational, even though a number of 
institutional influences were noted. Table 29 shows the factors related to the assessment. 
 
                                                 
117 This number is an estimate based on extrapolation of the ~6,000 units at the Atlanta airport. 
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Table 29: Factors related to the response assessment in Airport Customer Service 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO Y2K Solution in AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE  
Institutional model (Y2K Contingency: Y2K bug) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
Cultural 
 Related to a social fact: perceptions of air 
transportation, information technology, 
information security, safety & other values 
 Cognitive, e.g., Delta family culture 
 Familiarity with service orientation, 
comfortable, habitual, routine 
 Related to established relationships, e.g., 
vendors 
 Inadequate information and experience 
with changes to systems in the Internet 
environment 
 Inadequate information and experience by 
both Delta and by consultants as to 
responsibility for security 
 
1. Conditions in the business area and its IT 
systems: 
 Systems working but without documentation 
 Systems woefully out of date 
 IT employees content with the status quo 
 Habit of avoiding outside consultants 
 
2. Character of the business area environment: 
 Inadequate conditions in government agency 
charged with oversight (DHS / TSA) 
 
3. Distraction of other business area contingencies: 
 Financial status 
 Economic conditions 
 Competing airlines 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
 Requirements for maintaining 
organizational legitimacy 
 
Mimetic (Following the crowd) 
 Research from institutional sources 
 Fashionable, popular 
 Recommended by vendors 
 Inadequate information about products 
and experiences outside organizational 
boundaries (reports only about successes) 
 
4. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Industry regulations were focused on protecting 
the competitiveness of air transportation, not 
information security 
 U.S. govt agencies’ systems not Y2K compliant 
 Industry regulations focused on passenger 
screening after 9/11, but inadequately 
researched, equipped, and trained. 
 Industry regulations linked to intelligence 
gathering—a public concern strongly related to 
privacy, but not linked to information security 
 
5. Character of business area environment: 
 External chaos because of time limitation 
 Mixed understanding of the risk 
 IT products available in the marketplace 
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Table 29 continued 
Rational-contingency model  
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO A 
RATIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO A RATIONAL 
PROCESS IN IT MANAGEMENT 
Goal orientation 
Actions relating to efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Communications related to mission control 
1. Leadership: 
 Acted on the opportunity to improve operations, 
which made the enterprise more competitive 
 Applied human factors and field testing to 
assure usability 
 Stayed actively and personally involved in order 
to insure success. 
 
2. Condition in the business area and its IT 
systems: 
 Process put in place to assure continual 
assessment with respect to condition of systems 
and efficiency of performance 
 
3. Responses to business area contingencies: 
 Management of financial condition (e.g., 
delaying airport rollouts based on budget 
priorities) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO RATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
Requirements for maintaining organizational 
effectiveness 
 
Decision-making criteria  
 Based on knowledge of systems 
o Y2K compliance 
o Fit with functional area 




4. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Even though limited and late in coming, a 
bounding framework of concern by govt/industry 
rules wherein the condition of IT systems is 




 Knowledgeable about the value of information 
accuracy and availability 
 Understood the contribution of IT to the 
functioning of the organization 
 Employed personnel with high levels of skills 
 Adequately responded to security contingencies 
 
6. Character of the business area environment: 
 Personnel resources were adequately aligned 
with requirements 
 IT products to serve the needs in Airport 
Customer Service were available in the 
marketplace 
 
As the above information indicates, there were both institutional and rational 
influences that weighed into the Airport Customer Service decision. The rationality of the 
decision is obvious with respect to the financial benefit of the decision. The institutional 
character of decisions is implicit in the actions. Evidence of the imprinting of airport 
operations was preserved for the most part by the design of the systems. A customer still 
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has the same basic look and feel of the airport experience, even though the technology 
changes have been dramatic. Gate and ticket agent numbers were reduced, but their 
function and their presence is the same from a customer perspective. Delta Y2K teams, 
both developers and installers, had to interact with the airport authorities in order to be 
compliant with the rules of their facilities, which for the most part are just as they have 
always been. However, the changes Delta made to various reservations systems affected 
the very existence of travel agents in the Delta environment, a case where the Y2K 
solution actually influenced its institutional context.  
Travel agents as a body of workers has been systematically removed from 
interaction with Delta, beginning with the establishment of Worldspan, and then followed 
by the creation of the various modes by which customers can take action directly in 
arranging for their own travel. This institutional factor has been “virtually” eliminated 
and made non-essential as a design consideration for IT systems.  
The state of the technology application in Airport Customer Service may be 
described as completely current with all of the latest technical capabilities in computer-
based processing. This reflects the growth and evolution of the IT industry, and the 
changing nature of the air transportation industry with respect to in-house vs. proprietary 
programming code. In view of the fact that some of these same institutional influences 
and effects regarding technological changes have appeared in other sub-cases, these 
factors are discussed further in Chapter 8 as a part of the cross-case comparison. 
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Sub-case 2: Operations 
 
More than mechanical wizardry, it was computers that transformed transportation in the 
late 20th century. … Advanced computer systems in air traffic control tracked 32,000 
flights per day (Smithsonian National Museum of American History. “Transportation 
Technology, 1950-2000”). 
Airline Operations Portfolio … has the majority stake in Year 2000 (Delta archive, dt43, 
1998). 
Y2K solution 
Besides code remediation and other aspects that were carried out in all of the 
business areas, the notable Y2K solution in the Operations area took place in the 
Technical Operations (Tech Ops) division. In an effort to support the activities in Tech 
Ops with greater efficiency, Delta made a commitment to lease a commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) product from SAP, which enabled complex enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) and the integration of multiple functions across the Delta enterprise.118 Using this 
software, Delta decision makers believed that integration of activities in inventory 
management, supply chain, and the finance function could provide benefits.  
Because of its complexity (and possibly the expense), the installation of SAP was 
deferred until after the rollover (Overby, 2003). Tech Ops would then use it to aid in 
managing $1 billion worth of aircraft parts inventory. A system called Xelus, which 
enabled planning for parts based on demand, was linked with the SAP system. To 
document aircraft repairs, the Creative Concepts company supplied software, which 
enabled technicians to access all manuals and other technical information online.  
 
                                                 
118 SAP was a leading provider of enterprise resource planning (ERP) software, which was used to 
integrate functions such as human resources, accounting, manufacturing, and distribution. By 2007, SAP 
customers numbered over 27,000 companies worldwide (Hoover’s, 2007). 
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Following a failure in the flight attendant scheduling systems after year 2000 
rollover, Accenture was contracted to perform the analysis and integration for a new 
system. This project, like most systems work, was interrupted after 9/11, but continued 
after the crisis had abated. Table 30 shows the Y2K solution in Operations. The 
conditions in the Operations business area influenced these Y2K solution decisions in a 
number of ways.  
Table 30: Y2K solution in Operations 
OPERATIONS 
Function System Vendor 
Flight assignment Coldstart Developed with Ilog 
Flight-tracking Total Dispatch Delta Technology 
Supply-chain mySAP SAP 
Supply-chain mgmt mySAP Business Suite SAP 
Parts management Xelus Plan, Xelus Extend Xelus 
Technical documentation  Creative Concepts (Gen’l Dynamics subsidiary) 
Crew scheduling  Jacada, Accenture 
 
Functional and resource overview 
Operations was the business area that performed the crew, flight, and aircraft 
maintenance functions—the central functions of airline service. Conceptually, the other 
three business areas performed support functions for Operations. Operations was the 
largest as well as the most complex of Delta’s four business areas. Its 40,000+ employees 
represented over 60% of the Delta organization. As shown in Table 31, the 248 different 
PDNs and the location of operations at 180 different sites were evidence of the scope and 
complexity of Operations.119 As another distinguishing aspect when compared to the 
other Delta business areas, Operations presented the most concern for regulators, such as 
 
                                                 
119 The column headed by the title “NO. OF PDNs” (personnel department numbers) shows the 
number of sub-divisions included within a division named in this list; e.g., Flight Ops has 35 sub-divisions.  
 
   195
the FAA. For example, because the FAA was responsible for certifying the pilots and the 
condition of the aircraft, the agency had an obligation to monitor key activities in the 
Operations area. To handle the issues related to regulations of the FAA and others, 
Operations had established two divisions: FAA and, Corporate Safety and Compliance, 
which is evidence of the organization’s adaptation to its institutional environment. 
Table 31: No. of divisions and no. of locations in Operations 
DIVISION NO. OF PDNs NO. OF LOCATIONS 
FAA 1 1 
Corporate Safety and Compliance 1 1 
Operations Control Center (OCC) 1 1 
In-Flight Service (IFS) 18 
180 airports plus 
Atlanta campus 
Flight Operations (Flight Ops) 35 
180 airports plus 
Atlanta campus 
Ops Management  1 
Aircraft Crew & Resource Mgmt   
Airport Customer Service (ACS) – ACC & Back office   
Airport maintenance / Ground Support Equip (GSE)   
Ground Ops   
Flight Ops – campus  1 
Shuttle 1 
A number of U.S. 
airports 
Technical Operations (Tech Ops) 191 
nearly 50 U.S. and 
foreign locations 
Maintenance & Inventory   
Engine Comp & Hanger Ops   
Technical Operations Center (TOC): shop, offices, 
bays & hangars 
 1 
DFW hangars  1 
TPA hangars  1 
  
TOTAL 248 
180 airports plus 
Atlanta campus 
 
The Airline Operations (Air Ops) Portfolio division in Delta Technology was 
responsible for managing all of the IT systems that supported the Operations business 
area of Delta, which numbered over 200 systems. The individual Air Ops systems were 
combined into sub-groups for Y2K assessment and remediation purposes. The sub-groups 
were: FAA; Corporate Safety & Compliance; Operation Control Center (OCC); Delta’s 
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flight attendant scheduling with In-Flight Service; and pilot scheduling with Flight 
Operations (Flt Ops); Shuttle; and Technical Operations (Tech Ops), which included 
Delta’s Technical Operations Center (TOC), the maintenance repair and overhaul facility 
in Atlanta. The divisions shown in Table 31 reflect these groupings. 
Many of these systems were new at the start of the Year 2000 Program, but others 
had been in use for a long time. For example, one Delta Technology employee who began 
work at Delta in the late 1980s described his initial assignment as a system development 
project that supported flight attendant activities. Another informant, a former employee 
who began at TransQuest in the mid-1990s, described his initial assignment as working 
on changes to a long-established pilot scheduling system, changes which were required 
because of impending changes to the pilots’ contracts. The varying ages of these systems 
presented different levels of remediation difficulty to the Year 2000 Teams. 
The following personnel, shown in Table 32 , had leadership responsibilities in 
this business area for the Year 2000 Program:120 
Table 32: Year 2000 Program team in Operations 
DELTA DELTA TECHNOLOGY 
Delta Exec Sponsor: H. Alger, Exec VP – Ops (‘97)   
Delta Exec Sponsor: M. Armstrong, Sr VP –Ops (’99) Delta Technology VP: Walter Taylor 
Delta Portfolio Owner: J. Poole,  Sr VP – IFS  
IT systems not maintained by Delta Technology IT systems maintained by Delta Technology 
Corp Safety Dave Kocsis Y2K Team Leader: John Ruff (9/’97) 
IFS Bob Lederman Randy McCranie (PMO 11/’97) 
Flight Ops Charlie Bautz/Sue Martin Eugene Shtern (PMO 11/’97) 
OCC/FAA John Talmadge Y2K PD: Mark Hicks 
Shuttle Moira Kelly Y2K PD: David McGlothin 
Tech Ops  Peggy Reagan (12/’97)  
 
 
                                                 
120 A date beside a name in this table refers to the date of the Delta report that showed the assignment. 
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As Vice-President - Air Ops Portfolio for Delta Technology, Taylor provided 
leadership for the activities related to the management of IT systems for the Operations 
business area. In addition to this role, Taylor had responsibility for the entire Delta-wide 
Year 2000 Program. Placing the leadership of the Year 2000 Program in the Air Ops 
Portfolio was a logical step since this group managed the largest number of systems and 
lines of code compared to other Portfolio groups. Mac Armstrong was executive sponsor 
for the Year 2000 Program for Operations, and thus had ultimate responsibility for the 
Y2K solution in the business area. As Armstrong was Senior Vice-President – Operations 
for Delta Air Lines, a position that reported to the CEO, the importance of this work is 
evident. Prior to Armstrong, Harry Alger held the role until he retired.  
To ensure that the systems in the Operations area would function properly after 
the year 2000 rollover, as in the other business areas, the Operations Year 2000 team 
took stock of what they had; and from that, they could make decisions for Y2K solution. 
In the inventory and assessment phase, the main activity was to identify and locate all of 
the systems, and to understand how they interconnected to other systems and to users. 
The systems were also assessed as to their criticality to operations.121 Table 33 is a 
summary of metrics obtained when Delta Technology scanned and evaluated the 
Operations systems. The table shows the number of systems, number of programming 
languages, the lines of code, the number of systems that were waivered, i.e., considered 
adequate for production after year 2000, and the number of desktop units. Results are 
indicators of complexity.  
 
                                                 
121 A classification (HIGH, MED, or LOW) indicated the critical nature of the system to the 
functioning of Operations.  
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Table 33: Assessment metrics for systems in Operations 
NO. OF SYSTEMS 








NO. DESKTOP UNITS 
86 59 71 31 25 46 3346 
 
Table 34 lists the languages, the LOC for each language, the numbers of date fields that 
existed within programming code by language, and the number of date fields affected. 
These assessments were further indicators of the complexity of the Operations systems, 
and therefore both the importance and the difficulty of making changes to the systems. 
All of these metrics weighed into decisions for a Y2K solution. 
Table 34: Programming languages and date fields for systems in Operations 
LANGUAGE LOC DATE FIELDS DATE FIELDS AFFECTED PERCENTAGE OF OCCURRENCE 
AWK 400   0.00% 
Access 207,542   0.00% 
Aion DS 312,618   0.00% 
Assembler 43,185 299  0.69% 
Attachmate 34,890   0.00% 
Automator 31,009   0.00% 
C 2,031,686 1,355  0.07% 
C++ 2,035,473   0.00% 
COBOL 9,558,412 135,032 14,383 0.15% 
Clipper 137,237   0.00% 
DCL 55,028 1,182  2.15% 
DLPAGER 29,161 1,747  5.99% 
Delphi 64,183   0.00% 
Exec 26,663   0.00% 
Fortran 293,741 22,216  7.56% 
Foxpro 35,000   0.00% 
GEPR 45,773 242  0.53% 
INCL 11,742 67  0.57% 
INP 33,482 106  0.32% 
JAVA 167,000   0.00% 
Natural 7,095,975 624,379  8.80% 
Not specified 5,443   0.00% 
Oracle Forms 12,630   0.00% 
PL/SQL 30,000   0.00% 
PLM 13,800   0.00% 
Power Builder 216,002   0.00% 
Rexx 200   0.00% 
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Table 34 continued 
SAS 127,220 4,604  3.62% 
SQL 221,628 2,109  0.95% 
Smalltalk 8,000   0.00% 
Visual Basic 51,202   0.00% 
 
Besides code remediation or replacement, making no changes to a system was a 
valid decision. If a system was assessed either to have no date-related issues, or other 
wise to be an effective, robust system, the team could choose to waiver the system. Table 
35 is a list of Operations systems that received a waiver, i.e., systems that required no 
remediation or replacement. Many of the Operations systems that were waivered were 
among the most recent additions to the Portfolio, having been designed and written for 
the OCC, which is discussed later in this chapter. As another example, Ground Support 
Equipment (GSE) division had determined in the assessment phase that no failure 
potential existed in the equipment, even though a comprehensive treatment plan and 
schedule for stationary GSE equipment had been created. Therefore, remediation of all 
Ground Support items, other than the Vehicle Management System, was waivered in 
January 1999. 
Table 35: Waivered systems in Operations 
SYSTEM  LANGUAGE 
Operations Waiver - ASD/Off Times Processor 3002 C 
Waiver - Cancellation Balancing Application 3003 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Flight Planning System 3008 C 
Operations Waiver - Flight Planning System 3008 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Graphical Flight Following UNIX 3014 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Graphical Flight Following Win32 3015 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Integrated Management Tool 3016 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Operations Airport Support Information System 3019 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Pilot Weather Information Display System 3020 C 
Operations Waiver - Radio Call Accounting 3021 C 
Operations Waiver - Radio Call Accounting 3021 SQL 
Operations Waiver - Weather Imagery Display System 3022 C 
Operations Waiver - Weather Imagery Display System 3022 Pro-C 
Waiver - Workload Management 3024 C++ 
 
   200
Table 35 continued 
SYSTEM  LANGUAGE 
Waiver - Workload Management 3024 UIM/X 
Daily Operations Infrastructure: Vics’s Program 3036 DOS Basic 
DELTA INTRANET HP- Operations Control Center 3040 HTML 
Waiver - Diversion Recovery System 3042 C, C++, Java 
Waiver - Crew Reroute System 3043 C++, Java 
MORPH 4066 Visual Basic 
MANUAL INVENTORY TRACKING 4083 Visual Basic 
FAT/AD COMPLIANCE TRACKING SYSTEM 4084 Visual Basic 
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR TRACKING SYSTEM 4085 Visual Basic 
MAINTENCANCE PLANNING & SCHEDULING 4111 C 
Operations Portfolio Waiver for TransNet 4166 C++ 
Operations Portfolio Waiver for TransNet 4166 Visual Basic 
FAACOMM SERVER 5015 Clipper/Dbase 
FACILITIES INFORMATION TRACKING SYSTEM 5015 Clipper/Dbase 
Operations Waiver – PC Backup Weight Data Record 5019 Assembler 
Operations Waiver – PC Backup Weight Data Record 5019 C 
Operations Waiver – PC Backup Database Download Conversion 5020 C 
FAACOMM CLIENT 5027 C 
Operations Waiver - Crew Reservation Management System 9006 C 
Operations Waiver - Crew Reservation Management System 9006 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Crew Reservation Management System 9006 Natural 
Operations Waiver - Crew Reservation Management System 9006 Pro-C 
Operations Waiver - Crew Reservation Management System 9006 SQL 
PILOT OFFICE MANAGEMENT 9012 Clipper 
Operations Waiver - Safety, Trending and Report System 9017 C++ 
Operations Waiver - Safety, Trending and Report System 9017 SQL 
Operations Waiver - Safety, Trending and Report System 9017 UNIX Script 
MEAL ORDERING AND PAYMENT 10003 C++ 
MEAL ORDERING AND PAYMENT 10003 Java 
FLIGHT CANCELLATION REPORT 11002 SQL 
Executive Management Tool 11003 SQL 
QUALITY ASSURANCE & COMPLIANCE 11030 Foxpro 
 
The next steps, after inventory and assessment, involved system changes—either 
to remediate the code in a system, to upgrade, or to replace the system altogether. In 
addition, because of the complex environmental interconnections of the Operations area, 
other activities involved interaction with external parties. 
The next sections highlight these activities in four of the Operations divisions:  
o Operations Control Center, 
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o In-Flight Service, 
o Flight Operations, and  
o Technical Operations.  
These divisions were selected for greater in-depth attention because they represented high 
numbers of subdivisions and / or employees, and / or were characterized by high amounts 
of complexity. In addition, these divisions either were more directly connected with 
external regulators than the other divisions or otherwise offered unique attributes that 
provided insight into key study variables. Following discussions of these divisions, the 
institutional context of the entire Operations area is described. 
Operations Control Center 
The Operations Control Center (OCC), which employed around 350 people at its 
facility in Atlanta, was a special division of Operations. As a $30 million IT project that 
went live in 1995, the OCC offered specialists from multiple disciplines the tools to 
perform critical activities related to flight operations.  
Delta’s $30 million control center for operations (OCC) opened in late October 1995. 
From a “bridge” overlooking five jumbo screens, directors watch as computers track the 
movement of every Delta flight worldwide. Working within earshot of the bridge are 
meteorologists, traffic planners, mechanics, and reservation specialists (Greising, 1995). 
The OCC had been established in order to improve flight operations management 
for the more than 2,700 flights that Delta’s aircraft and crew performed each day. A 
natural result of better performance of these activities was not only an enhancement to 
safety, but also a decrease in costly flight delays. The resources of the OCC facility 
enabled the sophisticated monitoring of all aspects of flight operations: take-offs and 
landings, weather conditions, and air traffic. This provided better direction for the crews 
that flew the planes to their national and international destinations. After just over a year 
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of operations, OCC had paid for itself by cutting nearly 10% from the annual costs that 
had been attributed to “irregular” flight operations (Caldwell, 1997). 
Many of the systems that supported the OCC were brand new in 1996. 
TransQuest developed these systems in-house immediately prior to the official start of 
the Year 2000 Program, and represented Delta’s initial entry into the extensive 
modernization that was to follow. Individual applications for monitoring and controlling 
operations involved interactive real-time information processing, and included Aircraft 
Routing and Control, Graphical Flight-Following, Flight Cancellation Balancing, and 
Workload Balancing. The Graphical Flight-Following system tracked the status of all 
Delta flights, and all airports in the U.S. Assisting with these activities were a variety of 
electronic data feeds, which were obtained by subscription from various outside service 
organizations, e.g., WSI, Meteorological Office, National Weather Service, etc. The FAA 
also provided data on a regular basis.  
In 1997, TransQuest developed and implemented additional systems, such as 
decision-support tools for flight dispatchers. However, because TransQuest had 
completed development of many of the OCC systems roughly coincidental with the start 
of the Year 2000 Program, this division did not make any special plans for additional 
development or replacement of systems during the study period beyond what had been 
previously designed. Older systems that had buggy code were included with the code 
remediation project of the Air Ops Portfolio. The new code contained no incidence of the 
Y2K bug and was waivered. 
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In-Flight Service 
And, of course, you can continue to expect the outstanding service and warm hospitality 
of Delta's people. We appreciate your support, and we thank you for flying with us (Delta 
archive, email, 2005). 
The In-Flight Service (IFS) division had 18 PDNs and employed around 18,000 
flight attendants. Activities of this division focused on services that were performed 
while onboard the aircraft. These activities related to food and beverage service, cabin 
servicing, and flight attendants. As mentioned previously, many systems that supported 
these activities had been in use for a long time, and therefore required remediation of 
code. An example is the Easy Access Terminal System, which was developed and 
installed on IBM 286 computers back in 1988. 
Breaking with tradition, instead of CIS people heading systems development teams, 
departmental managers put in charge of teams. This helped build an interface for the Easy 
Access system, which runs off two mainframe databases and is used to schedule pilots 
and flight attendants. The system is mission-critical to Delta with 18,000 people to 
schedule on a regular rotating basis. Manager of In-Flight Service put together a 
development team that included programmers, pilots and flight attendants to accomplish 
user friendly system (Eskow, 1990). 
Description of this project also shows that the concept of cross-disciplinary teams 
was not new to Delta with the Year 2000 Program. Similar to the situation with the older 
systems in the OCC, the repair process in IFS was accomplished by including the code 
with the remediation project of the Air Ops Portfolio. Unfortunately, the flight attendant 
scheduling system was not repaired adequately as part of this process. The system failed 
to function following rollover to year 2000, which created havoc for a day or two for the 
passengers who had planned to fly and for the employees called into service to cover the 
system malfunction. The crew scheduling software was replaced with a COTS product 
later that year. (“Delta taps Jacada for scheduling,” 2000). The new software was 
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installed on new hardware that provided access to the airline's crew scheduling systems 
online.  
More than 27,000 Delta flight crew members view their scheduling assignments via 
computer terminals in airports serviced by Delta. Jacada's software will be used to make 
schedules available online through Delta's Intranet and also to graphically enhance the 
scheduling application, officials said (Ibid.). 
Table 36 shows the new system developed for In-Flight Service that had replaced the 
faulty system. 
Table 36: Y2K solution in IFS 
IN-FLIGHT SERVICE 
Function System Vendor 
Crew scheduling  Jacada, Accenture 
 
Flight Operations 
Flight Operations (Flight Ops) was the division related to the pilots and the 
aircraft operation, and included 35 PDNs. Pilots numbered around 8,600 in this division 
in 1997, a number that had fluctuated somewhat over the previous decade and over the 
study period because of changing financial conditions in the airline. The division was 
represented at 180 airport locations, with the main activities at the Hartsfield 
International Airport and the headquarters campus in Atlanta. 
Flight Ops had overall responsibility for flying the aircraft—for organizing the 
schedules and routes, analyzing flight operations data in order to formulate operational 
strategies, and managing back-office functions that supported pilots (e.g., training, 
payroll). Historically, Flight Ops had utilized IT principally to assist with various aspects 
of flight management, including routing, crew scheduling and training. Table 37 shows 
the various functions that the division performed. 
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Table 37: Functional activities in Flight Ops 
Aircraft routing, re-routing 
Crew records, resources 
Customer special assistance program 
Flight control, management 
Flight Ops communications automation & technology 
Flight Ops management, domestic & int’l 
Flight Ops publication & manual, services 
Flight safety, standards; Operational reliability & control 
Engine performance analysis 
Radio operators; Dispatch; Meteorology 
Pilots, domestic & int’l, trainees 
Training, Flight instruction & other, simulator support 
Scheduling, crew / training 
 
Table 38 shows the complexity of Flight Ops systems. Flight Ops had 160 
systems, the greatest number of systems of all the divisions in Operations, which also 
included the greatest number of high critical systems. Some of the information for this 
table was not available. 
Table 38: Assessment metrics for systems in Flight Ops 
NO. OF SYSTEMS 









68 28 22 n/a 8.5 n/a 293 
 
While the systems experts were busy with assessment and remediation activities, 
others were interacting with suppliers to understand the level of risk Delta faced, if any, 
from entities beyond its control boundaries. In the case of Flight Ops, this meant 
checking aircraft in liaison with manufacturers to get compliance documents.  
Overall, the Y2K problem with suppliers was a “trust arrangement”—letters written that 
indicated compliance, e.g., Boeing certified their planes (Mitchell, 2005). 
Table 39 shows the new systems developed for Flight Ops that had replaced 
systems that were at risk. 
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Table 39: Y2K solution in Flight Ops 
Y2K SOLUTION 
Function System Vendor 
Flight assignment Coldstart Developed with Ilog 
Flight-tracking Total Dispatch Delta Technology 
 
Further assessment involved desktop units, and the possibility to achieve 
standardization with the Future Vision model. The desktop units were all standardized by 
replacing with new HP computers with the exception of some that were difficult to 
resolve prior to the year 2000 rollover, e.g., the pilot/flight attendants’ easy access 
terminal systems (EATS). The software needed replacement both for Y2K and because it 
was an outdated system, but the task was deferred because it was difficult. The software 
package was unique and functioned in an older operating system environment; and it was 
not easy to migrate to an Intel Pentium machine. To modify it or rewrite it would have 
required more resources than Delta Technology had available. Consequently, the 
hardware was patched, but otherwise the systems were left alone for Y2K.  
Technical Operations 
Technical Operations (Tech Ops) was the division that repaired, serviced, and 
maintained the planes and other flight-related equipment, a $2.0 billion operation. Tech 
Ops had the largest number of subdivision within Operations—191 PDNs, and included 
over 10,000 employees. Tech Ops was responsible for maintaining a fleet of nearly 600 
Delta aircraft and 85 client aircraft. Large subdivisions within Tech Ops included 
Component Maintenance, Engine Maintenance, and Environment-related activities.  
Maintenance facilities in the Tech Ops division were located in nearly 50 U.S. 
cities and foreign locations. However, its facility in Atlanta, at Hartsfield International 
Airport, was the oldest. Tech Ops has been operating in Atlanta since 1938, even before 
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Atlanta became headquarters for Delta. Eight other smaller maintenance bases operated 
in Chicago, Dallas Fort Worth, and Philadelphia, while other cities did routine aircraft 
maintenance. The Technical Operations Center (TOC) in Atlanta was the largest such 
operation in the world, and also one of the world’s largest and most modern aircraft 
restoration facilities.122 Delta’s TOC had been providing this comprehensive range of 
maintenance support since 1983. Until the completion of the TOC in 1960, Hangar One, 
and later including Hangar Two, housed all aircraft maintenance for Delta.123  
The activities within Tech Ops represented by far the greatest amount of diversity 
of Delta’s functional divisions. The Tech Ops specialists understood and managed every 
part of the very complex aircraft that were in Delta’s fleet. Routine maintenance involved 
periodically dismantling the entire aircraft and reassembling it to make certain that every 
single part had been accounted for and inspected. Increasingly, various types of 
application software supported these highly specialized activities. Table 40 summarizes 
the inventory and assessment results showing that Tech Ops had 122 systems and the 
Year 2000 Program team remediated 15.5 million LOC, the greatest number of LOCs 
remediated of all divisions in Operations. 
Table 40: Assessment metrics for systems in Tech Ops 
NO. OF SYSTEMS 
 










37 29 56 15.5 n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
                                                 
122 The sign on the TOC is easy to see from a runway or from the air. It says, “Fly Delta Jets.” 
123 Hangar One, located at Delta’s Atlanta headquarters campus, is the site for the Air Transport 
Museum archive, the Museum store (housed in the body of an L-1011), and the Monroe Café. 
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In addition to code remediation, other remediation included upgrades and 
replacements for various machine tools, and other similar equipment in the Technical 
Operations Center (TOC). For example, the scheduled time for Hanger and Power plant 
tool remediation, as well as shop remediation, was January 1999. (Delta archive, 
ACT_ITMS.xls, 1999). Tools and diagnostic equipment in Component Maintenance, 
Engine Maintenance, Environmental Services, and Hangar Maintenance was scheduled 
for completion in June 1999 (Delta archive, “Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book,” 
1999). 
However, the systems that were most critical for their internal functioning, as well 
as for satisfying the regulators, were the maintenance documentation systems and parts 
inventory systems. Delta had signed with Digital Equipment (DEC) in 1991 to develop its 
Technical Operations Publishing System (TOPS) for aircraft maintenance schedules and 
documentation—the first online maintenance information system in the airline industry, 
which was likely showing its age compared to newer systems.  
TOPS will be deployed on a variety of VAX systems throughout Delta's operations, and 
includes publishing capabilities based on a database integrated with a Manufacturing 
Resource Planning system that complies with Air Transportation Association standards. 
(“DEC puts airline maintenance reports on-line at Delta,” 1991).  
Around the same time, Delta partnered with Andersen Consulting, reportedly spending 
between $50 million and $100 million, to develop a LAN-based system called MARC 
(Maintenance and Rebuild Control) in order to provide Tech Ops personnel with up to 
date information on aircraft parts.  
Delta has begun converting paper files for record-keeping, inventory and scheduling to an 
integrated data base co-developed with Andersen Consulting. … Delta is installing local 
area networks (LANs) at the center to disseminate the automation program to PC users. 
Delta will use bar-code scanning devices to automatically allocate plane parts, scan 
documents and sign off on completed repairs (Violino, 1992). 
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By 1997, however, the parts inventory system was a problem. When performing the 
inventory and assessments of Y2K, Taylor (VP-Air Ops Portfolio) asked TOC 
management how well parts were being tracked, i.e., how closely did inventory records 
match reality. “Over 50% was [sic] bad data.” As he investigated how this was 
happening, he found that users of the inventory system had access to the transaction 
database; and this access had led to corruption of the data, i.e., problems with data 
integrity. In addition, the software did not have the cross-functionality (i.e., the 
comprehensive ERP or supply chain capability) that had become available later in 
commercial software. Therefore, the decision was made to use Xelus and SAP to extend 
and improve the processes that they had begun years earlier. Further, the integration of 
the Tech Ops functions with Business Support through the SAP software was expected to 
produce greater operating efficiency. Tech Ops chose a different application system for 
inventory management, because it had aviation-specific features that other vendors (esp. 
SAP) did not offer. Taylor, who became Delta's managing director of MRO process and 
technology after year 2000, said the company saw a return on its investment in the Xelus 
software six months after first implementing it (Brown, 2003). 
Like other divisions, Tech Ops required liaison with manufacturers to understand 
the status of the manufacturers’ compliance, in this case regarding aircraft parts. Delta’s 
Year 2000 Program team sent letters to each of the companies that supplied parts to Tech 
Ops, and requested written confirmation that the parts were Y2K compliant. By January 
1999, Operations was up to date with requirements for all Y2K certifications, i.e., 
inventory forms, aircraft certifications (Boeing), letters from suppliers, and waiver forms 
(Delta archive, Act_Itms.xls, 1999). 
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This completes the functional and resource overview of the four divisions that 
were highlighted in the Operations business area. The next section presents the 
institutional context of Operations in order to assess the reasonableness of the Y2K 
solution. 
Institutional context 
Activities in the Operations area, in existence since the beginning of the crop 
dusting business, had evolved over time along with the institutionalized regulatory 
structures that supported the commercial airline industry. Thus, the Operations business 
area had a strong relationship to regulations and other structuring sectoral components 
relevant to these activities. The following sections describe the cultural character and 
regulative environment that encompassed all of the divisions in the Operations business 
area, and therefore incorporated the four divisions highlighted above.  
Cultural character 
The cultural character of the Operations business area was the source of the 
greatest amount of internal tension for Delta. Delta’s unions represented dependence and 
uncertainty, which was evident in labor relations that were continuously threatened by the 
adversarial posture of the ALPA. Because of the highly visible activities of ALPA within 
Delta, it was anticipated that Delta’s pilots would interact with the Y2K teams and 
possibly influence Y2K solutions. Mullin had said in an initial interview that the pilots 
had picketed (“demonstrated”) upon his arrival—his first day at work (L. Mullin, 2004). 
As an especially noteworthy example of the prominence of the pilots in company 
activities, part of the collective bargaining agreement with ALPA in 1996 included 
allowing one pilot representative to attend (but not to vote in) regularly scheduled, 
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quarterly meetings of the Board of Directors. Beginning with its July 1996 meeting, 
Delta's Board invited the attendance of an ALPA representative along with three other 
Delta personnel, the three others representing a new Delta Personnel Board Council. The 
council was comprised of a representative from each of seven different personnel groups: 
Airport Customer Service / Cargo; In-Flight Service; Technical Operations; Reservations 
Sales; Operational Support/Clerical; Field Sales/Sales Support Center; and Supervisory / 
Administrative. However, neither the council representatives nor the pilot representative 
had voting rights at Delta's Board meetings. In 1998, once again the pilots tried to 
negotiate for a voting seat on the Delta Board and were unsuccessful. Then, in what 
would appear to be retribution against the members of the Delta Board, the pilots’ union 
refused to agree to a pending code-sharing arrangement with United Airlines. 
On April 29, 1998, Delta and United Air Lines, Inc. (United) entered into a marketing 
alliance agreement (Agreement) pursuant to which the two airlines would engage in 
code-sharing arrangements, reciprocal frequent flyer programs and other areas of 
marketing cooperation.  
The implementation of the code-sharing aspects of the Agreement is subject to the 
approval of both companies' pilot unions. In August 1998, Delta's Board of Directors 
(Board) decided not to grant the request of the Delta pilot union for a voting seat on the 
Board. Following this decision, the Delta pilot union said it would no longer consider the 
approval of the code-sharing aspects of the Agreement. As a result, Delta has 
discontinued consideration of code-sharing arrangements with United (Delta Air Lines, 
1998).  
The actions of the ALPA thus prevented what might have been a stronger economic 
position for Delta in the marketplace.124 
However, even with the disadvantages of the presence of ALPA, Delta enjoyed a 
financial advantage over its competition because it was 88 percent nonunion while other 
 
                                                 
124 Note: It seems duplicitous that the pilots criticize the Board for its executive compensation 
packages when the pilots themselves encourage wage discrimination and unequal benefits between the 
compensation they receive and that of other personnel. This example revealed their apparent disregard for 
the efficient operation of the company. 
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major carriers had many unionized groups (Woods, 2002). The only other group at Delta 
represented by a union—the Professional Airline Flight-Control Association (PAF-
CA)—was the group of 190 employees who worked with air traffic control and ground 
operations. Other classes of Delta employees had been recruited strongly to join labor 
unions, but had declined to do so. Table 41 presents the state of Delta's domestic 
collective bargaining agreements in 1997, and shows the employee groups that were in 
this situation.125  
Table 41: Delta's domestic collective bargaining agreements in 1997 







Airline Pilots Association, 
International (ALPA) 
8,600 May 2, 2000 
Flight superintendents 
Professional Airline Flight 
Control Association (PAF-CA) 
190 Jan 1, 1999 
Flight attendants 
Association of Flight 
Attendants, CWA (AFA-CWA, 
AFL-CIO) 
0 See footnote: 126 
Mechanics 
Transport Workers Union of 
America (TWU) 
0 See footnote: 127 
Pilot ground training 
instructors 
Transport Workers Union of 
America (TWU) 
0 See footnote: 128 
Source: Delta Air Lines 1997 Annual Report 
The National Mediation Board governed part of the process of unionization as 
described in the following paragraph: 
 
                                                 
125 Note that a zero (0) under the column titled “No. of Employees Represented” means that this 
employee class was approached by the union, but voted it down. 
126 The flight attendants union continued their success in combating union presence by their votes in 
2002. 
127 On December 9, 1997, the National Mediation Board (NMB) dismissed an application filed by the 
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) to represent Delta's approximately 10,000 “Fleet Service” 
employees.  
128 The 107 pilot ground training instructors would join the union in 1999. 
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Delta’s relations with labor unions in the United States are governed by the Railway 
Labor Act. Under the Railway Labor Act, a labor union seeking to represent a craft or 
class of employees is required to file with the National Mediation Board (“NMB”) an 
application alleging a representation dispute, along with authorization cards signed by at 
least 35% of the employees in that craft or class. The NMB then investigates the dispute 
and, if it finds the labor union has obtained a sufficient number of authorization cards, 
will conduct an election to determine whether to certify the labor union as the collective 
bargaining representative of that craft or class. Under the NMB’s usual rules, a labor 
union will be certified as the representative of the employees in a craft or class only if 
more than 50% of those employees vote for union representation (Delta Air Lines, 2001). 
The Association of Flight Attendants, CWA (AFA-CWA) began a campaign to 
unionize Delta's flight attendants in 1997, which included opening an association office 
near Delta headquarters in 1998. According to the NMB, around 5,600 Delta flight 
attendants, or 29 percent, voted to join the union in 2002, which again did not allow 
union presence.  
“Delta deeply appreciates the confidence implicit in these election results, which reaffirm 
the strong relationship between our company and our employees,” says Leo Mullin, 
Delta's chairman and CEO (Woods, 2002). 
Like the pilots, Delta's flight attendants were highly paid relative to their counterparts at 
other carriers; flight attendants earned incomes that ranged from $20,000 to $60,000 
annually. 
In 1997, the Transport Workers Union had also failed to gain acceptance by the 
required 35% of Delta ground training personnel. However, after continuing to pursue the 
goal of representation for this Delta group, they were finally successful in 1999. 
In October 1999, the National Mediation Board certified the election of the Transport 
Workers Union to represent Delta's 107 pilot ground training instructors (Delta Air Lines, 
1999) 
Note that no other business area at Delta besides Operations had a unionized employee 
group.  
Another aspect of the Operations culture was the military training of many of its 
personnel. Because of the presence of pilots and other influential organization members 
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who had military experience, military doctrine likely influenced employee performance 
in Operations. Historically, many Delta pilots, mechanics, radio specialists, and ground 
operations employees had military experience.  
The culture in the maintenance division had evolved appreciably over time. The 
specialized technicians who serviced and repaired sophisticated aircraft had begun as 
generalists who were the whole source of knowledge about a plane. All they needed were 
the wrenches and other mechanical instruments that fit the job. Now with data downlink 
capability, computerized cockpits and data recording instrumentation, a mechanic can 
know what to repair before the plane lands. In addition, the mechanic must also be 
increasingly specialized and knowledgeable about the supporting computer-based 
application systems. 
… “To me,” said Delta’s technical chief [Ray Valeika, Sr. VP - Technical Operations], 
“it’s a fairly vivid example of how the world of maintenance is changing.” In a systems 
sense, this business has “become much more institutionalized.” …Indeed, it’s this 
institutionalization of the field that’s led to the unprecedented safety and reliability 
numbers the industry now enjoys -- a record predicated not on the old idea of hard limits 
for parts and components, but on a scientific understanding of the architecture of 
maintenance systems as a whole (Chandler, 2003). 
Regulative environment 
Government agencies 
The activities of the Operations divisions were of considerable interest to 
regulative organizations such as the FAA and others (e.g., EPA, OSHA). Many of the 
regulations imposed by these agencies had a positive effect on Delta, as well as on the 
flying public that they were designed to serve. Standards for maintenance, aircraft 
operating procedures and avionics equipment across the air transportation industry 
offered the opportunity to develop a resource base that had sustained a safe system for 
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aircraft operation. Because of the extensive rules disseminated by the FAA especially, it 
was predicted that the Y2K decisions in Operations would have been heavily influenced 
by FAA requirements.  
As an example of the influence of FAA rules in the IFS division, Delta's Boeing 
737-800 aircraft had an empty area in the rear cabin where seats are normally located. 
Since FAA rules mandated one flight attendant for every 50 seats, not installing seats in 
this area limited aircraft capacity to 150 seats, thereby optimizing the number of flight 
attendants on the aircraft. 
Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the FAA had imposed 
a number of rules in the Technical Operations division related to inspection and 
maintenance of aircraft. The EPA had the authority to regulate aircraft emissions; 
therefore, the engines on Delta's aircraft had to comply with applicable EPA standards. 
The FAA mandated that carriers assume responsibility for an aircraft's airworthiness; 
and, this rule applied even if the carrier did not perform its own maintenance (Moorman, 
2004). In addition, the FAA required that all airlines document all maintenance services, 
which included tracking every part of a plane and every change made to a plane. In the 
interest of safety, the FAA required that airlines keep maintenance records for the service 
life of the aircraft and, that the records be accessible for immediate FAA review. 
According to FAA rules, if a plane were sold, all records compiled by the seller and any 
prior owners had to be provided to the buyer. Delta had used software for a number of 
years to document aircraft repair histories and to manage its parts inventory. However, 
Delta had led “the list of airlines fined by the FAA for maintenance violations, accruing 
more than $2 million in penalties from 1986 to 1994” (Light & Tilsner, 1994). It was not 
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clear whether this was a failure in Delta’s IT systems, a failure among system users 
(mechanics), or if other issues contributed to Delta’s poor maintenance record with the 
FAA. 
For several years, growing numbers of substandard or bogus parts had been found 
in commercial aircraft. In one instance, an engine that was overhauled by a repair station 
in Turkey lacked FAA approval when it was sold to ValuJet. Many carriers attempting to 
ward against such circumstances had increased the use of Parts Manufactured Approval 
(PMA) parts, which were certified by the FAA [under CFR Section 21.303].  
While original expectations were that the numerous restrictions imposed by FAA 
and other agencies would affect Delta’s Y2K decisions, it turned out that the FAA had its 
own Y2K challenges and thus the relationship between the FAA and airline carriers such 
as Delta was one of cooperation rather than coercion in Y2K activities. Appendix F 
provides a brief overview of the FAA Y2K project.  
Industry relationships 
Watts must keep abreast of trends such as increased systems integration. Here he warns 
that in addition to being integrated, “we also need to make sure these systems are 
interoperable, meaning that if we fly in Europe, we don’t have to have different 
equipment in Europe than we have in the U.S.” (Watts, quoted in Jensen, 2000).129  
A number of air transportation organizations helped to orchestrate Y2K 
compliance for the industry. These organizations were the same ones that had been 
instrumental in providing umbrella regulative services since the inception of the industry, 
i.e., IATA, ATA, and ICAO. A brief example, which related to air traffic control (ATC), 
gives a sense of the depth of such organizations’ involvement in the Y2K crisis:  
 
                                                 
129 Capt. Bill Watts, Delta’s Director of Flight Operations and Technical Support. 
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If the Y2K problem resulted in a complete collapse of ground-based ATC while an 
aircraft was flying, pilots were expected to revert to a “do it yourself” ATC system 
(Smart, 1999). In-flight Broadcast Procedure (IFBP)—a part of the ICAO Y2K regional 
contingency plans—was to be the primary method used to prevent midair collisions. 
Using this procedure, pilots would broadcast their flight's crossing times and altitudes on 
a common radio frequency. Other aircraft would then listen for these broadcasts and 
minimize potential conflicts by changing their altitude to avoid the other aircraft. As a 
last resort in the event of the failure of both ATC and IFBP, an on-board Airborne 
Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), an electronic means for detecting other aircraft, 
would be used to avoid midair collisions. However, this option was not reliable because 
in order to detect a potential collision, ACAS required that the threat aircraft be equipped 
with an ICAO-compliant altitude reporting radar transponder; and, as of 1999, there was 
no mandatory requirement for aircraft to carry this equipment.  
The “trust arrangement” that was enabled by the industry suppliers enabled 
efficient Y2K compliance activities for Delta. Boeing and aircraft parts manufacturers 
were critical. 
Response assessment 
Walter Taylor, Delta's managing director of MRO process and technology, says the 
system not only will make the maintenance operation the envy of the industry but will let 
the airline turn the operation into a profit center by taking in repair and maintenance work 
for other carriers (Konicki, 2002). 
… [With our SAP project] we are developing a core asset at Delta Airlines …. It is 
absolutely an asset just like one of our aircraft. When we buy an aircraft we make a 
commitment that we are going to support it. … We have maintenance programs to make 
sure that asset becomes more efficient and effective as we go. An implementation such as 
SAP should be no different. (Taylor, quoted in Donoghue, 2002). 
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Every aspect of the Y2K solution in the Operations business area shows evidence 
of rational decision making, with the exception of Tech Ops’ choice to lease SAP. 
Considering the time and cost to implement, as well as the potential consequences if 
something did not perform as predicted, the SAP decision is questionable. SAP was a 
complex ERP system. ERP projects are notorious for taking a long time and a lot of 
money, and sometimes have completely fallen apart. Moreover, the cost and time for 
training to use SAP following installation has often been far greater than anticipated; and 
in this case, any mistakes would affect not only Tech Ops, but the finance function as 
well.  
On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that a single, enterprise-wide 
computer system is an improvement in efficiency—easier to maintain, and less costly, 
than an assortment of antiquated systems isolated in different areas of the business. In 
addition, with the new architecture and common databases already in place, connecting 
Tech Ops information to it via SAP could provide more reliable demand forecasts for 
aircraft parts and more efficient and reliable asset management. Furthermore, because all 
were accessing the same data, the company could reduce complexity, reduce inventory, 
and decrease the cost of having too many parts on hand. In fact, one informant described 
his experience in observing the Tech Ops inventory prior to Y2K as astonishing. 
Millions of dollars of aircraft parts were just lying around in the shop areas, with no one 
really knowing what was there. 
Another industry source said,  
The cost of having planes idle during unplanned maintenance is around $23,000 per hour, 
... And the cost of maintenance is roughly 12% of an airline's total operating expenses. “If 
[they] can't predict or guarantee that an aircraft is going to be available, then that starts to 
affect scheduling, availability and utilization” (Burkett, quoted in Brown, 2003, p. 32). 
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The airline said it specifically chose Xelus for inventory management because it has 
aviation-specific features that other vendors did not offer. Xelus was performing well to 
decrease inventory, and decrease associated costs. Therefore, it was easy to understand 
how the consideration for new inventory software came about.  
However, a number of factors had the potential to affect solution choices both 
during the Year 2000 Program and after it ended. The time constraint of year 2000 was a 
delimiter for immediate action. The time and resources constraint of Y2K meant a delay 
in dealing with systems installation, similar to the issue of the crew scheduling system 
described earlier. Therefore, resources were spent for code remediation and other stopgap 
measures that might have been eliminated without the other demands. Then, Tech Ops 
initially planned to go live with three of SAP's software modules in 2001, but postponed 
the implementation until 2002 because of 9/11. Along with Delta’s interest in 
management efficiency, recall that systems development in Tech Ops was driven by 
institutional requirements. IT systems supported the massive documentation and parts 
management activities that were required under FAA mandate. However, there was 
inadequate information related to the SAP solution. 
Some had believed that ERP systems were mandatory for managing the 
maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) supply chain. Maintenance software systems 
had covered a range of activities from automated planning and scheduling to execution, 
tracking, and configuration management. In some cases, a solution had directly linked 
management to the details of activities in line and heavy maintenance and component 
shops (Moorman, 2004). ERP-like systems had been evolving for decades having been 
installed in manufacturing environments in the 1960s. However, companies usually 
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associated with supply-chain software, i2 Technologies and Manugistics, were bypassed 
because most of the same functionality became available from ERP vendors J.D. 
Edwards, Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP. The ERP vendors could provide improved 
capabilities in supply-chain technology: integration and collaboration. The MRO function 
of Tech Ops was very much like a “manufacturing” environment, where operating 
efficiency related to the availability of parts and an effective process for repairing 
aircraft. One can envision Fordism principles and Just-in time concepts applying in this 
environment. However, Delta’s Rieder added that  
matters can get complicated when vendors try to apply IT products that are more 
appropriate for the manufacturing sector to the aviation MRO business.  
Unlike manufacturing, which is based on predictable processes, the MRO business is 
very dynamic, so the challenge is to use the IT system to manage information that is 
constantly changing in the most efficient manner. We have often found that there is a lack 
of understanding of the MRO business on the part of the software vendors, which causes 
implementation problems (Rieder, quoted in Seidenman & Spanovich, 2004).130 
In fact, the SAP software actually began as a tool for managing the finance 
function. Did it have other issues related to a possible misfit as well? SAP was being used 
by other companies to cut costs and to streamline MRO as well as to replace outdated and 
costly legacy systems. However, this was often a difficult thing to do. Other air carriers 
had tried to automate their maintenance processes with ERP-like systems and had 
encountered tremendous difficulties. Nevertheless, Taylor, who oversaw the Tech Ops’ 
SAP installation after year 2000, was convinced that the technology was sound. 
The problem was not with the technology. The systems are proven but hard to implement. 
Software for any purpose is only as good as the leadership, flexibility of the workforce 
and [its] implementation (Taylor, quoted in Moorman, 2004). 
 
                                                 
130 Udo Rieder was Delta’s Vice President - Engineering and Planning, Technical Operations in 2004. 
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Some had credited acceptance by the workforce as the major determinant for the 
overall success of a system. That means if the mechanics on the shop floor failed to 
interact with the ERP system, then it would be ineffective regardless of the quality of the 
system itself.  
At Delta, we are replacing legacy systems that are as much as 25 years old and asking 
people to adapt to the new systems. Often, this involves a difficult cultural change, 
because the users have learned to use the old systems in ways that are more efficient for 
them. (Rieder, quoted in Seidenman & Spanovich, 2004).  
Others had suggested that the quality of the legacy maintenance data determined its 
value. Improvements in data standards and practices alone could be significant, but at 
what cost to get to that point?  
Improvements in supply chain management could be huge. With the new systems, 
Delta planned to continue to service its own aircraft with greater efficiency, but also to 
bring in more profits through repairing the aircraft of others. Tech Ops tripled its income 
from repairing other aircraft between 1999 and 2002.  
The SAP software implementation began late in 2002, and the comments from 
Rieder in 2004. With the re-engineering of processes required, the lack of confirmed 
evidence of fit of the software to the Tech Ops activities, the complete commitment and 
focus on the installation for years without knowing if it would work, the tremendous 
expense, etc. the decision was judged as institutional. 
Sub-case 2 summary 
The Operations area performed the main core functions of the airline. The 
activities of the Operations area were complex, and the IT systems that supported them 
were even more so. Consequently, the divisions in this business area were numerous and 
many were highly specialized and critical. The analysis of this business area highlighted 
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the dependency and often-negative influence of the pilots’ union, and Delta’s dependency 
on favorable economic conditions to support its financial condition. In contrast to these 
uncertainties, the external environment of the air transportation industry offered support 
in effecting the successful Y2K solution of Operations.  
Table 42, Table 43, and Table 43 summarize the information from this sub-case. 
Table 42: Y2K solution by division in Operations 
OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
Flight assignment Coldstart Developed with Ilog 
Flight-tracking Total Dispatch Delta Technology 
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 
Supply-chain mySAP SAP 
Supply-chain management mySAP Business Suite SAP 
Parts management Xelus Plan, Xelus Extend Xelus 
Technical documentation  Creative Concepts (Gen’l Dynamics subsidiary) 
IN-FLIGHT SERVICE 




Table 43: Summary metrics in Operations 
NO. OF EMPLOYEES  
OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER 350 (1%) 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS 8,600 (14%) 
IN-FLIGHT SERVICE 18,000+ (29%) 
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 10,000+ (16%) 
OTHERS n/a 
TOTAL OPERATIONS EMPLOYEES (% total) ~40, 000 (~60%) 
NO. OF SUBDIVISIONS  
OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER 1 (.4%) 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS 35 (14%) 
IN-FLIGHT SERVICE 18 (7.3%) 
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 191 (77%) 
OTHERS n/a 
TOTAL SUBDIVISIONS (% total) 248 (100%) 
NATURE OF THE WORK Unpredictable, complex 
NO. OF LOCATIONS 180 airports plus Atlanta 
TECHNOLOGY PROFILES 1997 2003 
Application systems 216 240 
# High/Med/Low critical systems 86/59/71 105/57/78 
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# Languages 31  
# LOC (millions) 25  
# Delta Technology systems 216 240 
# Waivered systems 46  
# COTS systems 32  
# Desktop units 3,346 3,346 
# Desktop models, original 6  
# Desktop models, solution 3  
Intro computer processing date Actual date unknown, but prior to 1989 








Flight crew mgmt 
Corporate safety 
ENVIRONMENT  
GOVERNMENT FAA, OSHA, EPA, NWS, Customs, DOT, etc 
CULTURAL Union (ALPA, PCF-CA) 
INDUSTRY IATA, ATA, ICAO, ACH, ARINC, SITA, etc. 
 
Table 44: Summary of environmental factors in Operations 
FACTORS INSTANCE 
Public image 
Successful installation of SAP the “envy of the 
industry” 
Belief systems 
Delta family, union, military mentality, “trust 
arrangements” 
Existing practices and routines 
Shop workers do not need improved software to 
perform their jobs well, that’s for the “geeks” and 
the “suits.” 
Pilots work best with checklists. 
Industry relationships Boeing, other suppliers, ATA, ATA, ICAO 
Regulations Workplace safety, aircraft safety, FAA 
Imitating the solutions of others “The best run companies run SAP.” 
Goals Improve profitability (reduce inventory, costs) 
Cost management 
Deferring software project to after Y2K, then 
deferring installation until after 9/11 effects are 
lessened 
 
Given the Y2K solution in Operations, its context was examined in order to assess 
the rationality or institutionality of the decision as an alternative for solving the Y2K 
problem. The solution was assessed as institutional, even though a number of rational 
influences were noted. Table 45 shows the factors related to the assessment. 
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Table 45: Factors related to the response assessment in Operations 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO Y2K SOLUTION IN OPERATIONS 
Institutional model (Y2K Contingency: Y2K bug) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
Cultural 
 Related to a social fact: perceptions of air 
transportation, information technology, 
information security, safety or other value 
 Cognitive, e.g., military culture 
 Familiar, comfortable, habitual, e.g., family 
culture 
 Related to established relationships, e.g., 
vendors 
1. Conditions in business area and its IT systems: 
 Systems working but without documentation 
 Systems woefully out of date 
 IT employees content with the status quo 
 Habit of avoiding outside consultants 
 
2. Character of business area environment: 
 Inadequate conditions in government agency 
charged with oversight (FAA) 
 
3. Distraction of other business area contingencies: 
 Financial status 
 Economic conditions 
 Competing airlines 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
 Requirements for maintaining 
organizational legitimacy 
 
Mimetic (Following the crowd) 
 Fashionable, popular 
 Recommended by vendors 
 Inadequate information about experiences 
outside organizational boundaries 
(reporting only successes)  
4. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Industry regulations were focused on 
coordination & protecting the competitiveness of 
air transportation, not information security 
 U.S. govt agencies’ systems not Y2K compliant 
 Industry regulations focused on aircraft safety, 
but inadequately trained for understanding 
connection to information security. 
 
5. Character of business area environment: 
 External chaos because of resource limitation 
 Mixed understanding of the risk 
 IT products not available in the marketplace that 
are specifically designed for aircraft 
maintenance supply chain 
Rational-contingency model  
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO A 
RATIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO A RATIONAL 
PROCESS IN IT MANAGEMENT 
Goal orientation 
Actions relating to efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Communications related to mission control 
1. Leadership: 
 Acted on the opportunity to improve operations, 
which made the enterprise more competitive 
 Stayed actively and personally involved in order 
to enable best chance for success. 
 
2. Condition of business area and its IT systems: 
 Process put in place to assure continual 
assessment with respect to condition of systems 
and efficiency of performance 
 
3. Responses to business area contingencies: 
 Management of financial condition (e.g., 
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Table 45 continued 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO RATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
Requirements for maintaining organizational 
effectiveness 
 
Decision-making criteria  
 Based on knowledge of systems 
o Y2K compliance 
o Fit with functional area 




4. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Bounding framework of concern by govt/industry 
rules wherein the condition of aircraft is 
recognized as vital to safety and national 
security 
 
6. Organizational leadership: 
 Knowledgeable about the value of information 
accuracy and availability 
 Understood the contribution of IT to the 
functioning of the organization 
 Employed personnel with high levels of skills 
 Adequately responded to security contingencies 
 
6. Character of business area environment: 
 Personnel resources were adequately aligned 
with requirements 
 IT products to serve the needs in Tech Ops were 
not available in the marketplace, therefore, not 
supportive of Tech Ops activities. 
 
As the above information indicates, there were both institutional and rational 
influences that weighed into the Operations decisions. The rationality of the decision-
making is obvious with respect to the need for greater efficiency in the Tech Ops 
activities, and the cost savings that could result from a better system than they had. 
However, the complexity that had developed in the division that came along with the 
accumulation of features in modern aircraft meant would not be a quick fix to solve the 
problem. The fact that they had to find bits and pieces of the solution from multiple 
vendors was evidence of the effort, and the information gathering, required just to do the 
research and locate systems that could work. Undoubtedly, the desire to take advantage 
of the DNS architecture along with the complexity of the problem dictated a COTS 
solution. The cost savings were needed immediately and it would take years to develop 
such systems in-house, which might have been inferior in the end to those that were 
evolving in the commercial market.  
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It seems like a strong possibility that Taylor’s recent success with Y2K, coupled 
with his “get it done” attitude (military mentality) and self-confidence, may have made 
the solution seem feasible. Indeed, the airline might have been better served in the short 
term to hire a team of IT specialists to work full-time in Tech Ops to make better use of 
what they already had. That would have given the ERP vendors time to develop specific 
solutions for an airline technical operations environment. One can observe that Delta’s 
history includes a number of “firsts,” and that Delta likely had become accustomed to 
being an early adopter of technology. In this case, “early” carried far too much risk. 
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Sub-case 3: Business Support 
Delta has had extensive turnover at the top in recent months as it struggles to regain its 
financial footing, and analysts and investors said the role of the CFO there is vital 
(Reuters News Service, 2004). 
Delta Air Lines has undertaken aggressive IT projects which power the airline from 
almost every angle. In addition to going live with a massive database and infrastructure 
for sharing real-time information that spans a large part of the Delta enterprise, the 
airline’s finance function and MRO have implemented SAP over the past two years and 
continue to roll out new releases. (Murray, 2002, p. 1).  
Y2K solution 
The Finance division replaced almost all of their systems, but not until after year 
2000. Delta implemented two modules from software maker SAP, which connected users 
via the DNS across the supply chain, financial reporting, and human-resources functions. 
The SAP software provided access to various data and processes that changed the way 
the business was run. For example, in the early to mid-1990s, various Delta managers 
were authorized to write checks. SAP financial software centralizes check-writing. On 
Target Technologies then redesigned an existing application to analyze Delta’s SAP data 
in a timelier fashion. The new system was able to access daily information from SAP as 
well as from many other concurrently online systems, to produce accurate consolidations 
of business intelligence data, providing financial reporting, forecasting and planning 
capability. However, one of the Delta employees interviewed stated that Y2K repairs had 
created information security problems for Business Support. Table 46 shows the new 
systems. 
Table 46: Y2K solution in Business Support 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
Function System Vendor 
Financial management mySAP, Business Suite SAP 
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Table 46 continued 
Business analytics (financial 
reporting, forecasting, and 
planning functionality) 
Essbase, Enterprise Miner, Brio Hyperion, SAS, Brio 
Supply-chain management mySAP Business Suite SAP 
 
Functional and resource overview 
The Business Support area was charged with hiring the workers, paying the taxes, 
accounting for revenue and expenditures, and with purchasing, planning, and budgeting 
for future operations. These functions are common to most commercial enterprises; 
therefore, the regulative environment of the Business Support area of Delta had evolved 
over time and encompassed similar functions in all U.S. enterprises. In particular, the 
finance and accounting service functions had been a core part of Delta’s profit making 
enterprise over the 75 years of its existence, and the IT systems had evolved along with 
the accounting profession and their associated rules. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
at Delta was responsible for IT. 
In many companies responsibility for implementing and maintaining electronic data 
processing equipment remained under the auspices of the accounting or finance 
department because they were the earliest users of the new technology (Gale, 1968, p. 46; 
Gallagher, 1961, p. 28). 
Table 47 shows the complexity and scope of Business Support activities as 
evidenced by 127 department numbers. The numbers of Business Support locations could 
not be determined, but a large part of its operation took place at Delta’s Atlanta 
headquarters.  
Table 47: No. of divisions and no. of locations in Business Support 
DIVISION PDNS NO. OF LOCATIONS 
Government, Public and Community Affairs  3  
Investor Relations 1  
Corp Communications 1  
Capital Markets, Treasury 2  
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Table 47 continued 
Financial Analysis, Financial Planning, Financial Reporting 3  
Finance Business Support – Other, Printing & Mailing Svcs 2  
Accounting, Corporate Tax 2  
Corporate Security 1  
Legal 1  
HR   
Purchasing   
Properties & Facilities 1  
Museum 1  
Internal Audit (outsourced), Risk Management 2  
Delta Staffing Services, changed to DGS (Delta Global Services) 1  
Executive Support 1  
   
TOTAL 127 Atlanta +  
 
Table 48 provides further description of this business area in the activities in divisions 
and the application systems that supported them. 
Table 48: Functional divisions and systems in Business Support 
DIVISION SUBDIVISION APPLICATION SYSTEMS 
Financial management 
 Accounting Payroll;  
Accounts payable;  
Accounts receivable;  
General ledger maintenance; 
Fixed asset accounting 
 Financial Analysis Capital budgeting models; ROI models 
 Financial Planning Annual budgeting 
 Financial Reporting Preparation of financial statements for 
management, SEC, annual reports, internal 
and external auditors 
 Internal Audit sampling models 
 Treasury Cash management; similar to capital 
markets; short term investments tracking 
 Capital Markets Tracking bond prices/yields; bank loans 
 Corporate Planning  
 Corporate Tax Tax preparation 
 Risk Management Insurance claims; policy data bases; 
Human resource management 
 Personnel General employee database mgmt; 
performance evaluations; surveys of 
managers satisfaction with employees 
 Delta Staffing Services Résumé management; job postings; 
performance evaluations of temps; surveys' 
of managers satisfaction with temps; 
Legal 
  Case databases, internal lawyer scheduling; 
databases regarding communication with 
outside counsel, contracts and laws regarding 
partnerships, international, etc. 
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Table 48 continued 
External affairs 
 Gov/Public Affairs Mgmt of databases of key officials by gov’t 
entity; key pending legislation; text from 
positions taken by supporters and opponents; 
text documenting key meetings and 
conversations; scheduled meetings 
 Community Affairs Managing databases of employee 
participation on civic boards and volunteer 
hours donated to the community; target 
organizations to become close to because of 
key customer involvement with those 
organizations; scheduled events for the 




Managing databases of media services and 
key reporters; text of news releases; possibly 
similar use of governmental affairs for 
emergency contact and similar to investor 
relations to notify shareholders of key info 
 Investor Relations Management of shareholder database; 
communication records with shareholders; 




 Properties & Facilities Managing asset inventory; maintenance 
records; depreciation calculations to tie into 
the financial systems; asset records 
 Corporate Security Staffing schedules for security officers; 
incident reports; employee databases similar 
to HR 
 Museum Inventory of contents; staffing schedules 
Business services 
 Purchasing Arranges for purchases for all business areas, 
including negotiating agreements, contracts, 
and warranties. 
 Printing & Mailing 
Services 
Graphics arts software; data bases; postage 
 
The following personnel shown in Table 49 had leadership responsibilities in the 
Business Support area for the Year 2000 Program.  
Table 49: Year 2000 Program team in Business Support 
DELTA DELTA TECHNOLOGY 
Delta Exec Sponsor: R. Coleman, Exec VP - HR 
(‘97) 
 
Delta Exec Sponsor: W. Jenson, Sr VP – CFO (’98) Delta Technology VP: D. Pittman 
  
IT systems not maintained by Delta Technology IT systems maintained by Delta Technology 
 Y2K PD: Stephanie Hill 
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The top decision-maker on the Business Support Year 2000 Team changed a number of 
times over the study period. The first Executive Sponsor was Delta’s executive in charge 
of Human Resources (HR), but by 1998, the responsibility had been reassigned to the 
new CFO, Warren Jenson. Delta had four CFOs in four years. Jenson had replaced Tom 
Roeck, a Delta veteran, who left in 1997 when Mullin came aboard as new CEO, which 
was not an unusual happening. Then two CFOs (Warren Jenson, and after him, Ed West) 
left Delta to work for dot-coms. The fourth CFO was Michele Burns, who joined Delta in 
1999 and became CFO in 2000. Burns resigned in April 2004, along with Mullin and a 
number of other management-level employees—the year before Delta declared 
bankruptcy. She was the third to leave in 2004, following the departures of Fred Reid 
(President and COO) and Robert Coleman (Exec VP-HR) (Reuters News Service, 2004). 
Table 50 is a summary of metrics obtained when Delta Technology assessed the 
Business Support systems. 
Table 50: Assessment metrics for systems in Business Support 
NO. OF SYSTEMS 









19 53 107 16 12 17 ~600 
 
Table 51 lists the languages, the LOC for each language, the numbers of date 
fields that existed within programming code by language, and the number of date fields 
affected. These assessments provided evidence of both the criticality and the complexity 
of the systems, and therefore both the importance and the difficulty of making changes to 
the systems.  
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Table 51: Programming languages and date fields for systems in Business Support 





Access 9,100   0.00% 
Assembler 199,115 909  0.46% 
Attachmate 85,435   0.00% 
C 1,992,141   0.00% 
COBOL 3,425,350 80,087 18,149 0.53% 
Clipper 40,311   0.00% 
Exec 1,174 31  2.64% 
Fortran 73   0.00% 
Integra 248,136   0.00% 
Natural 319,128 36,935  11.57% 
Not specified 341,918   0.00% 
ReportBuilder 126,771 17,373  13.70% 
SAS 154,164 1,665  1.08% 
SQL 160,953   0.00% 
TGS 367,577 14,823  4.03% 
Visual Basic 230   0.00% 
 
Table 52 shows the systems that received a waiver, i.e., systems that required no 
remediation or replacement. 
Table 52: Waivered systems in Business Support 
   
Pass Bureau - Waiver 2012 Access 
Project Planning Tool 2042 Pro-C 
Business Support Waiver - New Hire Database 2044 Waivered: System not in use 
TQPants 2052 SQL 
TQPants 2052 Visual Basic 
Project Tracking System 2054 Access 
Business Support Waiver - New Hires Information System - 
Early Warning System 
2056 Access 
Corporate Records Contact Tracking System 5012 Clipper/Dbase 
A&CA Contact Viewing System 5013 Clipper/Dbase 
A&CA Contact Tracking System 5014 Clipper/Dbase 
FACILITIES TRACKING INFORMATION SYSTEM 5015 Clipper/Dbase 
Playtypus 8040 Not specified 
Waiver Employment Verification System 8047 SAS 
Personnel Data Warehouse 8087 Access 
Conference Room Scheduler 11001 Clipper/Dbase 
Business Support Waiver - Time Keeping (Paradox)  (Delta) 11026 COTS-Not specified 
Business Support Waiver - International Bank Reconcile 
(Delta) 
11032 Not specified 
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Institutional context 
Cultural character 
While the Business Support area was not connected to the military culture, the 
family culture was strongly related to this area, since the benefits that came from 
seniority were accounted for in this division. There was also a strong association with 
information technology, since IT systems were readily available for assisting with the 
activities in this area long before other specialty areas. The Finance area had been called 
the “nerve center” of the organization since the profit and loss accounting would relate to 
organizational survival. There was tension in the family in this area at Delta immediately 
prior to the executive changes of 1997. 
Of all the CFOs he has known at Delta, “I put Tom at the top,” says Jesse Hill Jr., 
chairman of the audit committee and now Delta's senior director. “He has done an 
outstanding job,” especially in reducing debt and formulating an aggressive cost structure 
to fight the competitive war with Southwest Airlines Co. and other lower-cost carriers. 
“The finance department has to be the nerve center” for such strategies, says Hill, a 
retired life insurance executive. “At every meeting, the principal report, other than the 
comments of the CEO, comes from Tom Roeck; he's the one we focus on.” 
Interviews with recently departed Delta managers, including some who worked in 
finance, paint a picture of a headquarters where Roeck was often excluded from Allen's 
inner circle. As a result, Roeck sometimes found himself treated badly by other top-level 
executives closer to Allen; finance department members formed mixed allegiances; and 
the role of finance at the airline suffered (Harris, 1997). 
Regulative environment 
Government agencies 
The government regulators that were most concerned with Business Support were 
the SEC, the IRS, the DOT, and DOJ. The company followed generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). Delta's unconsolidated operating revenue and operating 
income by geographic region were reported to the DOT (which differed from operating 
 
   234
revenue and operating income (loss) reported under GAAP). Performance results for 
Delta’s transatlantic operations were based on allocations in accordance with 
requirements of the DOT. Delta’s legal division took its direction from regulations 
related to the air transportation industry but also the Department of Justice (DOJ).  
Industry relationships 
The industry regulators that were most concerned with Business Support were the 
independent auditors, and the professional bodies associated with the accounting, legal 
and justice systems. For example, Arthur Andersen & Co served as independent auditors 
for Delta until 2002, thereafter, Deloitte & Touche. Various rules associated with the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) applied to their activities, which were 
required under the rules of the SEC. The AICPA and the American Bar Association 
(ABA) were interpreters of IRS regulations and other business rules. These and other 
professional associations related to the Business Support divisions. The Purchasing group 
handled contracts with all of the contractors/suppliers for Cargo. (Delta archive, 
Defnote1.doc). Each City Ticket Office (CTO) had agreements with local banks. 
Table 53: Year 2000 Program snapshots – Business Support 






Around 500 people (AC & DL) performed a complete 
redesign and implementation of the processes and IT 
systems in the Finance area. 
Nov/1997 CFO retired Tom Roeck 
Roeck was highly regarded by Delta’s Board. Had been at 
Delta for 8 years. Arrival of CEO Mullin implicated in his 
departure. 
 CFO Warren Jensen 
Jensen left following unfortunate seat assignment for his 
family that meant deplaning first class customers. 
 CFO Ed West Resigned 
Aug/2000 CFO Michele Burns 
Burns was hired in Jan 1999 from AA&Co tax dept. 
Departure to Mirant came when execs were being asked to 
give up their executive salaries and other perks. 
May/2004 New CFO 
Michael 
Palumbo 
Palumbo was a Grinstein colleague at Western Airlines. 
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Response assessment 
Within the context and conditions of Business Support, the Y2K solution decision 
is rational. Business Support, specifically the finance function, had re-engineered 
processes over a six year period in anticipation of the DNS architecture becoming 
available. Y2K delayed them in doing this. The SAP installation was the opportunity to 
integrate the processes into the IT systems in a more efficient manner. However, all of 
these processes were based on conformance with various rules for accounting and 
reporting of organization activities. The regulative processes that govern these activities 
are viewed differently depending on a rational or institutional perspective. For example, 
from a rational perspective an organization assesses tax regulations with respect to their 
consequences to profitability. From an institutional perspective, such regulations are a 
product of a values-oriented social system, where a larger societal goal may not respect 
the consequences to an individual organization. Therefore, tax consulting is more than 
just compliance reporting. It is lawyers and accountants trying to interpret tax regulations 
for the benefit of their clients. Either a more aggressive or a more conservative 
interpretation can emerge that is different from what the lawmakers intended. 
However, the institutional mechanisms that supported the SAP installation had 
other dimensions, the marketplace competition, increased complexity of IT systems that 
accommodated an increasingly complex regulative environment, and the increased 
complexity of Delta’s partnership activities. Therefore, an institutional perspective 
focuses on the popularity and visibility of SAP. This product had become the dominant 
COTS solution for the finance organizations of many large companies. The finance 
functions were institutionalized across enterprises regardless of the particular business 
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activities of an organization. The functionality of the SAP suite of financial applications 
were based on a long history of institutional “best practices,” as dictated by FASB 
reporting and commonly accepted internal control procedures. This made the SAP 
selection for the finance area a rational choice when compared to an in-house custom 
development approach. The rational choice was made within an environment of 
institutional practices. The rationality is tied to its increased efficiency and effectiveness 
as a tool for reducing complexity in accounting for the operations of a very complex 
organization. In addition, Delta demonstrated rational cost management by adapting the 
overhaul to fit their financial condition. Delta deferred projects that would take more than 
a year to pay off (like new HR systems). 
Sub-case 3 summary 
The Business Support area was the site for human resource functions, tax 
preparation and payment, accounting for revenue and expenditures, and with purchasing, 
planning, and budgeting for future operations. 
Table 54 and Table 55 summarize the Y2K solution, and the environmental 
conditions in the Business Support area, respectively. 
Table 54: Y2K Solution in Business Support 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
Function System Vendor 
Financial management mySAP, Business Suite SAP 
Business analytics Essbase, Enterprise Miner, Brio Hyperion, SAS, Brio 
Supply-chain management mySAP Business Suite SAP 
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Table 55: Summary metrics in Business Support 
TOTAL BUSINESS SUPPORT EMPLOYEES (% total) 3,500 (%) 
TOTAL SUBDIVISIONS (% total) 127 (%) 
NATURE OF WORK Routine 
LOCATIONS Atlanta 
TECHNOLOGY PROFILES 1997 2003 
Application systems 179 218 
# High/Med/Low critical systems 19/53/107 20/56/142 
# Languages 16  
# LOC 12  
# Delta Technology systems   
# Waivered systems 17  
# COTS systems 111  
# Desktop units 585  
# Desktop models, original 51  
# Desktop models, solution 2  












GOVERNMENT SEC, OSHA, IRS, DOT, DOJ 
CULTURAL Non-union 
INDUSTRY ABA, AICPA, FASB, local banks 
 
Table 56: Summary of environmental factors in Business Support 
FACTORS INSTANCE 
Public image “The best run companies use SAP” 
Belief systems Business ethics, strength of the regulatory system 
Existing practices and routines 
Highly supported by IT systems, comfortable with 
standard suites of business applications 
Industry relationships  
Regulations Tax, HR, Accounting, Securities: IRS, FASB, SEC 
Mimesis “Airport of the Future,” SAP 
Goals Improve centralized processes for accounting 
Cost management Reduce complexity of operations 
 
The Y2K solution in Business Support was examined in light of its context in 
order to assess its rationality or institutionality as an alternative for solving the Y2K 
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problem. Given the conditions of the Business Support systems and other requirements, 
the solution was considered rational. Table 57 shows the factors related to the 
assessment. 
Table 57: Factors related to the response assessment in Business Support 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO Y2K SOLUTION IN AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE  
Institutional model (Y2K Contingency: Y2K bug) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
Cultural 
 Related to a social fact: perceptions of air 
transportation, information technology, 
information security, safety or other value 
 Cognitive, e.g., military culture 
 Familiar, comfortable, habitual, e.g., family 
culture 
 Related to established relationships, e.g., 
vendors 
6. Conditions in business area and its IT systems: 
 Systems not entirely integrated across business 
areas 
 IT employees familiar with IT systems 
 Familiar with the presence of consultants 
7. Character of business area environment: 
 Most advanced in mechanisms because of 
history 
8. Distraction of other business area contingencies: 
 Financial status 
 Economic conditions 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
 Requirements for maintaining 
organizational legitimacy 
 
Mimetic (Following the crowd) 
 Fashionable, popular 
 Recommended by vendors 
 Inadequate information about experiences 
outside organizational boundaries 
(reporting only successes)  
9. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Industry regulations were focused on protecting 
the investor and the regulators 
 U.S. govt agencies’ systems not Y2K compliant 
 Industry regulations focused on passenger 
screening after 9/11, but inadequate solutions. 
 Industry regulations linked to intelligence 
gathering—a public concern strongly related to 
privacy, but not linked to information security 
10. Character of business area environment: 
 External chaos because of time limitation 
 Strong understanding of risk, therefore reluctant 
to get involved 
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Table 57 continued 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO Y2K SOLUTION IN AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE  
Rational-contingency model  
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO A 
RATIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO A RATIONAL 
PROCESS IN IT MANAGEMENT 
Goal orientation 
Actions relating to efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Communications related to mission control 
4. Organizational leadership: 
 Acted on the opportunity to improve operations, 
which made the enterprise more competitive 
 Leadership turnover, not actively involved in 
order to insure success with systems 
implementation. 
5. Condition of business area and its IT systems: 
 Process put in place to assure continual 
assessment with respect to condition of systems 
and efficiency of performance 
6. Responses to business area contingencies: 
 Good management of financial condition (e.g., 
delaying Finance systems based on budget 
priorities) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO RATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
Requirements for maintaining organizational 
effectiveness 
 
Decision-making criteria  
 Based on knowledge of systems 
o Y2K compliance 
o Fit with functional area 




7. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Even though limited and late in coming, a 
bounding framework of concern by govt/industry 
rules wherein the condition of IT systems was 
recognized as vital to safety and national 
security 
8. Organizational leadership: 
 Knowledgeable about the value of information 
accuracy and availability 
 Understood the contribution of IT to the 
functioning of the organization 
 Employed personnel with high levels of skills 
 Adequately responded to security contingencies 
7. Character of business area environment: 
 Personnel resources were adequately aligned 
with requirements 
 IT products to serve the needs in Business 
Support were available in the marketplace 
 
The fact that the institutionalized environment of Business Support, principally 
the finance area, has changed little over the years and that computer technology has been 
used to support the function since practically the beginning of electronic computing, the 
market place has developed simultaneously. In fact, the evolution of the ERP systems has 
kept pace with the leading edge of network computing innovation. This is evidenced by 
the product offered by companies, such as SAP. Therefore, the move to the new 
architecture of Delta was supportive of the addition of such a software package in the 
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finance division. The compatibility of the new software with the existing software, even 
though connected with the DNS system, enabled a familiar activity on the part of the 
users and required little change with regard to their routines. 
In sum, the Business Support area is supportive of rational-institutional 
compatibility. They had the most complete information, clear choices among products, 
proven products in the marketplace, and supported the future vision of modernization. 
Thus, it is not surprising that their decision-making regarding Y2K solutions was rational.  
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Sub-case 4: Revenue 
Y2K solution 
Besides the assessment, code remediation and other modernization activities, the 
Revenue business area chose to install new applications for revenue management.  
Table 58: Y2K solution in Revenue 
REVENUE 
Function System Vendor 
Revenue optimization NetWORKS Airline Revenue Optimizer 
Manugistics 
Accenture 
Flight network analysis Planet 
Kiehl Hendrickson 
Group 
Sales automation BaanFrontOffice Baan 
 
The principal additions in the Revenue business area were implementation of a system 
called Planet for analyzing an airline flight network, and a system called NetWORKS for 
optimizing revenue. The Planet System used state-of-the-art technology to forecast the 
market share, revenue and profitability consequences arising from assumed changes in 
airline flight networks, demand conditions, competitive structure, and other market 
dynamics. Kiehl Hendrickson Group (KHG) had previously installed Planet for such 
customers as Trans World Airlines (TWA), Comair, Frontier Airlines, Atlantic Coast 
Airlines, Bombardier Aerospace, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and others 
(“Delta Air Lines installs new route planning system,” 2000). NetWORKS was a product 
from Manugistics131 that calculated seat pricing, using a number of variables that were 
changing continuously. Revenue tied this into the DNS where real-time data was 
available from moment to moment, and using this software, they could automatically 
 
                                                 
131 Manugistics was a software company well-known for its cross-functional business applications. 
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generate pricing options especially for web based seat reservations systems. 
BaanFrontOffice was chosen for sales automation. 
Functional and resource overview 
The Revenue business area comprised the business areas of Delta that performed 
functions related to income production, i.e., marketing and sales. At the beginning of the 
study period, Revenue had over 10,000 employees in sales and distribution, which 
represented over 15% of the Delta organization. The scope and complexity of the 
Revenue business area was indicated by its 62 divisions, which include Alliance 
marketing Consumer Marketing, Delta Express, Europe-Asia, Marketing Administration, 
Marketing Development, Revenue Accounting, and Sales. Information regarding 
numbers of locations was not available. See Table 59. The Revenue Accounting division 
was responsible for accurate and timely accounting and reporting of passenger and 
alliance revenues, receivables, taxes, commissions, and related flight statistics 
information.  
Table 59: Number of divisions and no. of locations in Revenue 
DIVISION PDNS NO. OF LOCATIONS 
Alliance marketing 2  
Consumer marketing   
Delta Express 1  
Europe-Asia   
Marketing Administration 1  
Marketing Development 5  
Market Analysis   
Schedules   
Pricing/Revenue Management   
Marketing Executive 1 Atlanta Campus 
Revenue Accounting 11  
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The following personnel shown in Table 60 had leadership responsibilities in this 
business area for the Year 2000 Program: 
Table 60: Year 2000 Program team in Revenue 
DELTA DELTA TECHNOLOGY 
Delta Exec Sponsor: F. Reid, Exec VP & CMO – 
Revenue (‘98) 
Delta Technology VP: Mark Sohl 
Delta Portfolio Owner: V. Caminiti, Sr VP – Sales & 
Distribution Planning 
 
Delta Portfolio Manager: Larry Beck (5/’98)  
IT systems not maintained by Delta Technology IT systems maintained by Delta Technology 
Over 200 systems (CRS, others) Y2K Team Leader: Steve Cooper (9/’97) 
 Y2K PD: Steve Smith 
 
Results of the first phase, the inventory and assessment actions, are shown in 
Table 61 and Table 62, which indicates the level of complexity that existed in the systems 
in this business area. The inventory identified the systems; the assessment phase 
classified them based on their criticality to the functioning of the Revenue business area.  
Migration planning was the phase where the team confirmed action plans. In the 
code remediation phase, the code that had been previously identified as containing the 
Y2K bug was sent to one of two outside organizations to be cleaned. In the desktop 
renewal phase, desktop units were replaced with the standard models identified by 
particular division. The other data shown in Table 61 are the number of programming 
languages represented, the lines of code (LOC) requiring remediation to eliminate the 
Y2K vulnerability, the number of waivered systems, and the number of desktop units 
assigned to the area. 
 
   244
Table 61: Assessment metrics for systems in Revenue 
NO. OF SYSTEMS 







NO. DESKTOP UNITS 
24 77 1 16 10 33 629 
 
Table 62: Programming languages and date fields for systems in Revenue 





Access 8,000   0.00% 
Assembler 49,509 1,194  2.41% 
C 1,410,831   0.00% 
C++ 838,908   0.00% 
COBOL 2,079,709 45,216 6,969 0.34% 
Delta Term 2,500   0.00% 
Easytrieve 1,003,443   0.00% 
Exec 13,025 267  2.05% 
Fortran 117,064 2,089  1.78% 
LISP (AI) 230,394   0.00% 
Natural 1,570,999 157,523  10.03% 
Not specified 707,478   0.00% 
Rexx 296 6  2.03% 
SAS 701,038 60  0.01% 
SQL 573,177   0.00% 
Visual C++ 45,000   0.00% 
 
Designed by IBM and installed in 1964, Delta's Deltamatic flight reservation 
system was one of the first computer-based systems for airline reservation management 
that performed information processing in real-time.132 This type of processing was 
developed for the U.S. military where “real-time” information was necessary to calculate 
projected trajectories for missiles. Earlier systems had provided fast access to flight 
information but had not been interactive. They could retrieve information quickly, but 
entering the information was a separate action. Before that, reservations still had to be 
recorded by hand and calls placed to airlines to confirm availability. These specialized 
 
                                                 
132 American Airline's SABRE (Semi-Automatic Business-Related Environment) reservation system 
was developed by IBM and implemented in 1961. See Smithsonian National Museum of American History, 
Terminal Interchange from PANAMAC Airlines Reservation System. 
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systems developed into competitive tools for mining passenger information, along with 
the data from flights to use in automated pricing algorithms. 
The Revenue business area chose to install such new applications to improve the 
pricing of airline seats. Accenture assisted in the custom installation. Prior to the DNS 
installation, detailed revenue information had not been available. The actual numbers that 
corresponded to various variables in seat pricing algorithms were not available; therefore, 
statistical values were being used. Reporting was done based on sampling, and 
extrapolations had been used to determine revenue. “Statistically the numbers were good, 
but they did not have the actual values on a flight by flight basis” (J. McMillan, 2006, 
Sep 29, interview by author, Atlanta, GA). Calculations were performed based on 
averaging of values within the constraints of aircraft, route, configuration of class, i.e. 
first class or economy, demand as it materialized toward flight departure date and time. 
The calculations for making revenue projections and pricing models were complex. No 
manual calculations could have substituted for computer-based processing for this 
application. This project began in the ‘99-‘00 timeframe and they were still working on 
this at least until 2004, having all projects shut down and restarting following 9/11.  
In 1999, Delta signed a $9 million, 1,200-user contract with Baan Co. to replace a 
4-year old in-house sales-automation system with BaanFrontOffice software. This 
software allowed Delta’s sales force to mine the company’s customer records and find 
the best and overlooked sales opportunities through integrated data models.  
“The primary purpose of turning to this now is Y2K,” said Mark Sohl, a VP at DT. The 
airline will spend approximately $390m building new revenue-management and sales 
force systems, updating its scheduling system, shoring up its pricing system and installing 
intranet training systems and a boundary-breaking middleware system to track passengers 
and flights (Deck & Stedman, 1999).  
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The in-house system had Y2K issues, so the team chose replacement rather than 
remediation for the old code. Delta’s installation was much larger than the typical Baan 
installation of 300 to 600 end users. 
Institutional context 
Cultural character 
After 1978, the Delta internal organization, as well as Delta’s sectoral environment, 
experienced a number of changes, particularly in marketing, in response to the changes 
brought about by deregulation. Marketing began to play a strategic role in the company 
and in the air transportation industry in general, more so than before. As an example, in 
1981 Delta formed Epsilon Trading Corporation, a computerized marketing subsidiary, to 
coordinate and sell more passenger seats on all Delta flights. In 1982, Delta formed Datas 
Incorporated, another computerized marketing subsidiary. The competitive environment 
created a requirement for computer processing, and even though Delta had been a 
follower, rather than a leader, in this environment, the employees were accustomed to the 
requirement for computer use. The DNS and the investments made during Y2K enabled 
them to enjoy a role as leader. 
Regulative environment 
Government agencies 
The department of Justice was concerned with the use of computer systems to 
enable competitive advantage. The issues related to using such information in violation of 
privacy are in the forefront following 9/11. 
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Industry relationships 
Industry relationships have historically associated with travel agents and other 
vendors that connect with revenue management and sales activities. This has been greatly 
diminished by the introduction of the Internet and online reservations capabilities. 
Response assessment 
Taking advantage of the DNS architecture to enhance marketing and sales 
capability is a rational decision. Further, these systems reduced cost and complexity, and 
enabled predictability of operations. They could not have generated the same information 
in-house for the same cost without writing code with sophisticated and dynamic 
processing capability. Taking advantage of historical flight information that was captured 
by the DNS automatically allowed the optimal efficiency of aircraft utilization without 
adding any addition resources for the effort. The result was positive consequences for 
both efficiency and effectiveness. 
Sub-case 4 summary 
The Revenue business area of Delta served as Sub-case 4. The sub-case included a 
description of its Y2K compliance response (Y2K solution) and the context for this action 
provided both by the Revenue business area and by its sectoral environment. The Y2K 
solution included remediating code in existing high critical systems in order to remove 
the Y2K vulnerability, replacing the airline ticket pricing system, and enhancing the 
automation of its sales systems.  
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Table 63: Y2K solution in Revenue 
REVENUE 
Function System Vendor 
Revenue 
optimization 
NetWORKS Airline Revenue Optimizer Manugistics 
Sales-automation 
system 
BaanFrontOffice Baan Co. 
Flight network 
analysis 
Planet Kiehl Hendrickson 
Group 
 
Table 64: Summary metrics in Revenue 
TOTAL REVENUE EMPLOYEES (% total) ~10, 000 (~15%) 
SUBDIVISIONS  
TOTAL SUBDIVISIONS (% total) 62 (%) 
NATURE OF WORK dynamic 
LOCATIONS Atlanta 
TECHNOLOGY PROFILES 1997 2003 
Application systems 102 122 
# High/Med/Low critical systems 24/77/1 26/84/12 
# Languages 16  
# LOC 10  
# Delta Technology systems 102  
# Waivered systems 33  
# Desktop units 529  
# Desktop models, original 13  
# Desktop models, solution 10  
Intro computer processing date 1964, Deltamatic reservations system 
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Table 65: Summary of environmental factors in Revenue 
FACTORS INSTANCE 
Public image State-of-the art software 
Belief systems 
Computer enhancement is a great benefit to 
efficiency 
Existing practices and routines 
New products were simply enhancements to the 
familiar. 
Industry relationships Ticket processing, travel agents 
Regulations Security, privacy, competition 
Imitating the solutions of others 
American Airlines set the stage for this kind of 
work. 
Goals Improve profitability while removing Y2K bug 
Cost management Reducing cost of unsold seats 
 
The Y2K solution in Revenue was examined in light of its context in order to 
assess its rationality or institutionality as an alternative for solving the Y2K problem. 
Given the conditions of the Revenue systems and other requirements, the solution was 
considered rational. Table 66 shows the factors related to the assessment. 
Table 66: Factors related to the response assessment in Revenue 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO Y2K SOLUTION IN REVENUE  
Institutional model (Y2K Contingency: Y2K bug) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
Cultural 
 Related to a social fact: perceptions of air 
transportation, information technology, 
information security, safety or other value 
 Cognitive, e.g., military culture 
 Familiar, comfortable, habitual, e.g., family 
culture 
 Related to established relationships, e.g., 
vendors 
11. Conditions in business area and its IT systems: 
 Systems working but not as efficient as possible 
 Employees comfortable in computing 
environment 
 Comfortable in dealing with vendors and outside 
consultants 
12. Character of business area environment: 
 Government agencies challenged in regulatory 
oversight (DHS, DOJ) 
13. Distraction of other business area contingencies: 
 Financial status 
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Table 66 continued 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO Y2K SOLUTION IN REVENUE  
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
 Requirements for maintaining 
organizational legitimacy 
 
Mimetic (Following the crowd) 
 Fashionable, popular 
 Recommended by vendors 
 Inadequate information about experiences 
outside organizational boundaries 
(reporting only successes)  
14. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Industry regulations were focused on protecting 
the competitiveness of air transportation, not 
information privacy and security 
 U.S. govt agencies’ systems not Y2K compliant 
 Industry regulations focused on terrorism 
threats, passenger screening, but inadequately 
researched, equipped, and trained. 
 Industry regulations linked to intelligence 
gathering—a public concern strongly related to 
privacy, but not linked to information security 
15. Character of business area environment: 
 External chaos because of time limitation 
 Mixed understanding of the risk 
 Scarcity of personnel resources 
 Good products in the marketplace 
Rational-contingency model  
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO A 
RATIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO A RATIONAL 
PROCESS IN IT MANAGEMENT 
Goal orientation 
Actions relating to efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Communications related to mission control 
7. Organizational leadership: 
 Acted on the opportunity for improvement, 
which made the enterprise more competitive 
 Stayed actively and personally involved in order 
to insure success. 
8. Condition of business area and its IT systems: 
 Process put in place to assure continual 
assessment with respect to condition of systems 
and efficiency of performance 
9. Responses to business area contingencies: 
 Focused on improving possibility for efficient 
operations. 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO RATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulatory 
Requirements for maintaining organizational 
effectiveness 
 
Decision-making criteria  
 Based on knowledge of systems 
o Y2K compliance 
o Fit with functional area 




9. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 Bounding framework of concern by 
govt/industry rules wherein the information in IT 
systems was recognized as vital to safety and 
national security, but chaotic wrt policy 
10. Organizational leadership: 
 Knowledgeable about the value of information 
accuracy and availability 
 Understood the contribution of IT to the 
functioning of the organization 
 Employed personnel with high levels of skills 
 Adequately responded to security contingencies 
8. Character of business area environment: 
 Personnel resources were adequately aligned 
with requirements 
 IT products to serve the needs in Revenue were 
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The institutional environment was changed dramatically by deregulation. Even 
though seat prices and routes had been controlled previously, there was already activity in 
place moving airlines toward competition. When American Airlines began to use its CRS 
system for data mining, instead of for simply automating reservations, the associated 
computer programs began to be viewed as tools for seat pricing, therefore better 
prediction mechanisms for revenue production. Delta and the other major carriers 
followed suit. Such software was crucial to the airline’s profitability and competitiveness; 
and thus they developed it in-house and did not want to share it with their competitors. 
The fact that Delta is now able to purchase such seat pricing software commercially is 
evidence of the institutional evolution in the air transportation environment. The 
simulation of routing and other flight characteristics is increasingly complex due to the 
changes in both the technology and in the software development community. Within this 
institutionalized environment, the Revenue business area decision to stay current with the 
developments with this type of sophisticated software is completely rational. Future 
revenue and business alliances will be improved with the changes enabled by this Y2K 
solution.  
Summary 
This chapter traced the history of the Year 2000 Program in four sub-cases over 
the period from 1997 to 2003. The Y2K deadline coupled with considerations associated 
with financial and economic conditions positioned the implementation of some of the 
Y2K solutions beyond the year 2000 rollover, thus extending the study window from 
2000-2003. Each sub-case presented one of the four core business areas in four sections. 
(1) Y2K solution, the compliance decision; (2) Functional and resource overview, the 
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task environment; (3) Institutional context, the cultural and regulative aspects of the 
organization-environment system; and (4) Response assessment, the nature of the 
decision given the contextual conditions. Metrics, which included both organizational 
statistics and results of Year 2000 Program assessments, were presented in tabular form 
to enable comparison of contexts across sub-cases. The institutional contexts of individual 
business areas revealed different organizational cultures and different regulative 
structures. The cross-case comparisons are presented in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8      
COMPARING THE SUB-CASES 
 
Environment as institution assumes that the basic process is reproduction or copying of 
system-wide (or sector-wide…) social facts on the organizational level … (Zucker, 1987, 
p. 444). 
… the dominant assumptions, language, and ideas of economics can exercise a subtle but 
powerful influence on behavior, including behavior in organizations, through the 
formation of beliefs and norms about behavior that affect what people do and how they 
design institutions and management practices (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005, p. 20). 
This logic of consequences can be contrasted with a logic of appropriateness by which 
actions are matched to situations by means of rules … (March, 1994, p. 57). 
This dissertation has provided support for the theoretical perspectives of prior 
works that have demonstrated the power of institutional aspects of environment to 
influence the actions of organizations. Four business areas were examined as embedded 
sub-cases of Delta to determine how each responded to the Y2K compliance mandate. A 
final step in the investigation is to compare the sub-cases to determine whether the same 
relative causes can explain the differences in solutions adopted for dealing with the same 
problem. Toward that end, the objective of this chapter is to analyze the similarities and 
differences across the four sub-cases and attempt to isolate causal mechanisms. 
Discussion focuses on the relationships between sub-system environments and changes in 
IT systems across the sub-cases.  
Summary of sub-case analyses 
The results of the sub-case analyses in Chapter 7 have shown that 
 In Sub-case 1, Airport Customer Service, the Y2K solution was rational. It was 
consistent with the Future Vision goal and the Year 2000 Program goal. Even though 
it was impossible for Delta to make a completely rational evaluation of alternatives 
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and consequences under the time constraint (among other reasons), such an 
evaluation was itself inefficient. The solution decreased the complexity of IT systems 
and resulted in improvement in the quality and availability of information, increased 
predictability of IT systems, and business area operations. Further, the solution 
increased efficiency in systems maintenance, and in business area activities, which 
provided financial benefit to Delta. The solution improved the bottom line almost 
immediately.  
 In Sub-case 2, Operations, more specifically the Tech Ops division, the Y2K solution 
choice was predominantly institutional. SAP modules were installed as part of a move 
toward ERP functionality, along with other COTS systems that were chosen to reduce 
the cost of managing parts inventory and documenting repairs. Incomplete 
information related to complexity led to this mimetic behavior. Institutional 
monitoring related to safety regulations, coupled with the increasing complexity of 
aircraft, had led to greater complexity in the software for management. However, the 
SAP software was developed to serve a different function, and had not been 
adequately tested in an air transportation environment. Installing a system that was 
not specifically designed for the detailed services in maintenance and repair 
operations, and then “hard wiring” it to the finance function created the potential for 
greater complexity and risk in the short term. This complexity related to the 
reengineering of MRO processes that was required to accommodate SAP. However, 
if the Tech Ops overhaul could be accomplished successfully, because of the 
integration of these applications across the two business areas, there would be a 
corporate benefit in total. This choice was the likely result of the prominence of SAP 
in the software market, as well as the confidence and style of Delta’s MRO 
leadership. The decision to install SAP followed the highly successful project 
management of the Year 2000 Program, which may have contributed to 
overconfidence. The complexity in the Operations division did not lend itself to 
rationality as easily as eliminating the Y2K bug. 
 In Sub-case 3, Business Support, the Y2K solution was intertwined with Operations. 
In each of the two sub-cases, the notion of ERP was the driver, an ideal of 
organizational systems where all organizational elements are coordinated. While 
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elements of institutional decision-making existed in each sub-case, in Operations the 
choice was predominantly institutional, but in Business Support the choice was 
predominantly rational. In Business Support, more specifically the finance function, 
given the goal of modernization, evaluation of alternatives for achieving this goal 
could be accomplished with a small array of good choices. Among these choices, 
Business Support had the better opportunity to assure a streamlined experience in 
system installation when compared to Operations. The SAP modules decreased 
complexity of cross-functional interaction, therefore increased efficiency of 
operation. Having re-engineered the finance processes earlier in the decade in 
anticipation of a new architecture, Business Support had set up a smooth transition to 
the new application environment. Because the finance function was highly 
institutionalized, the “best practices” were time tested and predictable. It would be 
difficult for an organization like Delta Technology to re-create the COTS solution via 
in-house development and find the process cost effective.  
 In Sub-case 4, Revenue, the Y2K solution was rational. In the context of the 
deregulated air transportation industry and its intense competition, a strong 
interaction between institutional and rational forces had led to a sophisticated system 
for calculating seat prices. The Y2K solution choices were limited, but within the 
constraints of resources, the solution choices offered good alternatives. Given the 
complexity of the simulation system, it would be difficult to reproduce via in-house 
development and be cost effective. The solution increased the capability for 
optimization (i.e., increased predictability) of seat pricing on a flight by flight basis, 
therefore increased efficiency in Revenue operations.  
 In the sectoral environment of the air transportation industry, the institutional 
mechanisms and regulative structures benefited rather than constrained Delta’s 
actions. In contrast, the sub-case environments were constraining to the extent that 
“best practices,” or technical resources, not government or other focused sub-system 
regulations, guided decisions. Products in the IT industry define choice alternatives. 
Product decisions are often made in the context of contracts with outside agents. 
These now-institutionalized practices in the IT industry related to commercial 
developers and “integrators” have led to a structuring mindset of how such exchanges 
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happen. Historically, no provisions for security have been made or required in 
commercial contracts. Change in contractual requirements is needed to include an 
overt sign-off on whether the buyer or seller is taking responsibility for information 
security. If the buyer of IT services is responsible, the seller needs to verify that the 
buyer’s solution is reasonable and will be implemented. If the seller is responsible, 
the buyer must have assurance via enforceable penalty. 
Cross-case comparisons 
This section compares the variable items that were presented in the embedded 
sub-cases. Table 67 presents a comparison of the Y2K solution: Functional and resource 
overview, Institutional context, and Response assessment across the four sub-cases. Broad 
















 Fiberoptic networks installed at 
airports 
 Kiosks 
 Large screen displays 
 Flight-information system 
 Gate agent / passenger boarding 
system 
 Baggage handling system 
 Standardized desktop units 
replaced green screens 
 
 Supply-chain system 
 Supply-chain management 
 Parts management system 
 Technical documentation system 
 Standardized desktop units 
replaced existing PC systems 
 Financial management 
 Business analytics 
 Supply-chain management 
 Standardized desktop units 
replaced existing PC systems 
 Revenue optimization system 
 Flight network analysis system 
 Sales automation system 
 Standardized desktop units 
replaced existing PC systems 
Function Airport ticket / gate ops Aircraft operations, flight crew Finance, HR, legal, purchasing Marketing, sales 
Dominant industries 
• Customer relations 
 
• Aircraft maintenance 
• Aircraft operations 
• Flight crew 
• Catering 
















Industry relationships Ticket processing and travel agents 
Boeing, other suppliers, ATA, IATA, 
ICAO, hospitality, catering, ACH, 
ARINC, etc. 
ABA, AICPA, FASB, local banks, 
independent auditors 
Other airlines, IATA, ATA, ICAO, 
ACH, ARINC, SITA, ARC, etc. (Ticket 
processing, pricing.) 
Nature of the work Routine / dynamic Unpredictable / complex Routine Dynamic 
Size  
No. of PDNs 








 10, 000 
No. of locations 
 




180 airports plus Atlanta 
headquarters campus 
 
Atlanta headquarters campus plus 
finance operations in foreign 
locations 
Atlanta headquarters campus 
Date of first 
computer-based 
processing 
Deltamatic reservations system in 
1964 
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1997 119 216 179 102 
No. of systems 
2003 129 240 218 122 
1997 36 / 35 / 48 86 / 59 / 71 19 / 53 / 107 24 / 77 / 1 System 
criticality  
H / M / L 2003 36 / 34 / 59 105 / 57 / 78 20 / 56 / 142 26 / 84 / 12 
LOC 
(millions) 
6 25 12 10 
No. of languages 13 31 16 16 
Waivered systems 9 46 17 33 
COTS 
systems 
1997  32 111  
No. of desktop units 20, 000 (estimate) 3,350 585 529 
Orig 53 6 51 13 
Desktop models 
Sol 23 3 2 10 
% reduction 57 50 96 23 
Cultural context 
Delta family, “southern 
hospitality,” non-union 
Delta family, union (ALPA, PCF-CA), 
military mentality, “trust 
arrangements” 
Business ethics, strength of the 
regulatory system, non-union 
Computer enhancement a great 
benefit to efficiency, non-union 
Public image Airport displays and kiosks 
Successful installation of SAP is the 
“envy of the industry” 
“The best run companies use SAP” State-of-the art software 
Existing practices 
New airport settings and 
information displays were 
reformulations of the 
familiar, for both customer 
and Delta agent. 
Shop workers do not need 
improved software to perform their 
jobs well, that’s for the “geeks” and 
“suits.” Pilots work best with 
checklists. 
Strongly supported by IT systems, 
comfortable with standard suites of 
business applications. 
New products were simply 
enhancements to the familiar. 
Government 
DHS / TSA, DOJ (Security, 
privacy, anti-trust) 
FAA, OSHA, EPA, NWS, Customs, 
DOT, etc. (Workplace safety, 
aircraft / flight safety) 
SEC, OSHA, IRS, DOT, DOJ (Tax, HR, 
accounting, securities) 
DOT, DOJ (Security, privacy, 
competition). 
 
   259
Table 67 continued 
 
SUB-CASE 1 







     
Quality of information 
Custom systems development and 
installation by highly skilled in-house 
employees. 
Tech Ops system information based on 
“best practices” in other industries, 
other functional areas, but limited with 
respect to MRO. 
SAP systems were proven and 
developed for the finance function. 
Environment highly institutionalized 
and stable. 
Systems algorithms were proven 
and developed for the automated 
pricing and sales functions.  
Predictability  
Increased (Improved information, 
reduced complexity) 
Decreased (increased complexity) 
Increased (Improved information, 
reduce complexity of operations) 
Increased (Improved information, 
reduced complexity.) 
Efficiency 
Increased (reduced cost, potential for 
increased revenue) 
 
Unknown (potential for reduced cost 
and increased revenue) 
 
Increased (Improved information, 
centralized processing) 
 
Increased (reduced cost assoc with 
unsold seats) 
 
Cost management Deferred rollout depending on budget 
Deferred installation based on 
resource requirements. 




“Airport of the Future,” elements of 
BNI solution 
“The best run companies run SAP.” “Airport of the Future,” SAP 
American Airlines set the stage for 
this kind of work. Deregulation and 
IT created the environment for 
continuing. 
COTS 
All hardware and networking 
equipment 
Flight Ops systems developed in-house 
with a few additional COTS products. 
COTS crew scheduling, Technical 
supply chain mgmt, parts inventory 
and records documentation. 
 
All new software systems were 
COTS.  
All new software systems were 
COTS. 
Best Practices 
• Real-time information 
• Web-based reservations 
• Call centers 
• Handheld devices 
 
• OCC real-time monitoring 
• Tech Ops re-engineering / MRP 
• Maintenance profit center 
• Ground Ops devices 
 
• Centralized processing 
• Finance re-engineering 
• Outsourcing 
• MRP / ERP 
 
• Automated pricing models 
• Sales automation 
• Alliances & partnerships for 
marketing & sales 
     
Response assessment Rational Institutional Rational Rational 
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Table 68: Highlighted similarities and differences 








MIMESIS / BEST 
PRACTICE COMPLEXITY EFFICIENCY PREDICTABILITY 
RESPONSE 
ASSESSMENT 
SUB-CASE          
          
AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE  Routine / dynamic       Rational 
OPERATIONS Largest, most complex 
Complex / 
dynamic     ?  Institutional 
 Tech Ops  Complex / dynamic        
BUSINESS SUPPORT  Routine       Rational 
 Finance  Routine        
REVENUE  Dynamic    –   Rational 
 Revenue accounting  Dynamic        





Discussion of results 
Since Delta had initially planned to use an outside organization to do the Year 2000 
Program, they had budgeted $160 million for the project. Delta spent $110 million by 
doing the work in-house (Taylor, 2004). 
The focus of this dissertation was on organizations and their IT systems, and on 
the interplay between their technical and non-technical aspects. The hypotheses were 
based on mutually exclusive views of an organization system—alternate conceptions of 
an organization as either focused on efficiency or legitimacy, and decision-making as 
either rational or institutional. The criteria for evaluating a Y2K solution as rational 
included: (1) whether or not adequate information was acquired, (2) whether or not a 
rational choice process was followed, and (3) whether or not evidence revealed solution 
choices that (a) decreased complexity, and / or (b) increased efficiency and predictability. 
The criteria for evaluating a Y2K solution as institutional included all of the 
aforementioned criteria, in addition to one or more of the defining institutional 
mechanisms or processes:  
regulative, e.g., environmental agents in institutionalized sectors, in established 
business relationships, and in State regulatory agencies;  
cultural, e.g., social facts extending from the business area’s own historical 
structures and processes, e.g., routines related to historical imprinting, trust arrangements 
with resource suppliers; and  
mimetic, e.g., adopting solutions of other organizations, especially when uncertain 
about alternatives or under time constraints. 
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Theoretical inconsistencies 
While this dissertation alleged that performing legitimately rather than efficiently 
was the ultimate driver for Delta’s solutions, the case study evidence has revealed an 
amalgamation of rational-contingency and institutional features. Sometimes the 
organization performed as an institutional system (institutional) model and sometimes the 
organization performed as a rational-contingency system (rational) model.  
In the planning, inventory, and assessment phases, the rational-contingency 
concept seemed overwhelming. A “best way” was configured at the outset based on a 
standard project methodology, and the organization adapted to contingencies along the 
way, principally confronting new learning about the problem, and about the resources 
available to make the project function efficiently. The formal evidence of rational 
features included the extensive effort to create planning and documentation structures. 
Leadership and communication / reporting mechanisms were in place to accomplish the 
goal according to a phased time schedule.  
In the renewal (treatment) phases, the institutional aspects became visible. These 
observations suggested that a combination of the two contrasting organizational theories 
presented in this study would offer a more generalizable and comprehensive approach to 
studies of large complex organizations. 
Explanations from rival perspectives 
The rival organization theories explain the Y2K solutions differently, even though 
both models consider that organization structure and performance are affected vitally by 
environmental influences. A rational-contingency system perspective on Delta’s Y2K 
solutions considers the Y2K compliance plan as a rationalized blueprint for achieving a 
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predetermined goal. The scope of the Year 2000 program had a clear definition. Tasks 
associated with eliminating that Y2K bug and modernizing the IT systems were organized 
precisely. The division of labor and marching orders were assigned. Each business area 
contributed its part to implementing the plan as efficiently as possible in each case. A 
coordination mechanism provided integration of the parts. According to a rationalist 
perspective, the differences in business area solutions strictly related to the diverse 
activities that each business area performed and the kinds of technical equipment required 
for supporting those activities. Any deviations from the goals were caused by technical 
environments and resource limitations. The evidence from the Delta study that the 
organization performed according to a rational system model included features such as:  
1. organization of four business area teams, including the division of labor and 
coordination mechanisms that enabled Program integration and control 
2. focus on the goal of eliminating the uncertainty associated with the Y2K 
vulnerability, and uncertainties associated with complexity 
3. complete information to achieve the goal 
4. decision-making of the business area teams based on efficiency criteria 
Like this dissertation, studies employing rational system models (e.g., Lawrence 
& Lorsch, Woodward), which were described in the section on contingency theory, have 
shown that organizational differentiation is related to resources and requirements of the 
sub-unit’s particular task environment. These studies explained sub-unit actions by 
observing that they faced relatively unique environmental demands related to their 
associated sub-environments, and described a process of adaptation that leads to variation 
in structures and practices among different kinds of organizations as they pursue their 
goals. However, different from this dissertation, conclusions were based solely on the 
perspective of a rational-contingency model. Rationalists argue that organizational sub-
units have freedom to choose their actions within the scope of their functional 
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subsystems, and they do so based on economic principles. This dissertation does not 
show evidence entirely in conflict with this notion, but augments these ideas to include 
the influence of institutional contexts. 
In contrast to the rational system model, an institutional system model portrays 
the business area Y2K solutions—and the development of the Delta Year 2000 
Program—as a contextualized process shaped by institutional mechanisms. These 
institutional mechanisms include such constructs as historical values, perceptions, and 
judgments. Such mechanisms contribute to more explicit channeling provided by 
regulative mechanisms, such as marketplace supplies of COTS products, consultants and 
vendors, technical resources, and other forces in the organization’s wider environment. 
Consistent with an institutional system perspective, data from this Delta study 
revealed that business areas in part acted to satisfy values. These included, but were not 
limited to a familiarity and consistency of the presentation of the Delta image to the 
public, its employees, and the larger air transportation community, as well as a desire for 
more modern equipment and greater management control provided by improved 
information. In addition, business areas may have made certain decisions simply because 
the resources were available to do it. In fact, one informant said they had so much money 
to spend on the project, they had no opportunity to spend it all in the short time frame 
prior to the Year 2000 rollover.  
The Delta solutions far exceeded the goal of eliminating the Y2K bug, and some 
solution elements may have served no verifiable contribution to efficiency or 
effectiveness if the ultimate costs and benefits were weighed. Ideas of efficiency in some 
cases were secondary to the larger attempt to position Delta as a more competitive, and 
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legitimate player in the fast moving air transportation environment. If that had been the 
case in total, differences across business areas would have had their origins solely in the 
histories of the business areas, and, more specifically, in the histories of the fields—i.e., 
wider sectoral environments—represented by the respective business areas. 
Evidence that Delta performed according to an institutional system model 
included features such as: 
1. a focus on multiple goals, some of which transcended eliminating the 
uncertainty associated with the Y2K vulnerability 
2. inadequate information to support decisions 
3. decision-making of the business area team based on routines and familiarity, 
and other legitimacy criteria 
4. modeling solutions of other organizations in their industry sector 
5. implementation of solutions based on industry “best practices,” without ways 
of evaluating their efficacy in specific circumstances 
Airline-related organizations constitute an organizational field; therefore, 
institutional theory predicts that over time, a process of isomorphism produces 
similarities among these organizations. However, the industries and professions 
associated with individual organization business areas also constitute organizational 
fields: the accounting industry, airline operations, the marketing industry, the information 
technologies industry, etc. Employing an institutional system perspective, this study has 
demonstrated how business area interactions within their respective institutionalized sub-
environments shape airline development and functioning.  
The institutional system idea of this dissertation placed the rational model in a 
context of institutional processes that were shared with others in particular fields. 
Following the logic of Lawrence and Lorsch, it was reasonable to assume that relatively 
unique sub-environments may have included institutional as well as technical aspects and 
that fact has been confirmed. Similarities in the structures and practices of organizations 
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in the same field are the visible display of conformity to what is understood to be 
legitimate in their respective contexts, and not necessarily targeted toward achieving 
organizational purposes with greatest efficiency—especially under conditions of 
uncertainty.133  
… [H]ighly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual efforts 
to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to 
homogeneity in structure, culture, and output (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147). 
The more uncertain the relationship between means and ends, the greater the extent to 
which an organization will model itself after organizations it perceives as successful 
(Ibid., p. 154).  
Under conditions of uncertainty, network ties across organizational boundaries are 
especially influential with respect to choice of organization to imitate (Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989). Evidence indicated that there was uncertainty regarding means for 
Delta’s Y2K compliance. In response to this, Delta’s Board of Directors recommended 
locating a consultant to assist in designing the Year 2000 Program. The choice of The 
Feld Company, one of many consulting organizations involved in the process, came from 
Grinstein who had witnessed a successful IT project at another transportation 
organization. Delta has been given credit for being innovative as an airline company with 
regard to its information systems strategies, but similar experiences in other 
organizations, esp. from within the transportation sector, led Delta to adopt such 
strategies. However, the impetus for using the strategies came from Delta’s Board 
(Greising, 1997). 
Each of the Delta Technology application portfolios reflected the activities of a 
functional division of Delta Air Lines. Among all of these cooperative teams, each 
 
                                                 
133 It is important to note that organizational systems must serve many values and purposes, not only 
efficiency. 
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respectively represented an unrelated field and therefore was included in a somewhat 
distinct sub-environment. Sub-environments differ in their propensity toward 
institutionalization depending on their respective histories and cultures. This dissertation 
has demonstrated that isomorphism, the process by which standards of legitimacy are 
diffused within organizational sub-environments, can account for variation in the Y2K 
solution of the business areas at Delta, wherein most of the Y2K solutions were the result 
of a rational choice process. The “standard of legitimacy” related to the concept of an 
industry best practice, a rational / institutional concept. 
Multiple levels of context 
Each Y2K solution was the result of activities that took place in a business area 
over five to six years within a number of contextual levels. The levels of context included 
the air transportation sector, the Delta and Delta Technology organizations, the Year 2000 
Program, and the respective environments of each business area.  
In all four sub-cases, the environments were the same with respect to the air 
transportation sector and the enterprise organizations, i.e., Delta and Delta Technology. 
With regard to the enterprise contexts, in 1997 Delta Technology had been so recently 
established that many institutionalized elements of the Delta and Delta Technology 
contexts were the same. Further, in the four sub-cases, the same methodological 
framework defined the assessment and remediation process of the Year 2000 Program. 
The sub-case comparison therefore controlled for all of these higher level environments 
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to the extent that the business area solutions could be related to the context provided by 
their respective sub-system environments.134  
All four business areas made decisions to remediate code and to replace hardware 
and software. All four installed desktop units with as much standardization as possible. 
However, other solution elements were different. These different elements thus related to 
the distinctive contextual conditions in each of the areas.  
Comparing task environments 
The task environment comparison shows that Operations was the largest business 
area in numbers of employees and numbers of divisions. Operations had the greatest 
amount of complexity in its activities, which was reflected in the number of divisions, 
and in the numbers and complexity of its systems. The systems in Operations had a 
greater total number of LOCs, written in more programming languages, than the systems 
in any of the other three business areas. 
The Desktop Strategy Project was a comprehensive evaluation of all desktop units 
and their system configurations enterprise-wide. The results of the inventory and 
assessments performed for this project provided another measure of the complexity of the 
task environment in a business area. Airport Customer Service had a greater number of 
desktop units, and showed the greatest amount of complexity among the desktop unit 
models. While the complexity was reduced in all four business areas because of this 
project, Business Support showed the greatest percentage reduction in the number of 
desktop models. Airport Customer Service was next, followed by Operations and 
Revenue. 
 
                                                 
134  Note that the “system” referred to here is the organization and its sectoral environment. 
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Comparing institutional environments and response assessments 
Along with the differences in task environments, differences in perspective 
existed throughout the Delta organization. Cultural and cognitive divisions were 
extreme—the unionized pilots and “everyone else,” the military (therefore, rational / 
strategic mentality) and family (cultural persistence, therefore, institutional mentality); 
the institutionalization of the concept of safety and a disconnection with the concept of 
information security. In this dissertation, these differences related to the concept of 
complexity in a business area.  
Wider environments 
In addition to the task environments and institutional environments internal to 
Delta, competitive market conditions and the time deadline of Y2K affected solutions. 
Competitive market conditions, in terms of available COTS solutions and existing best 
practices, appeared to be the important preconditions to sub-organizations seeking the 
assistance of vendors and consultants in lieu of developing systems in-house. Vendors 
and consultants thus provided a principal mechanism for institutional influence. In all 
four business areas, however, there was conspicuous evidence of rational decision-
making related to improvement in performance efficiencies.  
The prominence of the Y2K event and its associated deadline had a strong 
influence on the Year 2000 Program in total. Y2K improved the focus of executive 
management and improved the efficiency of project management. Without the deadline 
and urgency to make changes to the IT systems, Delta might have continued to operate its 
information systems in a mode of responding to needs for development and repairs 
according to which system had crashed or become inadequate for producing a particular 
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output. Consideration for the economic benefits to be gained by completely transforming 
the IT systems might have been deferred for a long time. Additionally, the information 
security vulnerabilities that were inherent in aging systems, especially those with high 
levels of complexity, might have eventually led to disastrous consequences.  
The evidence provided by the creation of the OCC (Operations) and the 
CustomerCare system (Airport Customer Service) showed that the capability—the ideas 
and skills—were present to develop the increased functional efficiency in-house via state-
of-the art systems. However, the OCC was an ad hoc addition, a one-time notion in an 
isolated division and an earlier response. Similarly, the CustomerCare system in the 
Airport Customer Service business area had been in the works prior to the Year 2000 
Program launch. Before the crisis of Y2K, the justification had been missing that would 
have brought about the planning, synchronizing, and maintaining of systems enterprise-
wide in order to achieve maximum economic benefit—even though envisioned by IT 
experts for years.  
The Y2K time deadline, important to the Year 2000 Program in total, had minimal 
effect on a Y2K solution in an individual business area. The timing of installations was 
affected in some instances, but in most areas, not the solution itself. The criticality 
assignments during the systems assessment phase gave priority to high critical systems, 
so that code remediation and other actions were performed on these systems first. Certain 
systems were evaluated as needing replacement, and if the replacement was a complex 
implementation, the complete solution was delayed until after the year 2000 rollover. All 
of the business areas deferred at least a part of their solution activities until after the 
rollover. The fact that all of the business areas were successful, with a few minor 
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exceptions, in meeting the Y2K deadline without incident rules out the time deadline as 
an influence that differentiates the sub-case decisions.  
However, the focus and funding of Y2K may have set up the institutional 
decision-making that was evident in the Tech Ops solution. The development of the 
DNS, and the ideas associated with modernization were strongly influential to the Tech 
Ops solution. Further, all of the solution choices were made from within a narrow view 
and resulted in unanticipated information security impacts.  
Transformation: not a radical leap 
The puzzle that existed at the outset of the study—at Delta’s agreement to a 
“transformation” while eliminating the Y2K bug—diminished significantly with the 
knowledge gained through this investigation. The transformation, while still a “bold 
move” for Delta, was not a radical leap forward into a new IT environment with which 
the organization was completely unfamiliar. The organizational changes at first seemed to 
be adding complexity, but lessened in dramatic appearance upon further analysis.  
Organizational restructuring 
The “cultural revolution” reported by one of the informants had seemed 
inefficient. In actuality, the organizational restructuring enabled greater efficiency in 
achieving the changes that had been designed by the CIO. The placement of highly 
skilled employees or consultants in Y2K leadership positions enabled faster 
accommodation for the major changes in the infrastructure environment. This leadership 
was extremely important given the time constraint and the limited visibility of the teams. 
The leadership was clearly lacking, however, in terms of planning for the consequences 
to information security.  
 
   272
Institutionalism and rational decision-making: What could they be thinking? 
The cross-organizational make-up of the Year 2000 Program teams, with each 
team confined to a business area, reinforced a restricted “business area view” of the 
world.  
We all have a tendency to some degree to run on a mental “autopilot” - whether you want 
to call this phenomena “framing,” worldview, paradigms, schemas, ideological 
constructs, etc. - the precise meaning vary [sic] but the effect is to shape our perceptions 
of the world (highlighting or omitting data) and to an extent predetermine our responses 
in a large picture sense. Ideological blinders concentrates [sic] our vision but they distort 
our view of reality (Safranski, 2005). 
The compartmentalization and narrow focus of the bureaucratic structure decreased the 
rationality of the choice process in a business area, limiting consideration of all the 
consequences of their decision alternatives. To these blinders add additional sets—the 
narrow focus of the business area IT systems themselves, and the associated work 
environments, and the image becomes that of a team of workhorses.  
Each member of the team is shackled to the other and each must drag behind 
some share of the workload, the workload being a specific segment of systems dedicated 
to specific business area activities. However, each in the team is wearing his / her own set 
of blinders. Therefore, the one cracking the whip must know the destination and the best 
way to get there, because the workhorses are unlikely to speak up. They have worked in 
this configuration too long to expect or even think about change.  
There were four of these “workhorse teams” operating in their own respective 
spaces at Delta. Note that one of the main complaints about the architecture of Delta’s 
systems prior to the transformation was that they operated in “information silos,” without 
enough cross communication to enable information to be available, accessible, and 
accurate for all functional purposes. There had been “18 little disconnected fiefdoms” 
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(W. Taylor, 2004). Was the business area structure of the Year 2000 team, therefore, the 
“best way” to develop new solutions? It formed yet another institutional context within 
which the “rational” solution designs were produced. 
Changes to IT were incremental 
The results of the Delta transformation seemed dramatic to an outside observer 
because the reliability of information and its visibility had taken such prominence. 
Further investigation led to the understanding that Delta had been gradually augmenting 
its systems’ capabilities across the business areas over the years.  
The most striking major additions brought about by the transformation were to the 
reservations systems. These systems had been in use since the 1960s and improved 
throughout the 1980s. However, when the Internet and the DNS enabled online 
reservations systems in the 1990s, the world of CRS systems of the past was transformed 
completely.  
Similarly, improvements had been made gradually to the finance systems over 
time. Then in the early 1990s, major re-engineering of processes and systems was 
accomplished; the project ran six years from 1990-1996. This streamlining of the finance 
function was strongly connected to the influence of the regulative environment. The 
similarity in the finance function across all industry sectors had led to faster evolution in 
software support. The IT marketplace had the best products to serve this functional area 
compared to the others because of the size of the market, and the routinized processes 
that had evolved accordingly. The market was directly aligned with the regulative 
environment. The subsequent changes brought about by DNS during the Year 2000 
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Program simply enabled a “re-connection” from prior LAN-based systems to those 
designed with Internet protocols. 
The software in the maintenance area had been the latest additions to the parade 
of automated functions at Delta. Because of its complexity and specialized features that 
were different from other industries, it was not well-served by commercial software. 
Paper processes had been automated when the TOPS and MARC systems were installed 
in the early 1990s, which required process re-engineering. When the new SAP systems 
were installed, re-engineering was required again, not only because of the DNS 
connection, but because the software itself had not been designed for such application. 
The Revenue choice was based on the highly competitive airline industry and its 
increasing requirement for accuracy in pricing and forecasting because of the changes in 
IT systems. When the industry was deregulated, each airline was forced into a position of 
evaluating how to become better than the competition in seat pricing.  
The call centers in Airport Customer Service area were part of the Y2K solution, 
but not investigated in this study. This mechanism for customer service had become 
popular, a mimetic solution that is IT related. Most likely in the short term, the solution 
has been problematic and therefore may be evaluated as institutional. In this case, 
copying others’ ideas may lead down the road to a mess. The idea was to reduce head 
count and turn a headache over to outside entities. This move, solely focused on cost 
reduction, has undoubtedly diminished customer service and created more issues than 
Delta management ever imagined. The lesson here: do not assume that making changes 
based on cost alone is a rational act.  
 
   275
Summary 
This chapter presented cross-case analysis of the four sub-cases and a discussion 
of the results. Results showed that performing efficiently was the ultimate driver for each 
of the Delta business area solutions, even though performing legitimately could also be 
attached to the context of all four. All three of the defining institutional processes were at 
work in the Delta settings: regulative—by external sources, i.e., environmental agents in 
institutionalized sectors, such as in the professions, in established business relationships, 
and state regulatory agencies); cultural—transmitting social facts from the Delta business 
area’s own historical processes, such as trust arrangements with resource suppliers; and 
mimetic—adopting other organizations’ successful elements, especially when uncertain 
about alternatives. In total, however, within the confines of the study period, the choices 
were rational within a public regulative system where incentives were aligned. However, 
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CHAPTER 9      
WHAT HAPPENED TO INFORMATION SECURITY? 
 
The recent Year 2000 computer problem is the most remarkable example of global 
human cooperation I have ever witnessed (Beach, 2000).135 
Our goal was to operate normally, safely—our regular daily expectation. We achieved 
our goal and delivered significant computer improvements to the company at the same 
time (Taylor, 2000, quoted in Delta archive, Y2K-Normal.doc).  
After Year 2000, there were errors but none were [sic] catastrophic (Taylor, 2004). 
By any measure, 2000 was the “year of the virus” for Delta and Delta Technology. 
Employees spent more 24-hour shifts fighting viruses during the year than they care to 
remember (Davis, 2001, p. 11). 
The objective of this chapter is to present the results and experiences of the Year 
2000 Program in the context of information security. Recall that Delta’s plan focused on 
a primary and a secondary goal. The primary goal was to eliminate the Y2K bug; and the 
secondary goal was to transform and to modernize the IT systems architecture throughout 
the enterprise.  
Toward the goal of eliminating the Y2K bug, the organization operated most of its 
systems successfully following rollover. Given the complexity of the project, the Delta 
organization could be enormously pleased with this outcome. The project methodology 
that the company had purchased had obviously worked for them to assist in locating and 
repairing most all of the instances of the Y2K bug. This methodology was a COTS 
solution that was available in the marketplace, likely one of many that were available at 
the time. The methodology had spelled out each phase and each component in meticulous 
 
                                                 
135 From the prepared testimony of Gary Beach, publisher of CIO Magazine before the House Science 
Committee Subcommittee on Technology and the House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee 
on Government Management, Information and Technology. 
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detail. Maybe the nature of this plan distracted employees from a focus on the nature of 
the problem: the risk that the Y2K bug posed for information security. This plan may also 
have created blinders to consideration for all of the consequences of the solutions. 
It is difficult to remember how widespread public awareness was regarding 
information security in the years leading up to the year 2000, but it appeared that 
information security was not an overt focus for the Year 2000 Program. However, it is 
puzzling that the subsequent virus attacks on Delta’s computers after year 2000 were 
unexpected, following such a comprehensive overhaul as the IT transformation. At one 
point that year, a particularly malicious Outlook bug known as “funlove” had run 
rampant around Delta’s systems without any human intervention. Before it was stopped, 
the malware had infected more than 200 servers and “countless PCs” (Davis, 2001, p. 
11). Another, known as the “love bug,” brought down Delta’s entire email system. 
“Nearly 50 DT employees worked around the clock, some for as long as 36 hours at a 
stretch, to get rid of the problem” (Davis, 2000, p. 12). 
Right on the heels of celebrating Y2K success, and the renewal of so many aspects 
of the Delta IT operations, came a new project, “Antivirus Renewal.” By the end of 2001, 
Delta Technology engineers had installed new antivirus software on each desktop unit, 
and integrated the software with server software that would provide automatic updates. 
Why was this risk not anticipated and the defenses planned and implemented in advance? 
Before discussing this puzzling situation at Delta, the next section presents other post-
2000 events.  
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Post-2000 incidents and other stories 
The enormous efforts of a great many organizations during the latter part of the 
1990s paid off in eliminating most all critical issues that were related to the Y2K bug. The 
work was done so well that the lack of problems merely underscored for skeptics that the 
hoopla and expense had been a hoax. Many still believe that all the geeks had 
collaborated in a great worldwide conspiracy to generate work, and to raise salaries. The 
truth is that no organization before or after the event wanted to discuss Y2K, whether 
confirming or denying the allegation. Organizations were disinclined to discuss security 
issues of any sort, even those related to success. However, in spite of all the focus on the 
crisis and all of the hard work of organizations to remediate their systems, some failed to 
operate:  
• Nine nuclear power plant incidents occurred in Japan, and seven occurred in the U. S., all 
of which were attributed to minor electric power supply problems. According to press 
reports, the incidents did not involve a compromise of safety-related systems or require 
plants to be shut down. (The Daily Yomiuri, Tokyo, 2000, Jan 6 and The Los Angeles 
Times, 2000, Jan 2).  
• Point of sale credit card companies posted transactions multiple times to credit card 
accounts, because they did not download a patch (Computerworld, 2000, Jan 17).  
• The U.S. Defense Department experienced computer failures related to processing 
imagery from intelligence satellites, which resulted in an interruption in the flow of spy 
satellite information. The Pentagon insists the trouble did not jeopardize U.S. national 
security (The Associated Press, 2000, Jan 14).  
• Heathrow airport lights malfunctioned. A Delta informant said they could not be helpful 
with the problem, since Heathrow systems were completely different from anything Delta 
had installed at Hartsfield. 
A number of high profile interruptions to critical infrastructures have 
demonstrated the chaos that such incidents can create. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
blackout in the Northeast and Midwest part of the U.S. in August 2003 is an example. 
Many companies use diesel generators to keep backup systems running, but as the 
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gigantic power outage demonstrated, the diesel can run out if the backup systems are in 
continuous use. In such cases, companies must take special steps. Following the 2003 
blackout, Delta arranged for generator fuel to arrive by helicopter in the event of another 
shortage. (Nolan & McFarlan, 2005). However, as this example illustrates, the correction 
is often made after the damage is done. Further, and possibly more problematic, is 
planning a solution without adequate information, as the next example illustrates. 
Presenting the solution before considering all consequences 
Proponents of a new flight-tracking technology are pressing to have ADS-B 
transponders mandatory equipment on all aircraft so that all aircraft can be accounted for 
in U.S. airspace (Doyle & Gillies, 2007). However, this technology puts crew and 
passengers at risk. A pilot has described how easy it would be to intercept the signal from 
this particular type of transponder and use it to bring down an aircraft (Philips, 2000). Is 
this a hasty solution that is the result of exposing limitations in the FAA’s flight tracking 
in the details of the JFK Jr. crash? 
This is what happened. The plane went down around 9 PM on a Friday and the 
search and rescue efforts began at 6 AM Saturday. Those efforts continued, under intense 
press scrutiny, through all of Saturday, all of Sunday, and all of Monday. Around midday 
Tuesday, the FAA finally decoded enough of their radar tapes to determine where the 
plane went into the water. At that point, the remains of the aircraft were found quickly. 
The FAA had spent more than 72 hours trying to locate the aircraft, an aircraft that the 
President of the United States and the world press corps were actively interested in 
finding. It was evident from the experience that the FAA did not possess the resources to 
track the volume of flights for which the agency was responsible. Does the promotion of 
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mandatory ADS-B transponders suggest that policy-makers are rushing into a solution 
that will create more problems than now exist? Could we propose that this was the same 
situation when Congress approved the change to the scheduled daylight savings time for 
2007? 
Information security at Delta after the Year 2000 Program 
The system is not finished. In the works are more customer-facing applications, 
operations and revenue management functions and—a new need—security (Robb, quoted 
in “Technology Leadership: Delta Technology,” 2004). 
Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarb-Ox) pressures require reconciliation of systems to tie back to 
general ledger. Just because you reconcile doesn’t mean you pass. How you manage your 
systems and controls could lead to a material variance. Sarb-Ox is interested in behavior 
as well as systems security aspects. It is not clear exactly what Sarb-Ox requires; auditing 
is interpreting the meaning. Operating areas are the central aspects of compliance, well 
beyond the financial aspects (Taylor, 2004). 
Delta Air Lines Inc. and AMR Corp's American Airlines Inc. also confirmed that the 
stolen computer contained some of their customer data (Rosencrance, 2004). 
Because of the technology improvements that resulted from the Year 2000 
Program, real-time financial information was available to executives, which especially 
benefited them as they have managed through Delta’s difficult financial circumstances. 
However, in light of the development of the new threats to IT security that were 
developing in the late 1990’s because of wider network access, it is surprising that 
concerns for the security of this information were not more conspicuous in the Year 2000 
Program  plans. A role that was defined as part of the BDM methodology was that of 
Risk Manager: 
Risk Manager - establishes a risk plan concerned with identifying, analyzing, mitigating, 
monitoring, & controlling risks in the Year 2000 program for business/functional, costs, 
schedule, technical/operational (Delta archive, Sec 1). 
This title would suggest that a process was in place to account for the technical security 
of the new systems. However, when asked about security strategies, informants have 
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seemed to go blank. In fact, it was unclear that plans included data protection for the 
systems beyond code remediation or replacement to rid them of the Y2K bug. Information 
security was rarely mentioned in the Year 2000 Program documentation. Later, Delta 
Technology CEO Robb (when interviewed in 2004 about the remarkable successes of 
Delta Technology) was quoted as saying the next problem that the organization needed to 
address was security (“Technology Leadership: Delta Technology,” 2004).136 That is 
because the standardization, network connections, and other changes that led to the 
efficiency improvements had also generated disruption to “business as usual” for the IT 
users and actually created other security problems where none had existed before.  
Delta’s flight attendant scheduling system 
Following the year 2000 rollover, “a flight attendant scheduling system 
malfunctioned, along with around 40 other non-critical systems” (Taylor, 2004). 
However, no one at Delta is inclined to talk about these kinds of incidents. 
Delta Air Lines Inc. declined to comment about the cause of a systems glitch that forced 
it to cancel about 40 flights and delay an unspecified number of departures on May 1. 
The Atlanta-based airline has “resolved the situation,” said a spokeswoman. But, she 
added, “as a matter of company policy, we will not provide additional information on the 
issue to ensure the protection of our IT systems” (“Delta stays mum on cause of IT 
glitch,” 2004).  
Clearly, systems are more vulnerable when they are all tied together and 
connected to a common information repository. This is the familiar tradeoff between 
efficiency and security. Web-based applications that add efficiency to the development 
and maintenance process also create information security issues that require careful 
 
                                                 
136  Robb joined Delta Technology in late 1999 as CTO, and became Delta’s CIO in 2000. 
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management practices. However, historically vendors and consultants have not been 
concerned with the security of the clients’ or their clients’ customers’ information. 
[SAP] … continues to shift its customers to its mySAP products, which are Web-based 
software platforms used for a variety of enterprise functions (Hoover’s, 2007). 
Between April 2003 and June of … [2004], Delta made a major investment in web-based 
delivery of technical manuals via the company's intranet site. The new system, known as 
Flightline, supplied by InfoTrust … hosts 70 maintenance manuals and illustrated parts 
catalogs covering all aircraft and engines in Delta's fleet. Preliminary planning to make 
the manuals available on hand-held devices via wireless transmission now is going 
forward, and will be presented to Delta's management in 2005 for approval.  
Wireless devices add yet another set of information security issues. A test for 
intrusion possibility was conducted at both the Denver and DFW airports around the 
deadline for mandated baggage systems. The “red team” found that breaching the 
security of systems for connecting passengers to their baggage was extremely easy. 
Comair 
In 1997, Comair was a “Delta Connection” carrier, one of the regional airline 
affiliations that provided extended service to Delta customers. Events connected with 
Comair show examples of the complex dependency environment in commercial air 
transportation enterprises. 
The January 1997 crash of Cincinnati-to-Detroit Comair Flight 3272 represented a failure 
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to set adequate safety standards for icy 
conditions, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded Thursday. The 
NTSB said that “the probable cause of the accident was the FAA's failure to establish 
adequate certification standards for flights in icing conditions.” (Barton, 1998).  
An interesting incident regarding Delta’s institutional mindset is illustrated by the 
Comair IT systems “crash” on Christmas Day in 2004, long past the worrisome focus on 
Y2K and other systems vulnerabilities. An ice storm that day required rescheduling a 
larger number of passengers than the system had processed prior to the crash. When the 
computer systems exceeded their processing capacity, they simply stopped. As a result, 
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Comair grounded around 1100 flights and shut down for four days, which cost about $20 
million in revenue (Wagner, 2004).  
Comair knew there was a chance there would be a problem. They said they had planned 
on updating their computer system, but other cost pressures—such as meeting payroll—
were too great. So they just hoped that their system, patched together, would work. It 
didn't. Now they're playing catch-up. (Kasarda, cited in Rothfeder, 2005).137 
Delta bought Comair (which had been a regional subsidiary) in 2000 then proceeded to 
resist opportunities to invest in its systems, based on the institutionalized notion that low 
cost airline means not only low cost for the customer, but low cost for the company.  
Another incident involving Comair came in 2006. The Comair jet crash that killed 
49 people, some might call a “normal accident.” However, it reflects a violation of one of 
the basic elements of information security: information integrity. On August 27, 2006, a 
Comair flight filled with passengers bound for Atlanta crashed on takeoff from a 
Kentucky airport. With the exception of the co-pilot, all of the passengers and crew were 
killed instantly. Months before the crash, air traffic controllers at the Lexington airport 
wrote to federal officials complaining about a hostile working environment in the tower 
and short-staffing on the overnight shift, according to letters obtained by The Associated 
Press. However, the short-staffing was not the cause of the problem. A Comair 
spokesperson said the airline was using an airport map with outdated information at the 
time of the crash.  
The positive impacts of Delta’s Y2K solutions 
In the process of addressing the Y2K crisis, Delta invested $1 billion in its IT 
infrastructure and developed a publish-and-subscribe environment to support a cross-
functional customer-orientation (Ross, 2001).  
 
                                                 
137 Kasarda is a management professor who specializes in airlines at the University of North Carolina. 
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Delta’s overarching objective during the Year 2000 Program was to position its 
Delta Technology subsidiary to be more competitive in the year 2000 and after. The 
leadership for achieving this goal was extremely important—as was the elimination of the 
Y2K vulnerability. However, information security, as the organization understood it, was 
not a focus.138 This goal was a secondary aspect (the Y2K bug was the number one 
priority), that both strengthened and weakened information security. Strength would 
come by standardizing hardware, replacing outdated systems, and by gaining a better 
general understanding of how the systems worked. The negative effect would come by 
standardizing systems and employing a common network protocol to connect them all. 
However, not all of the effects on information security were negative. A number of 
positive results offered opportunities for a higher level of security in information systems 
management. 
One of the outcomes was a new position, called Chief Information Security and 
Privacy Officer. 
Spark Nowak works for Chris Duncan, Chief Risk Officer for Delta. Chief InfoSec 
Officer, Spark Nowak, is a person whose objective is to oversee policies company-wide, 
impacting technology through policy. Attack/penetration tests are run out of Nowak’s 
office. Each business unit also has a security officer (BISO), responsible for 
implementing policies on a business unit basis (Robb, 2004). 
Architecture 
The institutionalization of standards and practices mentioned above advanced as 
well as hinder the possibility for optimizing the activities of the organization and thus the 
supporting information systems. Advancement came with the renewal projects where a 
multitude of legacy systems and equipment was replaced in airports and headquarters 
 
                                                 
138  An information security department was not established at Delta until 2003. 
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campus offices. The airport and campus renewal projects replaced dumb terminals with 
new interactive systems, and provided gate-area information displays (GIDs) that allowed 
better communication with passengers. Integrating and undergirding all of this was a new 
infrastructure system that enabled communication among previously isolated systems, 
and which was designed to make future maintenance easy. These older systems could 
have been crash-prone technologies, similar to the ones in the Comair incident. In the 
inventory and desktop system project, the Delta teams had identified over 3,000 unique 
vendor software and hardware products. To standardize what had been a plethora of 
platforms and software systems enabled better management of application software.  
Business continuity planning 
Business Continuity Planning had been an integral part of the Year 2000 Program 
at Delta, which is a prominent feature of military culture. Mullin gave credit to the Y2K 
planning in enabling better preparedness for 9/11. This was what he said. 
At Delta, we had just started our weekly executive review of company events when the 
first aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center. Recognizing pretty quickly that this 
was almost certainly not an accident, we moved the already assembled executive group to 
Delta’s Operations Control Center,—a sort of Mission Control setting—where we 
watched the terrible events unfold across giant TV screens. 
Following the second crash and the FAA’s decision to ground all aircraft, we began a 
task unprecedented in the history of aviation. We used as our blueprint a plan we had 
formulated to serve as a failsafe in the event of any Y2K issues. According to that plan, 
each Delta aircraft was instructed, based on their position, to return to the point of origin, 
proceed to their destination, or find the nearest suitable airport and land immediately. 
Within an hour, all domestic flights were on the ground. Forty minutes later, passengers 
and crew had been accounted for. Landing our international fleet took longer—around 
three hours—since many flights were over the Atlantic Ocean when they received 
instructions (2001). 
Another positive result following 9/11 where business continuity planning was 
given credit is an incident with the Delta website. The delta.com website had been 
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receiving about 70,000 hits a day in 2001. The week of the attack, it saw 10 times that 
many queries each day. About 130,000 passengers viewed their flight itineraries online 
that week, compared with about 50,000 in a normal week. Because of its redundant 
systems in two Atlanta locations, the increased traffic created no problems.  
Release management and virtual testing facility 
Because of Y2K, Delta has an official “release management group,” which had not 
existed before. Prior to Y2K, Delta computer specialists had neither constructed nor 
worked with a testing environment. The testing environment that was created for Y2K 
improved significantly the development and maintenance methodology that ultimately 
contributed to better information security management. The virtual test facility allowed 
systems to be tested before returning them to a production environment. They installed a 
duplicate set of hardware to that of the production environment in order to test the 
systems. This MVS, C/S, & VM test environment was the first of its kind at Delta. By 
pretesting, they could determine if the Y2K bug had been cleaned and figure out where 
the software might fail. They could then provide a certified and tested copy of the 
upgraded software to its production environment.  
Asset management 
Data gathered during the inventory estimate will ultimately be used to populate a life-
cycle I/T Asset Management System for Delta Air Lines. The planned availability date for 
this system is June 1998, with the expectation that it will be fully populated by 
December, 1998 (Delta archive, “Year 2000 Hardware Assessment, Impact Analysis and 
Renovation Project Plan Version 1.0,” 1998, p.4). 
Managing the risks of IT systems involves decision-making on a regular basis 
regarding upgrading or replacing IT assets. Delta has a huge bandwidth network 
worldwide, which requires ongoing replacement of old switches, and other components 
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related to the operation of mainframes, servers, desktop units, and their voice and data 
networks. The company has assigned an annual capital budget of $200 million for 
renewal of this infrastructure. To analyze the relative costs and risks of components, 
Delta developed a framework that allows for maintenance while staying within this 
budget (Anthes, 2004). Delta Technology’s management developed a weighted score for 
each combination of business area and IT asset, based on five factors: technology age, 
business value at risk, platform supportability, platform complexity, and risk of failure. 
Each would be assigned one of three colored flags, depending on the IT asset in that 
business area offered a low, medium, or high risk to the airline. The results might show, 
for example, that the server infrastructure presented a medium risk for Airport Customer 
Service, a low risk for Operations, and a high risk for Business Support. Table 69 shows 
the risk matrix they have used.139 
Table 69: Risk assessment model 
 NETWORK SERVERS DEVICES 
AIRPORT CUSTOMER SERVICE    
OPERATIONS    
BUSINESS SUPPORT    
REVENUE    
Source: Anthes (2004). 
Plans for the future 
Future planning initiatives for Delta have included converting the Year 2000 
compliance database to an asset tracking type database (including quantities and 
location), and investigating means for expanding the types of data tracked through the 
 
                                                 
139 Adding the risk scores in the columns produces a scorecard like this, color-coded for high, 
medium, and low risk. 
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database (e.g., tracking which applications actually run on which servers) ( Delta archive, 
COTS state of the union.doc). 
And, the beat goes on …  
Delta Air Lines Inc. this week is launching a three-year project to replace its core IT 
backbone with a service-oriented architecture (SOA). Delta Technology Inc., the IT arm 
of the Atlanta-based airline, this week will begin the process of updating the Delta 
Nervous System, an IT backbone used to route messages among multiple systems. The 
DNS manages everything from tracking passenger check-ins and boarding to the 
SkyMiles frequent-flier program, the company said. The goal of the project — dubbed 
DNS 2.0 — is to replace proprietary Tuxedo middleware from BEA Systems Inc., which 
now runs DNS, with standards-based SOA technology … (Havenstein, 2006). 
Summary 
The Delta computing environment had changed dramatically because of the Year 
2000 Program. While system failures happened following the rollover, they were mostly 
non-critical systems. However, the consequences to information security were mixed. 
The web-based applications and standard operating systems in the desktop units created 
new vulnerabilities. The equipment and methodologies that were put in place to test and 
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CHAPTER 10      
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
[Delta] would never have achieved what we did without Y2K. And, 9/11 still has great 
impact. Delta was very involved at the time and it still strongly affects us. We instantly 
changed from a $16B to a $13B company. If it happens again, we can’t survive (Mullin, 
2004). 
It is also important to recognize that science is just one of many ways of understanding a 
world in which changes are increasingly a consequence of human beliefs and behavior. 
The capacity to respond to complex problems rests on an understanding of this changing 
context, without which scientific explanations and technical solutions are likely to be 
irrelevant no matter how precise (“Who We Are,” 2004). 
The flight operations system, invented from scratch from the space program, proved itself 
a model of how to make life-and-death decisions in seconds. The proof of the technical 
excellence of Apollo is its record (Murray & Cox, 2004a, p. vii).  
Some might say that a comparison of the rescue of the Apollo 13 flight with that 
of the Mission: Year 2000 Program is an apples and oranges comparison. The computer 
technologies involved in the two emergencies were light years apart. In the Apollo 
system, “all three stages of the [rocket] booster plus the command module and the lunar 
module—had less computing capacity combined than today’s typical cell phone” (Ibid). 
Further, Delta’s networked systems (many of them with unknown limitations) and 
operational environments, along with their interconnections in an institutionalized 
environment that was amassed over 70 years of operations, were vastly more complicated 
than the constituent agents and institutions of the Apollo 13—a relatively short-lived 
program. 
However, no matter how dissimilar the computer technologies, or how much 
more complex Delta’s situation when compared to Apollo 13, the broad risk management 
process was the same. A vulnerability in the critical infrastructure systems of each was 
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exposed to a threat that placed lives at risk; and, new controls were put in place to 
mitigate the risk under a crisis situation when time was running out. The management of 
the information security problem in each case was successful, and “proved itself a model 
of how to make life-and-death decisions.” 
The objectives of this final chapter are to summarize the results of the study of 
Delta, to consider study findings in light of relevant limitation, and to present further 
discussion related to theoretical implications and implications for information security 
practice. Recommendations for future investigations based on the findings of this study 
are included.  
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate how complex organizations deal 
with problems in computer-based systems that affect the security of the information that 
they store and transmit, and to understand how environment influences their solutions. To 
achieve this objective, the study examined the Y2K compliance process at Delta, a 
complex critical sector organization and one of the nation's oldest commercial air 
transportation organizations, in order to explain compliance decisions in light of 
environmental factors, and to relate these decisions to information security.  
Because of the size and complexity of the organization, and especially because of 
the nature of the expanding social environment that surrounded the management of 
Delta’s networked information systems, institutional theory was viewed as a useful 
heuristic framework for investigating the research question and conceptualizing the 
analysis of the data.140 A case study approach was employed to develop the evidence. 
 
                                                 
140 Because of IT networks, the social environment included more users, with a wider spectrum of 
competencies, which are interconnected to and interact with more complex computer-based systems than in 
the recent past. 
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The study examined both primary and secondary sources of evidence. Archival 
documents pertaining to the Year 2000 Program at Delta, along with previously 
published materials, were examined to determine the Y2K solution in each of four core 
business areas. Year 2000 Program members, organization administrators, and others 
related to the Delta environment were interviewed, both to validate the archival records 
and to gain understanding of institutional influences (as revealed in the records analysis 
and as perceived by the informants).  
Summary of findings 
Delta’s goal was “to simplify the technological infrastructure, improve efficiency 
and deliver state-of-the-art solutions for Delta’s business needs” (Delta Air Lines, 1997, 
p. 15). This was a clear indicator of the expectation of Delta’s management that the Year 
2000 Program would improve the company’s performance as a rational system. This 
dissertation affirms Delta’s success in meeting its goal. The following is a summary of 
key findings. 
First, with regard to theory, the research hypothesis stated that evidence would 
confirm a fit with an institutional model of performance; i.e., regulative, cultural, and / or 
mimetic mechanisms in Delta’s environment relating to the ideas of new institutionalism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) would constitute the principal pressures that shaped Y2K 
solutions. The expectation of a match between the Delta Year 2000 Program performance 
and an institutional model was partially supported.  
Institutional theory was supported in that business area solutions reflected 
evidence of incomplete rational evaluation and of mimesis. Specifically, at the outset a 
rational evaluation of consultants to lead the Year 2000 Program was curtailed by hiring 
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Feld, a consultant known to Grinstein through a previous working relationship. In 
addition, commercial software solutions were chosen based on what was available in the 
marketplace, not based on ideal solutions that might be achieved through customized 
design and coding. Therefore, rational choice was bounded, reflecting the ideas of Simon 
([1945] 1976) and his notion of “satisficing,” the ideas of North (1992a, 1992b) and his 
institutional economics model; and Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can 
model.  
Given the chaos of the existing Delta systems, the limitations in resources, and the 
rush to reconstruct and to modernize, the choice of SAP modules for Business Support, 
and especially in Operations, may be seen as “solutions looking for issues to which they 
might be the answer” (Ibid.). Available commercial solutions and “best practices” are by 
definition mimetic notions, since obviously others have previously conceived and applied 
these software solutions. However, each of these institutional mechanisms limits an ideal 
solution by virtue of the fact of its generalized development. 
A best practice holds aspects of both rational and institutional features. As a 
rational feature, an industry best practice is described as proven technology based on 
experiences in application that have shown to be effective in producing a desired 
outcome. As an institutional feature, a best practice is a fashionable management idea, 
often conceived by academics, promoted by management consultants, and adopted by 
organizational leadership. These application decisions are based on attempts either to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness, or to embrace the fad because they see it as 
validating their roles as leaders and innovators or as a means to career advancement.  
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Academic writings, practitioner press, consultants and many formalized methodologies 
view technological and organizational planning as the objective collection, evaluation, 
and application of data in a rational manner to direct the planning process. In application, 
however, planners are often motivated by individual interests, maintaining appearances, 
and demonstrating superiority in knowledge and influence. (Tillquist, 2002, p.40).  
“The best-run businesses use SAP” (Sign in the Atlanta Hartsfield airport, 2007).  
The use of COTS methodology for the solution process (BDM methodology), and 
the institutionalized thinking of the BDM consultants who assisted, is a similar mimetic 
action. This process obviously worked well enough, as evidence shows that the 
methodology and other outside influences brought rationality to the chaos. However, 
these sources may also have provided “blinders” to Delta’s wider environment and its 
threats to the security of information systems. 
Cultural effects associated with institutional theory were also evident in the 
processes—the program strategy, its adaptation, and its execution. The militaristic 
“command and control” style of the leadership was a direct result of military training and 
the flight operations culture, of work experiences as pilots or other military or airline 
positions.  
However, institutional theory was insufficient to explain all aspects of the results. 
Indeed, there was strong evidence that supported the rival hypothesis that a rational-
contingency model could explain solution choices. Pervasive throughout the Year 2000 
Program were actions and communications that reflected a focus on goal orientation, 
reducing complexity, and increasing efficiency. A “best way” was configured at the 
outset based on a standard project methodology, and the organization adapted to 
contingencies along the way, principally confronting new learning about the problem and 
about the resources that were available to make the project function efficiently. The 
evidence in Delta’s business area performance showed significant improvements in 
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efficiency and related cost reduction. Thus, both the institutional model and the rational 
model together helped to explain the Y2K solutions, supporting a melding of the two 
models, which is consistent with ideas of prior works (e.g., Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Gupta, Dirsmith, and Fogerty, 1994). 
Second, in accord with an institutional model, independent coercive relationships 
were expected to exist between institutional environments and Delta’s business areas, 
wherein the rules and restrictive interconnections that applied within business area 
sectors would influence and constrain their decisions regarding changes to IT systems. 
Any potential for such an effect on a sub-system basis was minimized by the 
collaborative environment of the air transportation field, which exhibited a “collective 
rationality” reflecting the broader level of isomorphism. Specifically, cooperative 
arrangements existed among regulatory agencies, industry organizations, competitor 
airlines, airports, and various other groups that benefited Delta and all organizations that 
populate the air transportation field in executing the massive project. In this cooperative 
setting, a vast network of related organizations worked together to address the issues they 
shared with respect to Y2K. Recognition that all groups were key stakeholders 
undoubtedly made this cooperation both possible and effective.  
Further, rather than being forced to comply with restrictive regulations, Delta, 
given its long history and the high esteem in which it was held by other relevant 
constituency groups, was able to provide influential leadership during the process of 
addressing the interorganizational, national, and global issues. As a result, Delta may be 
viewed as having been sufficiently powerful to be influential in creating and instituting 
structural practices in its environment, and thus was able to garner affirmation of its 
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legitimacy in the process. Although clearly a question for another study, the case inspired 
curiosity as to the uniqueness of the airline industry compared to other sectors in this 
regard, i.e., if other leading enterprises might be the main forces for collective behavior in 
their respective fields. 
Third, in terms of the effect on security management, the result was as usual a 
tradeoff between increased functional efficiency on the one hand and increased security 
on the other. Tradeoffs will always be required among security, and functionality, and 
efficiency (Schneier, 2007).141 However, neither Delta nor the sub-organizations 
considered adequately the impacts of solutions on information security. The 
institutionalized conditions of legacy systems and silo operations may have limited the 
ability of the Delta veterans to conceive of information security threats. However, the 
cognitive restriction seemed deeper than that. The organization also seemed to lack overt 
connection to the concept of information security in the Year 2000 Program, even as 
Delta evidenced a strong collective institutionalization of the concept of safety, which is a 
related concept to that of security. 
In addition, market-driven incentives were not adequately supportive of 
information security, and this remains true today, although the situation is improving. 
The consultants and vendors working in the Delta environment were ill-equipped to 
consider information security in their processes. Historically, this aspect of software 
development and installation was not a part of the project methodology of consultants. 
Because of these inadequacies, business areas chose Y2K solutions that introduced 
security problems in order to capitalize on the opportunity for competitive advantages. In 
 
                                                 
141 As Schneier stated, “Security costs money, but it also costs in time, convenience, capabilities, 
liberties, and so on.” 
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eliminating the one vulnerability of the Y2K bug, a different set of vulnerabilities was 
introduced that related to the open environment facilitated by Internet protocols. Further, 
the standards in hardware and software that afforded efficient maintenance also provided 
the opportunity to exploit security flaws.  
Lastly, and most importantly, examination of the Year 2000 Program revealed the 
existence of significant strategic leadership, which can be associated strongly with best 
practices in the methodology of IT development and project management, as well as the 
quality of leadership often found in military culture. The evidence for this strategic 
leadership was unmistakable. Competence in leadership and in information technology, 
as well as effectiveness in strategizing, understanding assets, and motivating others all 
worked together with remarkable effectiveness to achieve the goals of the project. An 
interesting question that will remain unanswered is as follows: could the quality of 
leadership that was vital to the success of the Year 2000 Program at Delta have 
developed from within Delta’s own ranks?  
Limitations 
It is not the fact that the old theory is strongly disconfirmed that makes a single case 
study so important; rather, it is its provision of new causal mechanisms in empirical 
accounts that fit the data at least once (McKoewn, 1998, p. 12). 
The findings from this investigation must be considered in light of study 
limitations related to methodology and design. Its first weakness related to the choice of 
design. This investigation was a contemporary study of situated action, therefore 
suggested a case study strategy. However, many critiques assert that case study designs 
have numerous flaws, most notably with regard to problems with both internal and 
external validity (Collier, 1998). With regard to internal validity, the subjective nature of 
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case study designs has drawn criticism, especially with regard to data collection. In this 
case, the author was the sole researcher, who was responsible for both defining the key 
constructs and finding evidence related to those constructs among the data. The 
researcher brings inherent bias to observation, but must attempt to maintain detachment 
and objectivity as much as possible. In addition, among the variables were concepts that 
were difficult to measure. The Y2K solutions in embedded cases included changes to 
computer code, but may have included changes in attitude or understanding, aspects that 
are difficult to observe and to measure, and required interpretation while reading reports 
and interviewing people. In addition, there are numerous other opportunities for 
introducing ambiguity, for example through the statements of informants, whose memory 
or attitudes may affect their descriptions of what happened. 
In terms of difficulties with external validity, researchers question the 
generalizability of the results of a case study analysis. Although there are always 
potential problems with the case study method, a strength of this method is its capacity to 
deal with complex variables, such as the influence of “institutional context,” where 
quantitative measurement is difficult. The method is also an advantage when studying a 
subject such as the security of IT systems, where the same outcome (e.g., Y2K success) 
can be achieved though different paths “in which there may be no single non-trivial 
necessary or sufficient condition” (Bennett & George, 1998).  
While the concerns with a case study design could not have been completely 
eliminated (Yin, 1994), a number of steps were taken to maximize the validity and 
reliability of the results. The internal validity was strengthened by establishing equivalent 
cross-case features and measures. Concerns about the internal validity of the project were 
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minimized further by the use of the comparative method, in which four business areas of 
the organization were compared on a number of key constructs. In addition, the 
constructs were carefully structured and carefully used in the analyses. Further, the 
attention to alternative explanations for identified causal relationships was another 
attempt to bolster the internal validity of the design (Huitt, 1999). Multiple individuals 
were interviewed within each of these business areas, and conclusions therefore were 
drawn about the nature of events based on all of their information considered together. 
The external validity of the investigation was enhanced by the attention paid to utilizing 
theory to explain the findings and conclusions, as doing so allows for greater 
transferability of the meaning of the results to other contexts. It has been purported that 
theory is the vehicle for generalizing a case study’s results (Yin, 2003). Generalizability 
is also enhanced by the consideration for rival hypotheses. The analysis was 
accomplished via the use of two competing causal models, which were designed to 
understand the relative importance of factors such as condition of systems, and 
institutional factors as influences on business area Y2K solutions. 
Further, the study design was operationalized in a fashion that would allow it to 
be reproduced in other organizations over time. The target case provided sufficient 
material that could permit reproduction, in that each sub-unit case contained the detailed 
history of one specific business area’s program contribution. The fact that the sub-unit 
cases encompassed the entire organization and its core functions means that it is likely 
that the findings could be comparable to those gleaned from other large organizations and 
their systems in general; thus the results have the potential to be generalized to a large 
extent.  
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Another aspect of the design that is associated with multiple challenges relates to 
the use of a qualitative, rather than quantitative, approach to data collection and analysis. 
Measurement is a distinctly separate stage in quantitative research, whereas in qualitative 
research measurement issues are integrated into the data collection process (Neuman, 
2000).  
A second major limitation of the study related to the time gap between the Year 
2000 Program and the conduct of the interviews. Because of the time delay, many people 
were gone from the company, and were not available for interview. Of those that were 
available and willing to contribute, some had memories that were less clear. Recall bias is 
one of the common challenges with retrospective reporting.  
A third potential weakness had to do with the reluctance of some of the 
informants to disclose fully the processes and activities associated with the Year 2000 
Program.  
Implications for theory 
This dissertation has presented a cross-disciplinary empirical study, bridging 
traditional information security disciplines with organizational analysis. Given the 
increasing importance of IT to the reliable functioning of organizations, and particularly 
those with critical infrastructure responsibilities, organizational analysis is an important 
part of the effective management of organizational risk. This dissertation has revealed the 
importance of consideration for institutions in understanding organizational actions 
related to information security management.  
While the focus of the argument was on consequences of system changes for 
information security, another contribution to theory falls under the area of organization 
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studies. The argument included an expectation of institutional model compatibility, but as 
stated earlier, this expectation was supported partially. The results give rise to the notion 
that organizations, within their social contexts, are quite rational in their choices. This 
blur between the goal oriented actions and those that reflect institutional influences 
creates problems for prediction using one model or the other exclusively in describing a 
complex organization. An organizational analysis must consider the instrumental 
rationality of actions with consideration for institutional aspects.  
A comparison of business area actions underscores a remarkable consistency in 
the nature of social contexts—the institutionalized nature of both the core areas of the 
airline business and the institutionalization of external structures related to IT systems. 
The IT field has constrained choices both by the nature of hardware and software 
products commercially available at any point in time, and by the mindsets that have 
developed over the history of computing and consulting engagements. 
… application and use of technologies shape the perceptions and attitudes through the 
social processes of legitimation, institutionalization, and practice (Klein & Hirschheim, 
1989, quoted in Tillquist, 2002, p.41). 
Technology is a tool for competitive advantage, particularly in the deregulated 
environment of air transportation. As the marketplace and competitors force reevaluation 
of solutions, these forces produce institutional choices (e.g., upgrades to remain 
competitive). The pace of technology changes means that incomplete information is 
continuously problematic. In order to evaluate options rationally (complete information), 
a “quiet time” for evaluation is required, but this has not been possible. The constraints of 
Y2K and competition, in addition to the pace of IT, did not allow the possibility for 
considering all alternatives at Delta. 
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The rational-institutional blur is demonstrated by the action of the U. S. 
government in creating the TSA and placing its agents in the midst of a well-oiled, highly 
institutionalized, and efficiency-focused organization such as Delta. In the short term, this 
action not only introduced inefficiencies, but also actually ran counter to the TSA mission 
of improving security by its lack of complete information about performing security-
related duties. However, this government action brought considerable awareness to the 
threats and created a conceptual / cognitive relationship between the customer and his / 
her responsibility in the security process. That part was consistent with a rational-
contingency model, but an analysis based on cost / benefit, or notions related to 
efficiency would not include it.  
Implications for policy and practice 
Nowhere is the age-old struggle between convenience and security more pronounced than 
in the battle to secure the nation's skies (Scalet, 2003).  
Information security issues have changed dramatically in recent years, but our 
societal perceptions and structures have not addressed this adequately. The attack on our 
country by terrorists in September 2001, and the subsequent investigation and analysis of 
evidence, revealed the inadequacy of our present defenses. Changed also are the issues 
specific to information security, both in perception and in fact. This research provided an 
examination of organizations within wider institutional environments to learn how such 
organization-environment systems shaped security solutions in the Delta organization.  
For Delta, a critical infrastructure organization with a long history of operation, 
the potential for Y2K malfunction had been especially threatening. Not only had the 
organization confronted computer-based systems with Y2K issues, the company had been 
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concerned with the state of these systems and with improving their functioning for 
several years. Some might say that the inability to envision the damage that could be 
done by not placing IT investment at a high priority was the height of incompetence. 
However, those years had been focused on cost-cutting, not on investing in infrastructure, 
and the technology too had been evolving.  
It did seem strange, however, for an organization so strongly focused on safety to 
have overlooked the potential for failure inherent in aging IT systems. A connection 
between safety and information security was clearly missing. Even Loy, first as head of 
the TSA from July 2002 then as the second-highest position in the Department of 
Homeland Security beginning in October 2003, did not articulate clearly the relationship 
between information technology and the safety of flight equipment and maintenance 
operations when he was asked about airline safety. 
In the old days it was a blur—9/11 clarified it. Safety is all about the equipment on board, 
the training of the pilots, the effectiveness of the flight attendants, whether the wing is 
going to fall off, if the rudder does what it's supposed to do. All those things remain the 
responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration. The security piece is focused on 
how transportation security fits inside Homeland Security, which fits inside national 
security (Scalet, 2003). 
Notwithstanding possible disconnects between safety and information security at 
Delta, the company invested heavily in its information technologies. Within a highly 
structured organization and process, changes were made across the enterprise that in 
retrospect could not have happened at a more propitious time. However, the decision to 
make these changes simultaneously with the process of eliminating the Y2K bug seemed 
suspect—complicating an already high-risk situation. The continuously changing IT 
environment suggests the need to assess organizational IT continuously, not waiting for a 
dire situation to force it. Only after the year 2000 rollover would Delta management 
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begin seriously to address the broader issue of information security, and then because of a 
subsequent dire situation. 
A comprehensive strategy for information security 
A disconnect exists between the institutional studies on information security and 
the apparent real world application. Delta’s approach in the Year 2000 Program was in 
keeping with contemporary arguments for a holistic organizational approach to 
information security. However, as this study revealed, a holistic concept and approach in 
a pure sense was not possible in a large, complex organization under the circumstances 
associated with a security problem. Within a company-wide strategy, information 
security actions were delegated via tasks in individual divisions with their associated 
cultures, a very reasonable and effective approach in such a crisis. A company-wide 
strategy for longer term management of information security would have to include a 
more lasting solution.  
Best practices in institutionalized environments often dictate how an organization 
applies information technology systems. Best practices are extremely helpful in the sense 
that they give rise to diffusion of effective and efficient techniques that have been tested 
in actual application. However, in the case of IT standards, best practices can only be as 
useful as the fit within the organization they are designed to serve.  
The purpose of any standard is to provide a kind of plumb line, and therefore that 
standard must be, “What is possible?” and “What is useful?” not, “what is somebody else 
doing?” (Hoag & Cooper, 2006). 
How are practitioners and policymakers constrained by best practices that bring 
about overly complex enterprise solutions in organizations, and by current sectoral 
regulatory arrangements? If effective controls are to be promoted in our organizational IT 
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systems, the institutions and the mechanisms by which they can be changed must be 
understood. A technology plan for an organization cannot be comprehensive and 
effective without considering the players in the technology professions outside the 
organizational boundaries. The institutional environment must accept responsibility for 
more and more of the structuring inside the organizations toward improving security.142 
It makes no sense therefore unless the … profession outside … can be supported in this 
task by a whole new development of the local authority services (Powell, 1961). 
The “Powell” who made this statement was concerned with the changes that were 
proposed to mental health organizations (facilities) in Great Britain. However, the idea is 
the same as the institutional changes needed to support air transportation organizations or 
any other entity that relies on information technologies as a critical part of its mission. 
Unless the supporting services of all kinds (governmental, industry, enterprise, and 
individual) are coordinated with the need for security and are supportive of this in their 
policies and practices, the mission will be a continuing failure. Because of issues of 
access, a security policy cannot be adequate unless there is understanding of the risks and 
the protection measures both inside and outside the organization boundaries.  
Networks make all users participants in the solution, just as the traveling public is 
part of the aircraft security solution. The community of users must be willing and able to 
accept progressively more responsibility for information security, which is now seen as 
strictly the “tech support” job. The endeavor must be sustained by a widespread public 
understanding and resolve. Without this, the planners may plan and the administrators 
 
                                                 
142  The daylight savings time change is a recent example of policymakers having no clue about the 
threats to IT systems with respect to date / time issues. Systems administrators felt that the impact was “far 
far greater than Y2K” (Babington, 2007). A Forrester Research analyst estimated the cost of making 
computer fixes to manage the daylight saving time shift at more than $350 million for the 7,000 U.S. public 
companies (Lohr, 2007). 
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may administer, but the culture will continue to operate as though someone else is 
responsible.  
How people envision the problem… 
Delta has designed a “solution that fits the problem” (Robb, quoted in Murray, 2002). 
Even though considerations regarding new, complex, IT systems often point 
toward improved organizational performance, many in executive management have been 
reluctant to get involved with the decisions. The realities that installing such systems 
often bring with them are daunting problems: design, development, project management, 
implementation and security challenges, and of course not least—the problem of cost. In 
the past, knowledge of the systems had been relegated to the “geek squad” in the 
organization and to vendors and consultants, none of which considered the effects of 
changes on the total organization.  
It has been said that how one envisions the problem dictates its solution (Dery, 
1984). However, over the years Delta executives had envisioned the activities of Delta 
Air Lines and the use of IT systems differently. Dave Garrett (CEO, 1978-1987), said to 
have “despised technology,” viewed Delta’s activities as supporting a personal 
relationship between the organization and its customers. Allen (CEO, 1987-1997) also 
found no value in the use of computer-based systems. One informant reported that Allen 
did not use a computer, and in fact did not have one in his office. Another employee who 
had spent close to 10 years in the organization under Allen’s leadership said that Allen 
felt it was better to use pencil and paper. He quoted Allen as saying, “[Computers] will 
slow down our work, and we have to get rid of them.”  
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The unsatisfactory IT conditions that existed in the business areas at the start of 
the Year 2000 Program undoubtedly stemmed from the preferences of Delta’s prior 
decision-makers. These executives and managers had not envisioned the extent of the 
possibilities for IT systems to improve safety and customer service, and ultimately for 
financial benefit. This must have made it difficult for the employees that reported to them 
to bring forth a business case for heavy investment in IT systems. One could speculate 
that the development of TransQuest was a way to remove the IT activities from within 
the core business areas not as a strategic economic move, but as a way to remove them 
from immediate view of the CEO.  
Mullin, in contrast to Garrett and Allen, viewed the business as a “mass market 
business, driven by price.”  
Real-time information is key to all of Delta’s operations. The challenge is to get 
information from the source to the customer (Mullin, 2004).  
Mullin’s mass market ideas focused on the power of networked information 
technologies. Mullin was an agent for change. He led the extensive restructuring of the 
airline's operations, including its fleet and customer service operations. Of course, the 
implementation of the customer service restructuring came about via the Y2K 
transformation. Recall that one of Mullin’s first acts after taking over leadership of the 
airline in 1997 was to hire Feld, and to assign him responsibility for the IT overhaul and 
creation of the Delta Nervous System. 
Robb, CIO following Feld, referred to Delta as having a very complex business 
model.  
You can see the business context by looking at the technology. I have never seen a model 
this complex. Delta Technology’s biggest job is integration of functional “silos,” or 
“stovepipes.” … There is a direct correlation with a business model in weaving 
technology (Robb, 2004).  
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Further, Robb envisioned Delta as a “unique real-time manufacturing operation,” 
explaining that  
the product is delivered at take-off every 40 seconds. Other than FedEx, Delta is the only 
transportation company to apply a manufacturing business model. 
“To get that plane off there is a whole assembly process of not just getting the passengers 
and their bags to the right place, but the crews there, the right aircraft there, the meals, the 
fuel,” says Robb. Delta serves 415,000 meals daily, uses 7.5 million gallons of aviation 
fuel, boards 109,000 bottles of water, brews 2,500lbs of coffee. The list goes on. These 
elements of the business all have to come together at the right place and on time on 
several thousand occasions every day (quoted in Murray, 2002). 
“What's unique about our process is that the customer really is right there in the middle of 
that manufacturing process,” says Robb. “When it doesn't go well, it's really very visible. 
When it goes well, they probably just don't appreciate the complexity.” 
In a true manufacturing environment, there is lots of instrumentation; Delta can’t do 
exactly this, but similarly has constructed a unique technology solution. With the new 
solution, Delta is able to “adapt.” In this manufacturing operation, the DNS operates like 
a trading floor. FAA provides flying “slots.” A hundred airports are “wired together.” 
ATPCO is the fare tracker. 
Not only must an organization envision its problems productively, but its 
decision-makers must develop a common model, a model that supports the security of its 
information and an understanding of its institutional environment.  
Capitalizing on institutionalized perceptions 
The Delta case transcends its sector as a model for aligning IT to business 
strategy. Also, in revealing the value in “systems housecleaning” and in developing 
infrastructure systems that can “put information in the hands of those who need it.” Such 
language that can serve to communicate this can be heard by all. In the case of 
information security and its connection to all who use computers, it may be more 
valuable to communicate using sector-specific language—in Delta’s case, the language of 
aircraft and airspace safety. 
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Perceptions of and attitudes about tasks, technology, and change are seen to be shaped by 
social influences and shaped by cues from one’s social context … (Pfeffer &Salancik, 
1978, quoted in Tillquist, 2002, p.41). 
Safety continues to be the foundation of everything we do; it is our single most important 
obligation to customers and employees (Grinstein, quoted in Delta Air Lines, 2004).  
[Airline] safety depends not only on new technology but also on the century-old concern 
of labor relations. Efficiency in the air has a lot to do with security provisions on the 
ground. … None of us is flying solo (Garvey, 2002).143 
The bottom line is to know your industry, your business and its processes and systems, 
says Walter Taylor, vice president of airline operations systems and year 2000 at Delta 
Air Lines. Establish a set of “guiding principles” such as “Safety will remain a priority” 
or “We won't inconvenience a customer,” he says (Saia, 1999). 
The mechanisms that support safety, institutionalized in the air transportation 
sector, offer significant benefits toward Delta’s attention to traditional safety issues (thus 
public benefits in that regard), but its information security may be downgraded by them if 
not overtly connected. One idea is to expand the notion of safety to include an 
understanding of information security, which may gain the assistance of all users in 
managing the problem. Nowak (2004) talked about the culture at Delta and the lack of 
interest on the part of the typical user in addressing information security issues—the 
difficulty in changing the culture to recognize the importance of information security and 
the employee’s contribution to it. Weill (“MIT's Weill on Leveraging Infrastructure,” 
2003) spoke about communicating infrastructure in business terms; Robb (2004) 
mentioned his success in communicating about information technology requirements in 
business terms. He presented a business case for maintaining his Delta Technology IT 
budget by using terms that were familiar to the Delta executives (Curley, 2004). If 
communication at Delta regarding information security were positioned in terms that 
 
                                                 
143  Jane Garvey was the head of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) during the Y2K event. 
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resonated with the notion of safety, maybe the notion and the cultural change could 
happen more naturally. 
Rethinking the regulatory model 
As with safety issues, success for all carriers is paramount. One failure impugns the entire 
industry (Delta archive, “Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book,” 1999, p. 26). 
Obviously, the airlines have already developed an institutional framework that 
can be employed to support information security. This was evident in the sector rally 
around addressing the Y2K problem. How can other regulative environments take 
advantage of this? 
To do anything substantive toward reducing vulnerabilities associated with 
information systems may take a complete rethinking of the regulatory models. A terrorist 
threat has a singular focus. In contrast, companies like Delta encompass a great amount 
of complexity, therefore, numbers of challenges in combating such threats to systems. 
Compromise is required in the strength of government regulation because of the plurality 
of values represented in systems operations, and understandings of the threats. The model 
provided by Delta shows industry level focus, where contributors understand both the 
goals and the technical aspects of the operational space. If continued at the government 
level, inefficiencies are introduced—policy makers cannot possibly stay abreast of the 
challenges in a timely fashion. Are the kinds of information security policies being 
deliberated presently consistent with the model demonstrated by airline industry 
cooperation, or do we need to rethink this problem? Homeland security is working top 
down, and they cannot know if what they are imposing will work until after it is 
implemented.  
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One can understand a lot about a person or an organization or a society by 
observing its budgets and expenditures. One may achieve a similar understanding about 
people and organizations and societies by observing the state of their IT systems. In an 
organization, if IT systems are streamlined, efficient, and adequately secured, the 
organization will function that way also. If IT systems provide adequate information 
security, organizational assets and operations have the best chance for survival. 
Observing the state of the Delta IT systems in 1997 revealed an organization that was in a 
mess. The housecleaning and modernization that was achieved through the Year 2000 
Program has most likely enabled efficiencies that will not and maybe cannot be 
measured, but are inherent in almost everything that happens at Delta and with its 
customer / supplier interactions. 
Suggestions for future research 
An institutional perspective supports a broader and longer view of organizational and 
social change. It encourages us not to restrict our attention to the legal or regulatory 
aspects of environmental controls, but to consider also the changing normative systems 
and cultural-cognitive frames. It also reminds us to be reflexive and put ourselves in the 
picture (Scott, 2000). 
Computers-based networks are pervasive in our society. However, changes to the 
institutionalized attitudes about them have not kept pace with the evolution in 
technologies. Users remain passive consumers, and expect “tech support” to handle all 
issues. To increase the security of these systems, it is critical that we transform human 
attitudes and understanding in order to engage users in the active process of enabling 
information security and creating new solutions. Just as professional associations, the 
insurance field, privacy regulations, and business models have influenced medical 
practice, the vast numbers of organizations related to the information technology field 
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have influenced the practice and strategy for information security. More work needs to be 
done to engage with these issues in institutionalized environments. 
This investigation can be replicated in other organizations. This dissertation 
provides a model for comparing similar processes in other comparably sized 
organizations. Thus, future studies can not only compare against experiences in other 
organizations, but against new security projects that can be carefully organized and 
controlled. For example, it could be important to contrast the Y2K response behavior of 
other organizations in the transportation sector that might be characterized as sharply 
different in terms of the organizations’ longevity, complexity, or other relevant attributes. 
As aviation matures, there are compelling reasons why we must move beyond a manually 
operated Air Traffic Control. Traffic density is already straining the limits of what a 
human-centered control system can accomplish. For the foreseeable future there will be a 
human involved when needed, but the routine separation chores can be handled more 
easily and more efficiently by technology … As we move from an old fashioned manual 
method of sequencing aircraft toward an automated system we must plan for a larger 
number of aircraft. (Philips, 2000). 
If Delta or another air transportation organization should choose to try to heighten 
awareness of information security as it connects with safety and survival, it would be 
interesting to understand how such awareness might affect solution choices in the future. 
It would also be interesting to compare the experiences in other organizations based on 
examination of military- vs. non-military-style leadership. Future analysis of individual 
perceptions might be beneficial for refining understanding, considering that these 
contrasting cultural conditions existed across the organization. 
However, these contexts also point out the cognitive contexts that have focused 
more on efficiency, and flight and workplace safety, than on information security, and in 
fact, the meaning of information security had no immediate association for organization 
members within the context of IT systems apart from the now common association with 
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network penetrations by “hackers.”144 Yet, the Y2K solution choices altered the 
requirements for information security management. 
Was this project a product of top management finally focusing on IT investment? 
If an information security issue (i.e., Y2K) elevated information technology to the 
forefront in this case and provided a catalyst for action to improve systems operation, can 
security policy be the driver again? A crisis environment has deep potential for 
advantageous positioning. In the case of external contingencies like Y2K, Robb believed 
that employees at Delta Technology worked better in an atmosphere of crisis. He 
expressed wonder about how a “crisis atmosphere” might be instilled in a “normal” 
project.  
New perspectives on information security are required to comprehend what has 
happened in the past in order to make decisions that enable better policies for the future. 
Toward this end, the recent emergence of new technological infrastructures has created a 
need for collaboration among fields that have developed independent of each other—
fields related to the technologies of information, and those related to their social contexts. 
One of the difficulties in accomplishing this has been the paucity of researchers who have 
knowledge in both areas, the technology area being a much faster-moving target than 





                                                 
144 The term “hacker” is a term that has become associated with malware, even though its original 
connotation is that of one who programs computers as a hobby rather than a profession. 
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APPENDIX A      
CASE STUDY PROTOCOLS AND IRB APPROVAL 
 
INSTITUTIONALIZED ENVIRONMENTS AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT: LEARNING FROM Y2K 
A Comparative Study in a Critical Sector Organization 
 
RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
The problem: information security management in organizations 
The societal problem 
 Organizations are paying dearly to manage the information security problem, 
which manifests itself in not only fiscal expense, but also in loss of 
productivity and often valuable information for the organization, and in loss of 
reputation and trust by customers and constituents. 
 The erosion of information systems security, which has been greatly 
facilitated by the networked environment, leaves our infrastructures 
vulnerable to compromise and therefore, compromises our national security. 
 This erosion imperils the health and vitality of enterprise, and deprives the 
global community of a sure route to empowerment. 
 The information security problem is amplified by the failure of organizations 
and the institutional environment to offer responses that can be seen as 
definitive and progressive. 
The research problem 
 Information security management is complex; it involves dealing with 
complex environments both inside and outside organization boundaries, and 
involves non-technical aspects as well as technical issues.  
 Research on technical components, i.e., hardware and software, dominates the 
literature. Ways of envisioning and understanding the problem need creative 
expansion in the attempt to lessen its serious consequences. 
 To manage the security of information and information systems effectively, an 
institutional infrastructure must be coordinated among organizational, social, 
and political rule systems.  
 This dissertation fills a gap in the information security literature by focusing 
on institutional environments of organizations. 
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The project: a comparative study of the management of a security incident 
“Institutionalized Environments and Information Security Management: Learning 
From Y2K” examines the process by which Delta Air Lines (Delta), a critical sector 
organization and one of the nation's oldest commercial air transportation organizations, 
dealt with the crisis of Y2K. The Y2K issue was this: many computer-based systems that 
relied on date calculations had been developed using two digits, rather than four, to 
specify the year. Because of the uncertainty regarding date calculations beyond 1999, no 
one knew whether systems would create erroneous results or fail completely without 
remediation or replacement of code that contained the “Y2K bug.”  
Y2K was a massive information security incident1 that required the largest 
concentrated effort ever undertaken by the airline. To manage the remediation project, 
Delta set up a project management group, which included, among others, a representative 
from each sub-unit of the Delta organization. Its strategic plan for eliminating the security 
vulnerabilities associated with Y2K included certain activities to be performed in phases, 
i.e., according to a predetermined timeline of events, by each of the sub-units. 
In 1997, Delta like many organizations was under pressure to deal with the Y2K 
bug. In that same year, Delta “launched a companywide Information Technology (IT) 
Transformation process,” with a stated goal “to simplify the technological infrastructure, 
improve efficiency and deliver state-of-the-art solutions for Delta’s business needs” 
(Delta Air Lines, 1997, p. 15). Between 1997 and 2000, Delta inventoried their IT 
systems, designed the new “transformed” systems, implemented changes (and decided on 
but deferred implementation of other changes) to its information systems, and to its 
organization structures and activities all while in the process of managing the 
organization’s Y2K problem. However, as one might expect in a complex organization, 
these changes were not uniform across the organization; instead, they represented a 
variety of actions across sub-units (i.e., organizational divisions). Across sub-units, some 
actions may have been similar, but also some were different. Drawing from Y2K 
 
                                                 
1  Like all system vulnerabilities, the complexity of systems environments rendered the Y2K bug 
difficult to eliminate. Preserving the integrity of information was the essential concern. However, the 
digital date coding scheme ultimately affected all of the features of secure systems (the confidentiality of 
information, its availability, and its integrity), and all system functions (its authentication scheme, its 
content, its accessibility, and its operations). Therefore, the integrity of the data affected the control and 
safety of critical infrastructure systems. 
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documentation, archival records, interviews, and a review of the literature, this study 
attempts to employ an institutional system model to explain what happened and why.  
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTION 
The objective of the study is to understand how institutionalized environments 
influence information security in large, complex organizations. The research question: 
how did Delta go about addressing and solving the Y2K problem, an IT problem that 
affected the security of its electronically stored and transmitted information; and how did 
contextual conditions influence the solution?  
The structure of the design is based on the knowledge that Delta’s sub-unit 
business areas arrived at different solutions for the same problem. To answer the 
question, two opposing organization theories are employed: institutional theory and 
rational-contingency theory. These two perspectives offer possibility for generalizing the 
theory to include other organizations. For example, if an institutional model fits the 
evidence, then this study will provide verification and replication in the context of the 
Delta setting the theory that an organization system performs based on other than 
efficiency (cost/benefit) criteria. In either case, the potential exists to demonstrate that 
institutional environments are important to information security management. 
Theoretical foundations 
Organization theories can explain relationships between forces in organization 
environments and observed actions of organizations, actions that can place the security of 
organizational systems at risk. Organizations are represented as “systems” where a 
conceptual boundary exists between activities that the organization controls and its 
external environment. Open system theories represent organization activities as extending 
into the environment outside organizational boundaries. Both technical and institutional 
aspects of the environment channel and constrain organizational performance. In the 
technical environment competition for resources and other contingencies potentially 
constrain efforts to maximize efficient or effective organizational performance. In the 
institutional environment organizations comply with rules and other institutional 
requirements in order to receive legitimacy and support, i.e., they compete for social 
fitness rather than economic efficiency. The institutional environment establishes social 
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norms and expectations of legitimate behavior, therefore, channels performance 
depending on restrictions imposed by laws2 and other social structures. Institutional 
environments form the context within which technical resources are made available and 
legitimate. With respect to these technical and institutional environments, two 
organization theories, institutional system theory and rational system theory, are in 
conflict. 
Institutional system theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992; Selznick, 
1948) claims that (1) institutional environments influence organizational structure and 
operation; and, (2) via regulations and other pressures in the common space of an 
organization sector, organizations tend to become similar because of their efforts to be 
competitive and to maintain legitimacy.  
The institutional system model portrays the Delta Y2K actions—and the 
development of the Delta Y2K plan—as a contextualized process shaped by institutional 
mechanisms, i.e., historical values, perceptions, and judgments, which in turn contributed 
to more explicit channeling provided by regulative mechanisms, technical resources, and 
other forces in the organization’s wider environment. According to this theory, a sub-unit 
may have acted to satisfy values such as a desire for more modern equipment, for more 
management control, or because the resources were available to do it. The actions may 
have far exceeded the goal of eliminating the Y2K bug, and further may have served no 
verifiable contribution to the efficiency or effectiveness of the sub-unit activities. Ideas of 
efficiency may have been secondary to the larger attempt to position Delta as a more 
competitive, and legitimate player in the fast moving air transportation environment. If 
that were the case, differences across sub-units would have had their origins in the 
histories of the departments, and, more specifically, in the histories of the fields—i.e., 
wider sub-unit environments—represented by the respective divisions. 
The rules and expectations associated with the wider environment represented by 
an organizational field 3 are manifestations of three broad institutional mechanisms:  
 
                                                 
2  A regulation may be assessed in terms of its ability to support an efficient outcome, e.g., tax 
incentives. However, from an institutional perspective a regulation is a product of a social system, values-
oriented and may actually inhibit efficient operation.  
3  An organizational field consists of communities of related organizations: organizations that 
produce similar services or products together with their suppliers, resource and product consumers, and 
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regulative, cultural, and mimetic4 (Scott, 2001, p. 52). These categories Scott (1987) 
expanded from three to seven, describing more specifically the assortment of mechanisms 
that he observed in empirical literature.  
Institutional mechanisms described as regulative: 
1. Imposition by environmental agents in institutional sectors or fields with 
coercive power. 
2. Authorization by superordinate unit, or authorizing agent. 
3. Inducement by environmental agents in institutional sectors or fields lacking 
coercive power. 
Institutional mechanisms described as cultural: 
4. Bypassing of organizational structures to establish control in organizations 
through belief systems. 
5. Imprinting of basic industry or sector characteristics at the time of their 
founding that tend to persist over time. 
Institutional mechanisms described as mimetic: 
6. Acquisition of structures and patterns by imitating the actions of other 
organizations. 
7. Incorporation of environmental complexity into organization structures.  
According to an institutional system perspective, institutional mechanisms shaped 
each sub-unit organization’s respective sectoral environment. Therefore, these 
mechanisms contributed to its particular approach for Y2K project strategy and 
implementation. 
Both rational and institutional system theories consider that organization structure 
and performance are vitally affected by environmental influences. However, for a 
rationalist, organizations adapt to environmental contingencies as they pursue a goal of 
efficient and effective operation. Rational system theory is a traditional approach to 
explaining the actions of a profit centered organization. Rationalists would argue that 
sub-units had freedom to choose their actions within the scope of their functional 
subsystems, and they did so based on economic principles.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulatory agencies. Some organization fields are often identified by industrial sector. 
4  Institutionalists claim that mimetic mechanisms are at work in situations whereby organizations 
are uncertain as to a course of action.  
 
   318
… [T]he rational-contingency model views organizational actions as the 
result of choices made among a set of goals in an environmental context of 
constraints and opportunities (Drazin & Van de Ven, cited in Hall, 1996, p. 
295). 
A rational system perspective on Delta’s Y2K actions would consider the Y2K 
compliance plan as a rationalized blueprint for achieving a predetermined goal. The 
scope of Y2K was precisely defined and organized. The division of labor and marching 
orders were decided. Each sub-unit contributed its part to implement the plan, improving 
the efficiency of operations in each case. A coordination mechanism provided integration 
of the parts. According to a rationalist perspective, the actions of the sub-units were a 
rational response to eliminate the uncertainty of Y2K, and their differences strictly related 
to the diverse activities that each sub-unit performed and the kinds of technical 
equipment required for supporting those activities. Any deviation from the goal was 
caused by technical environments and resource limitations. Evidence that the 
organization performed according to a rational system model would include factors such 
as:  
1. the quantity and structure of the sub-unit labor force based on predictability of 
tasks 
2. sub-unit focus on the singular goal of eliminating the complexity and 
uncertainty associated with the Y2K vulnerability 
3. clear and certain means to achieve the goal 
4. reporting/coordination mechanisms that enabled project integration and control  
5. sub-unit decision-making based on efficiency criteria. 
Hypotheses 
To test these propositions, this investigation considers competing hypotheses that 
reflect the institutional system and rational-contingency system perspectives, 
respectively: 
Hypothesis 1: the institutional system model: The diverse Y2K solutions of Delta 
business areas can be explained as institutional responses to 
contextual conditions, which are related to sector-based 
institutional mechanisms. 
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Hypothesis 1a: Business area solutions were institutional responses that 
reflected industry regulations. 
Hypothesis 1b: Business area solutions were institutional responses that 
reflected existing inter-organizational relationships. 
Hypothesis 1c: Business area solutions were institutional responses based 
on solutions of other organizations. 
Hypothesis 2: the rational-contingency system model: The diverse Y2K solutions 
of Delta business areas can be explained as rational responses to 
contextual conditions. 
Hypothesis 2a: Business area solutions were rational responses to 
technical system conditions. 
Hypothesis 2b: Business area solutions were rational responses based on 
cost/benefit evaluations and availability of resources. 
METHODS AND DATA 
Methods 
The research method is a retrospective, interpretive study of the environments of 
four sub-unit business areas as individual sub-cases. The unit of analysis is the 
organization. The study is a comparison of sub-unit Y2K actions and the possible factors 
that influenced those actions.  
The first step is to develop the context and content of Y2K response actions of the 
Delta sub-units. The next step is to present rational system and institutional system 
explanations for the actions. The final step is to compare the sub-unit cases to determine 
whether the same relative causes can explain the differences in solutions adopted for 
dealing with the same problem.  
The method of analytic comparison (Mill’s method of difference) 5 forms the 
basis for comparison, which systematically compares among the set of cases those that 
are similar with regard to outcome and causal factors with other sets that differ on 
outcomes and causal factors. The method enables finding cases that have the same causal 
factors and outcomes but lack a few key features, then through a process of elimination, 
locating factors common to all.  
 
                                                 
5  Neuman (2000) describes Mill’s logic. For further discussion, see Ragin (1987). 
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The investigative methodology includes comparison of the four business areas 
with respect to three variable constructs: Y2K solution, environmental context, and 
response assessment. 
The dependent variable, Y2K solution, is defined as changes to software systems 
in a functional business area of Delta over the period 1997-2003.  
An independent variable, environmental context, is defined as a set of conditions 
that existed in a business area-environment system and impinged upon the decision 
processes. 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS   
imposition   
authorization   
inducement   
bypassing   
imprinting   
acquisition influenced Y2K solution 
incorporation   
   
RATIONAL FACTORS   
Division of labor   
Goal orientation   
Certainty of means   
Coordination mechanisms   
Efficiency criteria   
 
Data collection 
A combination of data collection techniques will be employed in the study: (1) a 
search of Y2K documentation and archival records and, (2) interviews. As much as 
possible, sub-unit demographic data will be obtained from secondary sources. In order to 
confirm and elaborate on archival information, the investigation of Y2K documents will 
be followed by interviewing people associated with the project. It is expected that 
interviews will consist of at least 5 or 6 members of each of the target sub-units who were 
employees of Delta between 1997 and 2003. Participation will result in at most two 
interviews with each participant, a one hour interview, and possibly a short follow-on 
interview if clarification is needed. 
Interviews will probe certain themes in an unstructured way. The themes support 
the test for sets of rival factors: institutional factors (categories of institutional 
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mechanisms: regulatory, cultural, and mimetic), and rational factors (categories 
pertaining to economic decision-making). Interviews will assist in understanding the 
issues that each sub-unit organization faced during the study period and how each 
organization went about addressing them. The categories will serve only as prompts in 
asking questions during interviews, and will not form part of survey instruments. 
Confidentiality 
The statements of the interviewees must be carefully handled, not only to protect 
their rights as human subjects, but also to ensure their validity. In individual interviews, 
informants may not wish to share certain items of information, items that could 
imaginably threaten employability (e.g., relating to division performance with respect to 
information security, relating to cultural, or other divides in their division, etc.). It is 
therefore important to follow procedures to keep such personal information confidential 
in this study. The data that is collected from an individual will be kept private to the 
extent allowed by law. These records will be kept in locked files and only the PI and 
dissertation advisor will be allowed to look at them. Names and any other facts that might 
point to specific individuals will not appear when results of the study are presented or 
published. Although identities will remain confidential, informants will be provided the 
opportunity to review any verbatim quotes.  
A digital audio recording device will be employed in the interviews, if the 
informant is comfortable with that. Audio recording is not a requirement, but an aid to 
accuracy and to digital text conversion. If a recording device is used in the interview, 
audio files will be kept no longer than 1 year, and only the PI will have access to the files. 
They will be erased after the necessary information is collected from them. 
ANALYSIS PLAN AND CASE STUDY REPORTS 
To facilitate analysis, the documentation is first organized according to sub-unit, 
and then chronologically within each sub-unit to follow the phases of project 
development. Additionally, data is assembled that pertains to external organizations that 
played a role during the project. Results of case analysis will produce the following three 
tables:  
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Table 1: Y2K actions by sub-unit 
Y2K ACTIONS FINANCE FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 
Security practices    
Security policy    
Safeguards design    
Security clearances    
Employee 
monitoring    
Awareness program    
Risk analysis    
Security planning    
Disaster recovery 
planning    
 
Table 2: Manifestation of institutional factors by sub-unit 
FACTOR FINANCE FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 
Imposition    
Authorization    
Inducement    
Bypassing    
Imprinting     
Acquisition    
Incorporation    
 
Table 3: Manifestation of rational factors by sub-unit 
FACTOR FINANCE FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 
Sub-unit structure    
Goal orientation    
Certainty of means    
Coordination 
methods    
Efficiency criteria    
 
Case reports will be the multiple-case version of the classic single case (Yin, 
1994, p.134), where four divisions (sub-units) of Delta represent embedded cases. The 
dissertation will contain a chapter covering the cross-case analysis and results. 
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THE RESEARCH SITE 
Delta Air Lines is a large civil aviation organization with national and 
international operations. In 1997, some 8,600 Delta pilots were flying approximately 550 
aircraft over national and international routes, and its total employees numbered over 
63,000. In order to produce their finished product, which is safe and reliable 
transportation for people and freight, many parts of this complex organization must be 
working together: therefore, a system of reliable and timely information is vital to their 
business operation. The importance of safety and reliability of all commercial air 
transportation organizations has produced a number of agencies that provide regulatory 
oversight. From 1997 to 2003, the period during which the Delta Y2K actions were taken, 
a number of air transportation guidelines, professional certifications, and regulations 
existed that may have influenced the way divisions organized and developed its IT 
systems.  
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 Jet fuel 
 Aircraft 
 Aircraft parts 
 Food service 
Human Resources 
 Pay scale 
 Security clearances 
 Qualifications 
Personnel 
 Airport flight controllers 
 Pilots 
 Mechanics 
 Flight attendants 
 IT workers 
Computer-based systems (IT) 
Funding, financial operation 
Corporate compliance responsibilities 6 
 
Antitrust 
OSHA, Safety and health 
Federal Aviation Act 
Environmental 
Federal contract procurement policies 
Copyright and other intellectual property 
Political activity 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)  
IRS, foreign taxation 
Securities and corporate governance 
Embargoes and trade sanctions 
Immigration (including employment of aliens) 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other anti-bribery and 
anti-kickback laws 
Use or sale of drugs or alcohol while on duty 
Falsifying company records 
Compliance with other laws and regulations 
 
Delta is an appropriate target for this study because: 
 …the organization’s operations depend on the reliable functioning and 
trustworthiness of networked information systems. Scheduling (time, place, date) of 
operations is critical; therefore, Delta’s ability to comply with the directives of Y2K 
policy is related to its ability to continue to deliver service and to the ultimate 
survival of the organization. 
 …as a large, complex organization, Delta characterizes the differentiated 
environments within which security mechanisms must often be implemented. 
Further, the environment of the organization may be characterized as simultaneously 
technical and institutional. 
 …it is identified within a critical infrastructure sector.  
 …the organization has detailed documented evidence of the Y2K compliance process. 
 …the administration of the Y2K project was carried out in Atlanta; therefore, sources 
of information are convenient for the investigation. 
 …access to the organization has been provided for purposes of this work. 
In January 2004, early in the study design stage, access to the Delta organization 
was arranged by Leo Mullin, who served as Chairman and CEO of Delta during the years 
of the Y2K project. Mullin, who had resigned as CEO in December 2003, provided 
introduction to the employee who directed the project. Through this connection, 
extensive documentation of the Y2K project in the form of CDs and printed documents 
was made available.  
 
                                                 
6 See “Corporate compliance is everyone's responsibility,” 1997, p 10. 
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In 2006, this organization is a very difficult research site because of its bottom 
line—Delta reported a $2.6 billion net loss on $12 billion in revenue for the first nine 
months of 2005. In the attempt to reduce operating costs, layoffs and employee attrition 
have led to a workforce that has to shoulder more than its normal share of duties, 
therefore, has less discretionary time to spend with this Georgia Tech researcher. 
More recently, access has been facilitated through the office of Jerry Grinstein, 
CEO and former Delta board member.  
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Questions are organized according to the variables of interest to the case studies: 
informant history, Y2K solution, environmental context, and information security. 
 
BY INDIVIDUAL 
History with the company 
Technology orientation 
Concept of information security 
 
BY DELTA BUSINESS AREA 
Y2K solution 
Environmental context 
Business area attributes 
Sub-system environment 
 Cultural character 
  Military 
  Family 
  Technology orientation, concept of Y2K 
 Dominant fields 
 Regulative environment 
Y2K process - management & activities 
 
INDIVIDUAL 
*I1: How long have you been (or were you) employed by the company? Please tell me 
about your job. 
*I2: What was your position at Delta during the period (1997-2003)? Did you have a 
specific role in the Year 2000 Program? … in one of the Portfolio, or Renewal 
groups? 
The next questions relate to -- how the Y2K event became the focus at Delta, how the 
threat was understood. 
*I3: Can you tell the story leading up to addressing the Y2K event at Delta? 
When did you first become aware that Y2K was something Delta was going to have 
to deal with? How did the project start at Delta? 
What was the general perception of employees about Y2K? 
What did you understand the ultimate outcome to be? 
*I4: If Delta Technology employee …  
One of the pieces of information that I am curious about is the use of the term “IT 
Transformation.” I have assumed that referred to the new DNS architecture and the 
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renewal of systems, but now I read that “IT Transformation” also relates to an 
organizational restructuring at Delta Technology. Were you there when this 
restructuring took place? 
*I5: Do you have experience in other organizations? What about other Delta divisions? 
If yes: 
Probe different assignments in Delta. Which divisions? … terms of duty in those 
posts? …reported to whom? Can you describe the size of the departments? … any 
other characteristics? How were the departments structured? 
*I6: Did you routinely interact with employees in other divisions as a part of your job? 
What aspect of your job created the need for interaction? 
If so, 
what did you notice about attitudes toward computer use? Did most employees use a 




*Y1: What changes were made in computer systems in your business area beginning with 





Addressing authorization: professional accreditations and standards of performance 
*A1: Are professional certifications or educational backgrounds important to 
advancement in your business area? Are certifications required in certain instances? 
What organizations or agencies supply these authorizations? 
*A2: Do standards of performance exist in your business area that are based in 
compliance with laws or regulations? … outside contracts? … professional 
standards? 
*A3: Did organizations offering professional accreditations and standards of performance 
weigh into decisions regarding Y2K solutions? If so, how? 
Addressing imposition: compliance obligations 
*A4: What laws or government agencies regularly demand the attention of your business 
area? Is your business area subject to laws or regulations that differ from other 
business areas? If so, please describe the nature of the regulations. Were these same 
regulations in effect during Y2K? 
*A5: What makes your business area comply with rules? Is coercion involved? Is it the 
threat of fines or other enforcement mechanisms?  
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*A6: What is your attitude toward government rules and regulations? Do they serve a 
useful purpose in your opinion? What regulations cause particular hassle or stress? 
*A7: What other kinds of rules is Delta or your business area especially attentive to? 
*A8: How much does your business area rely on outside advice for expertise on 
regulations and/or compliance reporting? 
*A9: Do you think that regulations and rules affected the IT effort—either helped or 
hindered? (e.g., Specific requirements for Y2K compliance? Regulations in the air 
transportation sector? Other institutional factors?) 
Addressing inducement: affiliations 
*A10: What outside organizations does your business area interact with? What is the 
nature of the relationship(s)? e.g., suppliers, partner organizations, contractors. What 
relationships cause particular hassle or stress? … make your work easier? 
*A11: Were Y2K guidelines or mandates provided by other organizations? Did protocols 
(e.g., output formats) or other technical issues dictate solutions in some cases?  
*A12: Were there security issues with regulatory, partnership arrangements, rules, or 
other conditions during Y2K?  
*A13: What different types of organizational relationships have employees relied on for 
help with complex systems problems? (within the organization? external 
relationships, e.g., paid consultants, professional organizations, personal friends, 
listservs, etc?).  
CULTURAL MECHANISMS 
Addressing bypassing: routines and familiarity with systems and practices 
*B1: What kinds of activities are carried out in the business area(s) where you worked 
during Y2K? How would you describe these activities compared to other business 
areas at Delta (relatively stable, continuously changing, complex, critical, high or 
low pressure)? 
*B2: Is there an emphasis on standard ways of performing? Do you have freedom in the 
way you perform your duties? What about the business area as a whole? 
Addressing imprinting: how the business area has always done things 
*B3: When people are hired at Delta in your business area, how do they learn what they 
need to know in order to advance in the organization? (Examples?)  
*B4: In all organizations, there are groups or individuals that influence what gets done 
and how. What individuals or groups do you believe have the most power at Delta 
(outside the company officers)? What business area? What groups have the most 
power within your business area? Has this changed over the years? 
Addressing imprinting: historical precedence favoring particular solutions (includes 
aspects of culture and their effects on group dynamics) 
*B5: Tell me about the history of your business area within Delta.  
 
   329
*B6: Much has been written about the culture at Delta, calling the organization a family. 
Why do you think people identify it that way? How does this affect the way things 
get done? 
*B7: In your opinion, do cultural separations exist within the company, e.g., older vs. 
younger, employees with military vs. non-military backgrounds, technical vs. non-
technical, or racial divides? Are there business areas where a certain demographic 
predominates?  
*B8: Did you serve in the military? If so, does your military background influence how 
you think about your job or how you perform your duties? 
*B9: Are there other employees in your business area that have military experience? How 
many would you estimate? (As a percentage of the employees?)  
*B10: Please describe how employees in this business area have used computers or 
computer-based systems. Did you use a computer to perform your job during Y2K? 
What is your attitude about computer use? Has your computer use changed since 
Y2K?  
*B11: How did you usually bring up issues or problems with a computer system? Did a 
central computing group handle problems? Do you have tech support people in your 
business area? How much access do individuals have to Delta systems? Was it the 
same before Y2K? 
*B12: I'd like for you to think about the different types of systems problems that 
members of your business area have encountered that required expertise beyond the 
normal capabilities of the group. Were there existing organizational relationships that 
the group called on? How would you describe each of the relationships to your 
business area?  
*B13: Do you believe that the Y2K process was managed adequately? If you could, is 
there anything you would change about how your business area responded to the 
challenges of Y2K compliance? 
MIMETIC MECHANISMS 
Addressing acquisition: copying other organizations 
*C1: Did the practices or experiences of other organizations (e.g., competitors or 
professional associations) weigh into the decisions of your business area during 
Y2K?  
*C2: Did it seem to you that there was uncertainty concerning how to achieve Y2K 
compliance in your business area? Please describe. 
*C3: How much, if any, did your business area rely on outside expertise for 
recommending Y2K solutions? Were outside organizations involved in these 
actions? If so, how did they influence what was done? 
*C4: Did the popularity of software products in the marketplace matter in the decision 
process? Were any systems chosen because they were considered “best practices”? 
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Addressing environmental incorporation 
*C5: Are there groups or individuals in your business area that have responsibility to 
manage issues with outside entities or affiliations? How do they fit in the 
organization structure? 
*C6: What functions in your business area exist because of a process that is interactive 
across an external organization boundary? 
RATIONAL MECHANISMS 
Addressing organization: size of workforce, division of labor, coordination mechanisms 
*D1: Tell me a about your business area organization and the organization of the Desktop 
Systems Project team? (e.g., How many employees? How was it organized? Was 
there a clear chain of command? At the beginning of the Y2K project, how did the 
systems in your business area communicate and contribute to the rest of the 
enterprise?) 
*D2: How is your business area organized? Would you say that the structure represents a 
clear chain of command? Alternatively, is there a more informal way that things are 
done here? 
*D3: Describe the characteristics of your business area. How is it structured? How many 
employees? Particularly specialized functions compared to other business areas?  
Addressing goal orientation 
*D4: It seems to me that there were multiple goals for the Year 2000 Program, and the IT 
transformation project. What was the goal (or goals) of your business area? 
Addressing effectiveness of planning and strategy 
*D5: How much strategizing was done at the business area level? Did employees 
understand the function of the IT systems as well as the DT employees? 
*D6: Did the PMO, the CIO, or the IT Board dictate solutions at any point? If so, did this 
create a problem? 
*D7: Do you believe that the planning and strategy for the Year 2000 Program was 
sufficient? Was anything unexpected or unplanned that caused deviation from the 
Program master plan? 
Addressing operating efficiency 
*D8: After replacement systems were installed, did they bring the expected benefits? 
Were there unexpected consequences? 
*D9: Did the IT changes contribute to productivity or operating efficiency? If so, how? 
Were contributions to efficiency part of the original goal? Do you believe that 
changes contributed to productivity or did they add extra burdens in any way? 
Addressing decision criteria 
*D10: What do you think most Y2K teams worried the most about? … money, security, 
functionality, … something else? 
 
   331
*D11: Do you believe that choices of particular systems replacements were based purely 
on cost/benefit? What other considerations might have weighed into decisions? 
*D12: Hindsight being 20/20, would you like to have the freedom to go back and make a 
different decision on any aspect? 
*D13: Do you believe that business area decisions during Y2K were based on 
cost/benefit or some other criterion? I know that presentations were made concerning 
Y2K recommendations that required a cost/benefit analysis. Did this analysis 
actually influence the decisions that were made? 
*D14: Given the focus of your business area activities, do you think that your 
administrators made decisions differently from those of other business areas 
regarding Y2K compliance? 
Addressing technological and organization complexity 
*D15: What were the technological and/or organizational complexities that challenged 




Questions addressing the concept of information security, level of awareness of 
information security in the organization–understanding of specific threats and 
vulnerabilities, involvement of organizational leaders and members in security processes, 
and the contribution of organizational and technological complexity. 
Addressing information security understanding: the concept and awareness 
*E1: How do you define information security? Can you describe a digital signature? 
…What does encryption mean? 
*E2: How does security relate to safety? 
*E3: What was your understanding of the Year 2000 Program as related to information 
security? Do you remember a part of the Program that specifically addressed 
information security? Do you remember meetings where information security was 
discussed? How was information security being addressed? 
*E4: How do you feel about information systems security at Delta? During the Year 2000 
Program, was there an awareness of information security at Delta beyond just doing 
a job? What did you learn about security during Y2K?  
*E5: Does Delta have an information security policy? Do you have a clear understanding 
of what is and is not allowed? Have you received information security training? If so, 
how and when was the training administered? Is this different from the way your 
business area operated before Y2K? What jobs do the employees in the information 
security area of Delta (Delta Technology) perform? 
*E6: Has there ever been an instance of insider attacks or mistakes that compromised the 
security of Delta’s systems? What security routines are practiced here?  
Addressing information security strategies: understanding threats and vulnerabilities, 
leadership and security focus 
Addressing information security consequences: complexity 
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*E7: Did security issues change following installation of new systems? 
*E8: Is information security better now than before the Y2K event? If so, to what do you 
attribute the improvement? If not, what happened that caused the negative impact? 
*E9: If you could, is there anything you would change now about how decisions are 
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APPENDIX B      
DELTA CORPORATE ORGANIZATION 
 
Effective August 14, 1997, the Board of Directors (Board) elected Leo F. Mullin as the 
Company's President and Chief Executive Officer and a member of the Board. … The 
Board also elected Gerald Grinstein, a current member of the Board and former Chairman 
of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation and Western Air Lines, Inc., as Non-
Executive Chairman of the Board; Maurice W. Worth, a Delta veteran of 36 years, as 
Chief Operating Officer … (Delta Air Lines, 1997, p. 268).  
DELTA ORGANIZATION 
Non-executive Chairman of the Board, Gerald Grinstein 
Chief Executive Officer, Leo F. Mullin 
President, Leo F. Mullin 
Chief Operating Officer, Maurice W. Worth 
Exec VP - Operations, Harry C. Alger 
Exec VP - Marketing and Chief Marketing Officer, Robert W. Coggin 
Sr. VP - Personnel, Robert G. Adams 
Sr. VP - Sales and International, Vincent F. Caminiti 
Sr. VP - Cargo, W. E. Doll 
Sr. VP - Airport Customer Service, Vicki B. Escarra 
Sr. VP - General Counsel and Secretary, Robert S. Harkey 
Sr. VP - Corporate Planning and Information Technologies, Paul G. Matsen 
Sr. VP - In-Flight Service, Jenny R. Poole 
Sr. VP - Finance and Chief Financial Officer, Thomas J. Roeck, Jr. 
Sr. VP - Corporate Communications, Thomas J. Slocum 
Sr. VP - Technical Operations, Ray Valeika 
Sr. VP - Government Affairs, D. Scott Yohe 
VP - Corporate Safety and Compliance, Malcolm B. Armstrong 
VP - Delta Express, W. E. “Skip” Barnette 
VP - Public Affairs, Harold L. Bevis 
VP - Properties and Facilities, John W. Boatright 
VP - Consumer Marketing, Gayle M. Bock 
VP - Delta Staffing Services, Business Unit Development, W. Martin Braham 
VP - Flight Operations, Richard E. Colby 
Controller, Hiram A. Cox 
VP - Marketing Development, Mark A. P. Drusch 
VP - Atlantic/Pacific Business Unit, Stephan J. Egli 
VP - Maintenance: Aircraft, Michael S. Ellenburg 
VP - Personnel Relations, Terry M. Erskine 
VP - Reservation Sales and Distribution Planning, Lee A. Macenzak 
VP - Maintenance: Engine and Component, Harold G. McDonald 
VP - Personnel Benefits, Leon A. Piper 
VP - Financial Planning and Analysis, Edward H. West 
VP - Community Affairs, Michael M. Young 
 
Source: Delta Air Lines (1997). 1997 Annual Report. 
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Table 70: Committees of the Delta Board of Directors 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCE COMMITTEE 
Mary Johnston Evans, Chairman 
Edward H. Budd 
R. Eugene Cartledge 
Gerald Grinstein 
Jesse Hill, Jr. 
Leo F. Mullin 
Jesse Hill, Jr., Chairman 
Henry A. Biedenharn, III 
James L. Broadhead 
Mary Johnston Evans 
Peter D. Sutherland 
R. Eugene Cartledge, Chairman 
Edwin L. Artzt 
Edward H. Budd 
George D. Busbee 
Gerald Grinstein 
  
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION 
COMMITTEE 
BENEFIT FUNDS INVESTMENT 
COMMITTEE 
Gerald Grinstein, Chairman 
James L. Broadhead 
R. Eugene Cartledge 
Mary Johnston Evans 
Edward H. Budd, Chairman 
Edwin L. Artzt 
Henry A. Biedenharn, III 
Jesse Hill, Jr. 
Andrew J. Young 
Source: Delta Air Lines (1997). 1997 Annual Report. 
Leo F. Mullin 
Leo Mullin served Delta as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from 1997-2003. 
Mullin has been called an agent of change, and may be viewed as an institutional agent. 
He played a “fundamental role in creating and shaping the character and identity of 
[Delta]” (Scott & Christensen, 1995, p. 149) from August 1997 until December 2003, 
when he announced his intention to retire. Between 2001 and 2003, the chiefs of eight of 
the top nine airlines had been replaced (DiCarlo, 2004). A number of sources have 
pointed to Mullin’s role in enabling the creation of 40 different Internet-related programs 
and the radical improvements in how Delta related to customers, business partners, and 
employees (Corcoran, 2000).  
Gerald Grinstein 
Gerald Grinstein became CEO of Delta in January 2004 after Mullin stepped 
down. Previously, Grinstein had served as CEO of Western Airlines of Los Angeles, 
California. When Western merged with Delta in 1987, he was appointed to the Delta 
Board of Directors, a position he had held continuously after that. From 1985 to 1995, 
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Grinstein was CEO of Burlington Northern Railroad (BN). In this position, he led the 
organization through a merger with Santa Fe Railroad, forming the BNSF Railway. As 
CEO of Delta, Grinstein led the organization through a cost management process in the 
attempt to avoid bankruptcy. Delta ultimately filed for bankruptcy protection in 2005, in 
part because of unusually high fuel prices. 
 
 
Figure 7: Delta corporate leaders in 2004 
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APPENDIX C      
DELTA TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATION 
 
Table 71 shows the organization of Delta Technology during the Year 2000 
Program. Note that the VP – Air Operations Portfolio also served as the Director of the 
Year 2000 Program. 
Table 71: Delta Technology organization 
Chief Executive Officer, Charlie Feld – The Feld Group 
VP - Chief Financial Officer, David Pittman 
VP - Human Resources, Greg Tavohnen 
APPLICATION PORTFOLIOS TECHNOLOGY PORTFOLIO 
VP – Customer Portfolio (customer functions), 
Keith Halbert - The Feld Group 
 
Sr. VP – Technology Portfolio 
VP – Air Operations Portfolio (flight operations 
functions, pilots, flight attendants, 
mechanics), Director Year 2000 Program, 
Walter Taylor 
VP – Common Services, Wayne Hyde 
VP - Business Support Portfolio (internal audit, 
finance, legal, HR functions), David Pittman 
 
VP – Engineering, Paul Millard 
Desktop Strategy Project leader, Tim Mitchell 
VP - Revenue Portfolio (sales, marketing 
functions), Vince Accardo – The Feld Group 
 
VP – Systems Operations, Harry Richardson 
(beginning in 2000) 
 
Charlie Feld 
Feld served as interim CIO of Delta and CEO of Delta Technology from 1997 
through 1999. During that time, Feld was responsible for the development and operations 
of Delta Technology. While in this role, he was awarded the 1998 “CIO of the Year” 
award from the state of Georgia. Delta Technology received the 2000 Smithsonian Award 
for Technology Excellence for the CustomerCare system, which was developed and 
implemented under his leadership. After January 2000, Feld was involved with Internet 
related aspects of IT at Delta before leaving in 2001.  
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Previously, he was employed by Frito-Lay in 1981 as CIO with responsibility for 
implementing an integrated computer system that connected all departments into a 
common communications and data network. Feld began his association with Frito-Lay in 
1970 as systems engineer for IBM on the Frito-Lay account, playing a key role in 
developing the company's computer network over an 11-year period.  
Feld founded The Feld Group in 1992, where he built a team of IT consultants 
that helped to transform IT in a number of organizations, including Burlington Northern 
(BNI) where he met Grinstein, then CEO of BNI and a member of Delta’s Board of 
Directors. As CIO at BNI, Feld led the team managing the massive integration of the 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe railroad companies. He completed the work in 1997, 
after which he began the Delta assignment. 
After Feld left Delta Technology following the end of the Year 2000 Program, a 
succession of employees filled the role of CEO: 
o Bob DeRodes joined Delta in 1999 and resigned in 2002 to work for Home Depot.  
o Curtis Robb moved into the role in an acting position in February 2002, after Bob 
DeRodes left. Robb was made official CIO of the airline and CEO of the subsidiary 
in June 2002. He retired on April 1, 2005, and now works for Home Depot.  
o Brian Leinbach was named Sr. VP and CIO of Delta Airlines and president and 
CEO of Delta Technology in April 2005. He left late in 2005. 
o Shirley Bridges succeeded Leinbach. 
Walter Taylor 
Taylor served as VP – Air Operations Portfolio, and Director, Year 2000 Program 
in Delta Technology from 1997 - 2000. Immediately following the year 2000 rollover, 
Taylor was Tech Ops division’s CIO. He served as Managing Director of Maintenance, 
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Repair, and Operation Process and Technology for Tech Ops, then as Managing Director 
of Finance & Supply Chain Technology and Profit Improvement before his departure 
from Delta in 2004. In that capacity, he was responsible for the ERP implementation and 
management using SAP technology to provide Finance and Supply Chain capabilities and 
was responsible for a revenue enhancement program to begin the process of returning 
Delta to profitability.  
Taylor served for eight years in the U. S. Air Force where he was an officer and 
pilot. He is a veteran of Desert Storm. He joined Delta as a pilot, and then went to Total 
Systems (TSYS), the number two credit card processor, for two years as an IT project 
management consultant. Taylor then spent two years with EDS (where Feld is now 
employed) in natural gas & transportation before returning to Delta as a pilot and his 
assignment in Delta Technology leadership. Taylor worked for Delta for a total of 8 
years. 
Wayne Hyde 
Delta hired Wayne Hyde, a business intelligence expert, in 1998 to help assemble 
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APPENDIX D      
DELTA’S Y2K DEPENDENCIES 
 
IT APPLICATION SYSTEMS 
Customer Portfolio Business Support Portfolio 
Operations Portfolio Revenue Portfolio 
EQUIPMENT 
Aircraft 
Simulators & Flight Training Devices 
Tools & Diagnostic Equipment 
FACILITIES 








Fuel Suppliers Aircraft & Aircraft Parts 
Ground Handling Utility Providers 
Alliance Partners Connection Carriers 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 
FAA Customs 
DOT National Weather Service 
APHIS International Air Traffic Services 
INS  
INDUSTRY OWNED ORGANIZATIONS 
ATA Airlines Clearing House (ACH) 
IATA Airline Reporting Corporation (ARC) 
ATPCO Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) 
NAV Canada Air Cargo Inc. (ACI) 
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APPENDIX E      
DELTA Y2K PROGRAM OVERVIEW FACTS 
Millions of staff hours, dollars, digging and deliberation have gone into making Y2K a 
'non-event'. At DELTA and in the airline industry we feel confident that aviation will be 
as safe on January 1, 2000 as it is today. While it may not all run perfectly, we do not 
anticipate anything more than what would be experienced during a weather operation 
(Delta archive, “Delta Y2K Program Overview Facts,” 1999). 
The following information on the status of Y2K activities is taken directly from 
the Delta archive, “Delta Y2K Program Overview Facts,” 1999. 
Delta Y2K Business Program 
 Working closely with ATA, ATAC (ATA Canada), IATA 
 Program covers: internal airline assets, airports, suppliers (business and IT areas) 
- Internal airline equipment & assets: IT & Non-IT Equipment (SIMS, aircraft, 
diagnostic tools, office equipment) ECD June 30 
- Airports: DL metal, Connection carriers, alliances & code-share; ECD June 30 
- Suppliers: categorized by criticality - High, Medium, Low. Concentrating on 
Highs (the ones who really matter) 
 Methodology: Inventory, Assessment, Remediation, Testing, Implementation, 
Monitoring 
 $25M estimated spending for the business program 
 Focusing on Business Continuity Plans 
 Delta is a sponsor of:  
- Atlanta Year 2000 User Group 
- GA Utilities Forum 
- SBA (aid to/from Small Businesses)  
 Managing the Roll Over....Delta will 
- operate as normal 
- staff a Y2K Command Center 
- handle any anomalies 
- make Y2K a ‘non-event’ 
U.S. Air Transport Association 
 ATA/ATAC: joint program ... not a competitive issue, but a cooperative issue 
 Contracted Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) for airport site visits 
 All major airlines participating(107 carriers including Canadian carriers and RAA 
members) 
 $15 million budget 
 RAA/Connection carriers were included 
 Program focused on: 
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- Airports: airport workshops/seminars were held to assist airports with initiating 
Y2K programs. Details of this area of the Y2K program include obtaining a 
complete airport system inventory, statusing the systems based on criticality, and 
tracking Y2K readiness 
- Suppliers: this portion of the program focuses on the most critical suppliers that 
airlines share in common (fuel, communications, aircraft and aircraft parts, etc.) 
Face-to-face meetings were held initially with periodic follow-up. 
- Government Entities (NAVCANADA/FAA, APHIS, National Weather Service 
(NWS), Customs, Immigrations & Naturalizations) and Industry Owned 
organizations (SITA, AIRINC, ATPCO, etc.): focused on the readiness of 
government agencies and industry-owned organizations 
 Pushing airlines and airports to develop contingency plans 
 ATA would have a Y2K Command Center set up on 12/31/99 
 Working on an extensive communications plan 
International Air Transport Association 
 Working with regional and global organizations (ICAO, etc.) 
 Contracted PWC for airport and ATS site visits  
 Over 200 participating airlines  
 $19 million budget (plus asking for $6M more) 
 RAA/Connection carriers were included 
 Program focused on: 
- Airports: airport workshops/seminars were held to assist airports with initiating 
their Y2K programs. Held 26 Awareness Seminars, conducted site visits to 72 
airports and sent Y2K kits to over 2,500 airports. Details of this area of the Y2K 
program included obtaining a complete airport system inventory, statusing the 
systems based on criticality, and tracking Y2K readiness. Conducted monthly 
follow-up. 
- ATS/FIRs: visited over 100 sites. Monthly follow-up and some site re-visits 
- Suppliers:  Minimal focus as most suppliers were handled under ATA program 
- Government Entities:  somewhat engaged with ICAO. Customs was added to the 
program. 37 of 45 world customs organizations responded. 
 Urging airlines and airports to develop Contingency Plans. 
 Working on a public communications plan 
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 
 Program Director: Ray Long  
 Program Methodology: Inventory, Assessment, Remediation, Implementation, 
Testing 
 ECD June 30, 1999 - on target; if not slightly ahead 
 FAA reported that of 636 critical and non mission critical systems, 90% were 
compliant with 89% of the mission critical systems ready. They expect all mission 
critical systems to be ready by June 30, 1999. 
 End:End Testing - Denver - April 1999 
— dual system testing 
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— airline involvement - UAL 
— very successful - “blissfully boring” was the comment given; No problems 
occurred that were related to Y2K. Analysis of each software bit showed no 
deviation from the normal operation. 
— may do further end:end testing, but not necessary as all tests to date have been 
fine. Delta encouraged ATL Hartsfield to participate in testing with FAA (target 
timeframe is August) 
 FAA focused on OMB’s list of 50 systems and believed there would be no service 
interruption 
 As systems became compliant, code audits and configuration management assured 
their continued integrity. 
 Additional testing conducted in host computer systems, air traffic en route centers 
 Worked on a public communications plan 






- United Kingdom 
- Dominican Republic 
• FAA not expected to provide meaningful evaluation of information received on the 
readiness of other nation-states. The U.S. Department of State was involved there. 
There was a reluctance to cite a non-U.S. service provider as non-compliant or to say 
we should not operate to or over a particular state. This was somewhat contradictory 
to the security cautions regarding certain airports, e.g., Port-a-Prince & Zaire.  
• FAA developed contingency plans and requested airline involvement in such areas as 
ATC, capacity/flow control.  
• FAA inspectors made site visits to airlines 
 
NOTE: While FAA has not had access to the detailed information obtained in the ATA 
database, FAA has worked openly and willingly with ATA and member airlines and built 
a close working relationship for dealing with Y2K  
Aircraft manufacturers 
 Boeing 
- no safety of flight issues 
- completed ground/flight demonstrations for Y2K readiness 
- successfully completed ground and flight demonstrations on all current 
production models. Absolutely no effects to the flight deck or operation of the 
aircraft occurred. 
- Boeing expects to complete its internal preparedness activities by July 1999. 
- War room established in SEA 
 Airbus 
- no safety of flight issues 
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 Aircraft Component Manufacturers - similar programs/testing, good results 
 Power plant manufacturer representatives from GE and Roll Royce concur with 
Boeing that there are no Y2K engine issues 
 
Delta Air Lines Year 2000 Report to Shareholders 
This section is taken directly from Delta’s Annual Report (1999, p. 29-31). 
YEAR 2000 
Our Company has completed all phases of our Year 2000 program for our aircraft fleet, 
onboard flight support systems, and onboard flight management systems. In addition, all 
Year 2000 phases for our ground-based, safety-related computer systems and equipment 
and all critical internal business systems are complete. We will continue to test selected 
systems and equipment through December 31, 1999 as part of our normal systems 
maintenance. We will also monitor these systems well into calendar year 2000 to confirm 
that our hardware and software are operating correctly.  
We are replacing customer service hardware that is currently installed at our airport 
facilities with upgraded, Year 2000 compliant hardware. We began this effort in 
September 1998 and expect to complete installation during the December 1999 quarter.  
We will continue to communicate with third parties during the December 1999 quarter to 
determine our exposure to the failure of the third parties to remediate their Year 2000 
issues, and to resolve any problems discovered to the extent practicable.  
Our Company estimates that the total cost of achieving Year 2000 readiness for our 
internal systems and equipment is approximately $110 million. We have recognized $97 
million as expense ($6 million of which was incurred in the September 1999 quarter) in 
our Consolidated Statements of Operations through September 30, 1999.  
This “Year 2000” section is a “Year 2000 Readiness Disclosure” within the meaning of 
the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act enacted in October 1998. This 
“Year 2000” section includes forward-looking statements as defined in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Our Company uses the words “believes”, 
“expects”, “estimates” and similar expressions to identify forward-looking statements. 
Forward-looking statements involve a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause 
the actual results to differ materially from the projected results. Factors that could cause 
these differences include, but are not limited to:  
- the ability to identify and remediate all date-sensitive lines of computer code or to 
replace embedded computer chips in affected systems or equipment;  
- the availability of qualified personnel and other information technology resources; and  
- the actions of governmental agencies or other third parties with respect to Year 2000 
problems.  
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CRITICAL INTERNAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS  
Our critical internal business systems and equipment include computer hardware, 
software and related equipment essential for the following functions:  
- customer reservations  
- ticketing  
- flight scheduling  
- seat inventory management  
- airport customer services  
- finance administration  
- internal voice and data communications  
- aircraft ground handling  
- baggage handling  
- facility management  
- security  
We have completed the identification and assessment phases for all of our critical internal 
business systems and equipment. Remediation is in process for one of our vendor-
supported baggage handling systems, and we expect to complete its remediation and 
testing by October 1999. We have completed the remediation and testing phases for all 
other critical internal business systems and equipment. We will continue selective testing 
of our critical internal business systems through December 31, 1999 as part of normal 
systems maintenance. We will monitor remediated and tested systems well into calendar 
year 2000 to confirm that our hardware and software operates correctly.  
We are replacing customer service hardware that is currently installed at our airport 
facilities with upgraded, Year 2000 compliant hardware. We began this effort in 
September 1998 and expect to complete installation during the December 1999 quarter.  
INTERFACES WITH THIRD PARTIES 
Our Company has communicated with, and continues to review, third parties that provide 
essential goods or services to our Company in order to:  
1. determine the extent to which we are vulnerable to the failure of these third parties to 
remediate their Year 2000 issues, and  
2. resolve any problems discovered to the extent practicable.  
These third parties include suppliers of infrastructure critical to the airline industry, such 
as air traffic control and related systems of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and 
international aviation authorities, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and local 
airport authorities. Other critical third parties include other airlines as well as suppliers of 
aircraft fuel, utilities, external computer reservations services and communication 
services. We are actively involved in airline industry Year 2000 review efforts led by the 
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Air Transport Association (ATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). This review has identified 
potential Year 2000 compliance issues at several international locations. Delta, along 
with other airlines and the ATA, ICAO and IATA, is continuing to assess these specific 
situations. We will make future flight schedule revisions if necessary to ensure safe 
operations.  
 
ESTIMATED YEAR 2000 COSTS  
Our Company estimates the total cost of achieving Year 2000 readiness for our internal 
systems and equipment is approximately $105 million to $120 million, of which $91 
million has been recognized as expense in the Consolidated Statements of Operations 
through June 30, 1999. The majority of the estimated Year 2000 compliance costs have 
been funded by reallocating existing resources rather than incurring incremental costs.  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
We revised our existing business interruption contingency plans to address internal and 
external issues specific to the Year 2000 problem. These plans are intended to enable us 
to continue to operate, to the extent that we can do so safely. Our contingency plans 
include performing processes manually, repairing or obtaining replacement systems, 
changing suppliers and reducing or suspending operations.  
We believe, however, that due to the widespread nature of potential Year 2000 issues, the 
contingency planning process is ongoing and will require further modifications as we 
receive information about the results of the Year 2000 programs of Delta and of third 
parties.  
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF YEAR 2000 PROBLEMS  
Management believes that completed and planned modifications and conversions of our 
Company's internal systems and equipment will allow us to be Year 2000 compliant in a 
timely manner. There can be no assurance, however, that our internal systems or 
equipment or those of the third parties on whom we rely will be Year 2000 compliant in a 
timely manner, or that our Company's or third parties' contingency plans will mitigate the 
effects of issues that arise. The failure of our systems or equipment or of an essential 
third party (whose failure we believe is the most reasonably likely worst-case scenario) 
could result in the reduction or suspension of our operations and could have a material 
adverse effect on our business or consolidated financial statements.  
OTHER MATTERS  
The section above entitled “Year 2000 Readiness” is a “Year 2000 Readiness Disclosure” 
within the meaning of the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act (Public 
Law 105-271) enacted in October 1998. 
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APPENDIX F      
TEMPLATE FOR STANDARDIZING DESKTOP UNITS 
 
COMPUTING MODEL ATTRIBUTES 
Identification 
 Portfolio ID (PORTFOLIO: Portfolio_Id) 
 Portfolio Name (PORTFOLIO: Portfolio_Nm) 
 Division (A25) 
 Computing Model Name (A25) 
 DAL -Owner (A25) 
 Delta Technology Owner (A25) 
 Renewal Owner (A15) 
 Priority 
 Y2k Impact 
 Number of Installations (n5) 
 Locations (A50) 
Delta Applications 
 Application Name (A25) 
 Application Description (A50) 
 Application Owner (A25) 
 Owner Phone (A8) 
 Compiler (Use SFTWR_TYP & SOFTWARE tables to list products identified as “Language”) 
 Database (Use SFTWR_TYP & SOFTWARE tables to list products identified as “DBMS”) 
Delta Technology Applications 
 Application ID (APPLICATION: NUMBER) 
 Application Name (APPLICATION: Sys_Nm) 
Work Group Products 
 COTS Product Name (Use SFTWR_TYP & SOFTWARE tables to list products identified as “Business 
Application”) 
Operating System 
 COTS Product Name (Use SFTWR_TYP & SOFTWARE tables to list products identified as “Computer 
Operating System”) 
Desktop Hardware 
 COTS Product Name 
Source: Delta archive, Computing Model.doc, 1998. 
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APPENDIX G      
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FOR STUDY VARIABLES 
 
Systems 
 Groups of related software at Delta 
Y2K solutions 
 Changes to systems in a business area over the period 1997-2003 
Business area 
 A collection of sub-unit divisions of Delta categorized by its relationship to one of 
the four core business functions: Business Support, Airport Customer Service, 
Operations, and Revenue 
Business area characteristics 
 Size – measured as number of employees and/or functional divisions 
 Activities – measured by roles and functional divisions 
 Number of system users - measured by number of desktop units 
 Organization complexity – measured by relative size, number of geographic 
locations, variety of activities and specialized occupations, number of systems 
(home grown and/or COTS, mission critical, number of interfaces) and system 
users, evidence of organization adaptation: the complexity of environments as 
reflected in the complexity of the business area. 
 Cultural character – measured by evidence of cultural concepts (Delta family, 
military or union, and perception of information security or safety) 
 Regulatory environment – government and industry affiliations 
 Time constraint – measured by observations related to history of systems and 
estimated completion date (ECD) for Y2K compliance 
Institutionalized environment 
 Evidence of structural systems that had become established over time in Delta’s 
environment, i.e., “federations, associations, customer-supplier relationships, 
competitive relationships, and a social-legal apparatus defining and controlling 
the nature and limits of relationships” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
Nature of the Y2K solution 
 Institutional model 
 An institutional model demonstrates a departure from rational process and 
/ or decision-making, and often demonstrates unanticipated results. Note 
that institutional model performance can provide strategic benefits. 
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Evidence of institutional process 
 Regulative: required for maintaining organizational legitimacy 
 Cultural:  
♦ Social fact: perceptions of information technology, information 
security, safety and other values 
♦ Familiarity (easy to keep doing what is familiar without evaluating) 
♦ History with a system (accustomed to using/maintaining) 
♦ Established relationship (Upgrade to latest model from known vendor. 
Quick fix for existing, and outdated system already in Delta production, 
effect of time constraint) 
Evidence of institutional decision-making 
 Mimetic (effect of complexity and time constraint) 
♦ Fashionable, bandwagon effect 
Strategic benefits7 
Likely to find computer professionals that are familiar with the 
product 
Likely to get support or interconnect with external users 
Readily available (quick to implement, vendors ready to 
accommodate) 
♦ Recommended by consultant 
Strategic benefits 
Product endorsement related to competence in specialized skills 
Opportunity for outside resources 
♦ Previously applied at sites outside organizational boundaries 
Strategic benefit 
Evidence that product has been installed 
Opportunity to get feedback from users 
♦ Added pizzazz that presented an up-to-date image 
Strategic benefit 
Customers attracted to look & feel of innovation 
Mechanism for differentiation from competition 
 
                                                 
7  Including strategic benefits under the headings of institutional mechanisms is designed to show the 
difficulty in completely isolating institutional factors. 
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 Rational-contingency model 
 A rational-contingency model demonstrates a (more or less) efficient 
and/or effective form of organization. Rational-contingency mechanisms 
are related to organization of labor, goal orientation, reducing complexity, 
increasing predictability and the resulting effects on efficiency of 
operation, including productivity, cost reductions, and revenue increases. 
Evidence of rational process 
 Goal orientation 
 Communications related to mission control 
Evidence of rational decision-making 
Decision criteria for Y2K solution (best solution) 
 Understanding of system criticality 
 Tests for Y2K compliance 
 Fit with functional activities 
 Reduces complexity 
 Improves predictability 
 Highest efficiency related to cost, processing, resources, etc. 
 A specialized, well-functioning in-house system (no immediate 
replacement option, inadequate current resources to re-write) 
 A secure system (reasonably up-to-date, well-documented, easily 
supported, produces output as designed, etc.)  
Information security 
 The state of a computer-based system whereby electronically stored and / or 
transmitted information is adequately protected. Adequate protection relates to 
assurance of the confidentiality, integrity, availability, accessibility (including 
appropriate mechanisms for authorization), and non-repudiation of information.  
Information security management 
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APPENDIX H       
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
RELATED TO Y2K SOLUTION IN DELTA BUSINESS AREAS 
 
Table 72: Environmental factors related to business area responses 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FACTORS: RELATED TO BUSINESS AREA RESPONSE TO THE Y2K  CONTINGENCY (i.e., Y2K Solution) 
Institutional model (Contingency: Y2K bug) 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PROCESS 
Cultural 
 Related to a social fact: perceptions of air 
transportation, information technology, 
information security, safety or other value 
 Cognitive, e.g., military culture 
 Familiar, comfortable, habitual, e.g., family 
culture 
 Related to established relationships, e.g., 
ALPA, vendors, consultants 
16. Organizational leadership: 
 Inaction, not taking Y2K or information security 
seriously 
o Lacking vision or understanding 
o e.g., Delta investing in OCC etc. when Y2K had 
not been investigated 
17. Condition of business area and its IT systems: 
 Systems working but without documentation 
 IT employees inadequately trained internally and 
hired for life 
 IT employees content with the status quo 
 Habit of avoiding outside consultants 
18. Character of business area environment: 
 Inadequate condition in industry organizations’ IT 
systems 
 Standards and regulations focused on a limited 
view of safety 
19. Distraction of other business area contingencies: 
 Financial status 
 Economic conditions 
 War efforts 
 Pilots’ activities 
 Low cost carriers 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulative 
 Requirements for maintaining organizational 
legitimacy 
 
Mimetic (Following the crowd) 
 Fashionable, popular 
 Recommended by consultant 
 Previously applied at sites outside 
organizational boundaries 
20. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 SEC & legislature were the only regulators that put 
any level of teeth into Y2K compliance, but it was 
minimalist. Even at the last, a loophole was created 
to relieve companies of liability. 
 Industry regulations were focused on safety of air 
transportation, but not linked to information 
security. 
10. Character of business area environment: 
 Chaos because of time limitation 
 Scarcity of personnel resources 
 Availability of IT products in the marketplace 
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Table 72 continued 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
FACTORS: RELATED TO BUSINESS AREA 
RESPONSE TO THE Y2K  CONTINGENCY (i.e., Y2K 
Solution) 
Rational-contingency model  
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO A 
RATIONAL PROCESS 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO A RATIONAL 
PROCESS IN IT MANAGEMENT 
Goal orientation 
Evidence of decreasing complexity, improving 
predictability 
Actions relating to efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Communications related to mission control 
11. Organizational leadership: 
 Acts in advance of crisis, investigate, inventory 
 IT Dept. alerts execs to needs for resources, etc. 
 Desires to make enterprise more competitive 
12. Condition of business area and its IT systems: 
 Process in place that assures continual 
assessment with respect to condition of systems 
and efficiency of performance; e.g., in processes 
of reengineering, have employees and/or 
consultants assist in maintaining systems 
inventory / assessment. 
 Process in place that considers the possibility for 
achieving greater efficiency 
13. Character of the business area environment: 
 Government and industry organizations stay 
current with safety and security of their own 
systems 
14. Responses to business area contingencies: 
 Management of budget, financial condition 
 Anticipating change in economic conditions, 
community & military needs, pilot demands 
 Competitive market changes 
CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
FACTORS RELATING TO RATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING IN RESPONSE TO Y2K 
Regulative 
Requirements for maintaining organizational 
effectiveness 
 
Decision-making criteria  
 Based on knowledge of systems 
o Y2K compliance 
o Fit with functional area 
o Efficiency related to cost, processing, 
resources, etc. 
o Systems & information security 
 
11. U.S. laws, industry regulations: 
 A bounding framework of rules wherein the 
condition of IT systems is recognized as vital to 
safety and national security 
12. Organizational leadership: 
 Knowledgeable about information technology 
and information security 
 Values the contribution of IT to the functioning 
of the organization 
 Employs personnel with high levels of skills 
 Applies incentive systems to maintaining 
employee skills and levels of professional 
certification 
 Adequately develops and maintains IT systems 
 Adequately responds to security contingencies 
9. Character of business area environment: 
 Personnel resources available 
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APPENDIX I      
DELTA YEAR 2000 ARCHIVE 
 
This dissertation is based on many hours of interviews, as well as thousands of 
pages of published and unpublished materials. The archive of the Delta Year 2000 
Program (Delta archive) was the principal source for unpublished materials. This section 
provides a reference list for these proprietary and confidential Delta Air Lines documents 
that were cited in the body of the dissertation. The Delta archive had no uniform format 
for documents; therefore, the documents are described by electronic file name, and/or 
according to identifying information that appeared on the documents themselves. Most of 
the documents were stored on CD-ROM, and were located in a directory named 
CMLibrary1. Those that were provided as hard copy (with no backup to electronic 
media) are noted in the reference entry. 
TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
Page 
xxiii.  Asset Compliance Management Plan. (1998, Feb. 28). ACMPLAN.doc.  
xxvii.  dt147. (hard copy only). 
xxix.  Y2K CM Delta Divisions.doc 
xxxi.  Delta Technology, Inc. Statement of Work: Version 3.1 (1998, Mar 13). Y2K 
Engineering SOW.doc. 
xxxv.  Workshop Presentation.ppt. 
xxxvii.  Definiti.doc 
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CHAPTER 1: HOUSTON, WE’VE HAD A PROBLEM 
Page 
10.  Mission Year 2000 Master Plan, Section 1.0 Executive Summary. (1998, Feb).  
CHAPTER 3: SETTING UP THE INVESTIGATION 
Page 
80.  Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book. (1999, Feb). 
CHAPTER 5: THE CASE OF DELTA AIR LINES: ITS CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Page 
125.  Year 2000 Program Briefing Book. (1999, May 21). 
132.  (1998). 061298.txt. 
CHAPTER 6: THE YEAR 2000 PROGRAM SUPPORTED DELTA’S FUTURE 
VISION 
Page 
134. Mission Year 2000 Master Plan, Section 1.0 Executive Summary. (1998, Feb). 
 Delta Air Lines IT Costs (McCullough letter). ITCosts.doc. 
 Taylor, W. (2000). Corporate Communications. Y2K-Normal.doc.  
139. Figure 3-3. Mapping Technical and Business Risks. (1997, Dec 31). 
SEC_Definitions.doc. 
140.  Delta’s Enterprise Year 2000 Management Overview Inventory Phase. (1997, Nov 
11). INVOV2_0.doc.  
141.  Res Conference.ppt. 
145. Year 2000 correspondence E-GDTS-1606-006.00. 
. EC Update0399.ppt. 
146. Workshop Presentation.ppt. 
 (1997, Dec). ASR_123197 Lang-LOC stats 12.97.doc. 
147. (1998, Apr). OPS Migration plan 04.98.ppt. 
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 (1999). ACT_ITMS.xls. 
152.  (1997, Dec). ASR_123197 Lang-LOC stats 12.97.doc. 
153. (1998, Apr). OPS Migration Plan 04.98.ppt. 
157.  (1998). Y2K Desktop Charter. 
158.  BA Review.doc. 
159. Y2K Desktop charter.doc 
161. Y2K-Normal.doc. 
 BODDec97.doc. 
 Y2K Program Overview Facts.doc. 
161. BODMar98.doc. 
163. ACT_ITMS.xls, 1999. 
164 EC Update0399.ppt. 
 BODDec97.doc. 
165. ACT_ITMS.xls, 1999 
 Year 2000 Program Briefing Book. (1999, May 21). 
CHAPTER 7: PROGRAM ROLLOUT TO DELTA’S SUB-UNIT BUSINESS AREAS 
Page 
177.  Metrics.xls. 
180. Assessment Summary Report of Dec 31, 1997. (1997, Dec 31).  
 (1999, Mar). Customer Summary Document.doc. 
183.  Defnote1.doc. 
193. dt43. (1998, Apr), hard copy only. 
203.  email. (2005). 
208. (1999). Act_Itms.xls. 
 Year 2000 Program Briefing Book. (1999, May 21).  
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209. (1999). Act_Itms.xls. 
234. Defnote1.doc 
CHAPTER 9: WHAT HAPPENED TO INFORMATION SECURITY? 
Page 
278. Taylor, W. (2000). Y2K-Normal.doc. 
282. Sec 1. 
288. Year 2000 Hardware Assessment, Impact Analysis and Renovation Project Plan 
Version 1.0. (1998). 
290. (1999, Apr 21). COTS state of the union.doc. 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Page  
309. Delta Year 2000 Program Briefing Book. (1999, May 21). Delta Year 2000 Program 
Briefing Book.doc. 
APPENDIX F: DELTA Y2K PROGRAM OVERVIEW FACTS 
Page 
346. Delta Y2K Program Overview Facts. (1999, May 6). Delta Y2K Program Overview 
Facts.doc. 
APPENDIX G: TEMPLATE FOR STANDARDIZING DESKTOP UNITS 
Page 
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